13-709. Offenses committed in school safety zone; sentences; definitions
A. Except as otherwise prescribed in section 13-3411, a person who is convicted of a felony offense that is committed in a school safety zone is guilty of the same class of felony that the person would otherwise be guilty of if the violation had not occurred within a school safety zone, except that the court may impose a sentence that is one year longer than the minimum, maximum and presumptive sentence for that violation if the person is not a criminal street gang member or up to five years longer than the minimum, maximum and presumptive sentence for that violation if the person is in a position of trust as defined in section 13-1401 and is convicted of an offense listed in section 13-3212 or chapter 14 or 35.1 of this title or the person is a criminal street gang member. The additional sentence imposed under this subsection is in addition to any other enhanced punishment that may be applicable under section 13-703, section 13-704, section 13-706, section 13-708, subsection D or chapter 34 of this title.
B. In addition to any other penalty prescribed by this title, the court may order a person who is subject to subsection A of this section to pay a fine of at least $2,000 and not more than the maximum authorized by chapter 8 of this title.
C. Each school district governing board or its designee, or chief administrative officer in the case of a nonpublic or charter school, may place and maintain permanently affixed signs that are located in a visible manner at the main entrance of each school and that identify the school and its accompanying grounds as a school safety zone. A school may include information regarding the school safety zone boundaries on a sign that identifies the area as a drug free zone and not post separate school safety zone signs.
D. For the purposes of this section:
1. "School" means any public or nonpublic kindergarten program, common school or high school.
2. "School safety zone" means any of the following:
(a) The area within three hundred feet of a school or its accompanying grounds.
(b) Any public property within one thousand feet of a school or its accompanying grounds.
(c) Any school bus.
(d) A bus contracted to transport pupils to any school during the time when the contracted vehicle is transporting pupils on behalf of the school.
(e) A school bus stop.
(f) Any bus stop where school children are awaiting, boarding or exiting a bus contracted to transport pupils to any school.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
66
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1979–2021 · leading case:
State v. Reynolds, 823 P.2d 681 (Ariz. 1992).
State v. Reynolds, 823 P.2d 681 (Ariz. 1992).
· cites it 17× “The State of Arizona petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ opinion holding that a defendant is entitled to credit for time spent in a drug rehabilitation program as time spent “in custody” pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-709(B). We granted review to resolve a conflict between…”
State v. Cofield, 107 P.3d 930 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 18× “¶ 11 Whether Cofield is entitled to presentenee incarceration credit is determined by application of A.R.S. § 13-709(B) (2001): All time actually spent in custody pursuant to an offense until the prisoner is sentenced to imprisonment for such offense shall be credited against…”
State v. Cuen, 761 P.2d 160 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 18× “We agree that Cuen was not entitled to double credit A.R.S. § 13-709 reads in part: A. A sentence of imprisonment commences when sentence is imposed if the defendant is in custody or surrenders into custody at that time.”
State v. Ritch, 774 P.2d 234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 16× “STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF A.R.S. § 13-709 Resolution of this issue is governed by A.”
State v. Cruz-Mata, 674 P.2d 1368 (Ariz. 1983).
· cites it 10× “Renumbered as § 13-709 by Laws 1978, Ch. 201, § 104, eff.”
State v. San Miguel, 643 P.2d 1027 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
· cites it 20× “The problems associated with this case arise because the crime for which the defendant was placed on probation occurred prior to the enactment of A.R.S. § 13-709(B). 1 On the other hand, the crime which formed the basis for the revocation of his probation occurred after the…”
State v. Mathieu, 795 P.2d 1303 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 18× “Was the defendant denied equal protection when the trial court refused to give him credit for the 76 days spent in pretrial custody because he was unable to post bond? 3.”
State v. Pena, 683 P.2d 744 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 9× “The problem with this reasoning is that it contravenes A.R.S. § 13-709(A), which establishes the date of commencement of a sentence and places an unacceptably strained construction on the words “sentence or sentences for which the defendant was confined”.”
State v. Hamilton, 735 P.2d 854 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 10× “Sections (A) *246 and (B) of A.R.S. § 13-709 are complementary. Where the date sentence is imposed serves, as here, as the first day of sentence under § 13-709(A), it does not also count for presentence credit under § 13-709(B).”
