A. A person who is in custody shall not be admitted to bail if the proof is evident or the presumption great that the person is guilty of the offense charged and the offense charged is one of the following:
1. A capital offense.
2. Sexual assault.
3. Sexual conduct with a minor under either of the following circumstances:
(a) At the time of the offense, the person was at least eighteen years of age and the victim was under thirteen years of age.
(b) At the time of the offense, the victim was thirteen or fourteen years of age and the person was at least ten years older than the victim.
4. Molestation of a child under either of the following circumstances:
(a) At the time of the offense, the person was at least eighteen years of age and the victim was under thirteen years of age.
(b) At the time of the offense, the victim was thirteen or fourteen years of age and the person was at least ten years older than the victim.
5. A serious felony offense if there is probable cause to believe that the person has entered or remained in the United States illegally. For the purposes of this paragraph:
(a) The court shall consider all of the following in making a determination that a person has entered or remained in the United States illegally:
(i) Whether a hold has been placed on the arrested person by the United States immigration and customs enforcement.
(ii) Any indication by a law enforcement agency that the person is in the United States illegally.
(iii) Whether an admission by the arrested person has been obtained by the court or a law enforcement agency that the person has entered or remained in the United States illegally.
(iv) Any information received from a law enforcement agency pursuant to section 13-3906.
(v) Any evidence that the person has recently entered or remained in the United States illegally.
(vi) Any other relevant information that is obtained by the court or that is presented to the court by a party or any other person.
(b) "Serious felony offense" means any class 1, 2, 3 or 4 felony or any violation of section 28-1383.
B. The purposes of bail and any conditions of release that are set by a judicial officer include:
1. Assuring the appearance of the accused.
2. Protecting against the intimidation of witnesses.
3. Protecting the safety of the victim, any other person or the community.
C. The initial determination of whether an offense is bailable pursuant to subsection A of this section shall be made by the magistrate or judicial officer at the time of the person's initial appearance.
D. Except as provided in subsection A of this section, a person who is in custody shall not be admitted to bail if the person is charged with a felony offense and the state certifies by motion and the court finds after a hearing on the matter that there is clear and convincing evidence that the person charged poses a substantial danger to another person or the community or engaged in conduct constituting a violent offense, that no condition or combination of conditions of release may be imposed that will reasonably assure the safety of the other person or the community and that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the person committed the offense for which the person is charged. For the purposes of this subsection, "violent offense" means either of the following:
1. A dangerous crime against children.
2. Terrorism.
E. On oral motion of the state, the court shall order the hearing required by subsection D of this section at or within twenty-four hours of the initial appearance unless the person who is subject to detention or the state moves for a continuance. A continuance that is granted on the motion of the person shall not exceed five calendar days unless there are extenuating circumstances. A continuance on the motion of the state shall be granted on good cause shown and shall not exceed twenty-four hours. The prosecutor shall provide reasonable notice and an opportunity for victims and witnesses to be present and heard at any hearing. The person may be detained pending the hearing. The person is entitled to representation by counsel and is entitled to present information by proffer or otherwise, to testify and to present witnesses in the person's own behalf. Testimony of the person charged that is given during the hearing shall not be admissible on the issue of guilt in any subsequent judicial proceeding, except as it might relate to the compliance with or violation of any condition of release subsequently imposed or the imposition of appropriate sentence or in perjury proceedings, or for the purposes of impeachment. The case of the person shall be placed on an expedited calendar and, consistent with the sound administration of justice, the person's trial shall be given priority. The person may be admitted to bail in accordance with the Arizona rules of criminal procedure whenever a judicial officer finds that a subsequent event has eliminated the basis for detention.
F. The finding of an indictment or the filing of an information does not add to the strength of the proof or the presumption to be drawn.
G. In a hearing pursuant to subsection D of this section, proof that the person is a criminal street gang member may give rise to the inference that the person poses a substantial danger to another person or the community and that no condition or combination of conditions of release may be imposed that will reasonably assure the safety of the other person or the community.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
30
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1990–2022 · leading case:
Simpson v. Owens, 85 P.3d 478 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
Simpson v. Owens, 85 P.3d 478 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 105× “FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 3 At the November 2002 general election, Arizona voters passed ballot Proposition 103 amending Article 2, Section 22 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 13-3961. Prior to that amendment, Article 2, Section 22(1) of the Arizona…”
Simpson v. Miller, 377 P.3d 1003 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 56× “” We have examined § 13-3961(A) before. See Simpson v. Owens (“Simpson I”), 207 Ariz.”
