A. If a petition for terminating the parent-child relationship is contested, the court shall hold a termination adjudication hearing within ninety days after the initial severance hearing. The general public shall be excluded and only such persons admitted whose presence the judge finds to have a direct interest in the case or the work of the court, provided that such person so admitted shall not disclose any information secured at the hearing. The court may require the presence of any parties and witnesses it deems necessary to the disposition of the petition, except that a parent who has executed a waiver pursuant to section 8-535 or who has relinquished the parent's rights to the child shall not be required to appear at the hearing.
B. The court's findings with respect to grounds for termination shall be based on clear and convincing evidence under the rules applicable and adhering to the trial of civil causes. The court may consider any and all reports required by this article or ordered by the court pursuant to this article and such reports are admissible in evidence without objection.
C. If a parent does not appear at the pretrial conference, status conference or termination adjudication hearing, the court, after determining that the parent has been instructed as provided in section 8-535, may find that the parent has waived the parent's legal rights and is deemed to have admitted the allegations of the petition by the failure to appear. The court may terminate the parent-child relationship as to a parent who does not appear based on the record and evidence presented as provided in rules prescribed by the supreme court.
Notes of Decisions
Christy A. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 173 P.3d 463 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 8× “9 ¶ 14 As an initial matter, we observe that neither A.R.S. § 8-537(0 nor ARPJC 66(D)(2) expressly adopts or references the concept of “default”; rather, both speak in terms of “waiver of rights.”
Valerie M. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 198 P.3d 1203 (Ariz. 2009).
· cites it 8× “) (codified at AR.S. § 8-537 (2007))). She requested that the jury be instructed that it must find both the state-law findings and the ICWA findings beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Trisha A. v. Dep't of Child Saf./l.A./l.A., 446 P.3d 380 (Ariz. 2019).
· cites it 6× “See § 8-537(C); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 64(C). ¶45 Indeed, depending on how early in the process an accelerated hearing takes place, DCS may not have yet made initial disclosures, and the parent’s counsel may not have had an opportunity to interview the state’s witnesses.”
Kent K. v. Bobby M., 110 P.3d 1013 (Ariz. 2005).
· cites it 3× “The distinction is set up by separate clauses requiring that the trial court first consider “any of the following grounds [for termination]” and then requiring that the court “also consider the best interests of the child.” A.R.S. § 8-533.”
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cnty., 701 P.2d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 10× “” A.R.S. § 8-537(B) establishes that “[t]he court’s findings with respect to grounds for termination shall be based upon clear and convincing evidence under the rules applicable and adhering to the trial of civil causes.”
Valerie M. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 195 P.3d 192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 10× “Instead, both A.R.S. §§ 8-537(B) and -863(B) (2007) 4 permit the court to terminate a person’s parental rights based on “clear and convincing evidence” that one or more of the statutory grounds have been established without distinguishing between Indian and non-Indian children.”
Kenneth T. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 128 P.3d 773 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 12× “A.R.S. § 8-537(0 (Supp.2005) (“If a parent does not appear at the pretrial conference, status conference or termination adjudication hearing, the court .”
Raymond F. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 231 P.3d 377 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 2× “¶ 15 To terminate parental rights under § 8 — 533(B)(3), a court must find that: 1) parent has a history of chronic abuse of controlled substances or alcohol; 2) parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of his chronic abuse of controlled substances or…”
Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 304 P.3d 1115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 2× “AR.S. § 8-537(B) (West 2013); Kent K. v. Bobby M.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-537(A) — 3 cases
Kenneth T. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 128 P.3d 773 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
“A.R.S. § 8-537(0 (Supp.2005) (“If a parent does not appear at the pretrial conference, status conference or termination adjudication hearing, the court .”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-537(B) — 92 cases
Valerie M. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 198 P.3d 1203 (Ariz. 2009).
“) (codified at AR.S. § 8-537 (2007))). She requested that the jury be instructed that it must find both the state-law findings and the ICWA findings beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cnty., 701 P.2d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
“” A.R.S. § 8-537(B) establishes that “[t]he court’s findings with respect to grounds for termination shall be based upon clear and convincing evidence under the rules applicable and adhering to the trial of civil causes.”
Valerie M. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 195 P.3d 192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
“Instead, both A.R.S. §§ 8-537(B) and -863(B) (2007) 4 permit the court to terminate a person’s parental rights based on “clear and convincing evidence” that one or more of the statutory grounds have been established without distinguishing between Indian and non-Indian children.”
Raymond F. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 231 P.3d 377 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
“¶ 15 To terminate parental rights under § 8 — 533(B)(3), a court must find that: 1) parent has a history of chronic abuse of controlled substances or alcohol; 2) parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of his chronic abuse of controlled substances or…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-537(C) — 28 cases
Trisha A. v. Dep't of Child Saf./l.A./l.A., 446 P.3d 380 (Ariz. 2019).
“See § 8-537(C); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 64(C). ¶45 Indeed, depending on how early in the process an accelerated hearing takes place, DCS may not have yet made initial disclosures, and the parent’s counsel may not have had an opportunity to interview the state’s witnesses.”
Christy A. v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 173 P.3d 463 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
“9 ¶ 14 As an initial matter, we observe that neither A.R.S. § 8-537(0 nor ARPJC 66(D)(2) expressly adopts or references the concept of “default”; rather, both speak in terms of “waiver of rights.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-537(c) — 1 case
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