In this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
1. "Appeal" means a hearing before a state or local merit board, a civil service board, an administrative law judge or a hearing officer.
2. "At will" means an employment relationship where either party to the relationship may sever the relationship at any time for any reason other than an unlawful reason.
3. "Disciplinary action" means the dismissal, the demotion or any suspension of a law enforcement officer that is a result of misconduct or unsatisfactory performance.
4. "Excusable neglect" means neglect or inadvertence that might be the act of a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances.
5. "Good faith" means honesty of purpose and absence of intent to defraud.
6. "Investigative file" means the law enforcement agency's complete report and any attachments detailing the incidents leading to the disciplinary action, including complaints, audio recordings, video recordings, photographs, witness statements and exculpatory and mitigating evidence.
7. "Just cause" means:
(a) The employer informed the law enforcement officer of the possible disciplinary action resulting from the officer's conduct through agency manuals, employee handbooks, the employer's rules and regulations or other communications to the officer or the conduct was such that the officer should have reasonably known disciplinary action could occur.
(b) The disciplinary action is reasonably related to the standards of conduct for a professional law enforcement officer, the mission of the agency, the orderly, efficient or safe operation of the agency or the officer's fitness for duty.
(c) The discipline is supported by a preponderance of evidence that the conduct occurred.
(d) The discipline is not excessive and is reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and the officer's service record.
8. "Law enforcement officer" means:
(a) An individual, other than a probationary employee, who is certified by the Arizona peace officer standards and training board, other than a person employed by a multi-county water conservation district.
(b) A detention or corrections officer, other than a probationary employee or juvenile detention officer, who is employed by this state or a political subdivision of this state.
(c) A nonprobationary regularly appointed and paid deputy sheriff of a county.
(d) A nonprobationary regularly employed police officer in a city or town.
Notes of Decisions
Lewis v. Arizona State Pers. Bd., 379 P.3d 227 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 12× “We concluded that a law enforcement officer within the meaning of A.R.S. § 38-1101 "is afforded additional statutory protections—namely, restriction upon the circumstances under which the employing agency may reject the Board’s decision—which are not contained in Title 41.”
Stant v. City of Maricopa Emp. Merit Bd., 319 P.3d 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 2× “128, § 1, the city took no such action here. To the extent the board made a decision, the city upheld and affirmed it.”
MacKenzie v. Neidorf (In Re Neidorf), 534 B.R. 369 (9th Cir. BAP 2015).
“In Schedule C, Debtor claimed an exemption in the property for $150,000 under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101 (A). In Schedule D, Debtor showed the property was encumbered by three liens, including a first position deed of trust in favor of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.”
McSo v. McLeo (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 10× “See A.R.S. §§ 38-1101(A), (P)(2), -1105(B). But MCSO offers no factual support for this argument beyond Lopez’ testimony that “[a]ssuming no prior discipline,” the failure to properly handle evidence “typically” results in a written reprimand.”
Nyswaner v. Adc (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 12× “Nyswaner also contends the “specific statute,” A.R.S. § 38-1101, controls the “general rule” 5 The legislature revised and renumbered § 38-1101 effective August 2, 2012.”
Derek D. Fraser v. State of Arizona (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025).
· cites it 6× “He alleged that his termination was retaliatory and that policy and procedure violations had occurred during the disciplinary process, in violation of his due-process rights and the Peace Officers Bill of Rights, A.R.S. §§ 38-1101 to 38-1120. He also alleged that he had been…”
Melendres v. Skinner (D. Ariz. 2024).
· cites it 4× “1765 ¶ 223); see A.R.S. §38-1101(3). 16 This at least suggests the possibility that the MCSO has been removing cases from 17 the backlog without complying with the notification requirements contained in the Peace 18 Officer’s Bill of Rights and which notification standard police…”
Melendres v. Skinner (D. Ariz. 2024).
· cites it 4× “1765 ¶ 223); see A.R.S. §38-1101(3). 16 This at least suggests the possibility that the MCSO has been removing cases from 17 the backlog without complying with the notification requirements contained in the Peace 18 Officer’s Bill of Rights and which notification standard police…”
Minor v. Scottsdale (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 3× “¶3 In accordance with Arizona’s Peace Officers Bill of Rights (POBR), A.R.S. §§ 38-1101 through -1120, which governs the administrative review of disciplinary actions involving law enforcement officers, and Scottsdale Revised Code (S.”
McMichael-gombar v. Phoenix Civil Serv. (Ariz. 2023).
· cites it 3× “When addressing discipline imposed on police officers, the Board is also bound by the “peace officers bill of rights” (“POBR”), which provides minimum rights for all peace officers in Arizona.”
Collins (D. Ariz. 2025).
