Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli — Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions. 97 A.L.R.5th 1.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli — Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions. 122 A.L.R.5th 337.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli-Requisites of, and factors affecting, compensability. 13 A.L.R.6th 209.

Right to workers' compensation for injury suffered by worker en route to or from worker's home where home is claimed as “work situs”. 15 A.L.R.6th 633.

Legal status of posthumously conceived child of decedent. 17 A.L.R.6th 593.

Right to Workers' Compensation for Physical Injury or Illness Suffered by Claimant as Result of Nonsudden Mental Stimuli — Compensability under Particular Circumstances. 39 A.L.R.6th 445.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutory Provisions Exempting or Otherwise Restricting Farm and Agricultural Workers from Worker's Compensation Coverage. 40 A.L.R.6th 99.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Workers' Compensation Laws to Claim for Hearing Loss — Resulting from Long Term Noise Exposure. 99 A.L.R.6th 643 (2014).

Ark. L. Notes.

Noble, Erosion of Agricultural Labor Exemptions in Employment Law: Recent Developments Relevant to Arkansas, 1996 Ark. L. Notes 71.

Norwood, “Hi ho, hi ho, it's off to work we go:” The 1993 Arkansas Workers' Compensation Code and the “Performing Work” Doctrine, 2007 Ark. L. Notes 91.

Ark. L. Rev.

Workmen's Compensation — Common Law Marriage, 3 Ark. L. Rev. 487.

Workmen's Compensation — Corporate Officers and Partners as “Employees” Within the Act, 4 Ark. L. Rev. 498.

Workmen's Compensation — Employee Returning to Work After Week End — Whether “In Course of Employment,” 7 Ark. L. Rev. 423.

Workmen's Compensation — Existence of Employment Relation — Discharged Workman, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 188.

Workmen's Compensation — Employees Excluded from Coverage — Casual Employee, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 181.

Workmen's Compensation — Injury from Act of God as One Arising Out of Employment, 18 Ark. L. Rev. 357.

Workmen's Compensation — Injury Arising Out of the Course of Employment — Horseplay, 19 Ark. L. Rev. 197.

Workmen's Compensation: The “Going and Coming Rule” and Its Exceptions in Arkansas, 21 Ark. L. Rev. 414.

Workmen's Compensation — Recreational Activities Within the Scope of Employment, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 682.

Workmen's Compensation — Contractually Required Insurance for Agricultural Laborers — Coverage and Procedure, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 385.

Workmen's Compensation: Injuries Sustained While Preparing for Work Ruled Compensable, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 89.

Leflar, Compensation for Work-Related Illness in Arkansas, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 89.

Copeland, The New Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act: Did the Pendulum Swing Too Far?, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Recent Developments, Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ, 333 Ark. 335, 969 S.W.2d 190 (Ark. 1998); and Malone v. Texarkana Public Schools, 333 Ark. 343, 969 S.W.2d 644 (Ark. 1998), 51 Ark. L. Rev. 856.

Dolan, Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Oregon — The Tide Has Turned for Legitimate Carpal Tunnel Syndrome Claims in Arkansas Workers' Compensation Law, 54 Ark. L. Rev. 439.

Recent Development: Workers Compensation — Defining “Employee,” 57 Ark. L. Rev. 441 (2004).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Karber, Survey of Arkansas Law: Workers' Compensation, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 294.

Powell, Survey of Workers' Compensation Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 329.

Arkansas Law Survey, Greene, Workers' Compensation, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 271.

Note, Workers' Compensation — “Current Total Disability” Benefits Are Not Legitimate, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 109.

Survey—Workers' Compensation, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 269.

Lucy, Workers' Compensation Law: Act 796 of 1993 and the Definition of “Compensable Injury,” 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 265.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Workers' Compensation, 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1051.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Labor Law, Reaction to Smallpox Vaccine, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 426.

Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Labor Law, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 363.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Prior to the 1981 amendment a widow needed only to be either living with or dependent for support upon her husband at the time of his death to be entitled to compensation, while a widower had to both be living with and dependent upon his wife for support at the time of her death and be incapacitated to support himself for compensation, which was an impermissible gender-based discrimination and violated the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 18; however, that portion was severable and the offending words “was incapacitated to support himself” were excised from the section. Swafford v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2 Ark. App. 343, 621 S.W.2d 862 (1981) (decision prior to the 1981 amendment).

Subdivision (4)(B)(iv) of this section is constitutional since there is a rational basis for the conclusion that the presence of cocaine metabolites is related to intoxication or impairment. Ester v. National Home Ctrs., 335 Ark. 356, 981 S.W.2d 91 (1998).

Construction.

The statutorily-mandated standard of strict construction cannot be applied to subdivision (5) in such a way as to require that a claimant must offer objective medical evidence to prove not only the existence of an injury, but also to show the circumstances under which the injury was sustained and the precise time of the injury's occurrence; subdivision (5) contains many elements that simply are not susceptible of proof by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Stephens Truck Lines v. Millican, 58 Ark. App. 275, 950 S.W.2d 472 (1997).

If there is a causal connection between the primary injury and subsequent complication or disability, an activity of the claimant that triggers the subsequent complications must be “unreasonable under the circumstances,” in order to be an independent intervening cause under (5)(F)(iii) of this section. Davis v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 69 Ark. App. 74, 13 S.W.3d 171 (2000), aff'd, 341 Ark. 751, 20 S.W.3d 326 (2000).

Although subsection (16)(B) of this section provides that medical opinions addressing compensability must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, a statement by complainant's physician that the accident as described by complainant “could have caused the herniation and need for surgery”, met the requirement of (16)(B) of this section. Frances v. Gaylord Container Corp., 69 Ark. App. 26, 9 S.W.3d 550 (2000), aff'd, 341 Ark. 527, 20 S.W.3d 280 (2000).

Applicability.

The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act does not specify what extrastate situations it covers. An employer's liability under the Act, however, is based upon disability or death from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, and “employment” is defined as every employment carried on in the state. Therefore, the application of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act is limited by its terms to harms arising out of employments carried on in Arkansas. Patton v. Brown & Root, Inc., 31 Ark. App. 141, 789 S.W.2d 745 (1990).

Proceedings before the Workers' Compensation Commission and a workers' compensation claim in Oklahoma are not mutually exclusive, but all states having a legitimate interest in an injury have the right to apply their own rules and standards, either separately, simultaneously or successively. Robinson v. Ed Williams Constr. Co., 38 Ark. App. 90, 828 S.W.2d 860 (1992).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision to deny worker permanent partial disability benefits was based on a flawed application of subdivision (4)(F)(ii) of this section; although the commission's opinion properly examined the worker's claim regarding the issue of permanent impairment, its conclusions addressed whether the compensable injury was the major cause of the permanent disability or need for treatment such that the commission had to render a conclusion on whether the worker proved entitlement to the permanent partial impairment rating. Michael v. Keep & Teach, Inc., 87 Ark. App. 48, 185 S.W.3d 158 (2004).

Compensation claimant's impairment rating was proper because, in part, pursuant to subdivision (16)(A) of this section, pain, active range-of-motion, and straight-leg-raising tests could not be used for assessment of impairment in workers' compensation cases. Flowers v. Ark. State Police, 2010 Ark. App. 99, 377 S.W.3d 339 (2010), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 247 (Mar. 10, 2010), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 350 (June 17, 2010).

Governing law when the Workers' Compensation Commission decided to apply subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section to appellant's gradual-onset injury was that the section did not apply to gradual-onset injuries. The Commission's decision to apply subdivision (4)(A)(i) to time-bar appellant's claims was a mistake of law. Estrada v. AERT, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 652, 449 S.W.3d 327 (2014).

Accidental Injury.

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in awarding an employee temporary total-disability benefits because there was substantial evidence to support its finding that the employee's herniated disc was an accidental injury arising from his employment where the employee's testimony about what happened was corroborated by his supervisor and the documentary evidence in the record and there was no evidence of a non-work related injury or event that contradicted the employee's claim. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. v. Laster, 2015 Ark. App. 206, 465 S.W.3d 421 (2015).

Applicability of 1993 Amendment.

Acts 1993, No. 796 did not apply to employee who sustained one injury in 1992 and a second injury in August 1993, where the second injury was not a new injury but a recurrence of the first and thus was merely a second period of incapacitation. Atkins Nursing Home v. Gray, 54 Ark. App. 125, 923 S.W.2d 897 (1996).

Prior to 1993, there was a prima facie presumption under former § 11-9-707(4) that an injury did not result from intoxication of the injured employee while on duty; now however, under subdivision (5)(B)(iv) of this section, the presence of an intoxicant creates a rebuttable presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by the use of the intoxicant. Weaver v. Whitaker Furn. Co., 55 Ark. App. 400, 935 S.W.2d 584 (1996).

The pre-1993 version of this section did not place on a claimant the burden of proving that there were no physicians licensed in the state who could provide the required treatment before he could seek treatment by an out-of-state physician. Milligan v. West Tree Serv., 57 Ark. App. 14, 946 S.W.2d 697 (1997).

Benefits.

Denial of permanent-total disability benefits to the employee was appropriate pursuant to subdivision (4)(F)(ii)( a ) of this section because all of her physicians had returned her to work full-duty with no restrictions and no medical provider indicated that she was unable to work. Greenfield v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 292 (2010).

—Major Cause.

Evidence established that an injury was the major cause of an injured worker's impairment rating where a neurosurgeon testified that an on-the-job injury was the major cause of back surgery and that the surgery was the sole cause of the impairment rating. Second Injury Fund v. Stephens, 62 Ark. App. 255, 970 S.W.2d 331 (1998).

Employee's work-related accident was not shown to be the “major cause” of his knee injury, as required by subdivision (4)(F)(ii)( a ) of this section. Substantial evidence showed that the employee had a preexisting degenerative knee condition, particularly in view of his prior knee surgery, degenerative arthritis, and the absence of his medial meniscus and anterior cruciate ligament prior to the more recent surgery, and there was no evidence that the need for knee-replacement surgery and the resulting impairment would not have occurred but for the work-related injury. Hickman v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, 372 Ark. 501, 277 S.W.3d 591 (2008).

Employer's acceptance of a thirteen-percent impairment rating for a workers' compensation claimant satisfied the major-cause requirement and made it unnecessary for the administrative law judge to make a separate, specific major-cause finding. St. Edward Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Gilstrap, 2014 Ark. App. 306 (2014).

Child.

Dependency includes partial dependency unless it is stated to mean total dependency. Crossett Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 208 Ark. 572, 187 S.W.2d 161 (1945) (decision under prior law).

Minor child of deceased natural father was entitled to receive compensation for his death despite adoption by other parties, regardless of whether he was actually dependent on natural father for support. Holland Constr. Co. v. Sullivan, 220 Ark. 895, 251 S.W.2d 120 (1952) (decision under prior law).

Although deceased employee had not been supporting stepson, natural daughter and acknowledged illegitimate child, they were entitled to compensation under this chapter. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Smith, 228 Ark. 876, 310 S.W.2d 803 (1958), superseded by statute as stated in, Pinecrest Mem. Park v. Miller, 7 Ark. App. 185, 646 S.W.2d 33 (1983) (decision under prior law).

Niece or nephew did not qualify for compensation benefits under the statute unless he or she had been classified as a foster child. Ellis v. Ellis, 251 Ark. 431, 472 S.W.2d 703 (1971).

Evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption against illegitimacy of the children and the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded to the commission for it to review the evidence in the light of all the definitions of child. Spratlin v. Evans, 260 Ark. 49, 538 S.W.2d 527 (1976).

The addition of the word “actually” in § 11-9-527(c), was intended to change what amounted to a conclusive presumption of dependency under prior cases; it follows that when the child was not living with the employee at the time of his death, there must be some showing of actual dependency. Roach Mfg. Co. v. Cole, 265 Ark. 908, 582 S.W.2d 268 (1979).

The fact of temporary support by mother did not demonstrate that there was no longer any reasonable expectation of support on the part of the father; the child was not able to act for herself and her necessary expenses would naturally increase as she grew older, with the concurrent possibility that her mother would not be able to maintain the child in her accustomed mode of living. Roach Mfg. Co. v. Cole, 265 Ark. 908, 582 S.W.2d 268 (1979).

Evidence sufficient to support the finding of the commission that claimant was not wholly and actually dependent upon decedent. Bankston v. Prime W. Corp., 271 Ark. 727, 610 S.W.2d 586 (1981).

Evidence not sufficient to support the finding of the commission that claimant was not wholly and actually dependent upon the decedent. Bankston v. Prime W. Corp., 271 Ark. 727, 610 S.W.2d 586 (1981).

Claimant did not sustain burden of proof to establish that she was in any manner a “stepchild” or “foster child.” Bankston v. Prime W. Corp., 271 Ark. 727, 610 S.W.2d 586 (1981).

Children were not acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. McCoy on behalf of McCoy v. Logging, 21 Ark. App. 68, 728 S.W.2d 520 (1987).

Dependency of a stepchild is not a question of law, but a fact issue to be determined by the circumstances existing when the compensable injury occurs; it is based on proof of either actual support from the deceased employee, or a showing of a reasonable expectation of support where there is evidence that the stepchild is being actually supported by her natural parent, or where she has a right to expect support from the natural parent even if it is not actually provided. Hoskins v. Rogers Cold Storage, 52 Ark. App. 219, 916 S.W.2d 136 (1996).

In a workers' compensation case, a deceased employee's stepchildren were properly found to be dependent for purpose of receiving death benefits where the employee had been married to his current wife for two years, the stepchildren resided with them, and his earnings were used to support the stepchildren. Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Myers, 2014 Ark. App. 102 (2014).

Compensation.

The attorney's fees in a workers' compensation case should consist of a percentage of the amounts expended for medical services and hospitalization in addition to a percentage of the cash awarded to the client, since the compensation from which the fees are to be derived include medical and hospital services. Ragon v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 224 Ark. 387, 273 S.W.2d 524 (1954).

The definition of compensation in this section as including medical services and funeral expenses did not preclude future claims for medical expenses under §§ 11-9-508 — 11-9-517 after a lump sum settlement under § 11-9-804 since that provision only contemplated lump sum settlement of such benefits as were susceptible of determination at that time. Brooks v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 247 Ark. 61, 444 S.W.2d 246 (1969).

Compensation means the money allowance payable to the employee or his dependents and includes medical payments. Mohawk Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brider, 257 Ark. 587, 518 S.W.2d 499 (1975).

“Compensation” includes the furnishing of medicine only to the extent that it is “reasonably necessary” for treatment of the compensable injury. Northwest Tire Serv. v. Evans, 295 Ark. 246, 748 S.W.2d 134 (1988).

Where claimant suffered a compensable injury, received medical treatment, returned to his regular job and continued to work until he became totally disabled, claimant is entitled to the maximum weekly benefit rate in effect at the time the disability occurred, and this rate is based on the wages being earned on the date of the accident. Montgomery v. Delta Airlines, 31 Ark. App. 203, 791 S.W.2d 716 (1990).

Denial of the employee's claim for the compensability of a back injury was appropriate under subdivision (4)(B)(iv) of this section because the presence of marijuana metabolites was evidence of the presence of marijuana and the employee failed to overcome the presumption that his injury was caused by the use of illegal drugs. Jackson v. Smith Blair, Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 691, 379 S.W.3d 555 (2010).

One statute only provides the maximum amount of money an employer must pay as compensation for an employee's work-related death, but the statute is silent on whether a credit for good-faith, but ultimately mistaken, payments may be given; because the widow was not her husband's dependent, the money the employer paid her could not be counted as weekly benefits or compensation, and the payments did not accrue as a credit against the employer's responsibility to the Fund. Royal v. Bypass Diesel & Wrecker, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 90, 432 S.W.3d 139 (2014).

Date or Time of Accident.

Employee sustained a compensable injury, notwithstanding the contention that he failed to report his injury in a timely fashion and failed to seek medical treatment in a timely fashion, since this contention went to the weight and credibility of the testimony and since the definition of a compensable injury does not require timely reporting or timely treatment. Service Chevrolet v. Atwood, 61 Ark. App. 190, 966 S.W.2d 909 (1998).

Where the claimant was injured in 1977, but was able to continue working without loss of income until two accidents which occurred in 1996, his date of accident was 1996 and his compensation rate would be based on his 1996 earnings. Inskeep v. Emerson Elec. Co., 64 Ark. App. 101, 983 S.W.2d 132 (1998).

Workers' Compensation Commission erred in requiring an employee who claimed to have injured his back at work to prove the exact date on which the injury had occurred; it was sufficient under subdivision (4)(A) that the employee could show that the injury had occurred during a specific four-day period. Edens v. Superior Marble & Glass, 346 Ark. 487, 58 S.W.3d 369 (2001).

Workers' Compensation Commission found that appellant lacked credibility, which was based on her inconsistent reports about the injury, and although the inability to identify a certain date did not operate as a bar to appellant from obtaining compensation, it was within the province of the Commission to consider the date confusion a matter of credibility; the Commission questioned whether the slip and fall at work had taken place, and substantial evidence supported the finding. Swink v. Rest. Mgmt., 2012 Ark. App. 490 (2012).

Disability.

Where, in addition to the loss of use, the permanent partial disability consists also of loss of capacity, because of the injury, to earn wages as defined and set out in subdivision (5); the disability includes, blends with, and is usually greater than the disability occasioned by loss of functional use only. Wilson & Co. v. Christman, 244 Ark. 132, 424 S.W.2d 863 (1968).

The mere fact that the claimant was making as much money at the time of the hearing as he was making prior to his injury did not necessarily mean that he had the “capacity” to earn that much. Abbott v. C. H. Leavell & Co., 244 Ark. 544, 426 S.W.2d 166 (1968).

In determining the degree of disability as defined by this section, the mentality of the claimant is material to the wage-loss factor, but congenital mental deficiency does not affect entitlement to compensation because compensation is based on previous earnings and earning capacity and is measured by loss of capacity due to the accident. Rooney v. Charles, 262 Ark. 695, 560 S.W.2d 797 (1978).

Disability means not merely functional disability but also loss of the use of the body to earn substantial wages. Great Plains Bag Corp. v. Ray, 267 Ark. 943, 593 S.W.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1979).

If claimant is totally incapacitated to earn in the same or any other employment the wages he was receiving at the time of his injury, then he is entitled to receive weekly benefits during the continuance of the total disability. Sunbeam Corp. v. Bates, 271 Ark. App. 385, 609 S.W.2d 102 (1980).

The term disability controls compensation awards in all cases of temporary disability except where compensation is statutorily based upon the healing period. Arkansas State Highway & Transp. Dep't v. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 S.W.2d 392 (Ark. 1981).

Where claimant injured his knee, the injury did not become compensable until claimant suffered a loss of earnings as a result of a nonwork-related injury; thus claim was timely filed. Shepherd v. Easterling Constr. Co., 7 Ark. App. 192, 646 S.W.2d 37 (1983).

A person injured on the job may suffer disability because of a physical loss or because of an inability to earn as much as he was earning when he was hurt and a person can be disabled who has lost either or both. Terrell v. Austin Bridge Co., 10 Ark. App. 1, 660 S.W.2d 941 (1983).

Where claimant was earning higher wages at the time of the hearing than he was at the time of the accident, but claimed he could no longer do the work for which he was trained, whether he had a compensable disability was a question for the commission to determine. Terrell v. Austin Bridge Co., 10 Ark. App. 1, 660 S.W.2d 941 (1983).

Disability which is compensable is based upon incapacity to earn because of injury; the payment of full wages during a compensable disability does not negate the incapacity to earn but may, in proper circumstances, dispense with the requirement that compensation benefits be paid under § 11-9-807. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Grooms, 10 Ark. App. 92, 661 S.W.2d 433 (1983).

Where the claimant undisputedly filed to come within the odd-lot category, in order to prove her entitlement to total disability benefits, the burden remains on her to show that she was incapacitated, because of her injury, to earn, in the same or any other employment, the wages she was receiving at the time of the injury. Leslie v. Sanyo Mfg. Corp., 13 Ark. App. 59, 679 S.W.2d 222 (1984).

A person can be disabled if the injury has caused a physical loss or an inability to earn as much as he was earning when he was hurt; an injury must be more than an anatomical disability, but must be a disability in the compensation sense to be a previous disability, requiring apportionment under this chapter. State Treasurer, Second Injury Fund v. Coleman, 16 Ark. App. 188, 699 S.W.2d 401 (1985).

The Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in holding that worker's congenital dyslexia was not “a previous disability or impairment” which gives rise to a claim against the Second Injury Fund under § 11-9-525, where the worker entered the labor market as an unskilled manual laborer, he was pursuing that employment without diminished earning capacity at the time of his injury, and there was no evidence that the claimant could not have continued in the same or similar employment at the same wage he had always earned had it not been for his injury. Holley Enters. v. Nicholls, 19 Ark. App. 97, 717 S.W.2d 495 (1986).

“Disability”, in the workers' compensation sense, is not based upon loss of earnings per se, but rather is defined in terms of loss of earning capacity. Second Injury Fund v. Robison, 22 Ark. App. 157, 737 S.W.2d 162 (1987).

Evidence insufficient to support commission's conclusion that plaintiff was not legally disabled. Boyd v. General Indus., 22 Ark. App. 103, 733 S.W.2d 750 (1987).

A work-related disabling angina attack, although temporary, is no less a disability. Nashville Livestock Comm'n v. Cox, 302 Ark. 69, 787 S.W.2d 664 (1990).

Where, although plaintiff would try most any job offered to him, suitable work was not available to him due to a combination of his advancing age, his level of education, his limited experience in one area of the job market, and his disability; therefore he fell within the odd-lot category of workers. Lewis v. Camelot Hotel, 35 Ark. App. 212, 816 S.W.2d 632 (1991).

For the purpose of defining disability, “any other employment” means any other employment in lieu of the one in which the employee was injured, not concurrent employment, where an employee is working two jobs when injured, and continues employment in one. Stevens v. Mountain Home Sch. Dist., 41 Ark. App. 201, 850 S.W.2d 335 (1993).

Although the definition of “disability” in subdivision (9) does note include any specific reference to physical impairment, Arkansas case law clearly indicates that both physical and earning impairment are components of “disability.” Golden v. Westark Community College, 58 Ark. App. 209, 948 S.W.2d 108 (1997), aff'd in part, reversed in part, 333 Ark. 41, 969 S.W.2d 154 (1998).

