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Arizona Revised Statutes

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1103 (2026)

Manslaughter; classification

✓ current as of May 2026
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A. A person commits manslaughter by doing any of the following:

1. Recklessly causing the death of another person.

2. Committing second degree murder as prescribed in section 13-1104, subsection A on a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim.

3. Intentionally providing the physical means that another person uses to die by suicide, with the knowledge that the person intends to die by suicide.

4. Committing second degree murder as prescribed in section 13-1104, subsection A, paragraph 3, while being coerced to do so by the use or threatened immediate use of unlawful deadly physical force on the person or a third person that a reasonable person in his situation would have been unable to resist.

5. Knowingly or recklessly causing the death of an unborn child by any physical injury to the mother.

B. A person who is at least eighteen years of age commits manslaughter by intentionally providing advice or encouragement that a minor uses to die by suicide with the knowledge that the minor intends to die by suicide.

C. An offense under subsection A, paragraph 5 of this section applies to an unborn child in the womb at any stage of its development.  A person shall not be prosecuted under subsection A, paragraph 5 of this section if any of the following applies:

1. The person was performing an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person authorized by law to act on the pregnant woman's behalf, has been obtained or for which the consent was implied or authorized by law.

2. The person was performing medical treatment on the pregnant woman or the pregnant woman's unborn child.

3. The person was the unborn child's mother.

D. Manslaughter is a class 2 felony.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 143 cases (20 in the last 5 years), 1980–2026 · leading case: State v. Brewer, 826 P.2d 783 (Ariz. 1992).
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State v. Brewer, 826 P.2d 783 (Ariz. 1992). · cites it 14× “As the trial court's minute entry explains, A.R.S. 13-1103(A)[(5)] specifically deals with the facts of this case.”
State v. Hampton, 140 P.3d 950 (Ariz. 2006). · cites it 12× “The trial court excluded several other photographs because they were cumulative or potentially unduly prejudicial. On this record, we cannot conclude that the judge abused his discretion by determining that the probative value of the remaining photographs outweighed any danger…”
Vo v. Superior Court, 836 P.2d 408 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 10× “On July 17, 1991, Vo moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, to remand for a new finding of probable cause on Count II of the indictment, which alleged first degree murder of the fetus. The motion to dismiss was based on the contention that a fetus is not a “cognizable…”
State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 800 P.2d 1260 (Ariz. 1990). · cites it 6× “§ 13-1103(A)(5), which proscribes “[kjnowingly or recklessly causing the death of an unborn child at any stage of its development by any physical injury to the mother of such child which would be murder if the death of the mother had occurred.”
State v. Cocio, 709 P.2d 1336 (Ariz. 1985). · cites it 8× “" This instruction was derived from A.R.S. §§ 13-1103 and 13-105 and accurately defines manslaughter.”
State of Arizona v. Christepher E. Lua, 350 P.3d 805 (Ariz. 2015). · cites it 12× “Although provocation manslaughter requires proof of the additional circumstance set forth in § 13-1103 (A) (2), it does not substantively change the nature of second-degree murder in a way that requires it to be separately charged, either initially or by amendment.”
Hoover v. First Interstate Bank, 682 P.2d 469 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 20× “At the time the plea of guilty was entered the trial court established a factual basis for it but did not specify whether the crime was committed under subsection A(l) or subsection A(2) of A.R.S. § 13-1103. When Linda Hoover was sentenced she told the judge that she had…”
State v. Hutton, 694 P.2d 216 (Ariz. 1985). · cites it 12× “A.R.S. § 13-1103. The jury also found that, at the time this offense was committed, appellant was on probation.”
State v. Eddington, 244 P.3d 76 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 8× “The record thus suggests the jury necessarily considered the elements of manslaughter pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(1) when it found Eddington guilty of second-degree murder.”
State v. McKinney, 917 P.2d 1214 (Ariz. 1996). · cites it 6× “See A.R.S. § 13-1103. Aggravated assault would not be a crime of violence.”
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). · cites it 2× “120 (a)(2) (1996); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1103 (A)(3) (Supp.”