State v. Sodders, 633 P.2d 432 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
· cites it 10× “Appellant relies on A.R.S. § 13-709(B), which states: All time actually spent in custody pursuant to an offense until the prisoner is sentenced to imprisonment for such offense shall be credited against the term of imprisonment otherwise provided for by this chapter.”
State v. Cereceres, 800 P.2d 1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 16× “It is commonly interchangeable with such terms as “imprisonment”, “jail”, “arrest”, and “detention”. Consequently, its meaning varies depending upon the construction of the particular statute under consideration.”
State v. Shattuck, 684 P.2d 154 (Ariz. 1984).
· cites it 2× “The offenses were committed on different dates. As part of the plea agreement allegations of prior convictions were dropped from the indictment (see A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-709(27) — 1 case
State v. Cuen, 761 P.2d 160 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
“We agree that Cuen was not entitled to double credit A.R.S. § 13-709 reads in part: A. A sentence of imprisonment commences when sentence is imposed if the defendant is in custody or surrenders into custody at that time.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-709(A) — 7 cases
State v. Pena, 683 P.2d 744 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
“The problem with this reasoning is that it contravenes A.R.S. § 13-709(A), which establishes the date of commencement of a sentence and places an unacceptably strained construction on the words “sentence or sentences for which the defendant was confined”.”
State v. Hamilton, 735 P.2d 854 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
“Sections (A) *246 and (B) of A.R.S. § 13-709 are complementary. Where the date sentence is imposed serves, as here, as the first day of sentence under § 13-709(A), it does not also count for presentence credit under § 13-709(B).”
State v. Cuen, 761 P.2d 160 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
“We agree that Cuen was not entitled to double credit A.R.S. § 13-709 reads in part: A. A sentence of imprisonment commences when sentence is imposed if the defendant is in custody or surrenders into custody at that time.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-709(B) — 53 cases
State v. Reynolds, 823 P.2d 681 (Ariz. 1992).
“The State of Arizona petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ opinion holding that a defendant is entitled to credit for time spent in a drug rehabilitation program as time spent “in custody” pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-709(B). We granted review to resolve a conflict between…”
State v. Cofield, 107 P.3d 930 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
“¶ 11 Whether Cofield is entitled to presentenee incarceration credit is determined by application of A.R.S. § 13-709(B) (2001): All time actually spent in custody pursuant to an offense until the prisoner is sentenced to imprisonment for such offense shall be credited against…”
State v. San Miguel, 643 P.2d 1027 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
“The problems associated with this case arise because the crime for which the defendant was placed on probation occurred prior to the enactment of A.R.S. § 13-709(B). 1 On the other hand, the crime which formed the basis for the revocation of his probation occurred after the…”
State v. Cruz-Mata, 674 P.2d 1368 (Ariz. 1983).
“Renumbered as § 13-709 by Laws 1978, Ch. 201, § 104, eff.”
State v. Sodders, 633 P.2d 432 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
“Appellant relies on A.R.S. § 13-709(B), which states: All time actually spent in custody pursuant to an offense until the prisoner is sentenced to imprisonment for such offense shall be credited against the term of imprisonment otherwise provided for by this chapter.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-709(C) — 8 cases
State v. Cuen, 761 P.2d 160 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
“We agree that Cuen was not entitled to double credit A.R.S. § 13-709 reads in part: A. A sentence of imprisonment commences when sentence is imposed if the defendant is in custody or surrenders into custody at that time.”
State v. Cofield, 107 P.3d 930 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
“¶ 11 Whether Cofield is entitled to presentenee incarceration credit is determined by application of A.R.S. § 13-709(B) (2001): All time actually spent in custody pursuant to an offense until the prisoner is sentenced to imprisonment for such offense shall be credited against…”
State v. Reynolds, 823 P.2d 681 (Ariz. 1992).
“The State of Arizona petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ opinion holding that a defendant is entitled to credit for time spent in a drug rehabilitation program as time spent “in custody” pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-709(B). We granted review to resolve a conflict between…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-709(D) — 3 cases
State v. Shattuck, 684 P.2d 154 (Ariz. 1984).
“The offenses were committed on different dates. As part of the plea agreement allegations of prior convictions were dropped from the indictment (see A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-709(c) — 1 case
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