Workers' Compensation Commission erred in determining that claimant was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits after the date he began receiving unemployment benefits as the claim fell within § 11-9-506(b); thus, the case was remanded to the commission for a factual determination regarding whether claimant remained within his healing period and suffered a total incapacity to earn wages after his receipt of unemployment compensation began. King v. Peopleworks, 97 Ark. App. 105, 244 S.W.3d 729 (2006).

Temporary total disability was properly granted in a worker's compensation case due to a disability under subdivision (8) of this section while a claimant remained in his healing period from back surgery and supplemented his income by intermittent work with a family business. He was unable to earn pharmacist wages in other employment. Walgreen Co. v. Goode, 2012 Ark. App. 196, 395 S.W.3d 398 (2012).

Earning Capacity.

When the claimant returns to work and earns as much as or more than he did prior to his injury, then the necessary and logical inference, absent any contrary evidence, is that the claimant has not suffered a loss of earning capacity; thus, where there was no evidence that the claimant was not doing his job well, that his wage increases were the result of sympathy, or that his earnings were not commensurate with his earning capacity, the claimant failed to establish any compensable injury to his earning capacity. Bragg v. Evans-St. Clair, Inc., 15 Ark. App. 53, 688 S.W.2d 956 (1985).

Effect of Amendments.

Until 1993, a prima facie presumption existed that an injury did not result from intoxication of the injured employee while on duty; Acts 1993, No. 796, changed that presumption by deleting former § 11-9-707(4) and amending subdivision (5)(B)(iv) of this section. Brown v. Alabama Elec. Co., 60 Ark. App. 138, 959 S.W.2d 753 (1998), review denied, 334 Ark. 35, 970 S.W.2d 807 (1998).

Employee.

In determining whether, at time of injury, individual was an employee or an independent contractor, the act is to be given a liberal construction in individual's favor, and any doubt is resolved in favor of employment status. Irvan v. Bounds, 205 Ark. 752, 170 S.W.2d 674 (1943); Farrell-Cooper Lumber Co. v. Mason, 216 Ark. 797, 227 S.W.2d 444 (1950) (preceding cases decided under prior law); Hollingsworth & Frazier v. Barnett, 226 Ark. 54, 287 S.W.2d 888 (1956); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tuggle, 270 Ark. 106, 603 S.W.2d 452 (1980); Franklin v. Arkansas Kraft, Inc., 5 Ark. App. 264, 635 S.W.2d 286 (1982); Silvicraft, Inc. v. Lambert, 10 Ark. App. 28, 661 S.W.2d 403 (1983); Franklin v. Arkansas Kraft, Inc., 12 Ark. App. 66, 670 S.W.2d 815 (1984).

The general rule is that, where the person rendering assistance to another in an emergency has an interest for his employer in relieving the emergency condition, he does not become an emergency employee of the person to whom he renders the assistance. Transport Co. v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 210 Ark. 862, 198 S.W.2d 175 (1947) (decision under prior law).

The original employer remains liable under this chapter until there has been a reasonable time or course of events for knowledge of change of employer to be brought home to the employee, and the relationship of employer and employee is presumed to continue for a reasonable time after a sale of the business made without the knowledge of the employee. Ledbetter v. Adams, 217 Ark. 329, 230 S.W.2d 21 (1950) (decision under prior law).

When a corporate officer's duties involve distinctively nonexecutive, nonsupervisory or even manual work, the Workers' Compensation Act should apply. Benefield Real Estate v. Mitchell, 269 Ark. 607, 599 S.W.2d 445 (Ct. App. 1980).

Claimant held to be an employee and his injuries covered where claimant was injured while working at employer's personal residence. Christian v. Arkansas Crane & Crawler, 55 Ark. App. 306, 935 S.W.2d 1 (1996).

Despite having independent contractor labels and certificates of noncoverage pursuant to subdivision (9)(C) of this section, truck drivers were employees of multiple trucking enterprises owned by one man where the drivers hauled loads exclusively for the owner's motor carriers using trucks leased from the owner's leasing company with the carrier's logo on them and where the drivers were under their direction and authority. Steinert v. Ark. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 2009 Ark. App. 719, 361 S.W.3d 858 (2009), rehearing denied, Steinert v. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. App. LEXIS 999 (Dec. 16, 2009), review denied, Steinert v. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 110 (Feb. 18, 2010).

Deceased worker, who was killed when a felled tree fell on him, was not an employee at the time of the accident, although the employer intended to hire him that day and wages had been discussed, because there was no contract for hire. Therefore, the Workers' Compensation Commission did not have jurisdiction over the worker's estate's claim under subdivision (4)(B)(iii) of this section. Scroggins v. Glen Roberts Excavation, 2010 Ark. App. 84 (2010).

—Casual Employment.

Employment in building or repairing a structure is not to be regarded as casual where the work for which the claimant was engaged will require a considerable length of time for its completion. Buxton v. Dean, 218 Ark. 645, 238 S.W.2d 487 (1951).

Considering the meaning of the word “casual” as used in this section, before an employment is excepted from operation of this chapter, it must be both casual and not in the usual course of the employer's business; therefore claimant injured in the construction of a hangar which was to be used in the company's regular business was regularly employed and not a casual employee. Aerial Crop Care, Inc. v. Landry, 235 Ark. 406, 360 S.W.2d 185 (1962).

A blacksmith who shod the employer's horses three or four times a year and was injured by being kicked by such a horse he was shoeing was a casual employee but nevertheless employed in the course of the business of the employer and, therefore, not excluded under subdivision (2). Meek v. Brooks, 237 Ark. 717, 375 S.W.2d 671 (1964).

Insurer was not entitled to have jury told that the term employee included “part time, temporary, casual or otherwise.” Security Ins. Co. v. Owen, 252 Ark. 720, 480 S.W.2d 558 (1972).

The casual employee exclusion from coverage applies only where the employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of his employer. Purdy v. Livingston, 262 Ark. 575, 559 S.W.2d 24 (1977).

—Election of Noncoverage.

The form established by Commission regulations for a filing pursuant to subdivision (10) of this section is called an “A-18.” Jenny's Cleaning Serv. v. Reddick, 46 Ark. App. 5, 875 S.W.2d 856, 880 S.W.2d 876 (1994), superseded, 319 Ark. 123, 889 S.W.2d 754 (Ark. 1994).

The Arkansas Supreme Court has not decided the question of whether filing the A-18 form notice of election with the commission pursuant to subdivision (2) of this section is essential as a matter of law for coverage under this chapter. Jenny's Cleaning Serv. v. Reddick, 46 Ark. App. 5, 875 S.W.2d 856, 880 S.W.2d 876 (1994), superseded, 319 Ark. 123, 889 S.W.2d 754 (Ark. 1994).

—Evidence.

Evidence held sufficient to establish status as employee. Karcher Candy Co. v. Hester, 204 Ark. 574, 163 S.W.2d 168 (1942); Lundell v. Walker, 204 Ark. 871, 165 S.W.2d 600 (1942); Irvan v. Bounds, 205 Ark. 752, 170 S.W.2d 674 (1943); Wood Mercantile Co. v. Cole, 213 Ark. 68, 209 S.W.2d 290 (1948); Feazell v. Summers, 218 Ark. 136, 234 S.W.2d 765 (1950) (preceding cases decided under prior law); South Ark. Feed Mills, Inc. v. Roberts, 234 Ark. 1035, 356 S.W.2d 645 (1962); Garner v. Rogers, 234 Ark. 1069, 356 S.W.2d 418 (1962); McGehee Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 237 Ark. 448, 373 S.W.2d 401 (1963); Hale v. Mansfield Lumber Co., 237 Ark. 854, 376 S.W.2d 670 (1964); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tuggle, 270 Ark. 106, 603 S.W.2d 452 (1980); Curtis v. Ermert Funeral Home & Ins. Co. of N. Am., 4 Ark. App. 274, 630 S.W.2d 57 (1982); Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Kirby, 6 Ark. App. 198, 639 S.W.2d 529 (1982); Sands v. Stombaugh, 11 Ark. App. 38, 665 S.W.2d 902 (1984).

Evidence held insufficient to establish status as employee. Lockeby v. Ozan Lumber Co., 219 Ark. 154, 242 S.W.2d 115 (1951) (decision under prior law); West v. Lake Lawrence Pulpwood Co., 233 Ark. 629, 346 S.W.2d 460 (1961); Charles v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 235 Ark. 470, 361 S.W.2d 1 (1962); Albert Pike Hotel v. Tratner, 240 Ark. 958, 403 S.W.2d 73 (1966); Pearson v. Lake Lawrence Pulpwood Co., 247 Ark. 776, 447 S.W.2d 661 (1969); Sandy v. Salter, 260 Ark. 486, 541 S.W.2d 929 (1976); Julian Martin, Inc. v. Indiana Refrigeration Lines, 262 Ark. 671, 560 S.W.2d 228 (1978); Stewart v. Cosby-Parsons Quarter Horse Ranch, 269 Ark. 866, 601 S.W.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1980).

Physician's report diagnosed the workers' compensation claimant with lumbalgia, radiculitis, lumbar subluxation and contained no qualifying words regarding the injury; thus, the physician's report constituted substantial evidence supporting the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that the claimant sustained a compensable injury under subdivision (4)(D). Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Stotts, 49 S.W.3d 667 (2001), substituted opinion, 74 Ark. App. 428, 58 S.W.3d 853 (2001).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission found that, although the manner of a worker's pay was more indicative of an independent contractor, this was outweighed by the control exerted by the business over the worker's assignments. Riddell Flying Serv. v. Callahan, 90 Ark. App. 388, 206 S.W.3d 284 (2005).

—Facts Determining Status.

The determination whether the injured individual is an employee or an independent contractor depends on the facts of each case. Irvan v. Bounds, 205 Ark. 752, 170 S.W.2d 674 (1943); Farrell-Cooper Lumber Co. v. Mason, 216 Ark. 797, 227 S.W.2d 444 (1950) (preceding cases decided under prior law); Hollingsworth & Frazier v. Barnett, 226 Ark. 54, 287 S.W.2d 888 (1956); Moore v. Long Bell Lumber Co., 228 Ark. 345, 307 S.W.2d 533 (1957); Silvicraft, Inc. v. Lambert, 10 Ark. App. 28, 661 S.W.2d 403 (1983); Sands v. Stombaugh, 11 Ark. App. 38, 665 S.W.2d 902 (1984); Franklin v. Arkansas Kraft, Inc., 12 Ark. App. 66, 670 S.W.2d 815 (1984).

Evidence that company could discharge claimant at will; that the company required him to increase the number of his crew from time to time; paid social security and unemployment insurance taxes and liability insurance on claimant and his men; and the manner in which the company made loans and advances to claimant and members of his crew, were all facts which the commission had a right to consider in determining the relationship of claimant as an employee. Farrell-Cooper Lumber Co. v. Mason, 216 Ark. 797, 227 S.W.2d 444 (1950) (decision under prior law).

The power of an employer to terminate the work at any time without liability is incompatible with the full control of the work that is usually enjoyed by an independent contractor and is a strong circumstance tending to show the subserviency of the worker. Hollingsworth & Frazier v. Barnett, 226 Ark. 54, 287 S.W.2d 888 (1956).

The withholding of income taxes, social security taxes, and unemployment taxes is not conclusive or determinative, but are merely circumstances to be considered in determining whether claimant is an employee or an independent contractor. Smith v. West Lake Quarry & Material Co., 231 Ark. 294, 329 S.W.2d 167 (1959).

The right of control, and not its exercise, is a factor in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists. Julian Martin, Inc. v. Indiana Refrigeration Lines, 262 Ark. 671, 560 S.W.2d 228 (1978).

In order to make a factual determination of employment status, it may not be enough, in a particular case, to consider only the question of control. Franklin v. Arkansas Kraft, Inc., 5 Ark. App. 264, 635 S.W.2d 286 (1982).

Some of the factors which might be considered in determining whether an injured person is an employee or an independent contractor, are: (1) the right to control the means and the method by which the work is done; (2) the right to terminate the employment without liability; (3) the method of payment, whether by time, job, piece or other unit of measurement; (4) the furnishing, or the obligation to furnish, the necessary tools, equipment, and materials; (5) whether the person employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (6) the skill required in a particular occupation; (7) whether the employer is in business; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the regular business of the employer; and (9) the length of time for which the person is employed. Franklin v. Arkansas Kraft, Inc., 5 Ark. App. 264, 635 S.W.2d 286 (1982).

Ordinarily, whether a person is an employee can be determined by the position that person occupies and his relationship to the alleged employer. However, in those cases where a person occupies more than one position, it becomes necessary to consider the type of work that was actually being done by that person at the time of his injury. Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Kirby, 6 Ark. App. 198, 639 S.W.2d 529 (1982).

With respect to the determination of whether a worker is an employee, the factor of the right to control includes several items such as the right to determine the manner of completing the work, right to terminate, right to hire or control the hiring of helpers, the method of payment, and the furnishing of, or the obligation to furnish, tools or equipment necessary to perform the work; in determining the nature of the work relative to the alleged employer's business, some factors to be considered include whether the worker is engaged in a separate and distinct occupation or business, whether the work to be performed is an integral part of the employer's regular business, and the duration of the employment. Silvicraft, Inc. v. Lambert, 10 Ark. App. 28, 661 S.W.2d 403 (1983).

In determining whether an injured person is an employee or an independent contractor for purposes of workers' compensation insurance, there are a number of factors to be considered; the right to terminate the employment without liability; the method of payment, whether by time, job, piece or other unit of measurement; the right to control the means and the method by which the work is done; the furnishing, or the obligation to furnish, the necessary tools, equipment, and materials. Sands v. Stombaugh, 11 Ark. App. 38, 665 S.W.2d 902 (1984).

County sheriff's department was not liable under subdivision (10)(A) for workers' compensation for a deputy sheriff injured when responding to the department's call; the deputy was the employee of an improvement district, had no express or implied contract for hire with the department, and his compensation came entirely from the district. Sharp County Sheriff's Dep't v. Ozark Acres Improvement Dist., 75 Ark. App. 250, 57 S.W.3d 764 (2001), aff'd, 349 Ark. 20, 75 S.W.3d 690 (2002).

—Minors.

Since former workers' compensation law included a minor whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, a minor employee, though employed in violation of the child labor laws, was relegated to remedies afforded by former law for injuries received and could not maintain an action for damages. Cummings v. J.J. Newberry Co., 211 Ark. 854, 203 S.W.2d 187 (1947) (decision under prior law).

The statutory definition of an employee expressly includes a minor, and common-law rules of dependency do not apply; therefore parent of injured minor was entitled to award. Kimpel v. Garland Anthony Lumber Co., 216 Ark. 788, 227 S.W.2d 932 (1950) (decision under prior law).

—Partners or Proprietors.

The fact that father and son were partners in logging operation did not preclude a finding of an employer-employee relationship between the son and the person with whom the logging agreement was made. Hollingsworth & Frazier v. Barnett, 226 Ark. 54, 287 S.W.2d 888 (1956).

Evidence supported the commission's finding that the deceased, who died as a result of a work-related injury, was an employee within the meaning of this section, despite the fact that the deceased during the last three years of his life had filed tax returns reflecting that the business was a sole proprietorship. Continental Ins. Co. v. Richard, 268 Ark. 671, 596 S.W.2d 332 (Ct. App. 1980).

The terms “sole proprietor” and “self-employed employer,” as used in the Workers' Compensation Act, are neither synonymous nor interchangeable. Under subdivision (2) of this section, a “sole proprietor” must file written notice with the Workers' Compensation Commission to be included in the definition of an “employee,” while under subsection (b) of § 11-9-108 a “self-employed employer” may agree or contract to exclude himself or herself from coverage. Gilbert v. Gilbert Timber Co., 19 Ark. App. 93, 717 S.W.2d 220 (1986), aff'd, 292 Ark. 124, 728 S.W.2d 507 (1987).

Where it was stipulated that the employer was a sole proprietorship, subdivision (2) of this section was applicable, and the claimant, the owner of the sole proprietorship, was required to file written notice to be included within the definition of an “employee” under the Worker's Compensation Act. Gilbert v. Gilbert Timber Co., 19 Ark. App. 93, 717 S.W.2d 220 (1986), aff'd, 292 Ark. 124, 728 S.W.2d 507 (1987).

Sole proprietor is subject to this section. Gilbert v. Gilbert Timber Co., 292 Ark. 124, 728 S.W.2d 507 (1987).

After 1979, sole proprietors could be considered employees, but only if they elected to be included in the definition of employees and filed their election with the commission. Stone v. Patel, 26 Ark. App. 54, 759 S.W.2d 579 (1988).

—Sole Proprietor.

Sole proprietor, who wanted to be covered by workers' compensation insurance and obtained a policy for that purpose, did not necessarily have to file an A-18 form in order to be a covered employee; the employee had substantially complied with this section. Jenny's Cleaning Serv. v. Reddick, 46 Ark. App. 5, 875 S.W.2d 856, 880 S.W.2d 876 (1994), superseded, 319 Ark. 123, 889 S.W.2d 754 (Ark. 1994).

Where the appropriate form to be filed with the commission, in compliance with the notice requirement in subdivision (2) of this section, is a Form A-18, and where sole proprietor never listed herself as such on her workers' compensation insurance application, failed to file a Form A-18, and failed to file any kind of written notice to indicate her election to be included in the definition of “employee” as clearly required under subdivision (2), the sole proprietor did not substantially comply with the statutory requirements. Jenny's Cleaning Serv. v. Reddick, 319 Ark. 123, 889 S.W.2d 754 (Ark. 1994).

—Undocumented Worker.

Workers' Compensation Commission properly determined that an undocumented alien was entitled to temporary total-disability benefits because she suffered a compensable injury when she tripped and fell while performing services for the employer, even if that injury was just an aggravation of a preexisting shoulder spur; claimant's legal status was irrelevant as to whether she could take advantage of the benefits afforded to her by Arkansas law as the statutory definition of employee expressly included any person, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed. Packers Sanitation Servs. v. Quintanilla, 2017 Ark. App. 213, 518 S.W.3d 701 (2017).

Employer.

Under this chapter, the prime contractor is not the employer of an employee of a subcontractor, and becomes the statutory employer liable for compensation only when the subcontractor has failed to provide workers' compensation insurance. Carter v. Fraser Constr. Co., 219 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. Ark. 1963).

Where the owner of construction equipment supplied it for use on a construction project for which he would receive a percentage of the profits and had general supervision of the use of the equipment he was a joint venturer and was exonerated from tort liability as an employer by this chapter. Smith v. Rodgers, 251 Ark. 994, 477 S.W.2d 831 (1972).

By invoking the exclusive remedy provision of the compensation law, joint venturer was discharging his responsibility to claimant as an employee. Lewis v. Gardner Eng'g Corp., 254 Ark. 17, 491 S.W.2d 778 (1973).

Although a sublessee under a trip lease withheld money for compensation coverage to assure that it was paid by the lessee, the sublessee was not estopped from claiming that the lessee trucking company was the employer of the truckdriver for compensation purposes. Julian Martin, Inc. v. Indiana Refrigeration Lines, 262 Ark. 671, 560 S.W.2d 228 (1978).

When there is a lease of fully operated equipment for the transportation of cargo on the public highways, the determination of whether the lessee or lessor is the driver's employer for workers' compensation purposes is a question of fact. Julian Martin, Inc. v. Indiana Refrigeration Lines, 262 Ark. 671, 560 S.W.2d 228 (1978).

Evidence sufficient to support the commission's finding that the individual defendant should be jointly liable with his two firms and was an employer within the definition of subdivision (1). Richardson v. Rogers, 266 Ark. 980, 588 S.W.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1979).

The question of the minimum number of employees in order to qualify as an employer under this chapter is a factual question for the commission and cannot be disturbed on appeal unless unsupported by substantial evidence. Stewart v. Cosby-Parsons Quarter Horse Ranch, 269 Ark. 866, 601 S.W.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1980).

In determining whether an individual is an employer or an independent contractor, the relative nature of the work involves consideration of a combination of factors, all of which are utilized so as to give a clearer picture of the parties' relationship than is possible when only control is considered; control of the manner of performing the work is significant, but, if considered determinative or controlling, may lead to clearly wrong results. Silvicraft, Inc. v. Lambert, 10 Ark. App. 28, 661 S.W.2d 403 (1983).

Where general employer, a temporary service, assigned claimant to a special employer, there was no separate contract for hire between claimant and his special employer, so special employer did not have to share in paying claimant's workers' compensation benefits. National Union Fire Ins. v. Tri-State Iron & Metal, 323 Ark. 258, 914 S.W.2d 301 (1996).

Property lessees were properly deemed an employer under subdivision (10) of this section for purposes of a workers' compensation claim by surviving members of a decedent's family, as they had the “right of control” as well as other factors that supported that determination. Grady v. Estate of Smith, 2011 Ark. App. 568, 385 S.W.3d 854 (2011).

Employment.

This chapter was applicable to death of employee killed by a truck while engaged in construction work for private contractor at a military post in this state. Young v. G.L. Tarlton, Contractor, 204 Ark. 283, 162 S.W.2d 477 (1942) (decision under prior law).

The word employment does not have reference alone to actual manual or physical labor, but to the whole period of time or sphere of activities, regardless of whether the employee is actually engaged in doing the thing he was employed to do. Elm Springs Canning Co. v. Sullins, 207 Ark. 257, 180 S.W.2d 113 (1944) (decision under prior law); Williams v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 227 Ark. 340, 298 S.W.2d 323 (1957).

Where employer's principal place of business and scene of operations was in Arkansas but at time of worker's injury part of employer's business was operating out of state, employer's primary operations, under this section, were in Arkansas and the employment did not cease to be carried on within this state by reason of the out-of-state operations. Feazell v. Summers, 218 Ark. 136, 234 S.W.2d 765 (1950) (decision under prior law).

“Course of employment” is defined as relating to the time, place and circumstances under which the injury occurred. Howard v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 20 Ark. App. 98, 724 S.W.2d 193 (1987).

Since the premises exception to the going and coming rule had been eliminated, a back injury was not compensable under subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section where a benefits claimant tripped while emerging from an elevator at her workplace because she was not performing employment services at the time since she had not clocked in or reached her work station; the fact that she had to unlock a door to enter did not render the claim compensable. Moreover, the fact that she had stopped by a break room first did not matter since she had not begun her work day. Parker v. Comcast Cable Corp., 100 Ark. App. 400, 269 S.W.3d 391 (2007), review denied, 2008 Ark. LEXIS 156 (Ark. Mar. 6, 2008).

