A. An action to review a final administrative decision shall be heard and determined with convenient speed. If requested by a party to an action within thirty days after filing a notice of appeal, the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing, including testimony and argument, to the extent necessary to make the determination required by subsection F of this section. The court may hear testimony from witnesses who testified at the administrative hearing and witnesses who were not called to testify at the administrative hearing.
B. Relevant and admissible exhibits and testimony that were not offered during the administrative hearing shall be admitted, and objections that a party failed to make to evidence offered at the administrative hearing shall be considered, unless either of the following is true:
1. The exhibit, testimony or objection was withheld for purposes of delay, harassment or other improper purpose.
2. Allowing admission of the exhibit or testimony or consideration of the objection would cause substantial prejudice to another party.
C. For review of final administrative decisions of agencies that are exempt from sections 41-1092.03, 41-1092.04, 41-1092.05, 41-1092.06, 41-1092.07, 41-1092.08, 41-1092.09, 41-1092.10, and 41-1092.11, pursuant to section 41-1092.02, the trial shall be de novo if trial de novo is demanded in the notice of appeal or motion of an appellee other than the agency and if a hearing was not held by the agency or the proceedings before the agency were not stenographically reported or mechanically recorded so that a transcript might be made. On demand of any party, if a trial de novo is available under this section, it may be with a jury, except that a trial of an administrative decision under section 25-522 shall be to the court.
D. For review of final administrative decisions of agencies that regulate a profession or occupation pursuant to title 32, title 36, chapter 4, article 6, title 36, chapter 6, article 7 or title 36, chapter 17, the trial shall be de novo if trial de novo is demanded in the notice of appeal or motion of an appellee other than the agency.
E. The record in the superior court shall consist of the record of the administrative proceeding, and the record of any evidentiary hearing, or the record of the trial de novo.
F. After reviewing the administrative record and supplementing evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the court may affirm, reverse, modify or vacate and remand the agency action. The court shall affirm the agency action unless the court concludes that the agency's action is contrary to law, is not supported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary and capricious or is an abuse of discretion. In a proceeding brought by or against the regulated party, the court shall decide all questions of law, including the interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision or a rule adopted by an agency, without deference to any previous determination that may have been made on the question by the agency. In a proceeding brought by or against the regulated party, the court shall decide all questions of fact without deference to any previous determination that may have been made on the question by the agency. Notwithstanding any other law, this subsection applies in any action for judicial review of any agency action that is authorized by law.
G. Notwithstanding subsection F of this section, if the action arises out of title 20, chapter 15, article 2, the court shall affirm the agency action unless after reviewing the administrative record and supplementing evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing the court concludes that the action is not supported by substantial evidence, is contrary to law, is arbitrary and capricious or is an abuse of discretion.
H. This section does not apply to any agency action pursuant to title 40, chapter 2, article 5 or 6.2.
Notes of Decisions
Wallace Imports, Inc. v. Howe, 673 P.2d 961 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 52× “Such a motion is civil pretrial motion which neither comports with the Administrative Review Act, nor with A.R.S. § 12-910, the Scope of Review, which read in 1978 as follows: A.”
Curtis v. Richardson, 131 P.3d 480 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 10× “Thus, the convenience of witnesses was not an issue and the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying the change of venue.”
Simms v. Simms, 567 P.3d 92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025).
· cites it 36× “¶44 What is more, adopting a “substantial evidence is not deference” approach would make other parts of § 12-910 null or superfluous. Again, when a regulated party is involved, courts must decide all questions of law “without deference.”
Shaffer v. Arizona State Liquor Bd., 4 P.3d 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 15× “1 ¶ 7 On appeal, JESE argues that the superior court applied an incorrect standard of *408 review and failed to consider the supplemental evidence, that the superior court erred in affirming the license revocation, and that license revocation was too harsh a sanction.”
Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa, 218 P.3d 1045 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 4× “*593 Presumably, the respondent judge believed he had the authority to remand the matter under § 12-910(E), which gives the superior court the authority to “affirm, reverse, modify or vacate and remand the agency action,” and § 12 — 911 (A)(6), which empowers the superior court…”
Koller v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., 988 P.2d 128 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 14× “sections 12-911(A)(7) 2 and 28-3317 (1998) 3 provide discretion to the trial court to remand cases for a hearing when transcripts cannot be generated.”
Svendsen v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., 323 P.3d 1179 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 5× “” The latter statute provides, in pertinent part: Unless the cancellation or revocation is mandatory under this chapter, a person who is denied a license or whose license is canceled, suspended or revoked by the department may seek judicial review pursuant to [the Administrative…”
JH2K I LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 438 P.3d 676 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 4× “DISCUSSION ¶8 JH2K argues that the Department's denial of its application was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion and that the Department denied it equal protection and due process.”
