Ariz. Rev. Stat. » Title 12
Arizona Revised Statutes

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2506 (2026)

Joint and several liability abolished; exception; apportionment of degrees of fault; definitions

✓ current as of May 2026
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A. In an action for personal injury, property damage or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for damages is several only and is not joint, except as otherwise provided in this section. Each defendant is liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault, and a separate judgment shall be entered against the defendant for that amount. To determine the amount of judgment to be entered against each defendant, the trier of fact shall multiply the total amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff by the percentage of each defendant's fault, and that amount is the maximum recoverable against the defendant.

B. In assessing percentages of fault the trier of fact shall consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the alleged injury, death or damage to property, regardless of whether the person was, or could have been, named as a party to the suit. Negligence or fault of a nonparty may be considered if the plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with the nonparty or if the defending party gives notice before trial, in accordance with requirements established by court rule, that a nonparty was wholly or partially at fault. Assessments of percentages of fault for nonparties are used only as a vehicle for accurately determining the fault of the named parties. Assessment of fault against nonparties does not subject any nonparty to liability in this or any other action, and it may not be introduced as evidence of liability in any action.

C. The relative degree of fault of the claimant, and the relative degrees of fault of all defendants and nonparties, shall be determined and apportioned as a whole at one time by the trier of fact. If two or more claimants have independent claims, a separate determination and apportionment of the relative degrees of fault of the respective parties, and any nonparties at fault, shall be made with respect to each of the independent claims.

D. The liability of each defendant is several only and is not joint, except that a party is responsible for the fault of another person, or for payment of the proportionate share of another person, if any of the following applies:

1. Both the party and the other person were acting in concert.

2. The other person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.

3. The party’s liability for the fault of another person arises out of a duty created by the federal employers' liability act, 45 United States Code section 51.

E. If a defendant is found jointly and severally liable pursuant to subsection D, the defendant has the right to contribution pursuant to this chapter.  In an action arising out of a duty created by the federal employers' liability act (45 United States Code section 51), a person or entity, other than an employee of the defendant, whose negligence or fault caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injury or death shall contribute to the defendant pursuant to this chapter.  An action for contribution shall be adjudicated and determined by the same trier of fact that adjudicates and determines the action for the plaintiff's injury or death.  The trier of fact shall adjudicate and determine an action for contribution after the court enters a judgment for the plaintiff's injury or death.  On motion before the conclusion of the trial, the plaintiff is entitled to an award against the defendant for actual expenses the plaintiff incurred as a direct result of the defendant's claim for contribution.  The expenses shall include reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court.

F. For the purposes of this section:

1. "Acting in concert" means entering into a conscious agreement to pursue a common plan or design to commit an intentional tort and actively taking part in that intentional tort. Acting in concert does not apply to any person whose conduct was negligent in any of its degrees rather than intentional. A person's conduct that provides substantial assistance to one committing an intentional tort does not constitute acting in concert if the person has not consciously agreed with the other to commit the intentional tort.

2. "Fault" means an actionable breach of legal duty, act or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all of its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability and misuse, modification or abuse of a product.

 