Workers' compensation benefits were properly awarded to a claimant, a store manager, under subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section, after the claimant was injured escorting a 16-year-old employee to her vehicle in the parking lot after dark because watching the young employee to ensure her safety at night benefitted the employer by ensuring the safety of a trained and valuable employee, and by helping establish a record of safety on the premises. CV's Family Foods v. Caverly, 2009 Ark. App. 114, 304 S.W.3d 671 (2009).

In a workers' compensation action, a finding that the employee was not performing employment services when she was injured was inappropriate pursuant to subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section because she was injured in an area where employment services were expected of her. Checking the mailbox and fax machine at the end of the day advanced the employer's interests and it did not matter that the employee had already clocked out because the testimony proved that she often worked off of the clock and that she checked the mailbox and fax machine each day after clocking out. Barrett v. C.L. Swanson Corp., 2010 Ark. App. 91 (2010).

Finding that the employee failed to prove a compensable injury to her right knee in a workers' compensation action was appropriate pursuant to subdivision (4)(B)(iii) of this section because, at the time that she injured herself, she was merely walking outside to take a smoke break. The employer imposed no work requirements on the employee while she took her breaks and she was not advancing the interests of the employer at the time that she was injured. Haynes v. Ozark Guidance Ctr., Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 396, 384 S.W.3d 570 (2011).

Payroll sheets listed only the worker as an employee in 2011, and the company's owner testified that another individual was not an employee of the company; the Workers' Compensation Commission found the owner's testimony credible, and thus substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding that the company regularly employed only two employees, the worker and the owner, and thus the company did not qualify as an employer under the Workers' Compensation Law. Sammons v. Williams, 2015 Ark. App. 139 (2015).

—Agriculture Farm Labor.

Floriculture and horticulture are embraced within the term agriculture as used in former Workers' Compensation Act. Gwin v. J.W. Vestal & Son, 205 Ark. 742, 170 S.W.2d 598 (1943).

Exemption of agricultural farm labor was not, because of the inclusion of the work “farm,” intended to restrict the exemption to those engaged in the growing of ordinary farm crops. Gwin v. J.W. Vestal & Son, 205 Ark. 742, 170 S.W.2d 598 (1943).

Night watchman at greenhouses for a firm engaged in business described as florists, nursery and farming, was specifically exempted from former Workers' Compensation Act. Gwin v. J.W. Vestal & Son, 205 Ark. 742, 170 S.W.2d 598 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Crop duster airplane pilot employed by an independent contractor who sells crop dusting service to farmers in not an agricultural farm laborer and so is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment. Dockery v. Thomas, 226 Ark. 946, 295 S.W.2d 319 (1956).

Where employee was injured in employer's sawmill business which was located on employer's farm, employee was not engaged in farm labor at the time of the injury. Comer v. Pierce, 227 Ark. 926, 302 S.W.2d 547 (1957).

Defendant who was engaged in the raising of chickens was engaged in agriculture farm labor and thus claimant who received injury arising out of and in the course of employment cannot recover compensation. Franklin v. McCoy, 234 Ark. 558, 353 S.W.2d 166 (1962).

An employer who was engaged exclusively in the hatching and sale of chickens was not engaged in agriculture within the meaning of subdivision (3)(A). McGehee Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 237 Ark. 448, 373 S.W.2d 401 (1963).

Agriculture farm labor does not come within the purview of this chapter. McGehee Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 237 Ark. 448, 373 S.W.2d 401 (1963).

Employee who is an agricultural farm laborer is excluded from workers' compensation coverage. The question of whether employee is engaged in an “employment” in “agricultural farm labor” is one of law. Griffith v. International Cattle Embryo, Inc., 23 Ark. App. 58, 742 S.W.2d 124 (1988).

Exception of agricultural farm labor is broader than mere cultivation of soil; however, it does not cover farm when it is operated as mere sideline to commercial business. Griffith v. International Cattle Embryo, Inc., 23 Ark. App. 58, 742 S.W.2d 124 (1988).

—Building.

Where person who had engaged in farming rented his farm and built two houses which he intended to rent and supervised their construction, he was engaged in “building or building repair work” within the meaning of this chapter. Buxton v. Dean, 218 Ark. 645, 238 S.W.2d 487 (1951).

—Evidence.

The burden rests upon the party seeking benefits to prove the injury sustained was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Howard v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 20 Ark. App. 98, 724 S.W.2d 193 (1987).

—Foreign Jurisdiction.

An Arkansas resident came under this chapter even though his injury occurred in another state in which all of his employment was performed. International Paper Co. v. Tidwell, 250 Ark. 623, 466 S.W.2d 488 (1971).

Where Arkansas resident, employed by foreign corporation, was injured on job in another state, evidence sufficient to sustain an award by the commission under this chapter. Missouri City Stone, Inc. v. Peters, 257 Ark. 917, 521 S.W.2d 58 (1975).

Where claimant was injured while working in another state and the only circumstance bearing on jurisdiction was that claimant was an Arkansas resident, and facts connecting the state with the employment per se were entirely lacking, the statutory basis required for the commission's jurisdiction was absent. Patton v. Brown & Root, Inc., 31 Ark. App. 141, 789 S.W.2d 745 (1990).

The Workers' Compensation Commission did not have jurisdiction over a claim arising from an injury at a truck stop in Arkansas where (1) the claimant truck driver was an Alabama resident who was hired in Georgia by a Texas company, (2) the employer was not localized in Arkansas and did not maintain an office exercising general supervision and control of its employees while in Arkansas, and (3) the claimant testified only that she “thought” she was making a delivery in Arkansas. Baker v. Frozen Food Express Transp., 63 Ark. App. 100, 974 S.W.2d 487 (1998), substituted opinion, 981 S.W.2d 101 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998).

—Going and Coming Rule.

The going and coming rule provides that, since all persons are subject to the same street hazards while traveling, injuries sustained by employees going to and coming from work cannot ordinarily be said to arise out of and in the course of the employment within the meaning of the workers' compensation law. Fisher v. Proksch, 20 Ark. App. 80, 723 S.W.2d 852 (1987).

Injury during a trip which serves both a business and a personal purpose is within the course of employment if the trip involves the performance of a service for the employer which would have caused the trip to be taken by someone even if it had not coincided with the personal journey. Such a claimant falls within the “dual purpose” exception to the “going and coming” rule, and therefore his injuries are compensable. Fisher v. Proksch, 20 Ark. App. 80, 723 S.W.2d 852 (1987).

The basic premise of the going and coming rule is that employees having fixed hours and places of work are generally not considered to be in the course of their employment while traveling to and from work. Howard v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 20 Ark. App. 98, 724 S.W.2d 193 (1987).

Employees whose work entails travel away from the employer's premises are within the course of their employment continuously during the trip, except when a distinct departure on a personal errand is shown. Howard v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 20 Ark. App. 98, 724 S.W.2d 193 (1987).

The exception to the going and coming rule permitting recovery for injuries received by employees traveling between two parts of an employer's premises, such as by way of a public street, was applicable where, prior to July 1, 1993 (the effective date of the amendment to subdivision (5)(B)(iii)), employee was struck by a car after parking in employer's parking lot. Wentworth v. Sparks Regional Medical Ctr., 49 Ark. App. 10, 894 S.W.2d 956 (1995).

Even though the going and coming rule ordinarily precludes recovery for an injury sustained while the employee is going to or returning from his place of employment, where the journey is part of the service and/or where the employee furnishes his own conveyance, the employee's travel is usually determined to be within the course of employment. Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997).

Claimant's injury arose within the course of employment and thus was compensable where her vehicle overturned when she was traveling to her job of providing in-home care. Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997).

Workers' compensation benefits were denied as employee failed to prove the compensability of his claim because an exception to the “going and coming rule” did not apply simply based on the use of a company vehicle and the fact that the employee was on call the night before; moreover, the premises exception was no longer good law. Farler v. City of Cabot, 95 Ark. App. 121, 234 S.W.3d 352 (2006).

To the extent that the “going and coming rule” prevents recovery for injuries sustained while the employee was furthering the interests of the employer, it is overruled by the Arkansas Supreme Court. Moncus v. Billingsley Logging, 366 Ark. 383, 235 S.W.3d 877 (2006).

Employee who was following his employer's vehicle so he could locate the jobsite was carrying out the express directions of his employer at the time of his fatal auto accident, even though he was not then engaged in the activity for which he was primarily employed; thus; his death was compensable. Moncus v. Billingsley Logging, 366 Ark. 383, 235 S.W.3d 877 (2006).

—Newspapers, etc.

A boy delivering newspapers has no Workmen's Compensation under subdivision (3)(A). Clark v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 242 Ark. 133, 413 S.W.2d 629 (1967).

—Number of Employees.

Officers of company counted toward the minimum number of regularly employed employees. Aerial Crop Care, Inc. v. Landry, 235 Ark. 406, 360 S.W.2d 185 (1962).

Where employer employed only four employees the commission did not have jurisdiction over him. Lofton v. Bryan, 237 Ark. 376, 373 S.W.2d 145 (1963) (decision prior to 1976 amendment).

Where substantial evidence showed that there was a minimum of five employees who qualified appellant as an employer, he was covered by the compensation law. Donaldson v. Socia, 254 Ark. 158, 492 S.W.2d 253 (1973) (decision prior to 1976 amendment).

The determinative factor in ascertaining the requisite number of employees is whether three persons are regularly employed in the same business. Stewart v. Cosby-Parsons Quarter Horse Ranch, 269 Ark. 866, 601 S.W.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1980); Stone v. Patel, 26 Ark. App. 54, 759 S.W.2d 579 (1988).

Minimum number of employees found by combining employees of two related businesses owned by the same employer. Humphries v. Bray, 271 Ark. 962, 611 S.W.2d 791 (1981).

The question of whether the employer has the minimum number of employees in order to subject that employer to the requirements of this chapter is a factual determination for the commission. Mountain Valley Superette, Inc. v. Bottorff, 4 Ark. App. 251, 629 S.W.2d 320 (1982).

Shareholders held to be employees. Mountain Valley Superette, Inc. v. Bottorff, 4 Ark. App. 251, 629 S.W.2d 320 (1982).

Where the record showed that only three individuals were involved with the corporation or its operations in any capacity, and the commission found that one was not sufficiently active in the business to be counted as an employee, the employer did not have the number of employees needed for coverage under subdivision (3). Wright v. ABC Air, Inc., 44 Ark. App. 5, 864 S.W.2d 871 (1993).

—Performing Employment Services.

Whatever “performing employment services” may mean in the context of subdivision (5)(B)(iii), it must include the performance of those functions which are essential to the success of the enterprise in which the employer is engaged. Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 55 Ark. App. 343, 934 S.W.2d 956 (1996), aff'd, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997).

Claimant was not entitled to compensation for slipping and falling on ice in the employer's parking lot; walking to and from one's car, even on the employer's premises, does not qualify as performing services. Hightower v. Newark Pub. Sch. Sys., 57 Ark. App. 159, 943 S.W.2d 608 (1997).

The claimant was performing employment services when he was struck by a vehicle while transporting the results of a physical examination, required by and solely for the benefit of his employer, to the employer. Fisher v. Poole Truck Line, 57 Ark. App. 268, 944 S.W.2d 853 (1997).

Plaintiff was not performing “employment services” at the time of her motor vehicle accident where she drove to a mall on her break for a personal errand and was injured on her way back to work. Coble v. Modern Bus. Sys., 62 Ark. App. 26, 966 S.W.2d 938 (1998).

Employee, who tripped over a rolled-up carpet while exiting an elevator while on the way to a designated smoking area in the building in which she worked, was not performing employment services. Harding v. City of Texarkana, 62 Ark. App. 137, 970 S.W.2d 303 (1998).

A school custodian was performing employment services when he fell while entering his school upon his arrival at the start of his work day, where the custodian testified that one of his duties was to disarm the alarm system when he entered the building. Shults v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 63 Ark. App. 171, 976 S.W.2d 399 (1998).

An employee was performing employment services when he slipped and fell while on his way to an area adjacent to his work station so that he could smoke a cigarette during his work break as the employee was forced to remain near his immediate work area because no relief worker was available. White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999).

When an employee is doing something that is generally required by his or her employer, the claimant is providing employment services. White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999).

A claimant was performing an incidental activity which was inherently necessary for the performance of his primary employment activity; therefore, the claimant was entitled to benefits where he fell while moving items from a truck with a spring ride suspension system to a truck with an air ride suspension system. Ray v. Wayne Smith Trucking, 68 Ark. App. 115, 4 S.W.3d 506 (1999).

An employee was not performing employment services when he was involved in an automobile accident while traveling to his place of employment on a Monday morning since (1) although he had some contracts in the car which he had worked on during the weekend, neither working on those contracts over the weekend nor transporting them in his car was something he was required to do as part of his job or even something that his employer had asked him to do, and (2) a cellular telephone call made by the employee to his employer to inform them that he would be late was no more than a common courtesy. Campbell v. Randal Tyler Ford Mercury, Inc., 70 Ark. App. 35, 13 S.W.3d 916 (2000).

It is patently improper to summarily pronounce that all claims involving “personal comfort” or “personal convenience” accidents are outside the course of employment and, therefore, are non-compensable without regard for the underlying facts; by the same logic, it is improper to hold that all personal-comfort or personal-convenience accidents are within the course of employment and are compensable, no matter what the facts in individual cases may be; it should be common knowledge that determining the relevant factors for finding the facts in disputed cases under subdivision (4)(B)(iii), is a singularly judicial function rather than legislation. Matlock v. Ark. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 74 Ark. App. 322, 49 S.W.3d 126 (2001).

The “employment services” requirement of subdivision (4)(B)(iii), simply reflects the broader requirement that an accident must occur in the course of employment to be compensable; although it is true that “personal comfort” or “personal convenience” cases raise the “employment services” question, workers are entitled to compensation benefits based on injuries from accidents that occurred when they are not performing actual job tasks, and even when the accident occurred away from the employer's premises; the fact that a worker is injured while attempting to satisfy a personal need is not, per se, dispositive regarding whether she was performing employment services when the accident occurred; similarly, the fact that a worker is not directly compensated for the activity engaged in when an accident occurs for which workers' compensation benefits are sought is not controlling as to whether the worker was performing employment services; on the other hand, merely walking to and from one's car, even on the employer's premises, does not automatically constitute performing employment services. Matlock v. Ark. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 74 Ark. App. 322, 49 S.W.3d 126 (2001).

Workers' Compensation Commission erred in construing subdivision (4)(B)(iii) to require a denial of benefits where worker went to office restroom on next floor becaue the one on her floor was occupied, and upon returning to her desk, fell and hurt her back. Matlock v. Ark. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 74 Ark. App. 322, 49 S.W.3d 126 (2001).

Where employee was performing an incidental activity, inherently necessary for the performance of her job, an injury that occurred was compensable and did not provide a basis to circumvent the exclusive remedy provisions of § 11-9-105 so that she could file a civil action against her employer. Privett v. Excel Specialty Prods., 76 Ark. App. 527, 69 S.W.3d 445 (2002).

Employee who was struck by a cart being pushed by a co-worker while the employee was placing her purse in her locker before returning to work after a scheduled break was performing employment services within the meaning of subdivision (4)(b)(iii) of this section and was entitled to workers' compensation for her injury. Wal-Mart Stores v. Sands, 80 Ark. App. 51, 91 S.W.3d 93 (2002).

Employee's injury, suffered from a fall near a time clock, was compensable because the employee was performing employment services at the time of the accident; the evidence showed that the employer required the employee to show an identification badge at two stations, walk down a hallway, and punch a time clock, and it was not determinative that the employee was not paid for performing such duties. Caffey v. Sanyo Mfg. Corp., 85 Ark. App. 342, 154 S.W.3d 274 (2004).

Fact that claimant was coming off a break when his injury occurred did not determine compensability, but rather, because claimant was crossing a board which was placed over a ditch for that purpose, in order to return to work, the claimant's action in crossing the board was an activity that directly advanced his employer's interests and constituted employment services; because claimant was performing employment services at the time of his injury, an award of benefits was required under subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section. Wallace v. West Fraser South, Inc., 90 Ark. App. 38, 203 S.W.3d 646 (2005), aff'd, 365 Ark. 68, 225 S.W.3d 361 (2006).

Where evidence showed that employee was strongly encouraged to take her breaks in the employee lounge, the injuries employee sustained as she was walking to the lounge were compensable; employee was performing employment services within the meaning of subdivision (4)(B)(iii) of this section. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. King, 93 Ark. App. 101, 216 S.W.3d 648 (2005).

Employee's injury was compensable where, with the agency's knowledge and implicit consent, she was clearly performing a service for her own agency client that she was specifically contracted to perform and did so during her agency-scheduled hours; it was manifestly unjust to deny employee benefits where she was injured performing a service for which she could lose her job had she not performed these same services. Brotherton v. White River Area Agency on Aging, 93 Ark. App. 432, 220 S.W.3d 219 (Dec. 14, 2005).

Employee was performing employment services at the time of her injury at an offsite meeting where the employer hosted the event, considered it mandatory, and paid employees to attend, and the employee was engaging in conduct permitted and anticipated by the employer; thus, the employee was entitled to benefits. Engle v. Thompson Murray, Inc., 96 Ark. App. 200, 239 S.W.3d 561 (2006).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision displayed a substantial basis for denying compensability because appellant was not performing employment services at the time of the motor-vehicle accident as she was not compensated for driving to work; she was not required or expected by her employer to provide groceries for her clients; she acknowledged that on the day of the accident her clients' father had not asked her to stop and purchase groceries; and she was not grocery shopping or doing anything related to her job as a personal-care aide at the time of her injury as she was merely traveling to work. Black v. First Step, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 341 (2014).

In a workers' compensation case, a claimant failed to prove that he suffered a compensable injury because he was not performing employment services at the time that he injured his ankle when attempting to go to the bathroom; the claimant's work day had ended and he was not required to do anything, so he was not taking a necessary bathroom break. Moreover, the claimant was not considered a residential employee since the injury did not occur in his truck and was not related to sleeping in his truck. Trezza v. USA Truck Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 555, 445 S.W.3d 521 (2014).

—Police Officer.

Policeman who was prohibited from performing his duties as an officer because of a suspension, and who was injured during a drug raid, a prohibited act not only forbidden by his written suspension but unknown to and unaccepted by his superior, was acting outside the scope and course of his employment when he was injured. Arkansas State Police v. Davis, 45 Ark. App. 40, 870 S.W.2d 408 (1994), rehearing denied, 46 Ark. App. 320, 879 S.W.2d 473 (1994).

—Political Subdivisions.

School districts fell within the provision of subdivision (3)(A) excluding political subdivisions of the state from coverage. Muse v. Prescott Sch. Dist., 233 Ark. 789, 349 S.W.2d 329 (1961).

School district was not a state agency and its employees were not state employees within the meaning of § 11-5-309 extending this chapter to employees of the state and its agencies. Muse v. Prescott Sch. Dist., 233 Ark. 789, 349 S.W.2d 329 (1961).

This chapter does not provide coverage for teachers in the public schools. Muse v. Prescott Sch. Dist., 233 Ark. 789, 349 S.W.2d 329 (1961).

—Public Charities.

The Workers' Compensation Commission, in its finding that a hospital was not an exempt public charity, was not supported by substantial evidence. Marion Hosp. Ass'n v. Lamphier, 15 Ark. App. 14, 688 S.W.2d 322 (1985).

Fees paid to a voluntary ambulance service by the county emergency medical services district did not prevent the service, as a matter of law, from being an institution maintained and operated “wholly” as a public charity, and there was substantial evidence to support the decision that the service was exempt from liability under the workers' compensation law because of the exception provided by subdivision (3)(A)(iii). Sloan v. Voluntary Ambulance Serv., 37 Ark. App. 138, 826 S.W.2d 296 (1992).

—Subcontractor.

A cleaning service that cleaned for a company which required their subcontractors to carry workers' compensation insurance or allow a percentage to be taken from their checks to cover workers' compensation insurance under its policy was subject to the Workers' Compensation Act by virtue of being a subcontractor employing one or more employees under former subdivision (3)(D) (see now subdivision (12)(D)) of this section. Jenny's Cleaning Serv. v. Reddick, 46 Ark. App. 5, 875 S.W.2d 856, 880 S.W.2d 876 (1994), superseded, 319 Ark. 123, 889 S.W.2d 754 (Ark. 1994).

Summary judgment entered in favor of the United States Postal Service (USPS) was reversed as the USPS could not be considered a special employer of the injured contractor's employee when there was no evidence of an express or implied contract between the employee and the USPS. Phillips v. United States, 422 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2005).

Employment Services.

There was no err in finding that the decedent's death was compensable under workers' compensation, because it was undisputed that the decedent was within the time and space boundaries of his employment, and finished with his break and en route to receive further instructions, which constituted performance of employment services. Mitchell v. Tyson Poultry, Inc., 104 Ark. App. 327, 292 S.W.3d 848 (2009), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. App. LEXIS 723 (Mar. 18, 2009), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. LEXIS 483 (June 4, 2009).

In a case in which an employer appealed a decision by the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission awarding benefits in favor of an employee, she was not performing employment services at the time she fell and sustained her injury while on a smoke break; rather than waiting in line as directed by her employer to receive her paycheck, she took a purely personal break, and there was no evidence that she was on-call during the break. The decision of the Commission was not supported by substantial evidence. Jonesboro Care & Rehab Ctr. v. Woods, 2010 Ark. App. 236, 374 S.W.3d 193 (2010), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 313 (Apr. 7, 2010), superseded, 2010 Ark. 482 (2010).

Evidence.

Fair-minded persons could not reach the Workers' Compensation Commission's conclusion to deny benefits to a worker who claimed injuries to his back and right leg resulting from a work-related accident because: (1) the worker's testimony, corroborated by his supervisor, was that he did not suffer from back or right leg problems prior to the accident; (2) the commission's finding that there was no “documented report” of the worker's back complaints until six months after the work incident was unsupported; and (3) the absence of testimony from representatives of the employer's workers' compensation carrier, who were within the employer's control, raised the presumption that their testimony would have been unfavorable to the employer. Barnes v. Greenhead Farming, 101 Ark. App. 129, 270 S.W.3d 873 (2008), rehearing denied, Barnes v. Greenhead Farming, Inc., — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. App. LEXIS 160 (Feb. 13, 2008).