Waltz Healing v. Adhs, 433 P.3d 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 4× “DISCUSSION ¶9 We will affirm an agency's decision on review unless it is "contrary to law, is not supported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary and 2 In its briefs on appeal, Waltz distinguishes the Department's initial denial of the application from the Director's later order…”
Parsons v. Arizona Dep't of Health Servs., 395 P.3d 709 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 2× “1 The superior court’s review of an agency decision is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision and whether the decision is contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”
Sw. Paint & Varnish Co. v. Arizona Dep't of Env't Quality, 976 P.2d 872 (Ariz. 1999).
· cites it 4× “[9] The scope of the legislative distinction between exempt and non-exempt agencies is exemplified by A.R.S. § 12-910, which permits a trial de novo as part of the judicial review of final decisions of exempt agencies, but does not provide that proceeding in cases involving…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-910(0) — 1 case
Koller v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., 988 P.2d 128 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
“sections 12-911(A)(7) 2 and 28-3317 (1998) 3 provide discretion to the trial court to remand cases for a hearing when transcripts cannot be generated.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-910(A) — 22 cases
Wallace Imports, Inc. v. Howe, 673 P.2d 961 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
“Such a motion is civil pretrial motion which neither comports with the Administrative Review Act, nor with A.R.S. § 12-910, the Scope of Review, which read in 1978 as follows: A.”
Shaffer v. Arizona State Liquor Bd., 4 P.3d 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
“1 ¶ 7 On appeal, JESE argues that the superior court applied an incorrect standard of *408 review and failed to consider the supplemental evidence, that the superior court erred in affirming the license revocation, and that license revocation was too harsh a sanction.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-910(B) — 17 cases
Wallace Imports, Inc. v. Howe, 673 P.2d 961 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
“Such a motion is civil pretrial motion which neither comports with the Administrative Review Act, nor with A.R.S. § 12-910, the Scope of Review, which read in 1978 as follows: A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-910(C) — 9 cases
Koller v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., 988 P.2d 128 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
“sections 12-911(A)(7) 2 and 28-3317 (1998) 3 provide discretion to the trial court to remand cases for a hearing when transcripts cannot be generated.”
Svendsen v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., 323 P.3d 1179 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
“” The latter statute provides, in pertinent part: Unless the cancellation or revocation is mandatory under this chapter, a person who is denied a license or whose license is canceled, suspended or revoked by the department may seek judicial review pursuant to [the Administrative…”
Simms v. Simms, 567 P.3d 92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025).
“¶44 What is more, adopting a “substantial evidence is not deference” approach would make other parts of § 12-910 null or superfluous. Again, when a regulated party is involved, courts must decide all questions of law “without deference.”
Shaffer v. Arizona State Liquor Bd., 4 P.3d 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
“1 ¶ 7 On appeal, JESE argues that the superior court applied an incorrect standard of *408 review and failed to consider the supplemental evidence, that the superior court erred in affirming the license revocation, and that license revocation was too harsh a sanction.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-910(D) — 4 cases
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-910(E) — 84 cases
Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa, 218 P.3d 1045 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
“*593 Presumably, the respondent judge believed he had the authority to remand the matter under § 12-910(E), which gives the superior court the authority to “affirm, reverse, modify or vacate and remand the agency action,” and § 12 — 911 (A)(6), which empowers the superior court…”
Curtis v. Richardson, 131 P.3d 480 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
“Thus, the convenience of witnesses was not an issue and the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying the change of venue.”
JH2K I LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 438 P.3d 676 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).
“DISCUSSION ¶8 JH2K argues that the Department's denial of its application was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion and that the Department denied it equal protection and due process.”
Waltz Healing v. Adhs, 433 P.3d 14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
“DISCUSSION ¶9 We will affirm an agency's decision on review unless it is "contrary to law, is not supported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary and 2 In its briefs on appeal, Waltz distinguishes the Department's initial denial of the application from the Director's later order…”
Parsons v. Arizona Dep't of Health Servs., 395 P.3d 709 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
“1 The superior court’s review of an agency decision is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision and whether the decision is contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-910(E)(2003) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-910(F) — 36 cases
Simms v. Simms, 567 P.3d 92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025).
“¶44 What is more, adopting a “substantial evidence is not deference” approach would make other parts of § 12-910 null or superfluous. Again, when a regulated party is involved, courts must decide all questions of law “without deference.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-910(G) — 3 cases
Simms v. Simms, 567 P.3d 92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025).
“¶44 What is more, adopting a “substantial evidence is not deference” approach would make other parts of § 12-910 null or superfluous. Again, when a regulated party is involved, courts must decide all questions of law “without deference.”
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