13-917. Modification of supervision
A. The adult probation officer shall periodically examine the risk and needs of each person granted intensive probation and the risks of modifying the level of supervision of the person. The court or the adult probation officer may at any time modify the level of intensive probation supervision of a person granted intensive probation. The court may transfer the person to standard probation or terminate the period of intensive probation pursuant to section 13-901, subsection E.
B. If a petition to revoke the grant of intensive probation is filed and the court finds that the person has committed an additional felony offense that posed a serious threat or danger to the community, the court shall revoke the grant of intensive probation and impose a term of imprisonment as authorized by law. If the court finds that the person has committed a violation of a condition of intensive probation that posed a serious threat or danger to the community, the court shall revoke the grant of intensive probation and impose a term of imprisonment as authorized by law. If the court finds that the person has violated any other condition of intensive probation, the court may modify the conditions of intensive probation or may revoke the grant of intensive probation and impose a term of imprisonment as authorized by law.
C. The court shall notify the parties, and the victim on request, of any proposed modification of the terms of a person's intensive probation if that modification will substantially affect the person's contact with or safety of the victim or if the modification involves restitution or incarceration status.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
14
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1970–2024 · leading case:
State v. Botkin, 200 P.3d 323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
State v. Botkin, 200 P.3d 323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 156× “¶ 13 The relevant portions of A.R.S. § 13-917 provide: A. The adult probation officer shall periodically examine the needs of each person granted intensive probation and the risks of modifying the level of supervision of the person.”
State v. Taylor, 931 P.2d 1077 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 12× “Although the parties have either missed or ignored this distinction in both the trial court and this court, we conclude that it is fundamental error.”
State v. Botkin, 209 P.3d 137 (Ariz. 2009).
· cites it 29× “¶ 12 This case involves the intersection of two subsections of A.R.S. § 13-917. Subsection (A) provides that the trial court may transfer a person from intensive to supervised probation “at any time.”
State v. Hensley, 31 P.3d 848 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 4× “A.R.S. § 13-917(B) (Supp.2000). No statute authorizes the court to terminate probation as unsuccessful, as it did in this case.”
State v. Smith, 12 P.3d 243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 14× “¶ 11 Defendant argues as a fallback that the trial court had the authority, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-917(A), to terminate his intensive probation before reinstating him and thereby to circumvent § 13-917(B)’s mandatory incarceration provisions.”
State v. Thomas, 996 P.2d 113 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 3× “§§ 13-913 through 13-917 controlled and that § 13-917(B) required the court to revoke appellant’s probation because he committed a new felony by using cocaine, in violation of A.”
State v. Russell, 249 P.3d 1116 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 16× “Thus, the court did not err in finding Russell's use of marijuana was a felony offense and in imposing a mandatory prison sentence pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-917(B). Accordingly, we affirm.”
State of Arizona v. Lee L.N., 340 P.3d 1085 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 2× “2011), this court concluded the trial court had not erred by revoking the probation of a defendant on intensive probation, as required by A.R.S. § 13-917(B), based on his having used marijuana, a class six felony, notwithstanding the possibility that under § 13-604(A), a court…”
State v. Jones, 995 P.2d 742 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 5× “” ¶ 8 The State argues that the interpretation we give the statute repeals section 13-917 or renders it “superfluous, void, contradictory, or insignificant.”
State v. Andrews, 476 P.2d 673 (Ariz. 1970).
· cites it 3× “He made a motion before the trial to quash the information upon the grounds that it constituted double jeopardy in that he had previously pleaded guilty to a violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-917 and 13-917.01 which makes it a misdemeanor to recklessly or carelessly handle a firearm, or…”
State v. McFord, 475 P.2d 758 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970).
· cites it 2× “” Appellant argues that there was no specific violation of the terms of his probation and no specific violation of A.”
State v. Selby (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024).
· cites it 2× “See A.R.S. § 13-917(B) (permitting the superior court to revoke probation and impose a prison term allowed by law).”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-917(A) — 3 cases
State v. Botkin, 200 P.3d 323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
“¶ 13 The relevant portions of A.R.S. § 13-917 provide: A. The adult probation officer shall periodically examine the needs of each person granted intensive probation and the risks of modifying the level of supervision of the person.”
State v. Botkin, 209 P.3d 137 (Ariz. 2009).
“¶ 12 This case involves the intersection of two subsections of A.R.S. § 13-917. Subsection (A) provides that the trial court may transfer a person from intensive to supervised probation “at any time.”
State v. Smith, 12 P.3d 243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
“¶ 11 Defendant argues as a fallback that the trial court had the authority, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-917(A), to terminate his intensive probation before reinstating him and thereby to circumvent § 13-917(B)’s mandatory incarceration provisions.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-917(B) — 11 cases
State v. Botkin, 200 P.3d 323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
“¶ 13 The relevant portions of A.R.S. § 13-917 provide: A. The adult probation officer shall periodically examine the needs of each person granted intensive probation and the risks of modifying the level of supervision of the person.”
State v. Taylor, 931 P.2d 1077 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
“Although the parties have either missed or ignored this distinction in both the trial court and this court, we conclude that it is fundamental error.”
State v. Hensley, 31 P.3d 848 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
“A.R.S. § 13-917(B) (Supp.2000). No statute authorizes the court to terminate probation as unsuccessful, as it did in this case.”
State v. Botkin, 209 P.3d 137 (Ariz. 2009).
“¶ 12 This case involves the intersection of two subsections of A.R.S. § 13-917. Subsection (A) provides that the trial court may transfer a person from intensive to supervised probation “at any time.”
State v. Smith, 12 P.3d 243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
“¶ 11 Defendant argues as a fallback that the trial court had the authority, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-917(A), to terminate his intensive probation before reinstating him and thereby to circumvent § 13-917(B)’s mandatory incarceration provisions.”
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