State v. Cotton, 5 P.3d 918 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 9× “” A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(1) (emphasis added). For purposes of these homicide statutes, “ ‘[p]erson’ means a human being,” a definition we find not particularly elucidating.”
Show all 143 citing cases →
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1103(A) — 15 cases
State v. Bocharski, 22 P.3d 43 (Ariz. 2001).
Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987).
State v. Brewer, 826 P.2d 783 (Ariz. 1992). “As the trial court's minute entry explains, A.R.S. 13-1103(A)[(5)] specifically deals with the facts of this case.”
State v. Wood, 881 P.2d 1158 (Ariz. 1994).
State v. Runningeagle, 859 P.2d 169 (Ariz. 1993).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1103(A)(1) — 58 cases
State v. Walton, 650 P.2d 1264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
State v. Cocio, 709 P.2d 1336 (Ariz. 1985). “" This instruction was derived from A.R.S. §§ 13-1103 and 13-105 and accurately defines manslaughter.”
State v. Eddington, 244 P.3d 76 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). “The record thus suggests the jury necessarily considered the elements of manslaughter pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(1) when it found Eddington guilty of second-degree murder.”
State v. Tinajero, 935 P.2d 928 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
Hoover v. First Interstate Bank, 682 P.2d 469 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). “At the time the plea of guilty was entered the trial court established a factual basis for it but did not specify whether the crime was committed under subsection A(l) or subsection A(2) of A.R.S. § 13-1103. When Linda Hoover was sentenced she told the judge that she had…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1103(A)(2) — 37 cases
State of Arizona v. Christepher E. Lua, 350 P.3d 805 (Ariz. 2015). “Although provocation manslaughter requires proof of the additional circumstance set forth in § 13-1103 (A) (2), it does not substantively change the nature of second-degree murder in a way that requires it to be separately charged, either initially or by amendment.”
State of Arizona v. Adolfo Noel Ruiz, Jr., 340 P.3d 396 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
State v. Gomez, 123 P.3d 1131 (Ariz. 2005).
State v. Eddington, 244 P.3d 76 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). “The record thus suggests the jury necessarily considered the elements of manslaughter pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(1) when it found Eddington guilty of second-degree murder.”
State v. Lua, 330 P.3d 1018 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1103(A)(3) — 3 cases
State v. Palomarez, 657 P.2d 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
State v. Khoshbin, 804 P.2d 103 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
Coburn v. Rhodig (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1103(A)(4) — 2 cases
State v. Garcia, 202 P.3d 514 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
State of Arizona v. Robert Carlos Garcia (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1103(A)(5) — 11 cases
State v. Brewer, 826 P.2d 783 (Ariz. 1992). “As the trial court's minute entry explains, A.R.S. 13-1103(A)[(5)] specifically deals with the facts of this case.”
State v. Hampton, 140 P.3d 950 (Ariz. 2006). “The trial court excluded several other photographs because they were cumulative or potentially unduly prejudicial. On this record, we cannot conclude that the judge abused his discretion by determining that the probative value of the remaining photographs outweighed any danger…”
State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 800 P.2d 1260 (Ariz. 1990). “§ 13-1103(A)(5), which proscribes “[kjnowingly or recklessly causing the death of an unborn child at any stage of its development by any physical injury to the mother of such child which would be murder if the death of the mother had occurred.”
Vo v. Superior Court, 836 P.2d 408 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). “On July 17, 1991, Vo moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, to remand for a new finding of probable cause on Count II of the indictment, which alleged first degree murder of the fetus. The motion to dismiss was based on the contention that a fetus is not a “cognizable…”
Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona, 121 P.3d 1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1103(B) — 2 cases
State v. Hampton, 140 P.3d 950 (Ariz. 2006). “The trial court excluded several other photographs because they were cumulative or potentially unduly prejudicial. On this record, we cannot conclude that the judge abused his discretion by determining that the probative value of the remaining photographs outweighed any danger…”
State v. King, 873 P.2d 641 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1103(C) — 1 case
State v. Robertson (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021).
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