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 178 cases (29 in the last 5 years), 1985–2026 · leading case: Mein Ex Rel. Mein v. Cook, 193 P.3d 790 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
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Mein Ex Rel. Mein v. Cook, 193 P.3d 790 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 61× “1 ¶ 6 In January 2006, the trial court decided that there was no evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude that Defendants committed an intentional tort, a necessary prerequisite under the “acting in concert” exception to A.R.S. § 12-2506. As a result, the court…”
Courtney Cramer v. Hon. Starr/ munguia/bejarano, 375 P.3d 69 (Ariz. 2016). · cites it 30× “She also asserts that Second Restatement § 457, on which the trial court relied, “could never trump that controlling Arizona statute and case law” and, in any event, has been superseded by Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 35 (Am.”
State Farm Ins. Companies v. Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., 172 P.3d 410 (Ariz. 2007). · cites it 38× “The 1987 amendment, codified at A.R.S. § 12-2506, establishes a system of comparative fault, making “each tortfeasor responsible for paying his or her percentage of fault and no more.”
Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1995). · cites it 33× “[6] As ATLA recognizes, this argument also implicates the constitutionality of UCATA's abolition of joint-and-several liability, accomplished by adoption of A.R.S. § 12-2506 in 1987. Under the common-law rule of joint-and-several liability, a plaintiff could recover all damages…”
Dietz v. Gen. Elec. Co., 821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991). · cites it 30× “Pursuant ’ to A.R.S. § 12-2506, Defendants named Magma as a nonparty at fault.”
State Farm Ins. Companies v. Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., 142 P.3d 1232 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 35× “The superior court denied State Farm’s motion, holding the comparative fault principles set forth in A.R.S. § 12-2506 apphed to strict products liability cases.”
Stand. Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 945 P.2d 317 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 20× “This argument raises four others: (1) Did PW waive the argument by untimely assertion in the trial court? (2) Is it proper to reduce PWs several liability by allocating fault to United when the fault ascribed to PW is precisely the failure to discover and report United’s fault?…”
Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 978 P.2d 119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 34× “The primary issues on appeal are whether this court correctly interpreted A.R.S. § 12-2506 in Zuern v. Ford Motor Co.”
Neil v. Kavena, 859 P.2d 203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 34× “In 1987, through the enactment of A.R.S. § 12-2506, 2 the legislature abolished joint and several liability in all situations except when both parties were acting in concert and in actions relating to hazardous wastes or substances or solid-waste disposal sites.”
Sanchez v. City of Tucson, 953 P.2d 168 (Ariz. 1998). · cites it 24× “See A.R.S. § 12-2506; see also Gemstar Ltd. v.”
Gibbs v. O'Malley Lumber Co., 868 P.2d 355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 62× “See A.R.S. § 12-2506 (Supp. 1992). That statute defines fault as "an actionable breach of legal duty, act or omission proximately causing or contributing *345 to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including .”
Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 10 P.3d 625 (Ariz. 2000). · cites it 18× “¶ 1 We granted review in this wrongful death case to decide whether our comparative fault statute, A.R.S. § 12-2506, preserves vicarious liability for an independent contractor’s negligence when the employer of that independent contractor has a non-dele-gable duty.”
Show all 178 citing cases →
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2506(0) — 5 cases
State Farm Ins. Companies v. Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., 142 P.3d 1232 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006). “The superior court denied State Farm’s motion, holding the comparative fault principles set forth in A.R.S. § 12-2506 apphed to strict products liability cases.”
Piner v. Superior Court in & for Cnty. of Maricopa, 962 P.2d 909 (Ariz. 1998).
Fisher v. Edgerton, 336 P.3d 167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
Zuern v. Ford Motor Co., 937 P.2d 676 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
Valler v. Lee, 949 P.2d 51 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2506(A) — 53 cases
Amanda Watts v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 365 P.3d 944 (Ariz. 2016).
Sanchez v. City of Tucson, 953 P.2d 168 (Ariz. 1998). “See A.R.S. § 12-2506; see also Gemstar Ltd. v.”
Stand. Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 945 P.2d 317 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). “This argument raises four others: (1) Did PW waive the argument by untimely assertion in the trial court? (2) Is it proper to reduce PWs several liability by allocating fault to United when the fault ascribed to PW is precisely the failure to discover and report United’s fault?…”
Piner v. Superior Court in & for Cnty. of Maricopa, 962 P.2d 909 (Ariz. 1998).
John Munic Enter., Inc. v. Laos, 326 P.3d 279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2506(B) — 66 cases
Courtney Cramer v. Hon. Starr/ munguia/bejarano, 375 P.3d 69 (Ariz. 2016). “She also asserts that Second Restatement § 457, on which the trial court relied, “could never trump that controlling Arizona statute and case law” and, in any event, has been superseded by Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 35 (Am.”
Scottsdale Ins. v. Cendejas, 205 P.3d 1128 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
Dietz v. Gen. Elec. Co., 821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991). “Pursuant ’ to A.R.S. § 12-2506, Defendants named Magma as a nonparty at fault.”
Sanchez v. City of Tucson, 953 P.2d 168 (Ariz. 1998). “See A.R.S. § 12-2506; see also Gemstar Ltd. v.”
Ocotillo West Jt. Venture v. Superior Court, 844 P.2d 653 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2506(C) — 15 cases
Stand. Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 945 P.2d 317 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). “This argument raises four others: (1) Did PW waive the argument by untimely assertion in the trial court? (2) Is it proper to reduce PWs several liability by allocating fault to United when the fault ascribed to PW is precisely the failure to discover and report United’s fault?…”
Courtney Cramer v. Hon. Starr/ munguia/bejarano, 375 P.3d 69 (Ariz. 2016). “She also asserts that Second Restatement § 457, on which the trial court relied, “could never trump that controlling Arizona statute and case law” and, in any event, has been superseded by Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 35 (Am.”
