Arizona Revised Statutes

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2921.01 (2026)

Aggravated harassment; classification; definition

✓ current as of May 2026
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A. A person commits aggravated harassment if the person commits harassment as provided in section 13-2921 and, at the time of the offense, any of the following applies:

1. A court has issued any of the following orders in favor of the victim of harassment, the order was served on the person and the order was valid at the time of the offense:

(a) An order of protection issued pursuant to section 13-3602.

(b) An injunction against harassment issued pursuant to section 12-1809.

(c) Any other criminal-related injunction issued under the laws of this state.

2. A court has issued an order of protection on an emergency basis pursuant to section 13-3624 against the person in favor of the victim of harassment and the order was still in effect on the date of the offense.

3. The person has previously been convicted of an offense included in section 13-3601 committed against the victim of harassment.

4. A court has imposed a condition of release on the person that prohibits any contact with the victim of harassment and the court order was still in effect on the date of the offense.

B. A person who violates subsection A, paragraph 1, 2 or 4 of this section is guilty of a class 6 felony. A person who commits a second or subsequent violation of subsection A, paragraph 1, 2 or 4 of this section is guilty of a class 5 felony. A person who violates subsection A, paragraph 3 of this section is guilty of a class 5 felony.

C. For the purposes of this section, "convicted" means a person who was convicted of an offense included in section 13-3601 or who was adjudicated delinquent for conduct that would constitute a historical prior felony conviction if the juvenile had been tried as an adult for an offense included in section 13-3601.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1999–2024 · leading case: State v. Brown, 85 P.3d 109 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
State v. Brown, 85 P.3d 109 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 6× “¶ 20 Nonetheless, Brown argues that the statute “criminalizes any delivery of bad news, or delivery of a disturbing message regardless of fault[,] ... the firing of an employee, because such conduct is alarming and annoying[,] .”
State v. Lychwick, 218 P.3d 1061 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 3× “”) section 13-2921.01 (Supp. 2008). 1 We hold that, in determining the validity of an injunction against harassment, the date of service is not included in the “one year” calculation.”
In Re Casey G., 224 P.3d 1016 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 3× “] § 13-2921.01, [AR.S.] § 17-340 or [AR.S.] §§ 28-3304, 28-3306 and 28-3320, an order of the juvenile court in proceedings under this chapter shall not be deemed a conviction of *521 crime, impose any civil disabilities ordinarily resulting from a conviction or operate to…”
In Re Anthony H., 994 P.2d 407 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). “The disposition of a juvenile in the juvenile court may not be used against the juvenile in any case or proceeding other than a criminal or juvenile case in any court, whether before or after reaching majority, except as provided by § 13-2921.01 or §§ 28-3304, 28-3306 and…”
State v. Melgoza (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 11× “A grand jury indicted Melgoza, alleging he committed aggravated harassment in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2921.01, which states as follows: 2 STATE v.”
State v. Balli (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 6× “” A.R.S. § 13-2921.01(A)(1). “Harassment” is “conduct that is directed at a specific person and that would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person.”
State v. Rios, 555 P.3d 60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 6× “§ 13-2921 and (2) at the time of that harassment, one of the alternative aggravating circumstances specified in A.R.S. § 13-2921.01 is shown. See A.R.S. § 13-2921.”
State of Arizona v. Miguel Rios, 502 P.3d 474 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 5× “Here, as discussed, there is not a “same act” but discrete, separate acts that contribute to each count charged, and each act, or text message, violates the same statute—A.R.S. § 13-2921.01(A)(1). Therefore, this argument is not applicable to these circumstances.”
State of Arizona v. Lawrence Brown, Jr. (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 6× “the firing of an employee, because such conduct is alarming and annoying[,] .”
State v. Woods (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2× “A.R.S. §§ 13-2921.01(A)(2), -3601.02(A). The 2015 conviction was also relevant to prove Woods' motive and intent in committing the current offenses against E.”
State v. McKenzie (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 2× “” A.R.S. § 13-2921.01(A)(1). “Harassment” is “conduct that is directed at a specific person and that would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person.”
In Re Casey G. (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 3× “] § 13-2921.01, [A.R.S.] § 17-340 or [A.R.S.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2921.01(A) — 1 case
State v. Melgoza (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022). “A grand jury indicted Melgoza, alleging he committed aggravated harassment in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2921.01, which states as follows: 2 STATE v.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2921.01(A)(1) — 7 cases
State v. Brown, 85 P.3d 109 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “¶ 20 Nonetheless, Brown argues that the statute “criminalizes any delivery of bad news, or delivery of a disturbing message regardless of fault[,] ... the firing of an employee, because such conduct is alarming and annoying[,] .”
State v. Lychwick, 218 P.3d 1061 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). “”) section 13-2921.01 (Supp. 2008). 1 We hold that, in determining the validity of an injunction against harassment, the date of service is not included in the “one year” calculation.”
State v. Balli (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020). “” A.R.S. § 13-2921.01(A)(1). “Harassment” is “conduct that is directed at a specific person and that would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person.”
State of Arizona v. Miguel Rios, 502 P.3d 474 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021). “Here, as discussed, there is not a “same act” but discrete, separate acts that contribute to each count charged, and each act, or text message, violates the same statute—A.R.S. § 13-2921.01(A)(1). Therefore, this argument is not applicable to these circumstances.”
State v. Melgoza (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022). “A grand jury indicted Melgoza, alleging he committed aggravated harassment in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2921.01, which states as follows: 2 STATE v.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2921.01(A)(1)(a) — 1 case
State v. Rios, 555 P.3d 60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024). “§ 13-2921 and (2) at the time of that harassment, one of the alternative aggravating circumstances specified in A.R.S. § 13-2921.01 is shown. See A.R.S. § 13-2921.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2921.01(A)(2) — 4 cases
State v. Brown, 85 P.3d 109 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “¶ 20 Nonetheless, Brown argues that the statute “criminalizes any delivery of bad news, or delivery of a disturbing message regardless of fault[,] ... the firing of an employee, because such conduct is alarming and annoying[,] .”
State v. Woods (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018). “A.R.S. §§ 13-2921.01(A)(2), -3601.02(A). The 2015 conviction was also relevant to prove Woods' motive and intent in committing the current offenses against E.”
State of Arizona v. Lawrence Brown, Jr. (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “the firing of an employee, because such conduct is alarming and annoying[,] .”
State v. Melgoza (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022). “A grand jury indicted Melgoza, alleging he committed aggravated harassment in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2921.01, which states as follows: 2 STATE v.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2921.01(C) — 2 cases
State v. Balli (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020). “” A.R.S. § 13-2921.01(A)(1). “Harassment” is “conduct that is directed at a specific person and that would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person.”
State of Arizona v. Miguel Rios, 502 P.3d 474 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021). “Here, as discussed, there is not a “same act” but discrete, separate acts that contribute to each count charged, and each act, or text message, violates the same statute—A.R.S. § 13-2921.01(A)(1). Therefore, this argument is not applicable to these circumstances.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2921.01(D) — 2 cases
In Re Casey G., 224 P.3d 1016 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). “] § 13-2921.01, [AR.S.] § 17-340 or [AR.S.] §§ 28-3304, 28-3306 and 28-3320, an order of the juvenile court in proceedings under this chapter shall not be deemed a conviction of *521 crime, impose any civil disabilities ordinarily resulting from a conviction or operate to…”
In Re Casey G. (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). “] § 13-2921.01, [A.R.S.] § 17-340 or [A.R.S.”
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