40-607. Transition property; security interest; lien; priority
A. This section applies to all purported transfers of, grants of liens on, or security interests in transition property. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the creation, perfection and enforcement of a security interest in transition property that is pledged to secure the payment of the ongoing financing costs are governed by this section.
B. The description of or reference to transition property in a transfer or security agreement and a financing statement is sufficient if and only if the description or reference refers to this chapter and the financing order describing the transition property. A security interest in transition property is created, valid, binding and enforceable at the latest of any of the following:
1. When the transition bonds are issued by the qualified special purpose entity.
2. When a security agreement is executed and delivered by the qualified special purpose entity.
3. When value is received by the qualified special purpose entity for the transition bonds.
C. The security interest in transition property is a statutory lien in favor of the applicable financing party that attaches automatically when the transition bond is issued and value for the transition bonds is received. The security interest attaches without any physical delivery of collateral or other act, and the security interest is valid, binding and perfected against all parties having claims of any kind against the person granting the security interest, regardless of whether the parties have notice of the lien, on the filing of a financing statement with the secretary of state. The secretary of state shall maintain the financing statement in the same manner and in the same recordkeeping system maintained for financing statements that are filed pursuant to title 47, chapter 9, article 5. Financing statements that are filed pursuant to this section are effective without the need to file a continuation statement until a termination statement is filed.
D. A transfer of an interest, including a grant of a lien or security interest, in transition property is perfected against all third persons. A security interest in transition property is a continuously perfected security interest and has priority over any other lien that may subsequently attach to the transition property unless the holder of the security interest has agreed in writing otherwise.
E. The priority of a security interest in transition property is not affected by the commingling of financing revenues with other funds. Any pledgee or secured party has a perfected security interest in the amount of all financing revenues that are deposited in any account of the servicer in which financing revenues have been commingled with other funds, and any other security interest that may apply to such financing revenues is terminated when those funds are transferred to a segregated account for a financing party or assignee of a financing party.
F. The true-up mechanism does not affect the validity, perfection or priority of a security interest in or transfer of transition property.
G. The validity, perfection or priority of a lien and security interest under this chapter is not impaired by any later modification of a financing order or changes in a customer's financing charges.
Notes of Decisions
Visco v. State Ex Rel. Pickrell, 388 P.2d 155 (Ariz. 1963).
· cites it 15× “” In this case the appellant had neither a motor carrier’s permit under A.R.S. § 40-607 or § 40-608. As a private carrier he needs neither, (A.”
Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. Superior Court, 459 P.2d 489 (Ariz. 1969).
· cites it 16× “] The-Commission contended in that case that the-statutory provision was in conflict with the constitutional provision giving the Commission “full power to * * * prescribe-just and reasonable classifications and * * reasonable rates and charges to be made * * */ 'j’hig Court…”
Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. Reliable Transp. Co., 346 P.2d 1091 (Ariz. 1959).
· cites it 6× “It is sufficient to point out that the issue of whether appellants — if common carriers —would be entitled to certificates of public convenience and necessity under A.R.S. § 40-607, is not before this Court and would have to be raised first before the Commission on application…”
Horizon Moving & Storage Co. v. Williams, 559 P.2d 193 (Ariz. 1976).
· cites it 14× “In our view, the amendments here, by eliminating previous restrictions, would create new territorial authority; therefore, A.R.S. § 40-607 applies. Appellees additionally urge that these appellants lack standing to pursue judicial review of the Commission’s action because their…”
Cagle Bros. Trucking Serv. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 394 P.2d 203 (Ariz. 1964).
· cites it 6× “A.R.S. § 40-607, Subs. A, as amended, provides that the application shall contain certain specific information enumerated therein plus “such other information” as the Commission requires.”
Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. Cont'l Sec. Guards, 443 P.2d 406 (Ariz. 1968).
· cites it 5× “A.R.S. § 40-607, subsec. A, supra, gives to the corporation commission the power to require a certificate of public convenience and necessity from common carriers, and § 40-608 subsec.”
Williams v. Pipe Trades Indus. Prog. of Arizona, 409 P.2d 720 (Ariz. 1966).
· cites it 3× “Pacific Greyhound Lines, supra, the Commission contended that the statute, now A.R.S. § 40-607, in which the legislature had specified the regulations concerning granting of certificates to motor carriers, was unconstitutional.”
Cantlay & Tanzola, Inc. v. Senner, 373 P.2d 370 (Ariz. 1962).
· cites it 2× “Such a finding is important only in the application of a carrier for a common carrier’s permit under A.R.S. § 40-607. A.R.S. § 40-608, subd. C.”
Dial-A-Messenger, Inc. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 648 P.2d 1053 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
· cites it 2× “In this case, the driver’s availability to the general public was limited by A.R.S. § 40-607(C), which would prevent the issuance of a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate a common motor carrier over a route or in a territory already served by common carrier…”
George v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 322 P.2d 369 (Ariz. 1958).
· cites it 2× “Hence, they contend, the Commission’s act is subject to collateral attack. It is the Commission’s position that its order is final and not now reviewable, that the Commission had the power to make such an order ex parte, and that the appellants are barred by laches.”
Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. Gibbons, 344 P.2d 167 (Ariz. 1959).
· cites it 5× “1939 (hereinafter referred to as A.R.S. § 40-607, subd. C) by first offering them an opportunity to furnish such service.”
Walker v. De Concini, 341 P.2d 933 (Ariz. 1959).
· cites it 2× “1939, Section 66-506, now A.R.S. § 40-607) the Legislature has required a “notice”.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 40-607(C) — 3 cases
Horizon Moving & Storage Co. v. Williams, 559 P.2d 193 (Ariz. 1976).
“In our view, the amendments here, by eliminating previous restrictions, would create new territorial authority; therefore, A.R.S. § 40-607 applies. Appellees additionally urge that these appellants lack standing to pursue judicial review of the Commission’s action because their…”
Dial-A-Messenger, Inc. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 648 P.2d 1053 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
“In this case, the driver’s availability to the general public was limited by A.R.S. § 40-607(C), which would prevent the issuance of a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate a common motor carrier over a route or in a territory already served by common carrier…”
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