State Farm Ins. Companies v. Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., 142 P.3d 1232 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006). “The superior court denied State Farm’s motion, holding the comparative fault principles set forth in A.R.S. § 12-2506 apphed to strict products liability cases.”
Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 933 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
Wareing v. Falk, 897 P.2d 1381 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2506(D) — 31 cases
Sec. Title Agency, Inc. v. Pope, 200 P.3d 977 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 10 P.3d 625 (Ariz. 2000). “¶ 1 We granted review in this wrongful death case to decide whether our comparative fault statute, A.R.S. § 12-2506, preserves vicarious liability for an independent contractor’s negligence when the employer of that independent contractor has a non-dele-gable duty.”
State Farm Ins. Companies v. Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., 172 P.3d 410 (Ariz. 2007). “The 1987 amendment, codified at A.R.S. § 12-2506, establishes a system of comparative fault, making “each tortfeasor responsible for paying his or her percentage of fault and no more.”
State Farm Ins. Companies v. Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., 142 P.3d 1232 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006). “The superior court denied State Farm’s motion, holding the comparative fault principles set forth in A.R.S. § 12-2506 apphed to strict products liability cases.”
Courtney Cramer v. Hon. Starr/ munguia/bejarano, 375 P.3d 69 (Ariz. 2016). “She also asserts that Second Restatement § 457, on which the trial court relied, “could never trump that controlling Arizona statute and case law” and, in any event, has been superseded by Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 35 (Am.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2506(D)(1) — 9 cases
Mein Ex Rel. Mein v. Cook, 193 P.3d 790 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). “1 ¶ 6 In January 2006, the trial court decided that there was no evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude that Defendants committed an intentional tort, a necessary prerequisite under the “acting in concert” exception to A.R.S. § 12-2506. As a result, the court…”
Chappell v. Wenholz, 247 P.3d 192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
Herstam v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 919 P.2d 1381 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
Bishop v. Pecanic, 975 P.2d 114 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
Sanchez v. Tucson Orthopaedic Inst., P.C., 202 P.3d 502 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2506(D)(2) — 16 cases
Mein Ex Rel. Mein v. Cook, 193 P.3d 790 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). “1 ¶ 6 In January 2006, the trial court decided that there was no evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude that Defendants committed an intentional tort, a necessary prerequisite under the “acting in concert” exception to A.R.S. § 12-2506. As a result, the court…”
State Farm Ins. Companies v. Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., 172 P.3d 410 (Ariz. 2007). “The 1987 amendment, codified at A.R.S. § 12-2506, establishes a system of comparative fault, making “each tortfeasor responsible for paying his or her percentage of fault and no more.”
Warner v. Sw. Desert Images, LLC, 180 P.3d 986 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
Law v. Verde Valley Med. Ctr., 170 P.3d 701 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
Young v. Beck, 251 P.3d 380 (Ariz. 2011).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2506(D)(2001) — 1 case
Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42 (Utah 2002).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2506(E) — 4 cases
Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 10 P.3d 625 (Ariz. 2000). “¶ 1 We granted review in this wrongful death case to decide whether our comparative fault statute, A.R.S. § 12-2506, preserves vicarious liability for an independent contractor’s negligence when the employer of that independent contractor has a non-dele-gable duty.”
Neil v. Kavena, 859 P.2d 203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). “In 1987, through the enactment of A.R.S. § 12-2506, 2 the legislature abolished joint and several liability in all situations except when both parties were acting in concert and in actions relating to hazardous wastes or substances or solid-waste disposal sites.”
Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Ariz. 2009).
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Seats Inc., 349 P.3d 1096 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2506(F) — 3 cases
John Munic Enter., Inc. v. Laos, 326 P.3d 279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
Waterford v. Sanchez (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022).
Fuqua v. Dollar Tree (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2506(F)(1) — 6 cases
Mein Ex Rel. Mein v. Cook, 193 P.3d 790 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). “1 ¶ 6 In January 2006, the trial court decided that there was no evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude that Defendants committed an intentional tort, a necessary prerequisite under the “acting in concert” exception to A.R.S. § 12-2506. As a result, the court…”
Sec. Title Agency, Inc. v. Pope, 200 P.3d 977 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Ariz. 2009).
Siler v. Arizona Dep't of Real Est., 972 P.2d 1010 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
Clouse v. State, Dps, 984 P.2d 559 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2506(F)(2) — 25 cases
Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1995). “[6] As ATLA recognizes, this argument also implicates the constitutionality of UCATA's abolition of joint-and-several liability, accomplished by adoption of A.R.S. § 12-2506 in 1987. Under the common-law rule of joint-and-several liability, a plaintiff could recover all damages…”
State Farm Ins. Companies v. Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., 172 P.3d 410 (Ariz. 2007). “The 1987 amendment, codified at A.R.S. § 12-2506, establishes a system of comparative fault, making “each tortfeasor responsible for paying his or her percentage of fault and no more.”
Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 933 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
Amanda Watts v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 365 P.3d 944 (Ariz. 2016).
State Farm Ins. Companies v. Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., 142 P.3d 1232 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006). “The superior court denied State Farm’s motion, holding the comparative fault principles set forth in A.R.S. § 12-2506 apphed to strict products liability cases.”
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