A. In any action under the statutes of this state or under common law, constructive discharge may only be established by either of the following:
1. Evidence of objectively difficult or unpleasant working conditions to the extent that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign, if the employer has been given at least fifteen days' notice by the employee that the employee intends to resign because of these conditions and the employer fails to respond to the employee's concerns.
2. Evidence of outrageous conduct by the employer or a managing agent of the employer, including sexual assault, threats of violence directed at the employee, a continuous pattern of discriminatory harassment by the employer or by a managing agent of the employer or other similar kinds of conduct, if the conduct would cause a reasonable employee to feel compelled to resign.
B. As a precondition to the right of an employee to bring a constructive discharge claim against an employer pursuant to subsection A, paragraph 1 of this section, the employee shall take each of the following actions before deciding whether to resign:
1. Notify an appropriate representative of the employer, in writing, that a working condition exists that the employee believes is objectively so difficult or unpleasant that the employee feels compelled to resign or intends to resign.
2. Allow the employer fifteen calendar days to respond in writing to the matters presented in the employee's written communication under paragraph 1 of this subsection.
3. Read and consider the employer's response to the employee's written communication under paragraph 1 of this subsection.
C. If an employee reasonably believes that the employee cannot continue to work during the period for the employer to respond to the employee's written communication regarding the conditions allegedly constituting constructive discharge, the employee is entitled to a paid or unpaid leave of up to fifteen calendar days or until the time when the employer has responded in writing to the employee's written communication, whichever occurs first.
D. Any communications or actions by an employer in response to an employee's communications about the employee's working conditions shall not be deemed an admission by the employer that it has committed any action that gives rise to any claim or cause of action by the employee against the employer.
E. An employer shall be deemed to have waived the right to notice under subsection A, paragraph 1 if the employer fails to provide written notice to its employees of the requirements of this section as follows:
1. Notice by the employer under this section shall be provided by the posting of a notice, substantially in the form set forth in paragraph 2 of this subsection, in conspicuous places on the employer's premises where notices to employees are customarily posted, by including substantially similar language in an employment handbook or policy manual that is distributed to employees or by including the notice in a written communication that is provided to employees.
2. A notice that is substantially in the following form satisfies the notice requirements of this section:
Notice
An Employee is encouraged to communicate to the employer whenever the employee believes working conditions may become intolerable to the employee and may cause the employee to resign. Under section 23-1502, Arizona Revised Statutes, an employee may be required to notify an appropriate representative of the employer in writing that a working condition exists that the employee believes is intolerable, that will compel the employee to resign or that constitutes a constructive discharge, if the employee wants to preserve the right to bring a claim against the employer alleging that the working condition forced the employee to resign.
Under the law, an employee may be required to wait for fifteen calendar days after providing written notice before the employee may resign if the employee desires to preserve the right to bring a constructive discharge claim against the employer. An employee may be entitled to paid or unpaid leave of absence of up to fifteen calendar days while waiting for the employer to respond to the employee's written communication about the employee's working condition.
F. Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, an employee may bring a constructive discharge claim without prior written notice in the event of outrageous conduct by the employer or by a managing agent of the employer including sexual assault, threats of violence directed at the employee, a continuous pattern of discriminatory harassment by the employer or by a managing agent of the employer or other conduct if the conduct would cause a reasonable employee to feel compelled to resign.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
29
cases (
13 in the last 5 years), 2003–2025 · leading case:
Barth v. Cochise Cnty., 138 P.3d 1186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
Barth v. Cochise Cnty., 138 P.3d 1186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 21× “He contends the court erred in finding that, for claims of constructive discharge of county employees, *61 A.R.S. § 23-1502, 1 governing such actions, does not supersede A.”
Peterson v. Surprise, 418 P.3d 1020 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 9× “A.R.S. § 23-1502(A) (2018). The parties agree, however, that although constructive discharge may transform a resignation into a discharge, by itself, it does not afford an employee a remedy.”
Farina v. Compuware Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Ariz. 2003).
· cites it 4× “Plaintiffs letter would arguably comply with the fifteen-day notice requirement of Arizona’s constructive discharge statute, A.R.S. § 23-1502, which provides that constructive discharge can be established by “[e]vi-dence of objectively difficult or unpleasant working conditions…”
Day v. LSI Corp., 174 F. Supp. 3d 1130 (D. Ariz. 2016).
· cites it 2× “Evidence of outrageous conduct by the employer or a managing agent of the employer, including sexual assault, threats of violence directed at the employee, a continuous pattern of discriminatory harassment by the employer or by a managing agent of the employer or other similar…”
Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Redlon, 156 P.3d 430 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 3× “And, as ADES points out in its answering brief, A.R.S. § 23-1502 sets forth the factors an employee must establish to demonstrate his or her resignation was, in fact, a constructive discharge.”
Worldwide Jet v. Christian (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 35× “Worldwide argued the court should dismiss the counterclaim and grant summary judgment in its favor because (1) the counterclaim was really a common law claim for constructive discharge that was superseded by § 23-1502 of the AEPA, (2) even if Christian had properly asserted a…”
McNicol v. DMB Sports Clubs LP (D. Ariz. 2020).
