A. On request of the victim, the victim has the right to be present and be heard at any proceeding in which a negotiated plea for the juvenile accused of committing the delinquent act against the victim will be presented to the court.
B. The court shall not accept a plea agreement unless:
1. The prosecuting attorney advises the court that before requesting the negotiated plea reasonable efforts were made to confer with the victim pursuant to section 8-399.
2. Reasonable efforts are made to give the victim notice of the plea proceeding pursuant to section 8-390 and to inform the victim that the victim has the right to be present and, if present, to be heard.
3. The prosecuting attorney advises the court that to the best of the prosecutor's knowledge notice requirements of this chapter have been complied with and the prosecutor informs the court of the victim's position, if known, regarding the negotiated plea.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
17
cases, 1979–1995 · leading case:
J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995).
J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995).
· cites it 16× “Under the UCCJA the trial court has jurisdiction to determine child custody if: (1) the state is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceedings, or had been the home state within 6 months before commencement of the proceedings, and the child is absent…”
Jds v. Superior Crt., Cnty. of Maricopa, 893 P.2d 749 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 26× “[7] The UCCJA was designed to bring order to the chaos that had resulted from the application of vaguer doctrines such as comity. It establishes jurisdictional guidelines and limits custody jurisdiction to a state where the child has his or her home, or where there are other…”
Ledoux v. Aldridge, 841 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 12× “That this Court has jurisdiction to hear this petition under A.R.S. § 8-403(A); [[Image here]] 14. That .”
Iacouzze v. Iacouzze, 672 P.2d 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 8× “Here the trial judge decided, on the basis of evidence, that Arizona had jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8-403 A.3, which states: "A. The superior court of the state of Arizona is vested with jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if any…”
Canty v. Canty, 874 P.2d 1000 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 4× “” A.R.S. § 8-403(A) (emphasis added). Arizona is the only state with this variation in the text of section 3(A).”
In Re the Appeal in Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No. J-78632, 711 P.2d 1200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 4× “” A.R.S. § 8-403(A). The first responsibility of the juvenile court was to determine whether or not it had jurisdiction to hear the matter under one of these provisions.”
Iacouzze v. Iacouzze, 672 P.2d 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 8× “Here the trial judge decided, on the basis of evidence, that Arizona had jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8-403 A.3, which states: “A. The superior court of the state of Arizona is vested with jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if any…”
In Re the Marriage of Hinkston, 653 P.2d 49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
· cites it 4× “See generally A.R.S. § 8-403. The legislature has enacted an elaborate interlocking framework of legislation attempting to clarify the question of the superior court's jurisdiction in child custody matters.”
Lofts v. Superior Court, 682 P.2d 412 (Ariz. 1984).
· cites it 4× “The findings of fact in the order were replete with findings as to respondent’s residency and travels from state to state which could be used to find jurisdiction under the “significant connection with this state” and “substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or…”
Finck v. O'Toole, 880 P.2d 624 (Ariz. 1994).
· cites it 4× “See A.R.S. § 8-403. Because no party properly "commenced" a child custody proceeding for Christopher, the trial court did not have authority to award the Fincks visitation with him.”
Both v. Superior Ct., in & for Cty. of Mohave, 590 P.2d 920 (Ariz. 1979).
· cites it 5× “” Although it is not clear from the record, it would appear that the respondent judge ordered the exercise of jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-403(A)(2). That section reads: “A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-403(A) — 7 cases
Ledoux v. Aldridge, 841 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
“That this Court has jurisdiction to hear this petition under A.R.S. § 8-403(A); [[Image here]] 14. That .”
J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995).
“Under the UCCJA the trial court has jurisdiction to determine child custody if: (1) the state is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceedings, or had been the home state within 6 months before commencement of the proceedings, and the child is absent…”
Canty v. Canty, 874 P.2d 1000 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
“” A.R.S. § 8-403(A) (emphasis added). Arizona is the only state with this variation in the text of section 3(A).”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-403(A)(1) — 3 cases
J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995).
“Under the UCCJA the trial court has jurisdiction to determine child custody if: (1) the state is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceedings, or had been the home state within 6 months before commencement of the proceedings, and the child is absent…”
Jds v. Superior Crt., Cnty. of Maricopa, 893 P.2d 749 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
“[7] The UCCJA was designed to bring order to the chaos that had resulted from the application of vaguer doctrines such as comity. It establishes jurisdictional guidelines and limits custody jurisdiction to a state where the child has his or her home, or where there are other…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-403(A)(2) — 6 cases
Both v. Superior Ct., in & for Cty. of Mohave, 590 P.2d 920 (Ariz. 1979).
“” Although it is not clear from the record, it would appear that the respondent judge ordered the exercise of jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-403(A)(2). That section reads: “A.”
J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995).
“Under the UCCJA the trial court has jurisdiction to determine child custody if: (1) the state is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceedings, or had been the home state within 6 months before commencement of the proceedings, and the child is absent…”
Lofts v. Superior Court, 682 P.2d 412 (Ariz. 1984).
“The findings of fact in the order were replete with findings as to respondent’s residency and travels from state to state which could be used to find jurisdiction under the “significant connection with this state” and “substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or…”
Jds v. Superior Crt., Cnty. of Maricopa, 893 P.2d 749 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
“[7] The UCCJA was designed to bring order to the chaos that had resulted from the application of vaguer doctrines such as comity. It establishes jurisdictional guidelines and limits custody jurisdiction to a state where the child has his or her home, or where there are other…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-403(A)(3) — 4 cases
J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995).
“Under the UCCJA the trial court has jurisdiction to determine child custody if: (1) the state is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceedings, or had been the home state within 6 months before commencement of the proceedings, and the child is absent…”
Lofts v. Superior Court, 682 P.2d 412 (Ariz. 1984).
“The findings of fact in the order were replete with findings as to respondent’s residency and travels from state to state which could be used to find jurisdiction under the “significant connection with this state” and “substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or…”
Jds v. Superior Crt., Cnty. of Maricopa, 893 P.2d 749 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
“[7] The UCCJA was designed to bring order to the chaos that had resulted from the application of vaguer doctrines such as comity. It establishes jurisdictional guidelines and limits custody jurisdiction to a state where the child has his or her home, or where there are other…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-403(A)(4) — 2 cases
Jds v. Superior Crt., Cnty. of Maricopa, 893 P.2d 749 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
“[7] The UCCJA was designed to bring order to the chaos that had resulted from the application of vaguer doctrines such as comity. It establishes jurisdictional guidelines and limits custody jurisdiction to a state where the child has his or her home, or where there are other…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-403(A)(l) — 4 cases
J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995).
“Under the UCCJA the trial court has jurisdiction to determine child custody if: (1) the state is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceedings, or had been the home state within 6 months before commencement of the proceedings, and the child is absent…”
Canty v. Canty, 874 P.2d 1000 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
“” A.R.S. § 8-403(A) (emphasis added). Arizona is the only state with this variation in the text of section 3(A).”
Jds v. Superior Crt., Cnty. of Maricopa, 893 P.2d 749 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
“[7] The UCCJA was designed to bring order to the chaos that had resulted from the application of vaguer doctrines such as comity. It establishes jurisdictional guidelines and limits custody jurisdiction to a state where the child has his or her home, or where there are other…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-403(AXl) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-403(B) — 1 case
Both v. Superior Ct., in & for Cty. of Mohave, 590 P.2d 920 (Ariz. 1979).
“” Although it is not clear from the record, it would appear that the respondent judge ordered the exercise of jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-403(A)(2). That section reads: “A.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.