A. Unless prohibited by order of the court and except for estates being administered in supervised administration proceedings, a personal representative may close an estate by filing with the court no earlier than four months after the date of original appointment of a general personal representative for the estate a verified statement stating that the personal representative, or a previous personal representative has:
1. Determined that the time limit for presentation of creditors' claims has expired.
2. Fully administered the estate of the decedent by making payment, settlement or other disposition of all claims that were presented, expenses of administration and estate, inheritance and other death taxes, except as specified in the statement, and that the assets of the estate have been distributed to the persons entitled. If any claims remain undischarged, the statement shall state whether the personal representative has distributed the estate subject to possible liability with the agreement of the distributees or it shall state in detail other arrangements that have been made to accommodate outstanding liabilities.
3. Sent a copy of the statement to all distributees of the estate and to all creditors or other claimants of whom the personal representative is aware whose claims are neither paid nor barred and has furnished a full account in writing of the personal representative's administration to the distributees whose interests are affected thereby.
B. If no proceedings involving the personal representative are pending in the court one year after the closing statement is filed, the appointment of the personal representative terminates.
Notes of Decisions
Marianne Waldow v. James Laporta, 246 P.3d 628 (Ariz. 2010).
· cites it 2× “The personal representative or other interested parties may petition the court for instructions or other determinations in a “formal proceeding” when necessary.”
Tovrea v. Nolan, 875 P.2d 144 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 2× “Appellees contend that because Tovrea’s will did not directly devise any assets to appellants and because they had already received “all to which they were entitled,” by way of their individual trust distributions, appellants were neither “distributees” nor were their "interests…”
In Re Est. of Mcgathy, 246 P.3d 628 (Ariz. 2010).
· cites it 2× “The personal representative or other interested parties may petition the court for instructions or other determinations in a "formal proceeding" when necessary.”
In Re the Est. of ELLIOT GOLDMAN, 158 P.3d 892 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 2× “” A.R.S. § 14-3933(A)(2), (3). Although the parties agree a PR is not statutorily obligated to file a supplementary inventory or interim accounting whenever the value of estate assets changes, the requirements in §§ 14-3708 and 14-3933 are at least consistent with the view that…”
Gordon v. Est. of Brooks, 397 P.3d 1040 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 8× “§ 14-3803(C) (2012), A.R.S. § 14-3933 (2012), and A.R.S. § 14-3936 (2012) all barred Gordon’s Personal Liability Claims.”
Meyer v. Mikolay, 987 P.2d 822 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 2× “S § 14-3931 (no petition for an order of complete settlement may be entertained until the time for presenting claims which arose prior to death of decedent has expired); and A.R.S § 14-3933 (personal representative may close estate no earlier than four months after appointment…”
Claxton v. Brooks (Ariz. Ct. App. 2026).
· cites it 2× “Whether construed as a general challenge to administration or as a claim of fiduciary breach, the motion is untimely under both A.R.S. § 14-3933(B) and § 14-3935. The statutory deadlines operate independently but concurrently, and the movant failed to initiate proceedings within…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 14-3933(A)(2) — 1 case
In Re the Est. of ELLIOT GOLDMAN, 158 P.3d 892 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
“” A.R.S. § 14-3933(A)(2), (3). Although the parties agree a PR is not statutorily obligated to file a supplementary inventory or interim accounting whenever the value of estate assets changes, the requirements in §§ 14-3708 and 14-3933 are at least consistent with the view that…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 14-3933(A)(3) — 1 case
Tovrea v. Nolan, 875 P.2d 144 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
“Appellees contend that because Tovrea’s will did not directly devise any assets to appellants and because they had already received “all to which they were entitled,” by way of their individual trust distributions, appellants were neither “distributees” nor were their "interests…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 14-3933(B) — 2 cases
Gordon v. Est. of Brooks, 397 P.3d 1040 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
“§ 14-3803(C) (2012), A.R.S. § 14-3933 (2012), and A.R.S. § 14-3936 (2012) all barred Gordon’s Personal Liability Claims.”
Claxton v. Brooks (Ariz. Ct. App. 2026).
“Whether construed as a general challenge to administration or as a claim of fiduciary breach, the motion is untimely under both A.R.S. § 14-3933(B) and § 14-3935. The statutory deadlines operate independently but concurrently, and the movant failed to initiate proceedings within…”
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