Arizona Revised Statutes

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-712 (2026)

Calculation of terms of imprisonment

✓ current as of May 2026

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A. A sentence of imprisonment commences when sentence is imposed if the defendant is in custody or surrenders into custody at that time. Otherwise it commences when the defendant becomes actually in custody.

B. All time actually spent in custody pursuant to an offense until the prisoner is sentenced to imprisonment for such offense shall be credited against the term of imprisonment otherwise provided for by this chapter. A person who is found competent to stand trial after an involuntary commitment pursuant to section 13-4521 shall receive credit for all time that the person spent under the jurisdiction of the secure state mental health facility against a term of imprisonment for any of the charges that were the basis for the involuntary commitment.

C. If a sentence of imprisonment is vacated and a new sentence is imposed on the defendant for the same offense, the new sentence is calculated as if it had commenced at the time the vacated sentence was imposed, and all time served under the vacated sentence shall be credited against the new sentence.

D. If a person serving a sentence of imprisonment escapes from custody, the escape interrupts the sentence. The interruption continues until the person is apprehended and confined for the escape or is confined and subject to a detainer for the escape. Time spent in actual custody before return under this subsection shall be credited against the term authorized by law if custody rested on an arrest or surrender for the escape itself, or if the custody arose from an arrest on another charge which culminated in a dismissal or an acquittal, and the person was denied admission to bail pending disposition of that charge because of a warrant lodged against such person arising from the escape.

E. The sentencing court shall include the time of commencement of sentence under subsection A of this section and the computation of time credited against sentence under subsection B, C or D of this section in the original or an amended commitment order, under procedures established by rule of court.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 97 cases (30 in the last 5 years), 1970–2026 · leading case: State v. Hasson, 177 P.3d 301 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).

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State v. Hasson, 177 P.3d 301 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 16× “” Likewise, Defendant’s sentence could not be commuted because persons sentenced to flat-time pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-712 (as per the plea agreement) are not eligible to have their sentences commuted.”

State of Arizona v. David Soto Cecena, 334 P.3d 1282 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 12× “On appeal, he argues the trial court erred in refusing to grant him credit for time served during his presentence incarceration in Mexico pursuant to AR.S. § 13-712(B). For reasons set forth below, we remand this case for further fact finding as to whether his incarceration in…”

State Ex Rel. Purcell v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1299 (Ariz. 1975). · cites it 12× “A.R.S. § 13-712. The word “loitering” is used to describe a type of conduct which is proscribed when engaged in upon the private property of another, without the consent of or lawful business with the owner or occupant thereof.”

Khristina Lyn Shifflette v. Hon. Marner, 534 P.3d 101 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 13× “G A R D, Judge: ¶1 In this special action, petitioner Khristina Shifflette challenges the respondent judge’s ruling denying her request to receive credit under A.R.S. § 13-712(B) for time she spent in custody before sentencing.”

State v. Diaz, 213 P.3d 337 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 15× “§ 13-604 rather than A.R.S. § 13-712. 1 For the reasons stated below, we affirm his conviction but remand to the trial court for resentencing.”

State v. Sanders, 575 P.2d 822 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). · cites it 5× “Sanders was illegal because the criminal trespass statute A.R.S. § 13-712 was “apparently constitutionally infirm” by virtue of a United States District Court holding that is not otherwise specified in appellant’s briefs.”

State of Arizona v. Brandon Albert Seay, 302 P.3d 671 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 3× “in custody pursuant to” the charged offenses and entitled to credit under A.R.S. § 13-712(B). 1 A defendant is entitled to credit for “[a]ll time actually spent in custody pursuant to an offense until the prisoner is sentenced to imprisonment for such offense.”

Steven Lane Fuller v. State of Arizona, 314 P.3d 814 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 2× “¶ 14 Finally, unlike in criminal proceedings, where a person who is sentenced receives credit for any pretrial incarceration, see A.R.S. § 13-712(B); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 26.10(b)(2), and might thereby be made whole if ultimately convicted of the charges, a person subjected to civil…”

In Re the Appeal in Marcopa Cnty., Juv. Action No. J-75755, 523 P.2d 1304 (Ariz. 1974). · cites it 2× “§ 13-302(A) as: “ * * * entering a building, dwelling, house * * * with intent to commit grand or petty theft, or any felony, * * * » Under certain circumstances a burglary can be committed where the accused had the permission of the owner of the property to be there.”

