A. A covenant, clause or understanding in, collateral to or affecting a construction contract or architect-engineer professional service contract that purports to indemnify, to hold harmless or to defend the promisee from or against liability for loss or damage resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee or the promisee's agents, employees or indemnitee is against the public policy of this state and is void.
B. Notwithstanding subsection A, a contractor who is responsible for the performance of a construction contract may fully indemnify a person for whose account the construction contract is not being performed and who, as an accommodation, enters into an agreement with the contractor that permits the contractor to enter on or adjacent to its property to perform the construction contract for others.
C. This section applies to all contracts entered into between private parties. This section does not apply to:
1. Agreements to which this state or a political subdivision of this state is a party, including intergovernmental agreements and agreements governed by sections 34-226 and 41-2586.
2. Agreements entered into by agricultural improvement districts under title 48, chapter 17.
D. In this section:
1. "Architect-engineer professional service contract" means a written or oral agreement relating to the design, design-build, construction administration, study, evaluation or other professional services furnished in connection with any actual or proposed construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, moving, demolition or excavation of any structure, street or roadway, appurtenance or other development or improvement to land.
2. "Construction contract" means a written or oral agreement relating to the construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, moving, demolition or excavation or other development or improvement to land.
Notes of Decisions
1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. Wlb Grp., Inc., 196 P.3d 222 (Ariz. 2008).
· cites it 10× “A.R.S. § 32-1159 (2008); see also A.R.S. § 34-226 (2000) (similar provision regarding contracts for construction or improvement of public buildings).”
1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. Wlb Grp., Inc., 176 P.3d 33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 17× “¶ 14 Ocotillo next contends that A.R.S. § 32-1159 (2002) reflects a public policy against enforcement of limitation-of-liability provisions in construction contracts and architect-engineer professional service contracts, like the Contract at issue in this case.”
Hunter Contracting Co. v. Sanner Contracting Co., 492 P.2d 735 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
· cites it 5× “Furthermore, appellant contends that the trial court could properly determine the validity of Sanner’s license prior to any action by the Registrar of Contractors under A.R.S. § 32-1159, subsec. E which states: “The suspension or cancellation of a license as provided in this…”
James v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2007).
· cites it 37× “The Motion will be denied because there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Arizona’s anti-indemnity statute, A.R.S. § 32-1159, voids A-Ceco’s promise to indemnify, and because BNSF’s remaining grounds for summary judgment are without merit.”
Sarwark v. Thorneycroft, 596 P.2d 1173 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).
· cites it 2× “§ 32-554; Contractors, A.R.S. § 32-1159; and Accountants, A.R.S.”
Rhodes v. Clark, 373 P.2d 348 (Ariz. 1962).
· cites it 2× “” The only procedure for review of the decisions of the Registrar of Contractors is set out in A.R.S. § 32-1159. This section appears in Art.”
Long v. Mertz, 407 P.2d 404 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965).
“Section 32-1159, subsec. C of the Arizona Revised Statutes, concerning appeals from the decisions of the Registrar of Contractors specifically provides that the order or decision shall remain in effect pending final determination of the matter unless the person appealing files…”
James v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2007).
· cites it 40× “The Motion will be denied because there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Arizona's anti-indemnity statute, A.R.S. § 32-1159, voids A-Ceco's promise to indemnify, and because BNSF's remaining grounds for summary judgment are without merit.”
Meyer v. Campbell, 480 P.2d 22 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971).
“…; § 32-1857, subsec. B, as amended (Osteopathic Physicians); § 32-354 (Barbers) ; § 32-1054 (Collection Agencies); §§ 32-1159 and 32-1160 (Contractors); § 32-1453, as amended (Physicians) ; § 32-1554 (Naturopathic Physicians) ; § 32-1665 (Nurses). Other code sections…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-1159(A) — 3 cases
1800 Ocotillo, LLC v. Wlb Grp., Inc., 176 P.3d 33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
“¶ 14 Ocotillo next contends that A.R.S. § 32-1159 (2002) reflects a public policy against enforcement of limitation-of-liability provisions in construction contracts and architect-engineer professional service contracts, like the Contract at issue in this case.”
James v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2007).
“The Motion will be denied because there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Arizona’s anti-indemnity statute, A.R.S. § 32-1159, voids A-Ceco’s promise to indemnify, and because BNSF’s remaining grounds for summary judgment are without merit.”
James v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2007).
“The Motion will be denied because there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Arizona's anti-indemnity statute, A.R.S. § 32-1159, voids A-Ceco's promise to indemnify, and because BNSF's remaining grounds for summary judgment are without merit.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-1159(C) — 2 cases
James v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2007).
“The Motion will be denied because there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Arizona’s anti-indemnity statute, A.R.S. § 32-1159, voids A-Ceco’s promise to indemnify, and because BNSF’s remaining grounds for summary judgment are without merit.”
James v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2007).
“The Motion will be denied because there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Arizona's anti-indemnity statute, A.R.S. § 32-1159, voids A-Ceco's promise to indemnify, and because BNSF's remaining grounds for summary judgment are without merit.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-1159(D) — 2 cases
James v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2007).
“The Motion will be denied because there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Arizona's anti-indemnity statute, A.R.S. § 32-1159, voids A-Ceco's promise to indemnify, and because BNSF's remaining grounds for summary judgment are without merit.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-1159(D)(2) — 3 cases
James v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2007).
“The Motion will be denied because there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Arizona’s anti-indemnity statute, A.R.S. § 32-1159, voids A-Ceco’s promise to indemnify, and because BNSF’s remaining grounds for summary judgment are without merit.”
James v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz. 2007).
“The Motion will be denied because there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Arizona's anti-indemnity statute, A.R.S. § 32-1159, voids A-Ceco's promise to indemnify, and because BNSF's remaining grounds for summary judgment are without merit.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-1159(D)(l) — 1 case
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