Record did contain objective medical findings sufficient to establish compensability, and the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that the employee proved compensability or in relying on the physician's impairment rating; giving the physician's testimony its maximum effect, as the substantial-evidence standard required the appellate court to do, this would place the employee at the end of his healing period no later than July 28, 2007. United Farms, Inc. v. Gist, 2009 Ark. App. 717, 374 S.W.3d 23 (2009), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. App. LEXIS 998 (Dec. 9, 2009), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 94 (Feb. 12, 2010).

Employee was properly awarded workers' compensation benefits under subdivision (4)(D) of this section because the employee had proven a compensable injury to the employee's left elbow and was entitled to all reasonably necessary medical treatment related to the injury; the employee's physician stated that the injury was greater than 51 percent caused by the initial injury at work and failed conservative treatment necessitating surgical repair. Pafford Med. Billing Servs. v. Smith, 2011 Ark. App. 180, 381 S.W.3d 921 (2011).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision to award additional treatment for a knee injury given its findings that the symptoms of sciatica resulting from the knee injury, as opposed to a back injury, and anything related to it should have been covered. Wright v. Conway Freight, 2014 Ark. App. 451, 441 S.W.3d 45 (2014).

Healing Period.

The court's finding that an employee's healing period had not ended was improper, where it was based at least in part, upon a response by a rehabilitation agency to the court's personal inquiry whether that agency could undertake a therapeutic work program for the employee. Bibler Bros. v. Ingram, 266 Ark. 969, 587 S.W.2d 841 (1979).

Temporary total disability and the healing period in workers' compensation cases are not the same time periods in all cases; temporary total disability is that period within the healing period in which the employee suffers a total incapacity to earn wages under subdivision (5) and § 11-9-519. Arkansas State Highway & Transp. Dep't v. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 S.W.2d 392 (Ark. 1981).

The determination of when the healing period has ended is a factual determination that is to be made by the commission; if that determination is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed on appeal. Mad Butcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982), superseded by statute as stated in, Wright Contracting Co. v. Randall, 12 Ark. App. 358, 676 S.W.2d 750 (1984); Harvest Foods v. Washam, 52 Ark. App. 72, 914 S.W.2d 776 (1996) (decided under prior law) CDI Contractors v. McHale, 41 Ark. App. 57, 848 S.W.2d 941 (1993); Arkansas Hwy. & Transp. Dep't v. McWilliams, 41 Ark. App. 1, 846 S.W.2d 670 (1993).

The healing period continues until the employee is as far restored as the permanent character of his injury will permit, and if the underlying condition causing the disability has become stable and nothing further in the way of treatment will improve that condition, the healing period has ended; the persistence of pain may not of itself prevent a finding that the healing period is over, provided that the underlying condition has stabilized. Mad Butcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982), superseded by statute as stated in, Wright Contracting Co. v. Randall, 12 Ark. App. 358, 676 S.W.2d 750 (1984) (decided under prior law) Arkansas Hwy. & Transp. Dep't v. McWilliams, 41 Ark. App. 1, 846 S.W.2d 670 (1993).

Since injured claimant's healing period had ended, claimant could not be entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits. Mad Butcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982), superseded by statute as stated in, Wright Contracting Co. v. Randall, 12 Ark. App. 358, 676 S.W.2d 750 (1984) (decided under prior law) Elk Roofing Co. v. Pinson, 22 Ark. App. 191, 737 S.W.2d 661 (1987); Jordan v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 51 Ark. App. 100, 911 S.W.2d 593 (1995).

The Workers' Compensation law does not authorize award of current total or limited total disability benefits after the end of the healing period. The concept of current total disability benefits seems to have been based on McNeely v. Clem Mill & Gin Co., 241 Ark. 498, 409 S.W.2d 502 (1966); to the extent that McNeely has been interpreted as holding that temporary benefits regardless of how they are denominated may be paid after the end of the healing period that interpretation is erroneous. Arkansas Secretary of State v. Guffey, 291 Ark. 624, 727 S.W.2d 826 (1987).

Recurring symptoms may give rise to a subsequent healing period, after the original one has ended. Where a second complication is found to be a natural and probable result of the first injury, the employer remains liable, and this liability includes liability for additional temporary benefits when the employee undergoes a second, distinct healing period. Elk Roofing Co. v. Pinson, 22 Ark. App. 191, 737 S.W.2d 661 (1987).

A healing period has not ended so long as treatment is administered for the healing and alleviation of a condition. Arkansas Hwy. & Transp. Dep't v. McWilliams, 41 Ark. App. 1, 846 S.W.2d 670 (1993); Milligan v. West Tree Serv., 57 Ark. App. 14, 946 S.W.2d 697 (1997).

Employee's healing period ended a year and a half after he failed to lose the amount of weight necessary to allow treatment of his underlying injury. Shepherd v. Van Ohlen Trucking, 49 Ark. App. 36, 895 S.W.2d 945 (1995).

The healing period continues until the employee is as far restored as the permanent character of his injury will permit, and if the underlying condition causing the disability has become stable and if nothing in the way of treatment will improve that condition, the healing period has ended. Harvest Foods v. Washam, 52 Ark. App. 72, 914 S.W.2d 776 (1996).

Substantial evidence supported commission's conclusion that the employee had not reached the end of his healing period. Harvest Foods v. Washam, 52 Ark. App. 72, 914 S.W.2d 776 (1996).

Healing period held to end three months after surgery on an entrapped nerve. Carroll Gen. Hosp. v. Green, 54 Ark. App. 102, 923 S.W.2d 878 (1996).

Evidence did not support the commission's finding that the healing period for the claimant's injured wrist had ended. Milligan v. West Tree Serv., 57 Ark. App. 14, 946 S.W.2d 697 (1997).

The healing period in which a claimant suffers a complete inability to earn wages includes the time until the employee is as far restored as the permanent character of the injury will permit; once the underlying condition is more stable and will not improve with further treatment, the healing period is over. Dallas County Hosp. v. Daniels, 74 Ark. App. 177, 47 S.W.3d 283 (2001).

Whether a claimant's healing period has ended is a factual question that is resolved by the workers' compensation commission. Dallas County Hosp. v. Daniels, 74 Ark. App. 177, 47 S.W.3d 283 (2001).

Employee was still within her healing period and entitled to an award of temporary total disability benefits where only one of several doctors determined that she had reached maximum medical improvement; other doctors had diagnosed her with spinal stenosis, an acute, severe back pain secondary to a partially ruptured disc, herniation, and disc degeneration with posterior annular tears, and had noted that employee was unable to work since the time of injury, although several attempts had been made for her to return to work. Dallas County Hosp. v. Daniels, 74 Ark. App. 177, 47 S.W.3d 283 (2001).

Temporary total disability benefits were properly awarded to employee who fell off a ladder and landed on a concrete floor where she presented substantial evidence that she was temporarily totally disabled and in a healing period, as defined by subdivision (12) of this section, from the time of injury until the day she was released to return to work. Fred's, Inc. v. Jefferson, 361 Ark. 258, 206 S.W.3d 238 (2005).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that employee was not entitled to temporary-total-disability compensation was reversed as none of the doctors who testified at the hearing agreed that employee had reached the end of his healing period. Clairday v. The Lilly Co., 95 Ark. App. 94, 234 S.W.3d 347 (2006).

Finding against the employee in his workers' compensation action was appropriate under subdivision (12) of this section and § 11-9-526 because there was substantial evidence to support the finding that the employee failed to avail himself of the opportunity to work and that he was not entitled to temporary disability after May 8, 2008. A release to work stated that the employee be provided jobs within his sedentary restrictions and both the employee and his manager testified that he left that work with various complaints of inability to perform. Watts v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 2011 Ark. App. 529, 386 S.W.3d 19 (2011).

Employee's misconduct, which resulted in termination, did not amount to a refusal of suitable employment for the purpose of receiving TTD benefits from April 28, 2008 through August 6, 2008; the employee proved that the employee was still in the healing period under subdivision (12) of this section and was totally incapacitated from earning wages. Tyson Poultry, Inc. v. Narvaiz, 2012 Ark. 118, 388 S.W.3d 16 (2012), superseded, 2012 Ark. 118, 388 S.W.3d 16 (2012).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that an employee proved entitlement to additional medical and TTD benefits under subdivision (12) of this section for a lower back injury that was sustained while working as a concrete finisher; the medical evidence and the employee's testimony demonstrated that the employee remained within the healing period since the date of the injury. Webb v. Webb, 2012 Ark. App. 207 (2012).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err under subdivision (12) of this section in failing to award an employee temporary total disability benefits beyond March 9, 2010 because there was a substantial basis for its finding that the employee's healing period for the compensable back injury had ended by March 9, 2010. Towler v. Tyson Poultry, Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 546, 423 S.W.3d 664 (2012).

Workers' Compensation Commission's opinion displayed a substantial basis for the denial of the employee's claim for an additional period of temporary total-disability benefits because the Commission exercised its duty to assess the weight and credibility of evidence regarding whether the employee's healing period had ended and whether he was totally incapacitated from earning wages, and substantial evidence supported the factual findings that the healing period ended by February 2011 and that the employee was not totally incapacitated from earning wages. Jordan v. Home Depot, Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 572, 430 S.W.3d 136 (2013).

Substantial evidence supported the denial of additional temporary total disability where, just prior to his release to return to work, the claimant underwent a functional capacity evaluation that reflected that he had put forth an unreliable effort, the ALJ noted that there were multiple examples of inconsistency in effort contained in the report, and mere days days after being cleared for work, the claimant resigned. Bankston v. Univ. of Ark. at Little Rock, 2017 Ark. App. 72, 510 S.W.3d 825 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in determining the end date for the driver's healing period as it noted and compared the physicians' opinions and found that the evidence, including the surveillance footage, showed the driver able to walk, bend, and drive a vehicle. Marten Transp., Ltd. v. Morgan, 2017 Ark. App. 608, 532 S.W.3d 139 (2017).

Award of temporary total disability for a limited period of time was appropriate because there was no medical evidence that the claimant was incapacitated from earning wages after the end of the time period, based on the only medical document addressing the issue, which was an off-work slip from a doctor taking the claimant off work for the limited period of time. There was no medical opinion expressing that claimant was incapacitated from work at any time after that period, and no doctor took him off work beyond the end date of that period. Wall Farms, LLC v. Hulsey, 2017 Ark. App. 624, 534 S.W.3d 771 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly reversed the administrative law judge's decision granting temporary total disability benefits to a claimant who slipped and fell on her hands and knees when she was at work on April 22, 2016, because claimant was determined to have reached maximum medical improvement on April 25, 2016, she failed to prove any other compensable injuries other than those to her right arm and left knee, she had been released to return to work, and her own testimony established that her noncompensable back injury was the reason she could not return to work. Davis v. Remington Arms Co., 2018 Ark. App. 390, 557 S.W.3d 894 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that the surgery performed on the worker was reasonable and necessary and that she remained in her healing period and was entitled to temporary total disability benefits. The authority of the Commission to resolve conflicting evidence extends to medical testimony; thus, the Commission acted within its authority in giving more weight to one doctor's recommendation for surgery than to another doctor's recommendation for a delay, and the award corresponded to both doctors' opinions that the worker had not reached maximum medical recovery. Cent. Moloney, Inc. v. Scoles, 2018 Ark. App. 561, 565 S.W.3d 134 (2018).

Temporary total disability benefits beyond a specific date were properly denied given evidence that the claimant's healing period for his compensable cervical and thoracic strains ended on the date that a physician opined that he had reached maximum medical improvement and the lack of evidence linking the claimant's syrinx to his compensable injury. Page v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Company/AT&T, Inc., 2019 Ark. App. 521, 590 S.W.3d 740 (2019).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision denying a claimant's request for additional temporary total disability benefits was supported by substantial evidence where three medical opinions that his cervicothoracic syrinx was not causally related to his work-related motor vehicle accident conflicted with a fourth physician's report, and the Commission had accepted the medical opinions finding no causal relationship. Page v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Company/AT&T, Inc., 2019 Ark. App. 521, 590 S.W.3d 740 (2019).

Injury.

Deceased worker's statutory beneficiaries were entitled to recover workers' compensation benefits under § 11-9-527 because a compensable injury was suffered under subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section when the worker died in a fire in her living quarters at a hotel where she was employed, even though she was off-duty at the time. Under the increased-risk doctrine for residential employees, the worker's fatal injury was compensable as a residential employee who indirectly advanced the interests of her employer. Jivan v. Econ. Inn & Suites, 370 Ark. 414, 260 S.W.3d 281 (2007).

Where a benefits claimant did not show a specific incident at work that caused him to have tingling and burning in his hands, he failed to demonstrate that he had a compensable accidental injury under this section; the injury could have been sustained in a 1995 fall or any other time. Weaver v. Nabors Drilling USA & F.A. Richards & Assocs., 98 Ark. App. 161, 253 S.W.3d 30 (2007).

Reversal of an award of workers' compensation benefits to the employee was appropriate pursuant to subdivision (4)(E) of this section because she failed to prove a compensable injury by a preponderance of the evidence. The Workers' Compensation Commission determined that the employee was not a credible witness, and it noted the medical opinions of two doctors who testified that the employee's work activity did not cause or aggravate her carpal tunnel syndrome. Stutzman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 99 Ark. App. 19, 256 S.W.3d 524 (2007).

Workers' compensation benefits were properly awarded to an employee where the employee's knee injury was accidental under subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section; there was uncontradicted evidence that the employee had to climb the stairs regularly. There was no dispute that the employee did not have any problems with the knee when the employee started work in the morning. Cedar Chem. Co. v. Knight, 99 Ark. App. 162, 258 S.W.3d 394 (2007), aff'd, 372 Ark. 233, 273 S.W.3d 473 (2008).

Knee injury was compensable under subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section where a workers' compensation claimant testified that he felt pain while descending a flight of stairs at work; the claimant's testimony was found to be credible, and he testified that he was required to ascend and descend multiple flights of stairs per day during a 12-hour shift. Cedar Chem. Co. v. Knight, 372 Ark. 233, 273 S.W.3d 473 (2008).

Court of appeals erred in overturning an award of workers' compensation benefits to an employee who was struck by a gate and pinned under it where, in attempting to unlock the gate and provide access to a back entrance to a parking lot, the employee was advancing the employer's interests by allowing other workers to enter or exit the parking lot; the employee sustained a compensable injury under subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section. Texarkana Sch. Dist. v. Conner, 373 Ark. 372, 284 S.W.3d 57 (2008).

Where the employee was involved in a motor vehicle accident while riding to get a tractor from another job site, the fact that the employee was directly advancing his employer's interests trumped any application of the going-and-coming rule. The Court of Appeals of Arkansas held that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment for purposes of subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section; the fact that the employee was not being paid at the time of the accident was of no consequence. Witt v. Allen & Son, Inc., 2009 Ark. App. 561 (2009).

Where claimant was bitten by a horse while working at racing stables, she obtained jobs with other employers and continued to seek medical treatment for her arm. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err by denying her claim for benefits one year after the horse bite, because the record showed no causal connection between the horse bite and claimant's physical scars or the assessment of radial palsy; therefore, claimant failed to meet her burden of proving a compensable injury under subsection (4) of this section. Cossey v. Gary A. Thomas Racing Stable, 2009 Ark. App. 666, 344 S.W.3d 684 (2009).

There was evidence that an employee told another employee and a doctor that the employee's back injury occurred over a weekend while bike riding, the employee had never stated to either the company doctor or the employee's own doctor that the source of the back injury was caused by repetitive job duties and/or by specific incident, and the Workers' Compensation Commission did not find the employee's testimony as to the work-related source of the back injury credible; therefore, under either subdivision (4)(A)(i) or (ii) of this section, the employee had not met her burden of proving a compensable work-related injury. Alecia Clark v. San Antonio Shoes, Inc. Commerce Indust. Ins. Co., 2009 Ark. App. 689 (2009).

Under subdivision (4)(B)(iv)( a ) of this section, the employee's injury was not compensable as the accident was substantially occasioned by the use of methamphetamine; the doctor testified that enough methamphetamine was circulating in the employee' system at the time of the accident and would have affected his judgment. Hickey v. Gardisser Constr., 2009 Ark. App. 725, 377 S.W.3d 259 (2009).

When the employee's left shoulder was injured when a door-hanging mechanism fell, three co-workers witnessed the incident and it was immediately reported to his supervisor; after surgery, a doctor assessed a five-percent whole-person-impairment rating. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that he sustained a compensable injury under subdivision (4)(D) of this section was supported by the evidence; he was entitled to temporary-total-disability benefits. Potlatch Corp. v. Word, 2009 Ark. App. 772, 359 S.W.3d 426 (2009).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission had a substantial basis upon which to deny a claim for additional medical and temporary-total disability benefits because the workers' compensation benefits claimant underwent two MRIs, and there were new objective findings on the second MRI, according to the radiologist who reviewed both MRIs, and the doctor related claimant's need for treatment to the new injury; the Commission, reviewing the evidence de novo, found that no causal connection between the primary injury and the subsequent disability was shown, eliminating the need to address claimant's conduct. Griffith v. Medcath, Inc., 2009 Ark. App. 777 (2009).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that a claimant, who stepped outside a seminar room to smoke a cigarette, was performing employment services at the time of her injury. A reasonable person could reach the same decision as the Commission and find that the claimant was continuing to advance her employer's interests, at least indirectly, by remaining on the premises until she had received her paycheck, filled out any necessary paperwork, and clocked out. Jonesboro Care & Rehab Ctr. v. Woods, 2010 Ark. 482 (2010).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that an employee was not performing employment services for her employer when she was injured at the beginning of a mandatory break because the employee was doing something generally required by the employer; by the employer's own admission, the mandatory breaks were given so that all employees could take care of personal business, including getting something to drink or using the restroom, at the same time, which provided a direct benefit to the employer, and while the employee was not required to work during her break, she was required to take a break because the plant shut down. Dearman v. Deltic Timber Corp., 2010 Ark. App. 87, 377 S.W.3d 301 (2010).

In a case in which a workers' compensation claimant fell and broke her hip when she stepped outside to revive herself, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's determination that the claimant was not performing employment services at the time of her injury was not supported by substantial evidence. The claimant testified that she exited the building for the sole purpose of regaining alertness, that testimony was supported by all of the evidence, and there was no evidence that she stepped outside the hospital for any purpose related to her own personal comfort or convenience. Hudak-Lee v. Baxter County Reg'l Hosp., 2010 Ark. App. 121 (2010), vacated, 2011 Ark. 31, 378 S.W.3d 77 (2011).

Decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission to award an employee benefits for medical treatment and temporary total disability was supported by substantial evidence because it was for the Commission to determine the credibility of the employee's testimony, and it accepted as credible the employee's version of events; although the employee could not recall the exact location of the incident and did not immediately report the injury to his supervisor, the Commission found credible his claim that he jarred his back when he stepped off of a sidewalk. Mack-Reynolds Appraisal Co. v. Morton, 2010 Ark. App. 142, 375 S.W.3d 6 (2010).

Finding against the employee in his workers' compensation action was appropriate pursuant to subdivisions (4)(A)(i) and (B)(iii) of this section because he was not engaged in employment services at the time of his injury. At the time of the injury the employee had completed his daily tasks and had clocked out; he also stated that he was neither on call nor subject to being recalled into the plant. Rhodes v. Commercial Metals Co., 2010 Ark. App. 198 (2010).

Finding in a workers' compensation action that the employee failed to prove that she sustained a compensable injury to her left knee when she slipped and fell at work was improper pursuant to subdivisions (4)(A)(i) and (4)(B)(iii) of this section because substantial evidence did not support the conclusion that the employee's hug was a deviation and that the deviation was not complete at the time of her fall. Wood v. Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, 2010 Ark. App. 307, 374 S.W.3d 785 (2010).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that an employee established that she sustained a gradual-onset injury to her right shoulder and in awarding her benefits because there was a lack of substantial evidence supporting its opinion that the employee's bus driver job duties were rapid and repetitive; while the evidence of the employee's opening and closing the bus door touched on the repetitive nature of her job, there was no evidence about the time interval between each event, and that evidence failed to establish the rapidity requirement of subdivision (4)(A)(ii)( a ) of this section. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. v. Stewart, 2010 Ark. App. 487, 375 S.W.3d 758 (2010).

Substantial evidence supported Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that a claimant's climbing a ladder two to three times a day, two to three days a week, was not rapid, repetitive motion for purposes of compensability under subdivision (4)(A)(ii)( a ) of this section. Jenkins v. It's Fashion, 2010 Ark. App. 746, 379 S.W.3d 630 (2010).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission properly held that an employee failed to prove that the employee sustained a compensable injury to the employee's elbow under subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section because treatment notes reflected that the employee complained of shoulder pain and popping; a physician's report stated that an examination of the elbow showed full and painless range of motion with no crepitating. Morgan v. Highland Window, 2010 Ark. App. 797 (2010).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that a claimant did not suffer a compensable injury when she fell and broke her hip during her break because she was not performing employment services was not supported by substantial evidence. By taking a short break to revive herself in order to complete her shift, she was advancing the interests of her employer. Hudak-Lee v. Baxter County Reg'l Hosp. & Risk Mgmt. Res., 2011 Ark. 31, 378 S.W.3d 77 (2011).

Workers' compensation benefits were properly awarded to an employee, a truck driver, for a compensable injury in the form of a heart attack, pursuant to subdivision (14)(A) of this section; although the employee had previously assisted, on a single occasion, with changing a mud flap, the employee had not been required to perform such a duty in as hot an environment as that present on the day in question. The employee replaced it alone with less than ideal tools for the job. J Mar Express, Inc. v. Poteete, 2011 Ark. App. 122, 381 S.W.3d 159 (2011).

Claim for workers' compensation benefits for a knee injury was properly denied under subdivisions (4)(A)(i), (D), and (E)(i) of this section because the employee failed to prove that the injury occurred in the course of employment; employee's supervisor testified that the employee stated that the employee had gout in the knee and had hurt the knee playing football when the employee was younger. Montgomery v. J & J Lumber Co., 2011 Ark. App. 129 (2011).