Simpson v. Miller ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 387 P.3d 1270 (Ariz. 2017).
· cites it 17× “Owens, our court of appeals held that the state’s burden “is met if all of the evidence, fully considered by the court, makes it plain and clear to the understanding .”
Segura v. Cunanan, 196 P.3d 831 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 17× “Over the years, the list of nonbailable offenses was expanded, and by 2006 included capital offenses, sexual assault, certain crimes against children, offenses committed when the person charged is on bail on a separate felony charge, and felony offenses if the person charged…”
Hernandez v. Lynch, 167 P.3d 1264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 12× “Indeed, the Senate Fact Sheets of both Proposition 100 and the accompanying statutory amendment to A.R.S. § 13-3961 indicate that the Legislature was concerned with problems arguably caused by illegal immigration and undocumented immigrants, not with persons who had acquired…”
Angel Lopez-Valenzuela v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014).
· cites it 5× “The complaint proposed a plaintiff class consisting of “All persons who have been or will be held ineligible for release on bond by an Arizona state court in Maricopa County pursuant to Section 22(A)(4) of the Arizona Constitution and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961 (A)(5).” The…”
Miriam Mendiola-Martinez v. Joseph Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016).
· cites it 2× “I When Mendiola-Martinez was arrested in Arizona for forgery and identity theft on October 19, 2009, she was 6-months pregnant.”
Davis v. Winkler, 793 P.2d 99 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 21× “2d 1055 (1976), and because of the statewide importance of the application of A.R.S. § 13-3961 to similar factual circumstances, we accept jurisdiction.”
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Rayes, 75 P.3d 148 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 11× “Counts 8 and 9 allegedly occurred between May 2000 and September 2000 and involved a then thirteen-year-old female.”
Costa v. MacKey, 261 P.3d 449 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 4× “Also, because the State asserts that the propriety of the ruling it challenges is moot in light of Judge Ainley’s finding concerning the applicability of A.R.S. § 13-3961(D), we decline jurisdiction for this additional reason.”
State v. Williams, 854 P.2d 131 (Ariz. 1993).
· cites it 2× “A.R.S. § 13-3961(E). A process exists for expediting the prosecution of “dangerous crimes against children” over all other prosecutions.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(A) — 9 cases
Simpson v. Owens, 85 P.3d 478 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
“FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 3 At the November 2002 general election, Arizona voters passed ballot Proposition 103 amending Article 2, Section 22 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 13-3961. Prior to that amendment, Article 2, Section 22(1) of the Arizona…”
Hernandez v. Lynch, 167 P.3d 1264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
“Indeed, the Senate Fact Sheets of both Proposition 100 and the accompanying statutory amendment to A.R.S. § 13-3961 indicate that the Legislature was concerned with problems arguably caused by illegal immigration and undocumented immigrants, not with persons who had acquired…”
Simpson v. Miller ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 387 P.3d 1270 (Ariz. 2017).
“Owens, our court of appeals held that the state’s burden “is met if all of the evidence, fully considered by the court, makes it plain and clear to the understanding .”
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Rayes, 75 P.3d 148 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
“Counts 8 and 9 allegedly occurred between May 2000 and September 2000 and involved a then thirteen-year-old female.”
Simpson v. Miller, 377 P.3d 1003 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“” We have examined § 13-3961(A) before. See Simpson v. Owens (“Simpson I”), 207 Ariz.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(A)(2) — 3 cases
Simpson v. Miller ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 387 P.3d 1270 (Ariz. 2017).
“Owens, our court of appeals held that the state’s burden “is met if all of the evidence, fully considered by the court, makes it plain and clear to the understanding .”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(A)(3) — 7 cases
Simpson v. Miller, 377 P.3d 1003 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“” We have examined § 13-3961(A) before. See Simpson v. Owens (“Simpson I”), 207 Ariz.”
Simpson v. Miller ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 387 P.3d 1270 (Ariz. 2017).