· cites it 24× “6, 2012) (assuming by 11 defendant’s disregard of § 23-1502 that they either did not give the employment notice 12 required by § 23-1502(E), or they gave the notice and plaintiff complied with the 15-days’ 13 notice requirement).”
Cramton v. Grabbagreen Franchising LLC (D. Ariz. 2019).
· cites it 10× “1982) (finding no 25 constructive discharge when employee was screamed at by her supervisor, perceived a 26 “great deal of tension in the air,” had her desk given to a new employee, and received no 27 24 28 In contrast, A.R.S. § 23-1502 does not control whether Cramton was…”
Curtis v. Century Sur. Co., 320 F. App'x 546 (9th Cir. 2009).
“Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 23-1502(B). The statute provides an exception to the fifteen day notice requirement “in the event of outrageous conduct by the employer .”
Self v. Higher Logic (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 6× “Decision of the Court 2018) (internal quotations omitted); A.R.S. § 23-1502. To bring a claim of constructive discharge based on “objectively difficult or unpleasant working conditions,” an employee must follow the notice procedures of A.”
Udd v. Phoenix, City of (D. Ariz. 2021).
· cites it 6× “)2 21 According to the City, Darren’s initial theory of liability in this case was that he was 22 pursuing a standalone state-law claim for constructive discharge under A.R.S. § 23-1502, 23 but after the Court noted in the summary judgment order that Arizona law does not 24…”
Pearlmutter v. Coconino, Cnty. of (D. Ariz. 2022).
· cites it 6× “And he makes no attempt at invoking the second way of 26 establishing constructive discharge, nor has he presented the Court with evidence of the kind of “outrageous” conduct contemplated by the Arizona statute.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1502(A) — 12 cases
Day v. LSI Corp., 174 F. Supp. 3d 1130 (D. Ariz. 2016).
“Evidence of outrageous conduct by the employer or a managing agent of the employer, including sexual assault, threats of violence directed at the employee, a continuous pattern of discriminatory harassment by the employer or by a managing agent of the employer or other similar…”
Peterson v. Surprise, 418 P.3d 1020 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
“A.R.S. § 23-1502(A) (2018). The parties agree, however, that although constructive discharge may transform a resignation into a discharge, by itself, it does not afford an employee a remedy.”
Worldwide Jet v. Christian (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023).
“Worldwide argued the court should dismiss the counterclaim and grant summary judgment in its favor because (1) the counterclaim was really a common law claim for constructive discharge that was superseded by § 23-1502 of the AEPA, (2) even if Christian had properly asserted a…”
Pearlmutter v. Coconino, Cnty. of (D. Ariz. 2022).
“And he makes no attempt at invoking the second way of 26 establishing constructive discharge, nor has he presented the Court with evidence of the kind of “outrageous” conduct contemplated by the Arizona statute.”
Cramton v. Grabbagreen Franchising LLC (D. Ariz. 2019).
“1982) (finding no 25 constructive discharge when employee was screamed at by her supervisor, perceived a 26 “great deal of tension in the air,” had her desk given to a new employee, and received no 27 24 28 In contrast, A.R.S. § 23-1502 does not control whether Cramton was…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1502(A)(1) — 7 cases
Peterson v. Surprise, 418 P.3d 1020 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
“A.R.S. § 23-1502(A) (2018). The parties agree, however, that although constructive discharge may transform a resignation into a discharge, by itself, it does not afford an employee a remedy.”
McNicol v. DMB Sports Clubs LP (D. Ariz. 2020).
“6, 2012) (assuming by 11 defendant’s disregard of § 23-1502 that they either did not give the employment notice 12 required by § 23-1502(E), or they gave the notice and plaintiff complied with the 15-days’ 13 notice requirement).”
Worldwide Jet v. Christian (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023).
“Worldwide argued the court should dismiss the counterclaim and grant summary judgment in its favor because (1) the counterclaim was really a common law claim for constructive discharge that was superseded by § 23-1502 of the AEPA, (2) even if Christian had properly asserted a…”
Udd v. Phoenix, City of (D. Ariz. 2021).
“)2 21 According to the City, Darren’s initial theory of liability in this case was that he was 22 pursuing a standalone state-law claim for constructive discharge under A.R.S. § 23-1502, 23 but after the Court noted in the summary judgment order that Arizona law does not 24…”
Cramton v. Grabbagreen Franchising LLC (D. Ariz. 2019).
“1982) (finding no 25 constructive discharge when employee was screamed at by her supervisor, perceived a 26 “great deal of tension in the air,” had her desk given to a new employee, and received no 27 24 28 In contrast, A.R.S. § 23-1502 does not control whether Cramton was…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1502(A)(2) — 6 cases
Peterson v. Surprise, 418 P.3d 1020 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
“A.R.S. § 23-1502(A) (2018). The parties agree, however, that although constructive discharge may transform a resignation into a discharge, by itself, it does not afford an employee a remedy.”
McNicol v. DMB Sports Clubs LP (D. Ariz. 2020).