Claimant's action for workers' compensation benefits was properly denied as he failed to establish a compensable injury pursuant to subdivision (4) of this section. The claimant did not offer evidence of objective medical findings that established that an on-the-job incident aggravated his preexisting medical condition. Grothaus v. Vista Health, L.L.C., 2011 Ark. App. 130, 382 S.W.3d 1 (2011).

Substantial evidence supported the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of benefits to a claimant on the ground that the claimant had failed to establish that he sustained a compensable back injury as a result of a fall or from performing numerous strenuous activities during his employment as the claimant did not report a back injury to the employer until nearly three months after his fall, and he did not relate the injury to his fall or any specific incident at work. Moreover, the claimant had worked for the employer for only one and a half years while he had performed equally strenuous work for another employer for twenty-seven years, and he reported back pain several years before he began working for the employer. Smith v. Commercial Metals Co., 2011 Ark. App. 218, 382 S.W.3d 764 (2011).

Finding that the employee failed to prove a compensable injury to her right knee in a workers' compensation action was appropriate pursuant to subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section because, at the time that she injured herself, she was merely walking outside to take a smoke break. The employer imposed no work requirements on the employee while she took her breaks and she was not advancing the interests of the employer at the time that she was injured. Haynes v. Ozark Guidance Ctr., Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 396, 384 S.W.3d 570 (2011).

Sufficient evidence in the record supported the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that an employee's exposure to cobalt dust while at work aggravated his preexisting chronic obstructive pulmonary disease where, in addition to the medical opinions regarding causation, an Occupational Safety and Health Administration study found that the amount of dust in the workplace exceeded acceptable limits, the employee testified that the employer's overhead-exhaust system was not functioning for a period of time while he was exposed to dust, and there was also testimony that an employee who held the employee's job prior to him likewise experienced breathing problems. Qualserv Corp. v. Rich, 2011 Ark. App. 548 (2011).

Award of temporary total disability benefits to an employee was supported by substantial evidence that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment, and that it was the major cause of the disability or need for treatment pursuant to subdivision (4)(E)(ii) of this section. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Strickland, 2011 Ark. App. 585 (2011).

Workers' compensation claimant did not show that he suffered a compensable injury under subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section, as a radiologist stated that the x-rays taken immediately after the work-related incident did not show that the condition of the claimant's knee was any worse or different than it was two years before. Kelley v. Courtyard Marriott, 2011 Ark. App. 715, 386 S.W.3d 677 (2011).

Finding that the employee's injury was not the result of rapid repetitive motion was inappropriate pursuant to subdivision (4)(A) of this section because he was required to walk back and forth across a field over and over all day long and that repetitive motion met the requirement of being rapid as well. The only reasonable conclusion was that the fast-paced repetitive walking caused a blister as a result of the rapid motion of the ill-fitting boots rubbing against his toe. Pearson v. Worksource, 2011 Ark. App. 751, 387 S.W.3d 274 (2011), rehearing denied, Pearson v. Worksource & Wausau Ins. Co., — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Ark. App. LEXIS 32 (Ark. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2012), vacated, 2012 Ark. 406, 424 S.W.3d 311 (2012).

Employee whose feet became infected, allegedly due to water run-off on his apron and shoes during his employment at a poultry plant, failed to carry his burden under § 11-9-704(c) of proving that the infection and hospitalization was caused by exposure to water at work, as opposed to a continuation of a preexisting diabetic infection for which the employee had been hospitalized a month earlier. Serrano v. George's and Corckett Adjustment, 2011 Ark. App. 784 (2011).

Denial of workers' compensation benefits to the employee was inappropriate because substantial evidence did not support the finding that there was not enough evidence of record to rebut the presumption that the injury was occasioned by the presence of illegal drugs in the employee's system under subdivision (4)(B)(iv)( a ) of this section. Gentry v. Ark. Oil Field Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 786 (2011).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that an employee had not proved that a back injury occurred in the course of the employee's employment as a truck driver because the employee's testimony regarding the nature of the employee's complaints conflicted with the employee's statements to medical providers. Flynn v. J. B. Hunt Transp., 2012 Ark. App. 111, 389 S.W.3d 67 (2012).

There was substantial evidence to support the decision that appellee employee suffered a compensable aggravation of her preexisting cervical problems, because the employee complained of pain in her neck when she first sought medical treatment the day after her accident and her doctor's opinion that the pain in her neck and shoulder was work-related was stated with a reasonable degree of medical certainty under subdivision (16)(B) of this section. Ozark Natural Food v. Pierson, 2012 Ark. App. 133, 389 S.W.3d 105 (2012).

Doctor's opinion that claimant's carpal-tunnel injuries were directly related to her job as an ultrasound technician stated a causal link between the condition and claimant's employment duties for purposes of this section, and provided substantial evidence in support of the decision to award her for medical treatment and disability benefits. Ouachita County Med. Ctr. v. Murphy, 2012 Ark. App. 135 (2012).

Denial of permanent-disability benefits for the employee's compensable back injury was inappropriate pursuant to subdivision (4)(F)(ii)( a ) of this section because unrefuted testimony established that prior to the accident, he never had serious back pain and he was physically able to perform many activities and all of his work duties. Wright v. St. Vincent Doctors Hosp. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2012 Ark. App. 153, 390 S.W.3d 779 (2012).

Denial of workers' compensation benefits related to the employee's back injury was proper because the objective medical evidence indicated a three-month gap between the date of the accident and the report of the injury, calling into question whether his injury was a result of the work-related accident. Because the medical records made no mention of the ladder incident until the back injury was discovered in June 2010, his testimony was the only evidence linking the injury to the fall and given the three-month span, reasonable persons might disagree as to the actual cause of the injury; thus, he failed to meet his burden under subdivision (4)(E) of this section to prove compensability under subdivision (4)(A)(i). Luster v. Ben E. Keith Co., 2012 Ark. App. 197 (2012).

Denial of workers' compensation benefits related to the employee's back injury was proper because the objective medical evidence indicated a three-month gap between the date of the accident and the report of the injury, calling into question whether his injury was a result of the work-related accident. Because the medical records made no mention of the ladder incident until the back injury was discovered in June 2010, his testimony was the only evidence linking the injury to the fall and given the three-month span, reasonable persons might disagree as to the actual cause of the injury; thus, he failed to meet his burden under subdivision (4)(E) of this section to prove compensability under subdivision (4)(A)(i). Luster v. Ben E. Keith Co., 2012 Ark. App. 197 (2012).

Finding that the claimant in a workers' compensation action suffered a compensable injury to his spine and was entitled to medical services and temporary total disability benefits was appropriate because a 2007 MRI showed that he sustained a herniated cervical disc, which constituted an objective finding under subdivision (4)(D) of this section. The claimant presented several physician opinions that linked his cervical problems and his need for treatment to the 2004 incident and established that he was temporarily totally disabled. Ga. Pac. Corp. v. Lawhon, 2012 Ark. App. 206 (2012).

Finding that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a compensable injury to his left shoulder was appropriate pursuant to subdivisions (4)(A)(i) and (4)(E) of this section because the medical records showed instances where the claimant did not attribute his injury to a specific incident identifiable by the time and place of occurrence, which must be proved in order to establish a compensable injury. Jones v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 2012 Ark. App. 260 (2012).

Music teacher failed to show that minor cervical abnormalities were caused by a fourth-grader running into her because the bulging at C5-6 was in existence dating back to 2007, and her treating physician could point to no new objective medical findings establishing a compensable injury as required by subdivision (4) of this section. Vaughn v. Midland Sch. Dist., 2012 Ark. App. 344 (2012).

Workers' Compensation Commission found that the worker's symptoms could not be causally related to his injury, for purposes of subdivision (4) of this section, but nothing negated the possibility of any causal relationship, and therefore the record did not support this medical conclusion; the court reversed and remanded. Vijil v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 2012 Ark. App. 361 (2012).

As there was an obvious, direct correlation between the injury appellant claimed he suffered at work (a blister) and the specific incident he alleged caused that injury (repeatedly walking wearing ill-fitting work-supplied boots), it was not an “unexplained injury”; therefore, he was entitled to benefits under subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section. Pearson v. Worksource, 2012 Ark. 406, 424 S.W.3d 311 (2012).

Claimant had the burden, under subdivision (4)(E) of this section, to prove a compensable injury by a preponderance of the evidence. Swink v. Rest. Mgmt., 2012 Ark. App. 490 (2012).

There was evidence supporting appellant's claim that she suffered a compensable injury to her knee, but this did not warrant reversal, as the question was whether substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision, not whether the evidence supported contrary findings. Swink v. Rest. Mgmt., 2012 Ark. App. 490 (2012).

Workers' Compensation Commission found from the evidence that appellant had been seen by a doctor previously for her knee issues, which supported the conclusion that if she did fall at work, this did not play a causal role in her knee issues; there was a substantial basis for denying the claim. Swink v. Rest. Mgmt., 2012 Ark. App. 490 (2012).

Pursuant to subdivision (4)(F)(ii) of this section, an appellate court declined to reverse an award of disability benefits to an employee for a spine injury because there was ample evidence that the employee was not capable of performing the work duties that the employee had previously been able to perform before a work-related fall. Efird v. Whelan Sec., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 548, 423 S.W.3d 643 (2012).

Workers' compensation benefits were not awarded to a claimant for gradual-onset injuries to the neck and back under subdivisions (4)(A) and (E) of this section because the injuries were not reported between 2009 and 2011, and no medical treatment was sought between 2003 and 2011. It was the role of the Workers' Compensation Commission to judge the credibility of the witnesses. King v. Superior Wheels, 2013 Ark. App. 95 (2013).

Workers' Compensation Commission found the claimant was not credible and assigned minimal weight to one doctor's report, but found another doctor's statement that the claimant did not have an injury to his head, spine, or neck belied the claimant's assertion in that regard; because the claimant did not establish a causal relationship between his injury and his employment, the conclusion that he did not prove he sustained a compensable injury was supported by substantial evidence. Vijil v. Schlumberger Tech., Corp., 2013 Ark. App. 346, 427 S.W.3d 796 (2013).

Worker was on his lunch break when the injury occurred, he was not required to stay on premises during his break or perform job-related duties, and the injury occurred when the break was only half over and he did not intend to immediately return to work, such that the employer did not benefit from the worker's actions, which were for his own convenience; substantial evidence supported the finding that the injury did not occur within the time and space boundaries of employment and was therefore not compensable. Shelton v. Qualserv Am. Cas. Co., 2013 Ark. App. 469 (2013).

Workers' compensation claimant was unable to show a gradual injury to his neck since he did not establish that the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment; the only evidence was speculation offered by the claimant. Test results showed disc abnormalities and multilevel degenerative disc disease, and the Workers' Compensation Commission afforded more weight to the degenerative condition, stating it could have been a factor in the injury and need for treatment. Kimble v. Labor Force, Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 601, 430 S.W.3d 156 (2013).

Workers' compensation claimant was unable to show a neck injury that was caused by a specific incident and was identifiable by time and place of occurrence because he failed to identify a work event that caused his injury; he did not remember an acute trauma or report any incident or injury, he did not stop working, he was able to complete his shift, and he did not report any injury or incident to co-workers or supervisors. Kimble v. Labor Force, Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 601, 430 S.W.3d 156 (2013).

In a dueling-doctors case, a court was bound by the findings of the Workers' Compensation Commission under subdivisions (4)(A)(ii) (b) and (E)(ii) of this section that the employee failed to prove that he sustained compensable carpal-tunnel injuries as a result of his employment. Thrapp v. Smith Blair, Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 683, 430 S.W.3d 810 (2013).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly affirmed and adopted an administrative law judge's (ALJ) denial of benefits for a right-shoulder injury because the employee failed to prove a causal connection between objective findings of an injury and a work-related incident where the only evidence in the record supporting the employee's claim that he suffered a work-related shoulder injury was his own testimony, which the ALJ found not credible. Williams v. Baldor Elec. Co., 2014 Ark. App. 62 (2014).

Triggering of the statutory presumption shifted the burden of proof to the employee to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury or accident was not substantially occasioned by his use of illegal drugs. Edmisten v. Bull Shoals Landing, 2014 Ark. 89, 432 S.W.3d 25 (2014).

Workers' Compensation Commission arbitrarily disregarded testimony submitted in support of the employee's claim, and the decision that he failed to rebut the presumption that his accident was not substantially occasioned by the use of illegal drugs was not supported by substantial evidence; the employee testified that he was not intoxicated on the day of the accident, and he presented evidence that no one saw him impaired as the result of drug intoxication on the day of the accident. Edmisten v. Bull Shoals Landing, 2014 Ark. 89, 432 S.W.3d 25 (2014).

Medical testing of the employee established the presence of marijuana metabolites, which triggered the statutory presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by the use of illegal drugs. Edmisten v. Bull Shoals Landing, 2014 Ark. 89, 432 S.W.3d 25 (2014).

Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that the employee failed to rebut the statutory presumption that his accident was substantially occasioned by his use of marijuana, because the Commission arbitrarily disregarded any testimony supporting the employee's claim, which included testimony by coworkers and a supervisor that the employee was not impaired at the time of the accident, and merely speculated that the employee was high. Prock v. Bull Shoals Boat Landing, 2014 Ark. 93, 431 S.W.3d 858 (2014).

It was the worker's burden to prove a compensable injury, not the employer's burden to disprove one. Dismute v. Potlatch Corp., 2014 Ark. App. 176 (2014).

Substantial evidence supported the determination by the Workers' Compensation Commission that the worker failed to meet his burden of establishing a compensable injury, given in part the testimony that the worker was not lifting any lumber when he allegedly hurt his back, and a doctor stated that the worker did not sustain any objective change in his physical findings as a result of the alleged accident. Dismute v. Potlatch Corp., 2014 Ark. App. 176 (2014).

Workers' Compensation Commission found a compensable injury, as the worker was directly advancing the company's interests at the time of the incident and the company benefitted from the work the worker performed, and it was clear that the Commission's decision to reverse was based on issues of credibility alone; because questions of credibility were the exclusive province of the Commission, the court was foreclosed from determining the weight and credibility to be accorded to the testimony, and the court affirmed. Hill v. Treadaway, 2014 Ark. App. 185, 433 S.W.3d 285 (2014).

—In General.

Evidence sufficient to find job-related injury. Harding Glass Co. v. Moore, 230 Ark. 796, 327 S.W.2d 8 (1959); Bradham Drilling Co. v. Powell, 231 Ark. 555, 331 S.W.2d 35 (1960); Tri State Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 254 Ark. 944, 497 S.W.2d 39 (1973); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Williams, 270 Ark. 65, 603 S.W.2d 443 (1980).

Evidence insufficient to find job-related injury. John Bishop Constr. Co. v. Orlicek, 224 Ark. 182, 272 S.W.2d 820 (1954); Ocoma Foods v. Grogan, 253 Ark. 1111, 491 S.W.2d 65 (1973); Lybrand v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 266 Ark. 946, 588 S.W.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1979).

Separate injuries or conditions that occur simultaneously or near in time to each other can be compensable, even where the injuries are located in the same body member. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Griffin, 61 Ark. App. 222, 966 S.W.2d 914 (1998).

Order awarding temporary total disability benefits to an employee was upheld because it was undisputed that the employee sustained an accidental injury, as defined by subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section, when she fell off a ladder and landed on her back on a concrete floor as treatment, medication and physical therapy were prescribed. Fred's, Inc. v. Jefferson, 361 Ark. 258, 206 S.W.3d 238 (2005).

—Accident.

The words accidental injury mean something happening without the design of, and being unforeseen and unexpected by, the person to whom the injury happens. Hagger v. Wortz Biscuit Co., 210 Ark. 318, 196 S.W.2d 1 (1946) (decision under prior law).

Injury to heart by breathing excessive amounts of dust was not one which appellee might have reasonably expected or anticipated and was therefore accidental within the meaning of former Workers' Compensation Law although it continued over a period of years. Batesville White Lime Co. v. Bell, 212 Ark. 23, 205 S.W.2d 31 (1947) (decision under prior law).

Injury was not due to accident where evidence showed that injury was not due to any specific incident but was the result of heavy lifting over a period of time in the normal course of employment. Stallings Bros. Feed Mill v. Stovall, 221 Ark. 541, 254 S.W.2d 460 (1953).

An injury is accidental when either the cause or result is unexpected or accidental, although the work being done is usual or ordinary. Bryant Stave & Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 296 S.W.2d 436 (1956); Spencer v. Plainview Lumber Co., 239 Ark. 1039, 396 S.W.2d 943 (1965); Young v. Heekin Canning Co., 13 Ark. App. 199, 681 S.W.2d 419 (1985).

Accidental injury means every injury to an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment except those injuries caused by his intoxication or by his willful intention to bring about the injury or death of himself or another. Bryant Stave & Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 296 S.W.2d 436 (1956).

The adjective accidental refers to and modifies the noun injury, and does not refer to the cause of the injury. There is no statutory requirement that the cause of injury itself must have also been accidental. Bryant Stave & Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 296 S.W.2d 436 (1956).

Claimant did not prove by a preponderance of evidence that she experienced a compensable injury under subdivision (5)(A)(i), caused by a specific incident and identifiable by time and place of occurrence, as opposed to experiencing a gradual injury. Mikel v. Engineered Specialty Plastics, 56 Ark. App. 126, 938 S.W.2d 876 (1997).

Substantial evidence supported Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's decision finding that employee was entitled to benefits as the Commission found the brother's testimony that the accident was unavoidable to be credible and the presence of drugs did not controvert the claim for benefits. Apple Tree Serv. v. Grimes, 94 Ark. App. 190, 228 S.W.3d 515 (2006).

—Aggravation.

An aggravation is a new injury resulting from an independent incident; the independent incident must be shown to be work-related, and, under subdivision (5)(A)(i), it must be shown that the accidental injury was caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Farmland Ins. Co. v. DuBois, 54 Ark. App. 141, 923 S.W.2d 883 (1996).

Award of benefits to the employee in a workers' compensation action was proper where substantial evidence supported the determination that the employee sustained an aggravation of her pre-existing condition; the positive bone scan was an objective medical finding of injury that was out of the employee's control and it formed the basis for the recommendation of surgery. Heritage Baptist Temple v. Robison, 82 Ark. App. 460, 120 S.W.3d 150 (2003).

Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that the employee had failed to prove a casual connection between her compensable injury and her need for total-knee-replacement surgery; the employer and insurer had to take the employee as they found her, and the compensable injury that she suffered was a factor in her need for the additional surgery. Williams v. L & W Janitorial, Inc., 85 Ark. App. 1, 145 S.W.3d 383 (2004).

Denial of the employee's permanent benefits was error where the employee's back disease did not require surgery or any other medical treatment prior to the compensable aggravation; there was no evidence that the employee was assigned any rating for his pre-existing stenosis, and there was evidence that his impairment resulted from the aggravation that caused the need for surgery. Pollard v. Meridian Aggregates, 88 Ark. App. 1, 193 S.W.3d 738 (2004).

There was substantial evidence that claimant suffered a new injury and a compensable aggravation resulting from the independent incident where claimant testified that, after squatting down and opening his laptop on February 7, 2001, he started to get up and was knocked to the ground by severe pain in his back and right side; his testimony that his back was “crooked” following the severe pain experienced in the incident was credible and his physical therapist stated that he observed a decreased lumbar lordosis on March 5, 2001. King v. Peopleworks, 97 Ark. App. 105, 244 S.W.3d 729 (2006).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly found that an employee sustained a new compensable injury and was entitled to temporary total disability benefits and attorney's fees after he felt abrupt, excruciating pain as he stepped down from an excavator and required help to take him to a hospital; while the employee had preexisting chronic back pain, a new MRI showed, and two doctors stated, that the employee's spine had new and/or different injuries. Greene Cty. Judge v. Penny, 2019 Ark. App. 552, 589 S.W.3d 478 (2019).

Employment circumstances that aggravate preexisting conditions are compensable; an aggravation is a new injury resulting from an independent incident and must be evidenced by objective medical findings of a new injury to the preexisting condition. Greene Cty. Judge v. Penny, 2019 Ark. App. 552, 589 S.W.3d 478 (2019).

—Arising Out of and in the Course of Employment.

When the servant acts with reference to the services for which he is employed and for the purpose of performing the work of his employer, and not for any independent purpose of his own, but merely for the benefit of his master, acts done in such circumstances are within the scope of the servant's employment, but the master is not responsible where a servant acts without reference to the service for which he is employed, but to effect some independent purpose of his own. Lundell v. Walker, 204 Ark. 871, 165 S.W.2d 600 (1942).

Injury held not to be within scope. Birchett v. Tuf-Nut Garment Mfg. Co., 205 Ark. 483, 169 S.W.2d 574 (1943), overruled in part, Southern Cotton Oil Div. v. Childress, 237 Ark. 909, 377 S.W.2d 167 (Ark. 1964) (cases decided under prior law); Duke v. Pekin Wood Prods. Co., 223 Ark. 182, 264 S.W.2d 834 (1954); Grace v. Mt. Holly Lumber Co., 239 Ark. 519, 390 S.W.2d 105 (1965); West Tree Serv., Inc. v. Hopper, 244 Ark. 348, 425 S.W.2d 300 (1968); Bentley v. Henderson, 251 Ark. 203, 471 S.W.2d 548 (1971); Owosso Furn. Co. v. Townsend, 251 Ark. 265, 471 S.W.2d 752 (1971); Moseley Auto Sales & Serv. v. Vines, 254 Ark. 885, 497 S.W.2d 19 (1973); Queen v. Royal Serv. Co., 13 Ark. App. 274, 682 S.W.2d 779 (1985); Burks v. Anthony Timberlands, Inc., 21 Ark. App. 1, 727 S.W.2d 388 (1987); Lytle v. Arkansas Trucking Servs., 54 Ark. App. 73, 923 S.W.2d 292 (1996).

To be compensable the alleged injury must not only arise in the course of the employment, but also out of the employment. Barrentine v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 207 Ark. 527, 181 S.W.2d 485 (1944), overruled in part, Southern Cotton Oil Div. v. Childress, 237 Ark. 909, 377 S.W.2d 167 (Ark. 1964) (decision under prior law).