“Owens, our court of appeals held that the state’s burden “is met if all of the evidence, fully considered by the court, makes it plain and clear to the understanding .”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(A)(4) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(A)(5) — 7 cases
Hernandez v. Lynch, 167 P.3d 1264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
“Indeed, the Senate Fact Sheets of both Proposition 100 and the accompanying statutory amendment to A.R.S. § 13-3961 indicate that the Legislature was concerned with problems arguably caused by illegal immigration and undocumented immigrants, not with persons who had acquired…”
Segura v. Cunanan, 196 P.3d 831 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
“Over the years, the list of nonbailable offenses was expanded, and by 2006 included capital offenses, sexual assault, certain crimes against children, offenses committed when the person charged is on bail on a separate felony charge, and felony offenses if the person charged…”
Simpson v. Miller ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 387 P.3d 1270 (Ariz. 2017).
“Owens, our court of appeals held that the state’s burden “is met if all of the evidence, fully considered by the court, makes it plain and clear to the understanding .”
Angel Lopez-Valenzuela v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014).
“The complaint proposed a plaintiff class consisting of “All persons who have been or will be held ineligible for release on bond by an Arizona state court in Maricopa County pursuant to Section 22(A)(4) of the Arizona Constitution and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961 (A)(5).” The…”
Simpson v. Miller, 377 P.3d 1003 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“” We have examined § 13-3961(A) before. See Simpson v. Owens (“Simpson I”), 207 Ariz.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(A)(5)(a)(vi) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(A)(5)(b) — 3 cases
Angel Lopez-Valenzuela v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014).
“The complaint proposed a plaintiff class consisting of “All persons who have been or will be held ineligible for release on bond by an Arizona state court in Maricopa County pursuant to Section 22(A)(4) of the Arizona Constitution and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961 (A)(5).” The…”
Segura v. Cunanan, 196 P.3d 831 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
“Over the years, the list of nonbailable offenses was expanded, and by 2006 included capital offenses, sexual assault, certain crimes against children, offenses committed when the person charged is on bail on a separate felony charge, and felony offenses if the person charged…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(B) — 4 cases
Simpson v. Miller, 377 P.3d 1003 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“” We have examined § 13-3961(A) before. See Simpson v. Owens (“Simpson I”), 207 Ariz.”
Davis v. Winkler, 793 P.2d 99 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
“2d 1055 (1976), and because of the statewide importance of the application of A.R.S. § 13-3961 to similar factual circumstances, we accept jurisdiction.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(B)(3) — 1 case
Simpson v. Miller, 377 P.3d 1003 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“” We have examined § 13-3961(A) before. See Simpson v. Owens (“Simpson I”), 207 Ariz.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(C) — 3 cases
Segura v. Cunanan, 196 P.3d 831 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
“Over the years, the list of nonbailable offenses was expanded, and by 2006 included capital offenses, sexual assault, certain crimes against children, offenses committed when the person charged is on bail on a separate felony charge, and felony offenses if the person charged…”
Simpson v. Owens, 85 P.3d 478 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
“FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶ 3 At the November 2002 general election, Arizona voters passed ballot Proposition 103 amending Article 2, Section 22 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 13-3961. Prior to that amendment, Article 2, Section 22(1) of the Arizona…”
Davis v. Winkler, 793 P.2d 99 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
“2d 1055 (1976), and because of the statewide importance of the application of A.R.S. § 13-3961 to similar factual circumstances, we accept jurisdiction.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(D) — 9 cases
Simpson v. Miller, 377 P.3d 1003 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“” We have examined § 13-3961(A) before. See Simpson v. Owens (“Simpson I”), 207 Ariz.”
Simpson v. Miller ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 387 P.3d 1270 (Ariz. 2017).
“Owens, our court of appeals held that the state’s burden “is met if all of the evidence, fully considered by the court, makes it plain and clear to the understanding .”
Costa v. MacKey, 261 P.3d 449 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
“Also, because the State asserts that the propriety of the ruling it challenges is moot in light of Judge Ainley’s finding concerning the applicability of A.R.S. § 13-3961(D), we decline jurisdiction for this additional reason.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(D)(2010) — 1 case
Costa v. MacKey, 261 P.3d 449 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
“Also, because the State asserts that the propriety of the ruling it challenges is moot in light of Judge Ainley’s finding concerning the applicability of A.R.S. § 13-3961(D), we decline jurisdiction for this additional reason.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(E) — 1 case
State v. Williams, 854 P.2d 131 (Ariz. 1993).
“A.R.S. § 13-3961(E). A process exists for expediting the prosecution of “dangerous crimes against children” over all other prosecutions.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(d) — 1 case
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