“6, 2012) (assuming by 11 defendant’s disregard of § 23-1502 that they either did not give the employment notice 12 required by § 23-1502(E), or they gave the notice and plaintiff complied with the 15-days’ 13 notice requirement).”
Self v. Higher Logic (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020).
“Decision of the Court 2018) (internal quotations omitted); A.R.S. § 23-1502. To bring a claim of constructive discharge based on “objectively difficult or unpleasant working conditions,” an employee must follow the notice procedures of A.”
Worldwide Jet v. Christian (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023).
“Worldwide argued the court should dismiss the counterclaim and grant summary judgment in its favor because (1) the counterclaim was really a common law claim for constructive discharge that was superseded by § 23-1502 of the AEPA, (2) even if Christian had properly asserted a…”
Cramton v. Grabbagreen Franchising LLC (D. Ariz. 2019).
“1982) (finding no 25 constructive discharge when employee was screamed at by her supervisor, perceived a 26 “great deal of tension in the air,” had her desk given to a new employee, and received no 27 24 28 In contrast, A.R.S. § 23-1502 does not control whether Cramton was…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1502(A)(l) — 1 case
Farina v. Compuware Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Ariz. 2003).
“Plaintiffs letter would arguably comply with the fifteen-day notice requirement of Arizona’s constructive discharge statute, A.R.S. § 23-1502, which provides that constructive discharge can be established by “[e]vi-dence of objectively difficult or unpleasant working conditions…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1502(B) — 7 cases
Barth v. Cochise Cnty., 138 P.3d 1186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
“He contends the court erred in finding that, for claims of constructive discharge of county employees, *61 A.R.S. § 23-1502, 1 governing such actions, does not supersede A.”
Curtis v. Century Sur. Co., 320 F. App'x 546 (9th Cir. 2009).
“Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 23-1502(B). The statute provides an exception to the fifteen day notice requirement “in the event of outrageous conduct by the employer .”
Worldwide Jet v. Christian (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023).
“Worldwide argued the court should dismiss the counterclaim and grant summary judgment in its favor because (1) the counterclaim was really a common law claim for constructive discharge that was superseded by § 23-1502 of the AEPA, (2) even if Christian had properly asserted a…”
Self v. Higher Logic (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020).
“Decision of the Court 2018) (internal quotations omitted); A.R.S. § 23-1502. To bring a claim of constructive discharge based on “objectively difficult or unpleasant working conditions,” an employee must follow the notice procedures of A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1502(B)(2) — 1 case
Barth v. Cochise Cnty., 138 P.3d 1186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
“He contends the court erred in finding that, for claims of constructive discharge of county employees, *61 A.R.S. § 23-1502, 1 governing such actions, does not supersede A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1502(B)(l) — 1 case
Barth v. Cochise Cnty., 138 P.3d 1186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
“He contends the court erred in finding that, for claims of constructive discharge of county employees, *61 A.R.S. § 23-1502, 1 governing such actions, does not supersede A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1502(C) — 1 case
Barth v. Cochise Cnty., 138 P.3d 1186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
“He contends the court erred in finding that, for claims of constructive discharge of county employees, *61 A.R.S. § 23-1502, 1 governing such actions, does not supersede A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1502(E) — 4 cases
McNicol v. DMB Sports Clubs LP (D. Ariz. 2020).
“6, 2012) (assuming by 11 defendant’s disregard of § 23-1502 that they either did not give the employment notice 12 required by § 23-1502(E), or they gave the notice and plaintiff complied with the 15-days’ 13 notice requirement).”
Worldwide Jet v. Christian (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023).
“Worldwide argued the court should dismiss the counterclaim and grant summary judgment in its favor because (1) the counterclaim was really a common law claim for constructive discharge that was superseded by § 23-1502 of the AEPA, (2) even if Christian had properly asserted a…”
Cramton v. Grabbagreen Franchising LLC (D. Ariz. 2019).
“1982) (finding no 25 constructive discharge when employee was screamed at by her supervisor, perceived a 26 “great deal of tension in the air,” had her desk given to a new employee, and received no 27 24 28 In contrast, A.R.S. § 23-1502 does not control whether Cramton was…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1502(E)(2) — 1 case
McNicol v. DMB Sports Clubs LP (D. Ariz. 2020).
“6, 2012) (assuming by 11 defendant’s disregard of § 23-1502 that they either did not give the employment notice 12 required by § 23-1502(E), or they gave the notice and plaintiff complied with the 15-days’ 13 notice requirement).”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1502(F) — 2 cases
Worldwide Jet v. Christian (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023).
“Worldwide argued the court should dismiss the counterclaim and grant summary judgment in its favor because (1) the counterclaim was really a common law claim for constructive discharge that was superseded by § 23-1502 of the AEPA, (2) even if Christian had properly asserted a…”
McNicol v. DMB Sports Clubs LP (D. Ariz. 2020).
“6, 2012) (assuming by 11 defendant’s disregard of § 23-1502 that they either did not give the employment notice 12 required by § 23-1502(E), or they gave the notice and plaintiff complied with the 15-days’ 13 notice requirement).”
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