The burden of proof is on a claimant to show that injury or death of an employee was the result of an accidental injury that not only arose in the course of the employment, but in addition, that it grew out of, or resulted from, the employment. Duke v. Pekin Wood Prods. Co., 223 Ark. 182, 264 S.W.2d 834 (1954); Burks v. Anthony Timberlands, Inc., 21 Ark. App. 1, 727 S.W.2d 388 (1987).

Burden was on claimant to show accident occurred in the course of employment. American Cas. Co. v. Jones, 224 Ark. 731, 276 S.W.2d 41 (1955).

An accidental injury arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the injury is too great for the person undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the condition of his health, provided the exertion is either the sole or a contributing cause of the injury. Bryant Stave & Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 296 S.W.2d 436 (1956); Young v. Heekin Canning Co., 13 Ark. App. 199, 681 S.W.2d 419 (1985).

Injury held to be within scope of employment. Williams v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 227 Ark. 340, 298 S.W.2d 323 (1957); United Steelworkers v. Walden, 228 Ark. 1024, 311 S.W.2d 787 (1958); Malvern Brick & Tile Co. v. Lowery, 230 Ark. 857, 327 S.W.2d 86 (1959); Alma Canning Co. v. Hanna, 233 Ark. 996, 350 S.W.2d 166 (1961); Southern Cotton Oil Div. v. Childress, 237 Ark. 909, 377 S.W.2d 167 (Ark. 1964); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Craig, 243 Ark. 538, 420 S.W.2d 854 (1967); Arkansas Foundry Co. v. Cody, 251 Ark. 57, 470 S.W.2d 812 (1971); American Red Cross v. Wilson, 257 Ark. 647, 519 S.W.2d 60 (1975); Westark Specialties, Inc. v. Lindsey, 259 Ark. 351, 532 S.W.2d 757 (1976); Purdy v. Livingston, 262 Ark. 575, 559 S.W.2d 24 (1977); Saint Vincent Infirmary v. Carpenter, 268 Ark. 951, 597 S.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1980); J. & G. Cabinets v. Hennington, 269 Ark. 789, 600 S.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1980); Benton Serv. Ctr. v. Pinegar, 269 Ark. 768, 601 S.W.2d 227 (1980); Marshall v. Ouachita Hosp., 269 Ark. 958, 601 S.W.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1980), overruled in part, Harrison Furn. v. Chrobak, 2 Ark. App. 364, 620 S.W.2d 955 (1981); Meyer's Bakery, Inc. v. Pratt, 6 Ark. App. 421, 644 S.W.2d 299 (1982); P.A.M. Transp. v. Miller, 24 Ark. App. 163, 750 S.W.2d 417 (1988).

When an injury or disability is caused by exertion arising from the employment, whether the exercise is normal or extraordinary, the injury is compensable. Arkansas-Best Freight System v. Shinn, 235 Ark. 314, 357 S.W.2d 661 (1962).

There is no presumption that a claim for workers' compensation comes within the purview of the law, i.e., that it arose out of and in the course of the claimant's employment. O.K. Processing, Inc. v. Servold, 265 Ark. 352, 578 S.W.2d 224 (1979).

The phrase arising out of the employment refers to the origin or cause of the accident and the phrase in the course of the employment refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the injury occurred; in order for an injury to arise out of the employment, it must be a natural and probable consequence or incident of the employment and a natural result of one of its risks. J. & G. Cabinets v. Hennington, 269 Ark. 789, 600 S.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1980).

Activities of a personal nature, not forbidden but reasonably to be expected, may be a material incident of the employment and injuries suffered in the course of the activities are compensable, the fact that the injury is suffered during a lunch break, when the employee is not required to be on the premises, does not alter this principle since the controlling issue is whether the activity is reasonably expectable so as to be an incident of the employment, and thus in essence a part of it. J. & G. Cabinets v. Hennington, 269 Ark. 789, 600 S.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1980).

The workers' compensation commission should follow a liberal approach in determining whether the accident in fact grew out of and occurred in the course of the employment and it is the duty of the commission to draw all legitimate inferences possible in favor of the claimant and to give the claimant the benefit of doubt. Gerber Prods. v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985).

Minor acts of horseplay do not automatically constitute departures from employment but may be found to be insubstantial. Whether initiation of horseplay is a deviation from one's course of employment depends on (1) the extent and seriousness of the deviation; (2) the completeness of the deviation (i.e., whether it was commingled with the performance of duty or involved an abandonment of duty); (3) the extent to which the practice of horseplay had become an accepted part of the employment; and (4) the extent to which the nature of the employment may be expected to include some such horseplay. Ringier Am. v. Combs, 41 Ark. App. 47, 849 S.W.2d 1 (1993).

The fact that an injured employee may have been the instigator of, rather than a mere participant in horseplay, will not necessarily render the injury noncompensable. Ringier Am. v. Combs, 41 Ark. App. 47, 849 S.W.2d 1 (1993).

Claimant's injuries, sustained when a tornado destroyed a mobile home where he resided on the premises of his employer, arose out of and in the course of his employment. Deffenbaugh Indus. v. Angus, 313 Ark. 100, 852 S.W.2d 804 (1993).

A teacher was performing employment services when she fell in the school parking lot while retrieving her glasses where she had reported to work, had supervised children before the bell rang beginning school, was given an assignment after reporting to the librarian, and had injured herself in efforts taken to complete the assignment. Crossett Sch. Dist. v. Fulton, 65 Ark. App. 63, 984 S.W.2d 833 (1999).

Substantial evidence supported the determination that the claimant was not engaged in employment services at the time of her injury where she was injured when she slipped on a wet floor during her lunch break while attending a two week instructional seminar. Beaver v. Benton County Child Support Unit, 66 Ark. App. 153, 991 S.W.2d 618 (1999).

A food service worker at a university was performing employment services at the time that she slipped in a puddle of salad dressing; she was getting a snack from the cafeteria to eat during her 15 minute break because she was paid for her breaks and was required to assist students on her break if the need arose. Ray v. University of Ark., 66 Ark. App. 177, 990 S.W.2d 558 (1999).

The Commission erred in finding that claimant failed to prove that her condition arose out of and in the course of her employment as required by (5)(A)(ii) of this section where there was little, if any, evidence to suggest that her carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by anything other than work at UPS. Lloyd v. UPS, 69 Ark. App. 92, 9 S.W.3d 564 (2000).

The gradual onset for back injuries specified in subdivision (4)(A)(ii) (b) does not apply to injuries to the neck or cervical spine; recognized medical definitions have very clearly defined the term “back” as being below the neck or from the neck to the pelvis. Hapney v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 342 Ark. 11, 26 S.W.3d 777 (2000).

Pursuant to subdivision (4)(A)(i), there was substantial evidence to support the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that the claimant's need for medical treatment was directly and causally related to an incident that occurred at work. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Stotts, 49 S.W.3d 667 (2001), substituted opinion, 74 Ark. App. 428, 58 S.W.3d 853 (2001).

Under subdivision (4)(B)(iii), an employee's injury that occurred while he was on a restroom break was not excluded from the definition of “compensable injury” because the injury did not occur at a time when he was not performing employment services; the restroom break was a necessary function and directly or indirectly advanced the interests of his employer. Pifer v. Single Source Transp., 347 Ark. 851, 69 S.W.3d 1 (2002).

Employee did not suffer an injury arising out of or in the course of his employment, as defined by subdivision (4)(A)(i) where he was not performing employment services at the time of the injury but rather he chose to jump over tube sheeting to retrieve his soda so that he could go on his smoke break; therefore, he was properly denied workers' compensation benefits. McKinney v. Trane Co., 84 Ark. App. 424, 143 S.W.3d 581 (2004).

Where Department of Correction employee was injured while travelling to a required staff meeting at his normal place of work on his day off, he was properly denied workers' compensation benefits; merely traveling to and from the workplace was not a covered activity under the workers' compensation statutes and it was not clear that the “special errand” exception was still valid after the passage of Acts 1993, No. 796, which revised the definition of a “compensable injury.” Linton v. Ark. Dep't of Corr., 87 Ark. App. 263, 190 S.W.3d 275 (2004).

Where employee who was employed as a freight hauler was “off the clock” and taking a mandated eight-hour overnight rest break when the accident occurred in a motel bathroom, his injury was not compensable; the appellate court noted that the accident was no different from one which could have occurred at the employee's home during his off hours. Cook v. ABF Freight Sys. Inc., 88 Ark. App. 86, 194 S.W.3d 794 (2004).

Given the evidence that the injury occurred before the claimant's work shift had started, and while claimant was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the sheriff's department by which he was employed, the Workers' Compensation Commission could reasonably have concluded that his injury was sustained at a time when employment services were not being performed. Maupin v. Pulaski County Sheriff's Office, 90 Ark. App. 1, 203 S.W.3d 668 (2005).

Workers Compensation Commission erred in denying employee's claim for benefits as employee was injured in an area in which employment services were expected of her and she was furthering her employer's interests when she was injured; an employee may be compensated for an injury that occurs even before she reaches her work station or before she is “on the clock” if she is performing a service that is required by her employer and is directly or indirectly advancing her employer's interests. Foster v. Express Pers. Servs., 93 Ark. App. 496, 222 S.W.3d 218 (2006).

Where benefits claimant had been required to attend a corporate meeting and demonstration prior to his scheduled shift, injuries he suffered in a car accident on the way to work from the demonstration were compensable because he was on a special errand and traveling from one job site to another; thus, the going-and-coming rule did not preclude the award of benefits. Jones v. Xtreme Pizza, 97 Ark. App. 206, 245 S.W.3d 670 (2006).

Slip and fall injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment, as required by subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section, because appellant truck driver was not advancing his employer's interests in any way while he was operating a vending machine away from the area in which his truck was being unloaded. While in the break room, he could not have seen his truck had someone hit it, he could not have seen any damage inflicted upon the products being unloaded, and he was not in an area where he could have determined whether someone needed him to move the truck for any reason. Hill v. LDA Leasing, Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 271, 374 S.W.3d 268 (2010), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 443 (May 12, 2010).

Pursuant to subdivision (4)(B)(iii) of this section, a truck driver's injury—caused when he fell while buying snack crackers at a vending machine— was not compensable because it was inflicted upon him at a time when employment services were not being performed. The act of pushing the vending machine buttons could not be said to directly or indirectly advance the interests of his employer. Hill v. LDA Leasing, Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 271, 374 S.W.3d 268 (2010), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 443 (May 12, 2010).

Whatever an employee's deviation from his driving route might have been when he stopped his truck to visit his sick grandmother, the employee's act of attempting to put out a fire on the employer's truck was the performance of employment services, for which he was entitled to compensation under subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section. Gaskins v. Jeff Minner Trucking, 2010 Ark. App. 471 (2010).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in reversing an administrative law judge and in dismissing an employee's claim, because the only issue in the case was whether there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision, and the Full Commission's opinion adequately explained why it found that the employee failed to prove she was providing employment services at the time of her accidental injuries. Ness v. Fort Smith Pub. Sch. Dist., 2014 Ark. App. 118 (2014).

Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that a housekeeper was acting within the course and scope of her employment was supported by substantial evidence where she testified that her primary purpose in going to the laundry room was to get clean towels. Best Western Inn v. Paul, 2014 Ark. App. 520, 443 S.W.3d 551 (2014).

Claimant for workers' compensation benefits failed to prove that the claimant's injury arose out of and in the course of the claimant's employment because the claimant was on a personal errand to retrieve food for the claimant's own benefit when the claimant injured the claimant's knee in a slip and fall accident while stepping into an elevator at the hospital where the claimant worked. Ganus v. St. Bernard's Hosp., LLC, 2015 Ark. App. 163, 457 S.W.3d 683 (2015).

Workers' Compensation Commission, which determined that a claimant sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of her employment, could reasonably conclude that the claimant's briefly leaving her workstation to get a snack did not detract from her job duties, which benefited her employer, directly or indirectly. There was nothing in the record to suggest that the claimant's actions were inconsistent with her employer's interest in advancing the work. Centers for Youth & Families v. Wood, 2015 Ark. App. 380, 466 S.W.3d 422 (2015).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that a truck driver in training sustained a compensable injury was supported by substantial evidence where, as a trainee, the driver was expected to study or practice backing up the truck, the injury occurred within the truck during a period when the driver was not enjoying a leisure time off or free to do as he pleased, and reasonable minds could have concluded that a discussion of the testimony concerning the timing of a Facebook post was unnecessary in reconciling conflicting evidence. P.A.M. Transp., Inc. v. Eason, 2018 Ark. App. 77, 540 S.W.3d 308 (2018).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in awarding benefits to the claimant, an administrative assistant, because reasonable minds could conclude that the claimant was acting within the scope and course of her employment and directly or indirectly advancing her employer's interests when she slipped and fell, and, whether she was technically “on” or “off” the clock was not dispositive, as the claimant was expected to respond to work queries if she was approached away from her desk or before her regular work hours began; and the claimant was inside the building, and was on her way to her office when she was injured. Ark. Sec'y of State v. Young, 2018 Ark. App. 508, 559 S.W.3d 331 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that a housekeeper failed to establish a compensable injury because she was not performing employment services at the time of the accident; substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding that the housekeeper was on her way to lunch when she fell in the lobby because she told the human resources office immediately following the incident that she fell when she was going to lunch and both the human resources officer and the housekeeping supervisor testified that the housekeeper was walking toward the front door when she fell. Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. Jamestown Health & Rehab, LLC, 2019 Ark. App. 530, 589 S.W.3d 408 (2019).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that the claimant was performing employment services at the time she was injured because she testified that during her break she remained on duty and in the building, she was clocked in, and she remained on call and available to work; she testified that she was the only unit coordinator on her shift and that if she had been called to return to her desk based on an emergency or a trauma, she would have been required to do so; she stated that she had been called back three or four times in the past; and the employer derived a benefit from the claimant's remaining in the building, immediately available to resume her duties. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis. v. Hines, 2019 Ark. App. 557, 590 S.W.3d 183 (2019).

— —Assaults.

In the cases of assaults, the positional risk doctrine applies only when the risk is neutral; neutral means that the risk which caused the injury was neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment. In other words, before the doctrine will be applied there must be no evidence that the assault was personal and no evidence that the assault was work related. Pigg v. Auto Shack, 27 Ark. App. 42, 766 S.W.2d 36 (1989).

Claimant, a maintenance worker and security guard, was injured in the course of his employment when he was assaulted by a trespasser who refused to leave the property; because the risk of assault was increased by the nature of the claimant's work, the injury arose out of his employment. Bryan v. Best Western/Coachman's Inn, 47 Ark. App. 75, 885 S.W.2d 28 (1994).

An assault arises out of the employment either if the risk of assault is increased by the nature or setting of the work (regardless of the reason for the assault), or if the reason for the assault was a quarrel having its origin in the work; the test is an alternative one and the satisfaction of either condition will render injuries received as the result of an assault compensable. Bryan v. Best Western/Coachman's Inn, 47 Ark. App. 75, 885 S.W.2d 28 (1994).

Actions of employee who was injured while attempting to break up a fight between her son and another worker, both of whom were also employees, were held to be in the best interests of the employer and thus the injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Pilgrims Pride Corp. v. Caldarera, 54 Ark. App. 92, 923 S.W.2d 290 (1996).

An employee was entitled to benefits for injuries sustained in an incident in which another employee pulled a chair out from under her while she was changing from work clothes into street clothes as the injured employee was not an “active participant” in the assault that caused her injury. Flowers v. Arkansas Hwy. & Transp. Dep't, 62 Ark. App. 108, 968 S.W.2d 660 (1998).

In a workers compensation action, a bank teller failed to establish that she suffered a compensable injury under subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section when a gunman attacked her in her home and she injured her wrist as she fled. She was not within the scope of her employment as there was no evidence that he was after her bank key or vault codes. Gingras v. Liberty Bank, 2011 Ark. App. 65, 381 S.W.3d 112 (2011).

Award of workers' compensation benefits to the employee for compensable injuries was appropriate because he did not fall within the exclusion under subdivision (4)(B)(i) of this section since he was not an active participant in the assault against him. Additionally, the risk of assault was increased by the employee's work setting. Odd Jobs & More v. Reid, 2011 Ark. App. 450, 384 S.W.3d 630 (2011), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Ark. App. LEXIS 521 (Ark. Ct. App. July 27, 2011).

Claimant was entitled to workers' compensation benefits when a co-worker repeatedly hit the claimant with a baseball bat during an altercation that occurred in their employer's parking lot on the morning of a supervisor-called meeting between the parties regarding an incident between them the previous day; the claimant was not an active participant in the assault and the claimant was performing employment services at the time of the assault as he was well within the time and space boundaries of his employment. Dorn v. Hous. Auth. Pine Bluff, 2017 Ark. App. 309, 522 S.W.3d 167 (2017).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that decedent restaurant employee was killed during and in the course and scope of his employment because all of the evidence demonstrated that the decedent was carrying out his employer's purpose and advancing its interests at the time of his death during the armed robbery; accordingly, the Commission properly found that the employer was protected by the exclusive-remedy provision. Herrera-Larios v. El Chico 71, 2017 Ark. App. 650, 535 S.W.3d 305 (2017).

— —Gradual Development.

Arkansas law has long upheld the compensability of gradual injuries which arise out of and in the course of employment. Marcoe v. Bell Int'l, 48 Ark. App. 33, 888 S.W.2d 663 (1994).

The gradual-onset exception for back injuries does encompass injuries to the cervical spine. Hapney v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 341 Ark. 548, 26 S.W.3d 771 (2000).

Employee's compensable gradual-onset injury was established by her testimony regarding the physical requirements of her job and an MRI showing a disc herniation not previously present. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Leach, 74 Ark. App. 231, 48 S.W.3d 540 (2001).

Substantial evidence supported the finding that the employee sustained a compensable gradual-onset injury to her lower back; there was no evidence that the employee experienced any back problems prior to her employment, there was documentation that her pain was exacerbated by working, and her pain persisted and ultimately required her to quit work. Lowe's Home Ctrs. v. Pope, 2016 Ark. App. 93, 482 S.W.3d 723 (2016).

— —Positional Risk Doctrine.

The positional risk doctrine does not provide a new ground for recovery, but allows a presumption to arise in favor of compensation where the accident causing the injury was unexplainable. Pigg v. Auto Shack, 27 Ark. App. 42, 766 S.W.2d 36 (1989).

The positional risk doctrine provides a method of satisfying the “in the course of” requirement where the source of the injury is unexplained. An injury “arises out of” the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position where he was injured. Pigg v. Auto Shack, 27 Ark. App. 42, 766 S.W.2d 36 (1989).

An employee was entitled to benefits for injuries sustained in an incident in which another employee pulled a chair out from under her while she was changing from work clothes into street clothes as the injured employee was not an “active participant” in the assault that caused her injury. Flowers v. Arkansas Hwy. & Transp. Dep't, 62 Ark. App. 108, 968 S.W.2d 660 (1998).

—Burden of Proof.

Under subdivision (5)(E)(ii), only when the injury was not occasioned by a specific incident does it need to be shown that the compensable injury was the major cause of employee's disability. Farmland Ins. Co. v. DuBois, 54 Ark. App. 141, 923 S.W.2d 883 (1996).

Only when a claimant who has sustained a compensable injury is seeking permanent disability benefits is there a requirement to prove that the compensable injury is the major cause of the permanent disability. Farmland Ins. Co. v. DuBois, 54 Ark. App. 141, 923 S.W.2d 883 (1996).

The Workers' Compensation Commission erred as a matter of law when it required a finding that the claimant's work, rather than her injury, was the major cause of her disability or need for treatment. Medlin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 64 Ark. App. 17, 977 S.W.2d 239 (1998).

Based on the Workers' Compensation Commission's credibility determination concerning the employee's testimony, the letter indicating that the employee had previously made complaints regarding neck pain, and the MRI proving that the employee had in fact sustained an injury to her cervical spine, the Commission had correctly found that the employee had met her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable neck injury in addition to her low-back injury. Searcy Indus. Laundry, Inc. v. Ferren, 82 Ark. App. 69, 110 S.W.3d 306 (2003).

Where a hospital drug test was ruled invalid, employee was not required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the cannabinoids and metabolites found in the test did not substantially occasion a burn suffered in a work-related accident. Epoxyn Prods. v. Padgett, 84 Ark. App. 147, 138 S.W.3d 118 (2003).

Where there was evidence that employee drove a forklift without permission very fast in tight circles like a game, and that employee was “wasting time and playing” while doing so, the Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that the employee's injury was the result of horseplay under subdivision (4)(B)(i). Morales v. Martinez, 88 Ark. App. 274, 198 S.W.3d 134 (2004).

—Carpal Tunnel Syndrome.

Claimant was not required to prove that his carpal tunnel syndrome was the result of the same movement again and again; this interpretation of subdivision (5)(A)(ii) (a) is too restrictive and precludes multiple tasks, such as hammering or grinding, from being considered together to satisfy this section's requirements. Baysinger v. Air Sys., 55 Ark. App. 174, 934 S.W.2d 230 (1996).

Carpal tunnel syndrome claimants must prove rapid repetitive motion to sustain a claim for a compensable injury; carpal tunnel syndrome is not exempted from the proof requirement of other gradual-onset injuries, but is merely listed as an example of a type of gradual-onset injury that may be proven by evidence of rapid repetitive motion. Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ, 58 Ark. App. 194, 948 S.W.2d 100 (1997), rev'd, 333 Ark. 335, 969 S.W.2d 190 (1998).

Employee's carpal tunnel syndrome was compensable where a physician diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome, a nerve conduction study confirmed the diagnosis, and medical records established the need for medical treatment. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Griffin, 61 Ark. App. 222, 966 S.W.2d 914 (1998).

Carpal tunnel syndrome is both compensable and falls within the definition of rapid repetitive motion and, therefore, proof of rapid and repetitive motion by a claimant is not required. Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ, 333 Ark. 335, 969 S.W.2d 190 (1998).

The claimant was entitled to benefits based on his carpal tunnel syndrome where it was undisputed that the claimant's employment required quick hand and wrist movements throughout the day, there was no doubt that his job was repetitive, and there was no other suggestion in the record as to what, other than his employment, could have caused his carpal tunnel syndrome. Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc., 69 Ark. App. 206, 11 S.W.3d 567 (2000), rev'd, 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding of a compensable injury where objective medical findings showed that the worker developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome while employed solely by the employer for a period of six years, that his job with the employer was repetitive and hand-intensive, and that he received reasonably necessary treatment for the condition. W L Harper Co. Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Woods, 2016 Ark. App. 431 (2016).