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa Cnty., Juv. Action No. J-75755, 521 P.2d 641 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974). · cites it 32× “However, the only definition of trespass which the juvenile's conduct could possibly come within is found in A.R.S. § 13-712 (9). Since the juvenile court did not state which statutory definition of trespass he was relying upon, and since counsel did not question the propriety…”

State v. Burns, 298 P.3d 911 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 2× “See A.R.S. § 13-712(B) (West 2013) (defendant entitled to credit for all time spent in custody pursuant to an offense until the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for such offense).”

Susan Scheerer v. State of Arizona, 281 P.3d 491 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2× “See A.R.S. § 13-712(C) (“If a sentence of imprisonment is vacated and a new sentence is imposed on the defendant for the same offense, the new sentence is calculated as if it had commenced at the time the vacated sentence was imposed, and all time served under the vacated…”

Show all 97 citing cases →

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-712(11) — 1 case

State v. Sanders, 575 P.2d 822 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). “Sanders was illegal because the criminal trespass statute A.R.S. § 13-712 was “apparently constitutionally infirm” by virtue of a United States District Court holding that is not otherwise specified in appellant’s briefs.”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-712(9) — 5 cases

State Ex Rel. Purcell v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1299 (Ariz. 1975). “A.R.S. § 13-712. The word “loitering” is used to describe a type of conduct which is proscribed when engaged in upon the private property of another, without the consent of or lawful business with the owner or occupant thereof.”

In Re the Appeal in Marcopa Cnty., Juv. Action No. J-75755, 523 P.2d 1304 (Ariz. 1974). “§ 13-302(A) as: “ * * * entering a building, dwelling, house * * * with intent to commit grand or petty theft, or any felony, * * * » Under certain circumstances a burglary can be committed where the accused had the permission of the owner of the property to be there.”

In Re the Appeal in Maricopa Cnty., Juv. Action No. J-75755, 521 P.2d 641 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974). “However, the only definition of trespass which the juvenile's conduct could possibly come within is found in A.R.S. § 13-712 (9). Since the juvenile court did not state which statutory definition of trespass he was relying upon, and since counsel did not question the propriety…”

State v. Gomez, 466 P.2d 378 (Ariz. 1970).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-712(A) — 4 cases

State v. Hasson, 177 P.3d 301 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). “” Likewise, Defendant’s sentence could not be commuted because persons sentenced to flat-time pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-712 (as per the plea agreement) are not eligible to have their sentences commuted.”

State v. Garcia (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).

State v. Humelhans (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).

State v. Drew (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-712(B) — 82 cases

State of Arizona v. David Soto Cecena, 334 P.3d 1282 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). “On appeal, he argues the trial court erred in refusing to grant him credit for time served during his presentence incarceration in Mexico pursuant to AR.S. § 13-712(B). For reasons set forth below, we remand this case for further fact finding as to whether his incarceration in…”

Khristina Lyn Shifflette v. Hon. Marner, 534 P.3d 101 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023). “G A R D, Judge: ¶1 In this special action, petitioner Khristina Shifflette challenges the respondent judge’s ruling denying her request to receive credit under A.R.S. § 13-712(B) for time she spent in custody before sentencing.”

State of Arizona v. Brandon Albert Seay, 302 P.3d 671 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). “in custody pursuant to” the charged offenses and entitled to credit under A.R.S. § 13-712(B). 1 A defendant is entitled to credit for “[a]ll time actually spent in custody pursuant to an offense until the prisoner is sentenced to imprisonment for such offense.”

Steven Lane Fuller v. State of Arizona, 314 P.3d 814 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). “¶ 14 Finally, unlike in criminal proceedings, where a person who is sentenced receives credit for any pretrial incarceration, see A.R.S. § 13-712(B); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 26.10(b)(2), and might thereby be made whole if ultimately convicted of the charges, a person subjected to civil…”

State v. Burns, 298 P.3d 911 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013). “See A.R.S. § 13-712(B) (West 2013) (defendant entitled to credit for all time spent in custody pursuant to an offense until the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for such offense).”

— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-712(C) — 1 case

Susan Scheerer v. State of Arizona, 281 P.3d 491 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). “See A.R.S. § 13-712(C) (“If a sentence of imprisonment is vacated and a new sentence is imposed on the defendant for the same offense, the new sentence is calculated as if it had commenced at the time the vacated sentence was imposed, and all time served under the vacated…”

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