· cites it 3× “Plaintiffs invoke the Peace Officers Bill of Rights (“the POBR”) enacted by 18 the Arizona Legislature at A.R.S. § 38-1101 et seq. which, among other things, protects 19 law enforcement officers, with limited exceptions, from disciplinary action without just 20 cause.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101(1) — 1 case
Lewis v. Arizona State Pers. Bd., 379 P.3d 227 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“We concluded that a law enforcement officer within the meaning of A.R.S. § 38-1101 "is afforded additional statutory protections—namely, restriction upon the circumstances under which the employing agency may reject the Board’s decision—which are not contained in Title 41.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101(3) — 3 cases
Melendres v. Skinner (D. Ariz. 2024).
“1765 ¶ 223); see A.R.S. §38-1101(3). 16 This at least suggests the possibility that the MCSO has been removing cases from 17 the backlog without complying with the notification requirements contained in the Peace 18 Officer’s Bill of Rights and which notification standard police…”
Melendres v. Skinner (D. Ariz. 2024).
“1765 ¶ 223); see A.R.S. §38-1101(3). 16 This at least suggests the possibility that the MCSO has been removing cases from 17 the backlog without complying with the notification requirements contained in the Peace 18 Officer’s Bill of Rights and which notification standard police…”
Collins (D. Ariz. 2025).
“Plaintiffs invoke the Peace Officers Bill of Rights (“the POBR”) enacted by 18 the Arizona Legislature at A.R.S. § 38-1101 et seq. which, among other things, protects 19 law enforcement officers, with limited exceptions, from disciplinary action without just 20 cause.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101(7) — 2 cases
McMichael-gombar v. Phoenix Civil Serv. (Ariz. 2023).
“When addressing discipline imposed on police officers, the Board is also bound by the “peace officers bill of rights” (“POBR”), which provides minimum rights for all peace officers in Arizona.”
Derek D. Fraser v. State of Arizona (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025).
“He alleged that his termination was retaliatory and that policy and procedure violations had occurred during the disciplinary process, in violation of his due-process rights and the Peace Officers Bill of Rights, A.R.S. §§ 38-1101 to 38-1120. He also alleged that he had been…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101(7)(a) — 2 cases
Lewis v. Arizona State Pers. Bd., 379 P.3d 227 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“We concluded that a law enforcement officer within the meaning of A.R.S. § 38-1101 "is afforded additional statutory protections—namely, restriction upon the circumstances under which the employing agency may reject the Board’s decision—which are not contained in Title 41.”
Derek D. Fraser v. State of Arizona (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025).
“He alleged that his termination was retaliatory and that policy and procedure violations had occurred during the disciplinary process, in violation of his due-process rights and the Peace Officers Bill of Rights, A.R.S. §§ 38-1101 to 38-1120. He also alleged that he had been…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101(7)(c) — 1 case
Lewis v. Arizona State Pers. Bd., 379 P.3d 227 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“We concluded that a law enforcement officer within the meaning of A.R.S. § 38-1101 "is afforded additional statutory protections—namely, restriction upon the circumstances under which the employing agency may reject the Board’s decision—which are not contained in Title 41.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101(8)(a) — 1 case
Lewis v. Arizona State Pers. Bd., 379 P.3d 227 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“We concluded that a law enforcement officer within the meaning of A.R.S. § 38-1101 "is afforded additional statutory protections—namely, restriction upon the circumstances under which the employing agency may reject the Board’s decision—which are not contained in Title 41.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101(8)(b) — 1 case
Lewis v. Arizona State Pers. Bd., 379 P.3d 227 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“We concluded that a law enforcement officer within the meaning of A.R.S. § 38-1101 "is afforded additional statutory protections—namely, restriction upon the circumstances under which the employing agency may reject the Board’s decision—which are not contained in Title 41.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101(A) — 1 case
McSo v. McLeo (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
“See A.R.S. §§ 38-1101(A), (P)(2), -1105(B). But MCSO offers no factual support for this argument beyond Lopez’ testimony that “[a]ssuming no prior discipline,” the failure to properly handle evidence “typically” results in a written reprimand.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101(D)(2) — 2 cases
McSo v. McLeo (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
“See A.R.S. §§ 38-1101(A), (P)(2), -1105(B). But MCSO offers no factual support for this argument beyond Lopez’ testimony that “[a]ssuming no prior discipline,” the failure to properly handle evidence “typically” results in a written reprimand.”
Nyswaner v. Adc (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
“Nyswaner also contends the “specific statute,” A.R.S. § 38-1101, controls the “general rule” 5 The legislature revised and renumbered § 38-1101 effective August 2, 2012.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101(H) — 1 case
Nyswaner v. Adc (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
“Nyswaner also contends the “specific statute,” A.R.S. § 38-1101, controls the “general rule” 5 The legislature revised and renumbered § 38-1101 effective August 2, 2012.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101(J) — 2 cases
McSo v. McLeo (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
“See A.R.S. §§ 38-1101(A), (P)(2), -1105(B). But MCSO offers no factual support for this argument beyond Lopez’ testimony that “[a]ssuming no prior discipline,” the failure to properly handle evidence “typically” results in a written reprimand.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101(K) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101(P)(4)(b) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.