—Causal Connection.

Liability under former Workers' Compensation Act was based, not upon any act or omission of the employer but upon the existence of the relationship which the employee bears to the employment because of and in the course of which he has been injured; it is enough if there be a causal connection between the injury and the employment substantially contributory though not the sole or proximate cause. McGregor & Pickett v. Arrington, 206 Ark. 921, 175 S.W.2d 210 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Causal connection established between injury and employment. Pekin Wood Prods. Co. v. Graham, 207 Ark. 564, 181 S.W.2d 811 (1944) (decision under prior law); Crossett Chem. Co. v. Sedberry, 232 Ark. 608, 339 S.W.2d 426 (1960); International Paper Co. v. Myers, 233 Ark. 378, 345 S.W.2d 1 (1961); McGeorge Constr. Co. v. Taylor, 234 Ark. 1, 350 S.W.2d 313 (1961); Arkansas-Best Freight System v. Shinn, 235 Ark. 314, 357 S.W.2d 661 (1962); International Paper Co. v. Tidwell, 250 Ark. 623, 466 S.W.2d 488 (1971); Bechtel Corp. v. Winther, 262 Ark. 361, 556 S.W.2d 882 (1977); Benton Serv. Ctr. v. Pinegar, 269 Ark. 768, 601 S.W.2d 227 (1980); Gerber Prods. v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985).

A period of minutes between the discharge and injury of an employee on the work premises by another employee in a work connected fight does not bar the employee from receiving workers' compensation. Johnson v. Safreed, 224 Ark. 397, 273 S.W.2d 545 (1954).

The rule of liberal construction does not relieve the claimant of the burden of showing a causal relation between the injury and the employment. McFall v. Farmers Tractor & Truck Co., 227 Ark. 985, 302 S.W.2d 801 (1957).

In order to show causal connection between deceased's work and his death it is not necessary that claimant show unusual physical exertion on the part of deceased prior to his death. Harper v. Henry J. Kaiser Constr. Co., 233 Ark. 398, 344 S.W.2d 856 (1961).

The burden is on the claimant to show a causal connection between the death of deceased and his work. Harper v. Henry J. Kaiser Constr. Co., 233 Ark. 398, 344 S.W.2d 856 (1961).

Causal connection not established between injury or death and employment. Lemmer v. Chicopee Mfg. Co., 233 Ark. 523, 345 S.W.2d 629 (1961); Latimer v. Sevier County Farmers' Coop., 233 Ark. 762, 346 S.W.2d 673 (1961); Kivett v. Redmond Co., 234 Ark. 855, 355 S.W.2d 172 (1962); Farrelly Lake Co. v. Redden, 235 Ark. 404, 360 S.W.2d 187 (1962); Pace Corp. v. Burns, 251 Ark. 311, 472 S.W.2d 78 (1971); Southland Corp. v. Hester, 253 Ark. 959, 490 S.W.2d 132 (1973); McCarty v. Reid, 268 Ark. 756, 595 S.W.2d 702 (Ct. App. 1980); Fowler v. McHenry, 22 Ark. App. 196, 737 S.W.2d 663 (1987).

In determining the allowability of employee's claim for compensation under this chapter it was error not to permit a doctor to answer a hypothetical question embracing all of the essential facts involving causal connection between the work and employee's injury. Johnson v. Bear Brand Roofing, Inc., 233 Ark. 639, 346 S.W.2d 472 (1961).

If the disability does not manifest itself until many months after the accident, so that reasonable men might disagree about the existence of a causal connection between the accident and the disability, the issue becomes one of fact upon which the commission's conclusions are controlling. Hall v. Pittman Constr. Co., 235 Ark. 104, 357 S.W.2d 263 (1962).

Liberality in the application of this chapter does not extend to allowance of claims absent proof of one of the essential elements; causation is one of the essential elements. Lybrand v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 266 Ark. 946, 588 S.W.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1979).

It is not essential that the causal relationship between the accident and disability be established by medical evidence. Gerber Prods. v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985).

In order for a worker's disability to be compensable, there must be a causal connection between the accident and a risk which is reasonably incident to the employment. There must be affirmative proof of a distinctive employment risk as the cause of the injury; the connection with the employment cannot be supplied by speculation. Gerber Prods. v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985).

Where conversion disorder follows a physical, on-the-job injury, causal requirement is met if it is shown that symptoms of neurosis were triggered or precipitated by physical injury. Boyd v. General Indus., 22 Ark. App. 103, 733 S.W.2d 750 (1987).

Compensable injury did not aggravate claimant's preexisting left hip condition and was not the major cause of the resulting left hip condition of claimant. Langley v. Danco Constr. Co., 57 Ark. App. 295, 944 S.W.2d 142 (1997).

Compensable injury held not to be “major cause” of disability of claimant with cervical spondylosis. Sullivan v. Paris Retirement Inn, 60 Ark. App. 283, 961 S.W.2d 785 (1998).

A causal connection existed between the claimant's lifting at work and the findings at surgery where it was undisputed that the claimant had degenerative back disease, but his accidental injury at work either caused or precipitated the need for medication and surgery. Estridge v. Waste Mgmt., 343 Ark. 276, 33 S.W.3d 167 (2000).

In order to prove a compensable injury, an appellee had to prove, among other things, a casual relationship between the injury and the employment; it was not essential that the casual relationship between the accident and the disability be established by medical evidence. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Stotts, 74 Ark. App. 428, 58 S.W.3d 853 (2001).

Objective medical evidence was necessary to establish the existence and extent of an injury but not essential to establish the casual relationship between the injury and work-related accident. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Stotts, 74 Ark. App. 428, 58 S.W.3d 853 (2001).

Where an employee acquired a serious infection through scratches obtained during the course of employment, the Workers' Compensation Commission erred by requiring the employee to prove that the infection was an occupational disease; the employee was only required to establish a causal link between the scratches and the infection in order to show a compensable accident injury under subdivision (4)(a). Heptinstall v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 84 Ark. App. 215, 137 S.W.3d 421 (2003).

Workers' compensation commission did not err in finding that claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his cognitive dysfunction and psychological problems were causally related to his having being accidentally shocked with 440 volts of electricity. Arbaugh v. A.G. Processing, Inc., 360 Ark. 491, 202 S.W.3d 519 (2005).

Where employee returned to work after an accident and an MRI taken months later showed a broad posterior disc protrusion at C6-7, which the doctor stated was causally related to the accident, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred by finding that the employee did not sustain a compensable injury. Wilson v. Cornerstone Masonry, 95 Ark. App. 1, 233 S.W.3d 161 (2006).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied the claimant's claim for permanent partial impairment because she failed to establish through her own testimony or other means that either the annular tear or muscle spasms supported the existence of a permanent impairment causally related to her 2009 injury. O'Guinn v. Little River Mem'l Hosp., 2013 Ark. App. 593, 430 S.W.3d 150 (2013).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied an employee's claim for benefits for a back injury allegedly incurred when she fell on a wet floor at work because the employee had a long history of degenerative joint disease that had progressively worsened and a statement in a doctor's notes allegedly providing the necessary causal connection between her fall at work and the back injury appeared to be a recitation of medical history given by the employee herself. Hymes v. Pinewood Health Rehab., 2014 Ark. App. 320 (2014).

An impairment rating could be based on annular tears only if the tear resulted from the compensable injury, and the causal connection was a fact question for the Workers' Compensation Commission to decide. Thompson v. Mt. Home Good Samaritan Vill., 2014 Ark. App. 493, 442 S.W.3d 873 (2014).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that a claimant failed to prove that the claimant sustained a compensable head injury in a motor vehicle accident because there were no complaints by the claimant regarding the claimant's head or brain having been injured in the accident until more than two years following the event. Furthermore, there was no evidence that an MRI finding of scarring was related to the accident. Myers v. City of Rockport, 2015 Ark. App. 710, 479 S.W.3d 33 (2015).

Because the Workers' Compensation Commission failed to make any causal-connection findings in connection with the claimant's July 2017 right-shoulder injury, reversal and remand for the Commission to do so was appropriate. Reed v. First Step, Inc., 2019 Ark. App. 289, 577 S.W.3d 424 (2019).

—Causal Connection Not Shown.

In a workers' compensation case, a claimant did not recover for neck and shoulder injuries because causation was not established; a doctor's report was not given weight where it was based on subjective information provided by the claimant; it was not credible that a minor incident described by the claimant caused all the fairly serious injuries as alleged; moreover, the claimant had reported problems with her neck, as well as numbness, pain, and tingling in her hands for years prior to the work-related incident. Hosey v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 2016 Ark. App. 189, 487 S.W.3d 837 (2016).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly found that claimant failed to prove that he sustained a compensable injury while acting in the course and scope of his employment where there was no evidence that he was working for the employer during a seizure that preceded the brain scan on which he relied, there was no evidence of a causal connection between a suggested laceration in the brain scan and the work accident, given that a brain scan on the date of the work accident revealed no abnormal findings, and claimant failed to argue against the possibility that the subsequent seizure may have been an intervening cause for the suggested laceration. Garcia v. Jensen Constr. Co., 2017 Ark. App. 450, 527 S.W.3d 749 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied a worker's claim that she suffered a compensable injury because there was no indication in her medical records of any injury to her left hand and wrist due to a work-related injury where her medical records only indicated left-wrist pain from a fall, not from a work-related incident, and her doctor attributed her carpal-tunnel syndrome symptoms to her morbid obesity. White v. Butterball, LLC, 2018 Ark. App. 7, 538 S.W.3d 240 (2018).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err by finding that a claimant failed to establish a specific-incident compensable injury. Substantial medical evidence supported the Commission's finding that the claimant failed to prove a causal connection between any event on a specified date and his elbow condition; although it was one physician's opinion that the claimant's elbow condition resulted from an injury sustained at work, that opinion was based on the claimant's self-reported history, and objective medical evidence showed that the claimant had a prior history of elbow pain. Clark v. Williamson G.C., Inc., 2018 Ark. App. 331, 550 S.W.3d 458 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that the worker failed to meet her burden of proving that her back injury arose out of and in the course of her employment; her first low-back complaints began three months after her fall at work and she first sought treatment for her back pain 73 days after the fall, and given the lapse of time between her fall and the manifestation of her symptoms, reasonable persons might disagree about the causal connection between the two. Webb v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 2018 Ark. App. 627, 567 S.W.3d 86 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that the claimant failed to prove that her left-shoulder problems were causally connected to an incident at work as they were degenerative in nature. Reed v. First Step, Inc., 2019 Ark. App. 289, 577 S.W.3d 424 (2019).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly affirmed and adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by an administrative law judge that an employee did not sustain the cervical injury in the same accident that caused a hairline fracture to her sternum because the employee did not convey any problems with her neck for two weeks, the initial medical records affirmatively indicated that there were no problems with her neck, and it could not be said that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions of the Commission. Bledsoe v. Viskase Cos., 2020 Ark. App. 53 (2020).

—Disease.

Employee was entitled to an award for disability caused by an occupational disease or infection arising out of his employment. Solid Steel Scissors Co. v. Kennedy, 205 Ark. 958, 171 S.W.2d 929 (1943); Pekin Wood Prods. Co. v. Graham, 207 Ark. 564, 181 S.W.2d 811 (1944) (preceding cases decided under prior law); Shell Oil Co. v. Miller, 220 Ark. 546, 248 S.W.2d 698 (1952); Faust Band Saw Mill v. Richardson, 221 Ark. 336, 253 S.W.2d 213 (1952); Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Scroggins, 230 Ark. 936, 328 S.W.2d 97 (1959); Chambers v. Bigelow-Liptak Corp., 233 Ark. 330, 344 S.W.2d 588 (1961); Donaldson v. Socia, 254 Ark. 158, 492 S.W.2d 253 (1973); Dega Poultry Co. v. Tanner, 259 Ark. 396, 533 S.W.2d 207 (1976).

An attack of angina pectoris which results in disability as defined in this section may constitute an injury giving rise to compensation if it arises out of and occurs in the course of employment. Nashville Livestock Comm'n v. Cox, 302 Ark. 69, 787 S.W.2d 664 (1990).

—Evidence.

Employee will not be denied recovery for injury caused by his work merely because he cannot point out any particular activity that caused him pain or increased pain or mention any incident when an activity produced an unusual or increased pain. Shainberg v. Dacus, 233 Ark. 622, 346 S.W.2d 462 (1961).

Expert medical testimony was not essential proof where evidence warranted finding of injury as to worker pinned between two machines. Harris Cattle Co. v. Parker, 256 Ark. 166, 506 S.W.2d 118 (1974); Burks v. Anthony Timberlands, Inc., 21 Ark. App. 1, 727 S.W.2d 388 (1987).

Evidence was insufficient to support commission's finding that there was no causal relationship between the disability and the on-the-job injury. Boyd v. General Indus., 22 Ark. App. 103, 733 S.W.2d 750 (1987).

Evidence sufficient to support finding of an independent intervening cause. Appleby v. Belden Corp., 22 Ark. App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (1987).

Evidence that employee sustained a compensable back injury due to a slip-and-fall at the hotel where he worked, held insufficient. Kuhn v. Majestic Hotel, 324 Ark. 21, 918 S.W.2d 158 (1996).

Claim for benefits for a back injury denied where claimant failed to show the injury was work-related and failed to support his claim with objective medical evidence. Crawford v. Pace Indus., 55 Ark. App. 60, 929 S.W.2d 727 (1996).

Denial of benefits held improper where the medical evidence of the claimant's back injury was uncontroverted, the claimant gave adequate account of the injury, and the Commission gave inconsistent findings of fact. Jordan v. J.C. Penney Co., 57 Ark. App. 174, 944 S.W.2d 547 (1997).

The requirement that a compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings applies only to the existence and extent of the injury. Stephens Truck Lines v. Millican, 58 Ark. App. 275, 950 S.W.2d 472 (1997).

The inconsistencies between claimant's testimony and the medical evidence persuaded the Commission that claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained an injury arising out of and during the course of his employment. McMillan v. U.S. Motors, 59 Ark. App. 85, 953 S.W.2d 907 (1997).

Pregnant employee who suffered a back injury held to have a compensable injury supported by objective findings, even though certain diagnostic X-rays could not be performed due to her pregnancy. University of Ark. Medical Sciences v. Hart, 60 Ark. App. 13, 958 S.W.2d 546 (1997).

Physician's determination of impairment was not upheld where only range-of-motion tests were performed. Department of Parks & Tourism v. Helms, 60 Ark. App. 110, 959 S.W.2d 749 (1998).

Evidence of six-week healing period held sufficient where there was evidence that employee suffered from overuse syndrome affecting her left hand, and the condition improved after she stopped using her hand altogether for six weeks on the recommendation of her specialist. American Greetings Corp. v. Garey, 61 Ark. App. 18, 963 S.W.2d 613 (1998).

Injured worker failed to establish a compensable injury where he did not report an injury either to his foreman or to his physicians and he waited about 4 weeks to file a claim. Barnett v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 62 Ark. App. 265, 970 S.W.2d 319 (1998).

Evidence held insufficient to establish compensable injury. Ford v. Chemipulp Process, Inc., 63 Ark. App. 260, 977 S.W.2d 5 (1998).

There were no objective findings in the record to support a diagnosis of de Quervain's tenosynovitis as required by subdivision (5)(A)(ii)( a ) of this section and, therefore, the claimant was not entitled to benefits for this diagnosis. Steveson v. Frolic Footwear, 70 Ark. App. 383, 20 S.W.3d 413 (2000).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in its determination that the employee's range of motion tests did not constitute objective findings to support an award of benefits where the tests were under the employee's voluntary control. Mays v. Alumnitec, Inc., 76 Ark. App. 274, 64 S.W.3d 772 (2001).

Where it was established that: 1) the medical report prepared by the emergency room physician shortly after the accident specifically noted that the employee did not strike her head; 2) an authorized physician testified that it was more common to have a concussion in conjunction with a blow to the head and that a concussion would not likely occur in a slip-and-fall accident; and 3) the objective CT scan of employee's brain did not indicate an abnormality, substantial evidence existed to support the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that the employee failed to establish evidence of a concussion or other brain injury. Sharp v. Lewis Ford, Inc., 78 Ark. App. 164, 78 S.W.3d 746 (2002).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision affirming the administrative law judge's finding that an employee was entitled to permanent anatomical impairment was reversed and remanded where the commission failed to make the specific findings of fact necessary for the reviewing court to carry out a meaningful review of issues relating to whether the employee's injury was the major cause of his impairment, the permanency of the employee's condition, the assessment of the medical evidence, and the employee's impairment rating. Excelsior Hotel v. Squires, 83 Ark. App. 26, 115 S.W.3d 823 (2003).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in affirming an administrative law judge's decision that claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his claimed cognitive dysfunction and psychological problems were causally related to a 440-volt electrical shock he suffered in an accident at work. Arbaugh v. AG Processing, Inc., 86 Ark. App. 303, 184 S.W.3d 53 (2004), aff'd, 360 Ark. 491, 202 S.W.3d 519 (2005).

Substantial evidence supported Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that claimant acted diligently in obtaining the additional medical evidence and that claimant sustained a compensable injury; the December 2001 MRI report and the February 2002 operative report, both introduced at the second hearing, constituted sufficient evidence to uphold the findings. Hargis Transp. v. Chesser, 87 Ark. App. 301, 190 S.W.3d 309 (2004).

Although employer argued that the only evidence of employee having muscle spasms was her self-serving testimony and the subjective history that she gave to an emergency room nurse five months after her alleged incident, it was undisputed that, at the time of the accident, the employee was diagnosed as having suffered thoracic and lumbar contusion and strain and that the company physician prescribed a medication for the relief of muscle spasms and other musculoskeletal conditions; thus, employer's argument that there was no medical evidence supporting objective findings of an injury was rejected and employee was entitled to temporary total disability benefits. Fred's, Inc. v. Jefferson, 89 Ark. App. 95, 200 S.W.3d 477 (2004), aff'd, 361 Ark. 258, 206 S.W.3d 238 (2005).

Employer's appeal of a worker's compensation award was affirmed as there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that (1) the worker suffered a compensable injury under subdivision (4)(D) of this section, (2) it was not a recurrence of his prior back injuries, and (3) the Shippers defense was inapplicable. Allen Canning Co. v. Woodruff, 92 Ark. App. 237, 212 S.W.3d 25 (2005).

Claimant was unable to prove the existence of a new injury as the objective medical findings were unchanged from claimant's prior work-related injury; thus, the denial of benefits for his low-back injury was proper. Liaromatis v. Baxter County Reg'l Hosp., 95 Ark. App. 296, 236 S.W.3d 524 (2006).

Award of benefits to employee for a repetitive injury was reversed as, while the evidence established that employee had engaged in repetitive motion, there was no evidence that the injury was the result of a rapid motion. Holland Group, Inc. v. Hughes, 95 Ark. App. 369, 237 S.W.3d 120 (2006).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in rejecting subjective evidence in determining that employee sustained no anatomical impairment as a result of his ankle injury as the injury was supported by objective findings which could not come under the employee's voluntary control. Singleton v. City of Pine Bluff, 97 Ark. App. 59, 244 S.W.3d 709 (2006).

Because the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission was the ultimate arbiter of weight and credibility of the complainant and other witnesses, the Commission's decision that the complainant proved that he sustained a compensable injury under subdivision (4) of this section to his middle back, thoracic spine, ribs, lower back, and lumbar spine was upheld. Baxter v. Baxter, 2012 Ark. App. 251, 413 S.W.3d 561 (2012).

It was the worker's burden to prove that his back injury arose out of and in the course of his employment, in addition to the other requirements for a compensable injury; his conflicting statements regarding the cause of his injury were indeed relevant to the determination of whether he proved that he sustained a compensable injury, and the administrative law judge did not deny the claim based on a failure to give sufficient notice. Leming v. La-Z-Boy, Inc., 2015 Ark. App. 336, 463 S.W.3d 719 (2015).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that an employee failed to establish that she had sustained a compensable back injury while working for the employer because the employee admitted she had been treated for back pain prior to the accidents; the employee did not immediately report the accident to her employer and paid for the medical treatment herself, and no coworker knew about the accident or the injury until several weeks after the occurrence. Halliday v. N. Ark. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2016 Ark. App. 392, 500 S.W.3d 198 (2016).

Employee argued that because no alternative explanation for his knee injury was proven or even offered, the Workers' Compensation Commission was required to speculate to find that his claim was not compensable, but the court disagreed; to prove the occurrence of a specific-incident compensable injury, employee had to establish that the injury was one arising out of and in the course of employment, and as the Commission was to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and resolve conflicts in medical testimony and evidence, the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence in this case. Godwin v. Garland Cnty. Landfill, 2016 Ark. App. 498, 504 S.W.3d 660 (2016).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that a claimant's compensable injury was established by objective medical evidence given the treating physician's treatment notes, and the progression of the injury that led to amputation of the claimant's toe. St. Jean Indus. v. Ezell, 2016 Ark. App. 516, 504 S.W.3d 679 (2016).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision denying compensability of a worker's claim was supported by substantial evidence where the Commission had considered a treating physician's report noting the presence of muscle spasms in the cervical and lumbar spine, the evidence that the claimant suffered from preexisting conditions in his neck, back, hip, and head, the Commission found the claimant not credible based on his conflicting answers about the extent of his injuries, and the case turned on the claimant's credibility. Johnson v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 514, 529 S.W.3d 678 (2017).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that a claimant failed to prove physical bodily harm where it focused on a medical note in a treating physician's report stating that the incident in which the claimant lifted a lot of weight did not or may not have caused the radiological findings in his back. Grantham v. Hornbeck Agric. Group, LLC, 2017 Ark. App. 520, 529 S.W.3d 666 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in concluding that a truck driver suffered a compensable injury when he tripped and fell; the Commission weighed the conflicting evidence, the employer pointed to no evidence indicating that the driver had a herniated disc before the fall, and an MRI indicated acute disc herniation that a neurosurgeon causally correlated to the incident at work. Marten Transp., Ltd. v. Morgan, 2017 Ark. App. 608, 532 S.W.3d 139 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission's findings as to the date of compensability were supported by substantial evidence; the finding that the claimant sustained compensable back injuries in a later incident while working on a farm was supported by objective medical findings, while there was a lack of objective medical findings to support the claimant's claim of a compensable back injury in an earlier incident at work. Wall Farms, LLC v. Hulsey, 2017 Ark. App. 624, 534 S.W.3d 771 (2017).

