Ariz. Rev. Stat. » Title 13
Arizona Revised Statutes

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1504 (2026)

Criminal trespass in the first degree; classification

✓ current as of May 2026
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A. A person commits criminal trespass in the first degree by knowingly:

1. Entering or remaining unlawfully in or on a residential structure.

2. Entering or remaining unlawfully in a fenced residential yard.

3. Entering any residential yard and, without lawful authority, looking into the residential structure thereon in reckless disregard of infringing on the inhabitant's right of privacy.

4. Entering unlawfully on real property that is subject to a valid mineral claim or lease with the intent to hold, work, take or explore for minerals on the claim or lease.

5. Entering or remaining unlawfully on the property of another and burning, defacing, mutilating or otherwise desecrating a religious symbol or other religious property of another without the express permission of the owner of the property.

6. Entering or remaining unlawfully in or on a critical public service facility.

B. Criminal trespass in the first degree under subsection A, paragraph 6 of this section is a class 5 felony.  Criminal trespass in the first degree under subsection A, paragraph 1 or 5 of this section is a class 6 felony.  Criminal trespass in the first degree under subsection A, paragraph 2, 3 or 4 of this section is a class 1 misdemeanor.

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 33 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1982–2025 · leading case: State v. Comer, 799 P.2d 333 (Ariz. 1990).
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State v. Comer, 799 P.2d 333 (Ariz. 1990). · cites it 4× “2d *423 449, 452-53 (1975) (former A.R.S. § 13-1504(B)). Appellant contends that all of the acts constituting the elements of Count XII (sexual abuse) and Count XIII (sexual assault) occurred in Gila County.”
State v. Mitchell, 675 P.2d 738 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 13× “§ 13-1507 and appellant claims that the lesser-included offense instruction should have been under A.R.S. § 13-1504(A)(2). The statutes at issue are A.”
State v. Serrano, 702 P.2d 1343 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 8× “Appellant first contends that our “peeping tom” statute, A.R.S. § 13-1504(A)(2) is unconstitutionally vague.”
State v. Borbon, 706 P.2d 718 (Ariz. 1985). · cites it 4× “§ 13-2508, and criminal trespass, A.R.S. § 13-1504. Because defendant was on probation from an earlier matter, solicitation of the sale of cocaine, he was sentenced *394 to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years for the robbery, A.”
State v. Poland, 645 P.2d 784 (Ariz. 1982). · cites it 2× “” Former A.R.S. § 13-1504(B). See present A.R.S. § 13-109(A).”
State v. Thompson, 924 P.2d 1048 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 5× “§ 18-4-203(2) with A.R.S. § 13-1504(A). Consequently, it is immaterial whether, when convicted of the class 3 felony of second degree burglary in November 1983, Defendant was found to have committed the specific act of burglary with the objective of obtaining a controlled…”
State v. Agnew, 647 P.2d 1165 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). · cites it 4× “” (emphasis added) and, A.R.S. § 13-1504(B) provided: “Where several acts are requisite to the commission of an offense, the trial may be in any county in which any of such acts occurs.”
State v. McLamb, 932 P.2d 266 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “g, A.R.S. § 13-1504(2) (unlawful to enter and look into residential structure without lawful “authority”); § 13-1803 (unlawful use of means of transportation is temporary "unauthorized” control over another’s means of transportation); § 13-2104 (forgery of credit card is…”
State v. Willis, 178 P.3d 480 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 4× “” A.R.S. § 13-1504(A)(1) (Supp.2007). ¶ 8 Here, ample uncontroverted evidence supports the conclusion that Willis violated the statute.”
State v. Zamora, 202 P.3d 528 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). “”) section 13-1504(A)(1) (Supp.2008). 4 Zamora moved to suppress the statements he made to the police officers at the scene, arguing the statements were coerced, but neither party cited or argued Elstad or Seibeit.”
State v. Ennis, 689 P.2d 570 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “A.R.S. § 13-1504, Criminal Trespass in the First Degree, reads in pertinent part: *314 A.”
State of Arizona v. Anthony Lewis, 340 P.3d 415 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). “§ 13-1504(A)(2), (3) (emphasis added). Thus, when the legislature has intended to criminalize an act committed in both fenced and unfenced residential yards in this statutory scheme, it has done so explicitly and unambiguously.”
Show all 33 citing cases →
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1504(2) — 1 case
State v. McLamb, 932 P.2d 266 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). “g, A.R.S. § 13-1504(2) (unlawful to enter and look into residential structure without lawful “authority”); § 13-1803 (unlawful use of means of transportation is temporary "unauthorized” control over another’s means of transportation); § 13-2104 (forgery of credit card is…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1504(A) — 2 cases
State v. Thompson, 924 P.2d 1048 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). “§ 18-4-203(2) with A.R.S. § 13-1504(A). Consequently, it is immaterial whether, when convicted of the class 3 felony of second degree burglary in November 1983, Defendant was found to have committed the specific act of burglary with the objective of obtaining a controlled…”
State v. Rodriguez (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1504(A)(1) — 16 cases
State v. Willis, 178 P.3d 480 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). “” A.R.S. § 13-1504(A)(1) (Supp.2007). ¶ 8 Here, ample uncontroverted evidence supports the conclusion that Willis violated the statute.”
State v. Zamora, 202 P.3d 528 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). “”) section 13-1504(A)(1) (Supp.2008). 4 Zamora moved to suppress the statements he made to the police officers at the scene, arguing the statements were coerced, but neither party cited or argued Elstad or Seibeit.”
State v. Thompson, 924 P.2d 1048 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). “§ 18-4-203(2) with A.R.S. § 13-1504(A). Consequently, it is immaterial whether, when convicted of the class 3 felony of second degree burglary in November 1983, Defendant was found to have committed the specific act of burglary with the objective of obtaining a controlled…”
State v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 296 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
In re Christopher R., 957 P.2d 1004 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1504(A)(2) — 4 cases
State v. Mitchell, 675 P.2d 738 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). “§ 13-1507 and appellant claims that the lesser-included offense instruction should have been under A.R.S. § 13-1504(A)(2). The statutes at issue are A.”
State v. Serrano, 702 P.2d 1343 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). “Appellant first contends that our “peeping tom” statute, A.R.S. § 13-1504(A)(2) is unconstitutionally vague.”
State of Arizona v. Anthony Lewis, 340 P.3d 415 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). “§ 13-1504(A)(2), (3) (emphasis added). Thus, when the legislature has intended to criminalize an act committed in both fenced and unfenced residential yards in this statutory scheme, it has done so explicitly and unambiguously.”
State v. Boles, 905 P.2d 572 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1504(B) — 5 cases
State v. Comer, 799 P.2d 333 (Ariz. 1990). “2d *423 449, 452-53 (1975) (former A.R.S. § 13-1504(B)). Appellant contends that all of the acts constituting the elements of Count XII (sexual abuse) and Count XIII (sexual assault) occurred in Gila County.”
State v. Poland, 645 P.2d 784 (Ariz. 1982). “” Former A.R.S. § 13-1504(B). See present A.R.S. § 13-109(A).”
State v. Agnew, 647 P.2d 1165 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). “” (emphasis added) and, A.R.S. § 13-1504(B) provided: “Where several acts are requisite to the commission of an offense, the trial may be in any county in which any of such acts occurs.”
State v. Thompson, 924 P.2d 1048 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). “§ 18-4-203(2) with A.R.S. § 13-1504(A). Consequently, it is immaterial whether, when convicted of the class 3 felony of second degree burglary in November 1983, Defendant was found to have committed the specific act of burglary with the objective of obtaining a controlled…”
State v. Kinney (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
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