—Head Injury.

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in affirming and adopting the administrative law judge's opinion that the claimant sustained a compensable head injury as there was substantial evidence to support the finding that she fell off a yoga ball at work and suffered a scalp contusion. The Commission did not err in giving more weight to an audiologist's opinion that the claimant's current complaints were caused by her fall at work and not her preexisting conditions; the audiologist found that the ringing in the claimant's ears was made worse after her fall due to swelling in the nerves, and that her current vertigo complaint more likely than not was a result of the impact to her head, and not the 2012 car accident. Northwest Ark. Cmty. College v. Migliori, 2018 Ark. App. 286, 549 S.W.3d 399 (2018).

—Hemorrhoids.

Hemorrhoids are not a compensable injury as defined by subdivision (5)(A)(ii) of this section. Tillman v. Baldwin & Shell Constr., 58 Ark. App. 177, 948 S.W.2d 118 (1997).

—Idiopathic Injuries.

Idiopathic injury is one whose cause is personal in nature, or peculiar to the individual; injuries sustained due to an unexplained cause are different from injuries where the cause is idiopathic. Crawford v. Single Source Transp., 87 Ark. App. 216, 189 S.W.3d 507 (2004).

Because an idiopathic injury is not related to employment, it is generally not compensable unless conditions related to the employment contribute to the risk by placing the employee in a position, which increases the dangerous effect of the fall. Crawford v. Single Source Transp., 87 Ark. App. 216, 189 S.W.3d 507 (2004).

Substantial evidence did not exist to support the finding that employee's injury was idiopathic and noncompensable because there was no evidence presented that employee's broken foot was caused by his diabetes. Swaim v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 91 Ark. App. 120, 208 S.W.3d 837 (2005).

—Independent Intervening Cause.

If there is a causal connection between a primary compensable injury and the subsequent disability, there is no independent intervening cause unless the subsequent disability is triggered by activity of the claimant that is “unreasonable under the circumstances.” Davis v. Old Dominion Freight Line, 341 Ark. 751, 20 S.W.3d 326 (2000).

Workers’ Compensation Commission properly denied death benefits to a deceased worker’s surviving beneficiaries because the decedent had been using opiates for some time prior to his compensable injury, had a proclivity to drug addiction, and the decedent’s overdose and resultant death was unreasonable and an independent intervening cause not related to the work where he took a substantial overdose of methadone that was not in response to uncontrolled pain, but was instead simply the result of his drug addiction. Loar v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 2014 Ark. App. 240 (2014).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly awarded an employee additional-medical benefits because he had been receiving various benefits for nearly two years before he filed an AR-C Form, the first hearing on the employee's claim for additional-medical benefits was held more than eight years later, the “additional follow-up care” sought by the employee was reasonably necessary medical treatment, and a subsequent car wreck was not an independent intervening cause of the employee's need for further medical treatment where his conduct was not unreasonable and he was never restricted from driving by any doctor. Nabholz Constr. Corp. v. White, 2015 Ark. App. 102 (2015).

Substantial evidence supported the findings that a worker's compensation claimant, who had worked as a correctional officer for 23 years, was entitled to 20% wage-loss disability in addition to a 3% anatomical rating and that the compensable back injury was the major cause of the disability, despite the employer's contention that an unauthorized surgery constituted a nonwork-related independent intervening cause that was improperly considered in awarding wage loss. The findings were based on proper wage-loss factors, the opinion adequately discussed the rationale, and the causation findings were supported by the claimant's testimony and medical evidence. Ark. Dep't of Corr. v. Jackson, 2019 Ark. App. 124, 571 S.W.3d 539 (2019).

—Injury Off Premises.

Injuries or death occurring off of employer's premises held to be compensable. Hunter v. Summerville, 205 Ark. 463, 169 S.W.2d 579 (1943); Tinsman Mfg. Co. v. Sparks, 211 Ark. 554, 201 S.W.2d 573 (1947) (preceding cases decided under prior law); Owens v. Southeast Ark. Transp. Co., 216 Ark. 950, 228 S.W.2d 646 (1950); American Cas. Co. v. Jones, 224 Ark. 731, 276 S.W.2d 41 (1955); Frank Lyon Co. v. Oats, 225 Ark. 682, 284 S.W.2d 637 (Ark. 1955); Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Cox, 229 Ark. 20, 313 S.W.2d 91 (1958); Fine Nest Trailer Colony, Inc. v. Reep, 235 Ark. 411, 360 S.W.2d 189 (1962); Bechtel Corp. v. Winther, 262 Ark. 361, 556 S.W.2d 882 (1977); Bunny Bread v. Shipman, 267 Ark. 926, 591 S.W.2d 692 (Ct. App. 1979); City of Sherwood v. Lowe, 4 Ark. App. 161, 628 S.W.2d 610 (1982); Daniels v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 5 Ark. App. 142, 633 S.W.2d 396 (1982); University of Ark. Medical Sciences Ctr. v. Raleigh, 14 Ark. App. 277, 688 S.W.2d 303 (1985); Fisher v. Proksch, 20 Ark. App. 80, 723 S.W.2d 852 (1987).

Injury or death occurring off of employer's premises held not to be compensable. Fox Bros. Hdwe. Co. v. Wilson, 206 Ark. 680, 177 S.W.2d 44 (1944); Stroud v. Gurdon Lumber Co., 206 Ark. 490, 177 S.W.2d 181 (1944) (preceding cases decided under prior law); Penny v. Hudson Dairy, 218 Ark. 594, 237 S.W.2d 893 (1951); Pearson v. Faulkner Radio Serv. Co., 220 Ark. 368, 247 S.W.2d 964 (1952); Martin v. Lavender Radio & Supply, Inc., 228 Ark. 85, 305 S.W.2d 845 (1957); Johnson v. Clark, 230 Ark. 275, 322 S.W.2d 72 (1959); Beckerman v. Owosso Mfg. Co., 233 Ark. 973, 350 S.W.2d 321 (1961); McCollum v. Rogers, 238 Ark. 499, 382 S.W.2d 892 (1964); Brooks v. Wage, 242 Ark. 486, 414 S.W.2d 100 (1967); Carter v. Ward Body Works, Inc., 246 Ark. 515, 439 S.W.2d 286 (1969); Wilson v. UAW Int'l Union, 246 Ark. 1158, 441 S.W.2d 475 (1969); Willis v. Dumas, 250 Ark. 496, 466 S.W.2d 268 (1971); Chicot Mem. Hosp. v. Veazey, 9 Ark. App. 18, 652 S.W.2d 631 (1983); Howard v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 20 Ark. App. 98, 724 S.W.2d 193 (1987).

The general rule is that injuries sustained by employees going to and from their regular place of employment are not deemed to arise out of or in the course of their employment. Blankinship Logging Co. v. Brown, 212 Ark. 871, 212 Ark. 948, 208 S.W.2d 778 (1948) (decision under prior law) Fisher v. Proksch, 20 Ark. App. 80, 723 S.W.2d 852 (1987); Howard v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 20 Ark. App. 98, 724 S.W.2d 193 (1987); Lepard v. West Memphis Mach. & Welding, 51 Ark. App. 53, 908 S.W.2d 666 (1995).

When a vehicle is supplied by the employer for mutual benefit of himself and the worker to facilitate the progress of the work, the employment begins when the workman enters the vehicle and ends when he leaves it on the termination of his labor. Blankinship Logging Co. v. Brown, 212 Ark. 871, 212 Ark. 948, 208 S.W.2d 778 (1948) (decision under prior law).

Whether an employee is acting in the course of his employment in going to or from the place of his employment will depend largely upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case under this chapter. Owens v. Southeast Ark. Transp. Co., 216 Ark. 950, 228 S.W.2d 646 (1950).

The course of employment of a traveling salesman covers the time and place of traveling as well as the selling of goods. Frank Lyon Co. v. Oats, 225 Ark. 682, 284 S.W.2d 637 (Ark. 1955).

Where the trip or attendance of a traveling salesman is one ordered or directed by the employer or is for the mutual benefit of employer and employee, compensation may be recovered for injury during the trip. Frank Lyon Co. v. Oats, 225 Ark. 682, 284 S.W.2d 637 (Ark. 1955).

Exceptions to the general rule that an employee is not in the course of his employment while going to or returning from his home in which off-premises injuries are held compensable, involved situation (1) where the employee is subject to call at all hours, and (2) when the employee has a duty to perform for the employer while en route home. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Cox, 229 Ark. 20, 313 S.W.2d 91 (1958).

Question as to whether or not injury of employee who has left employer's premises is compensable was not how near he may have been to his employer's premises when he was injured but whether he was performing any duty in connection with his employment or was at the point of the accident at his employer's direction, or was using facilities supplied by the employer. Beckerman v. Owosso Mfg. Co., 233 Ark. 973, 350 S.W.2d 321 (1961).

The street adjacent to employer's plant could not be considered as part of employer's premises for workers' compensation purposes even though the street at the point of the plant was heavily used by employer. Beckerman v. Owosso Mfg. Co., 233 Ark. 973, 350 S.W.2d 321 (1961).

The criteria for applying the special hazard exception to the going and coming rule is not sheer distance or proximity but rather the causal connection between the injury and the employment, nor is the exception necessarily inapplicable due to the existence of an alternate route. Bechtel Corp. v. Winther, 262 Ark. 361, 556 S.W.2d 882 (1977).

In order for an injury incurred while the employee is going to work to be compensable, the employee must fall within one of the exceptions to the going and coming rule such as where an employee is injured while in close proximity to the employer's premises, where the employer furnishes the transportation to or from work, where the employee is a traveling salesman, where the employee is injured on a special mission or errand, or when the employer compensates the employee for his time from the moment he leaves home until he returns home. City of Sherwood v. Lowe, 4 Ark. App. 161, 628 S.W.2d 610 (1982).

An injury sustained by a worker riding in a private automobile while going home from work is not a compensable one where the employer pays an insubstantial portion of the travel expense. Chicot Mem. Hosp. v. Veazey, 9 Ark. App. 18, 652 S.W.2d 631 (1983).

Injury during a trip which serves both a business and a personal purpose is within the course of employment if the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel; if, however, the work has had no part in creating the necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business errand had been dropped, and would have been canceled upon failure of the private purpose, though the business errand was undone, the travel is then personal, and personal the risk. Rankin v. Rankin Constr. Co., 12 Ark. App. 1, 669 S.W.2d 911 (1984); Fisher v. Proksch, 20 Ark. App. 80, 723 S.W.2d 852 (1987).

Employee was in the course of his employment when he turned from his route to the restaurant where he was employed to go to the catering kitchen to pick up the equipment he had been directed to return to the restaurant, as it is clear that someone would have had to get this equipment and take it to the restaurant and once the employee turned toward the catering kitchen for that purpose, he was, at least, on a “dual-purpose” journey and therefore in the course of his employment. Jane Traylor, Inc. v. Cooksey, 31 Ark. App. 245, 792 S.W.2d 351 (1990).

The risk of injury during the course of a trip by the claimant to retrieve forgotten medication needed for a compensable first injury is one which, on balance, ought not to be borne by the employer, thus, the second injury sustained during such a trip is not compensable. Wolfe v. City of El Dorado, 33 Ark. App. 25, 799 S.W.2d 812 (1990).

A determination that a trip falls within the “dual purpose” exception to the going and coming rule does not end the inquiry; instead, the dual purpose doctrine merely serves to label the overall trip as either business or personal: deviations from the main purpose require a separate inquiry. Day v. Central Day Care, Inc., 38 Ark. App. 241, 833 S.W.2d 783 (1992).

Where claimant had completed her employer's errand and was returning to work in her vehicle, the commission could properly find that slipping on ice while pursuing a personal errand was a risk of the deviation, rather than of the employment. Day v. Central Day Care, Inc., 38 Ark. App. 241, 833 S.W.2d 783 (1992).

Some nexus between the employment and travel must be present in order for a claimant to recover for injuries sustained on a trip from his employer's premises to his home. Lepard v. West Memphis Mach. & Welding, 51 Ark. App. 53, 908 S.W.2d 666 (1995).

Although claimant was not directly compensated for her travel time, because traveling was an inherent and necessary incident of the claimant's required employment activity, the claimant was “performing employment services” under subdivision (5)(B)(iii) when she was injured while en route from her employer's office to a client's home. Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 55 Ark. App. 343, 934 S.W.2d 956 (1996), aff'd, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997).

The premises exception to the going-and-coming rule has effectively been eliminated by subdivision (5)(B)(iii). Hightower v. Newark Pub. Sch. Sys., 57 Ark. App. 159, 943 S.W.2d 608 (1997).

—Intoxicants.

Where claimant's laboratory test results showed high levels of cannabinoids in his urine on the day he was injured, under subdivision (5)(B)(iv), this created a rebuttable presumption that his injury was substantially occasioned by the use of illegal drugs. Weaver v. Whitaker Furn. Co., 55 Ark. App. 400, 935 S.W.2d 584 (1996).

There was no presumption under subsection (5)(B)(iv) that the injury was substantially occasioned by the alcohol or drugs where the urine specimen was not collected until two days after the injury and the employee has a credible explanation for the presence of codeine in the urine. Morrilton Manor v. Brimmage, 58 Ark. App. 252, 952 S.W.2d 170 (1997).

Urine test showing presence of marijuana metabolites was sufficient evidence to invoke the presumption that employee's accident was substantially occasioned by the use of marijuana. Brown v. Alabama Elec. Co., 60 Ark. App. 138, 959 S.W.2d 753 (1998), review denied, 334 Ark. 35, 970 S.W.2d 807 (1998); Graham v. Turnage Emp. Group, 60 Ark. App. 150, 960 S.W.2d 453 (1998), review denied, 334 Ark. 32, 970 S.W.2d 808 (Ark. 1998).

This section does not require that the Commission promulgate drug-testing procedures or specify particular types of tests to be used as a precondition to the intoxication presumption in subdivision (5)(B)(iv); the Arkansas General Assembly could have required testing that would show a certain level of illegal drugs, as it has required to invoke the presumption in D.W.I. cases, but it has not made such a requirement. Brown v. Alabama Elec. Co., 60 Ark. App. 138, 959 S.W.2d 753 (1998), review denied, 334 Ark. 35, 970 S.W.2d 807 (1998); Graham v. Turnage Emp. Group, 60 Ark. App. 150, 960 S.W.2d 453 (1998), review denied, 334 Ark. 32, 970 S.W.2d 808 (Ark. 1998); Rudick v. Unifirst Corp., 60 Ark. App. 173, 962 S.W.2d 819 (1998).

A blood-alcohol level of less than 0.01% was low enough to rebut the presumption that employee's injury was substantially occasioned by alcohol. ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 60 Ark. App. 310, 961 S.W.2d 36 (1998), aff'd, 335 Ark. 63, 977 S.W.2d 212 (Ark. 1998).

Employee's long term use of alcohol did not disqualify him from receiving workers' compensation disability benefits where he had not consumed alcohol on the date of the injury, even though he was injured as a result of a fall caused by an alcohol-withdrawal seizure. ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 60 Ark. App. 310, 961 S.W.2d 36 (1998), aff'd, 335 Ark. 63, 977 S.W.2d 212 (Ark. 1998).

A worker failed to rebut the presumption that his motor vehicle accident was caused by the use of illegal drugs where he tested positive for opiates and cocaine metabolites and the only evidence presented to rebut the presumption was his own uncorroborated testimony concerning the nature and extent of his drug use and his own uncorroborated testimony regarding his interpretation of the cause of his accident. Ester v. National Home Ctrs., Inc., 61 Ark. App. 91, 967 S.W.2d 565 (1998).

An employee rebutted the presumption that a motor vehicle accident in which he was involved was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol, notwithstanding that he was found to have a blood alcohol level of .021 percent, where he was driving between 6:00 and 7:00 PM. on a two-lane road under the posted speed limit, it was raining and foggy, his trailer was empty, he was cut off by another vehicle, he passed a field sobriety test administered by the investigating officer, and he was not cited for being under the influence of alcohol. Continental Express v. Harris, 61 Ark. App. 198, 965 S.W.2d 811 (1998).

An employee who tested positive for marijuana metabolites 2 days after an accident in which he fell through a hole cut in the roof of a new building while carrying a 4 foot by 16 foot board with his supervisor rebutted the statutory presumption that his injury was substantially occasioned by the use of marijuana where he testified that he had not smoked marijuana on the day of the accident or in the preceding few days, the manner in which he carried the board prevented him from seeing the hole, and he was fatigued because he had worked 7 days in a row and was in his 28th hour of overtime. Express Human Resources v. Terry, 61 Ark. App. 258, 968 S.W.2d 630 (1998).

A blood test which showed a blood alcohol level of less than .01 percent was sufficient to trigger the statutory presumption that an injury was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol. ERC Contr. Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 335 Ark. 63, 977 S.W.2d 212 (Ark. 1998).

The phrase “substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol” requires that there be a direct causal link between the injury and the use of alcohol, rather than the abstinence from the use of alcohol, and, therefore, the fact that the claimant's accident was caused by an alcohol-withdrawal seizure did not allow a finding that the accident was substantially related to the use of alcohol. ERC Contr. Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 335 Ark. 63, 977 S.W.2d 212 (Ark. 1998).

Evidence held sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption that the claimant's injury was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol where (1) the claimant's supervisor testified that the claimant did not use alcohol on the day of his accident, (2) the medical reports reflected that the claimant told his doctors that he did not use alcohol on the day of the accident, (3) the claimant's girlfriend told his doctors that the claimant did not use alcohol on the day of the accident, and (4) the claimant's doctors concurred that a seizure related to alcohol-withdrawal syndrome caused the claimant's accident. ERC Contr. Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 335 Ark. 63, 977 S.W.2d 212 (Ark. 1998).

The presence of alcohol in an employee's body was not proven simply by testimony that his breath smelled of alcohol, since the evidence presented did not negate the reasonable hypothesis that such smell might have come from his previous night's drinking, especially in light of his testimony that he drank several beers the night before his accident, that he slept in his clothes and wore the clothes to work the next morning, and that he did not brush his teeth prior to departing for work. Flowers v. Norman Oaks Constr. Co., 68 Ark. App. 239, 6 S.W.3d 118 (1999), rev'd, 341 Ark. 474, 17 S.W.3d 472 (2000).

In a proceeding pertaining to the electrocution of a tree service employee which occurred when he was struck in the face by an energized wire which fell from a tree branch he picked up, the Workers' Compensation Commission properly found that the presence of marijuana metabolites in the employee's system constituted the presence of an illegal drug and therefore invoked the rebuttable presumption found in subsection (5)(B)(iv)( b ) of this section that his death was substantially occasioned by the use of marijuana. Wood v. West Tree Serv., 70 Ark. App. 29, 14 S.W.3d 883 (2000).

A finding of the presence of alcohol in the claimant's body was supported by substantial evidence, notwithstanding the absence of medical testing, where (1) the claimant admitted that he drank 6 to 8 beers the night before the accident, and stated that he went to bed by 11:00 or 11:30 p.m. the night before the accident and left for work on the morning of the accident at about 6:30 a.m., (2) upon arrival at the accident scene, paramedics noted a strong smell of alcohol about the claimant at 8:45 a.m., (3) the registered nurse at the hospital reported that the claimant had a smell of alcohol about his breath, (4) when the claimant was readmitted to the hospital a week later complaining of hallucinations, his medical records stated that he admitted that he habitually drank a twelve-pack or six-pack of beer a day, and (5) there was circumstantial evidence that the claimant drank at the job site. Flowers v. Norman Oaks Constr. Co., 341 Ark. 474, 17 S.W.3d 472 (2000).

Substantial evidence existed for the Worker's Compensation Commission to deny relief to the claimant where he both readily admitted smoking crack cocaine the night before he fell from rickety scaffolding and admitted that he tested positive for a drug screen on the date of the accident. Woodall v. Hunnicutt Constr., 340 Ark. 377, 12 S.W.3d 630 (2000).

The presence of alcohol in an employee's body need not be proven by medical testing but can also be proven by testimony that a claimant was seen consuming alcohol prior to his accident, had slurred speech, and was unsteady on his feet. Flowers v. Norman Oaks Constr. Co., 68 Ark. App. 239, 6 S.W.3d 118 (1999), rev'd, 341 Ark. 474, 17 S.W.3d 472 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumption that the claimant's injury was caused by her use of intoxicants where (1) the claimant's hand was caught in a press she was operating, (2) a drug test two days later found codeine and methamphetamine in her system, and (3) the plant supervisor testified that within a 24 hour period another person was injured while running the same machine, that he personally checked the safety devices on the machine on the date of the accident, and that since the accident the company had put a double hand control button on the press, and (4) the safety supervisor testified that the accident was caused by a “pinch point” and that it was corrected with a double hand-actuating device. Bice v. Waterloo Indus., Inc., 71 Ark. App. 1, 26 S.W.3d 129 (2000).

Claimant was awarded workers' compensation benefits where the Workers' Compensation Commission held that the claimant had rebutted the presumption contained in subdivision (4)(B)(iv)( b ) and proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the accident in which he was injured was not “substantially occasioned” by the use of illegal drugs. Sys. Contr. Corp. v. Reeves, 85 Ark. App. 286, 151 S.W.3d 18 (2004).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in failing to find any indication that, on the date of a fatal injury, illegal drugs had caused the accident where none of claimant's co-workers saw him use drugs or otherwise exhibit signs of impairment and not one of the expert toxicologists could state when claimant had ingested the drugs. Ark. Elec. Coop. v. Ramsey, 87 Ark. App. 254, 190 S.W.3d 287 (2004).

Degloving injury to the genitalia and scrotum was not substantially occasioned by the use of drugs under subdivision (4)(B)(iv)( a ) of this section; even though a positive drug test gave rise to a presumption, that was rebutted by the testimony of co-workers that the employee did not appear to be under the influence at any time. Ward v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 97 Ark. App. 311, 248 S.W.3d 482 (2007).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly awarded temporary total-disability benefits to an employee because the Commission found that the employer and its insurance carrier failed to establish the presence of illegal drugs in the employee's body, and the rebuttable statutory presumption was not triggered; no urine, blood, or hair-follicle test was administered, no drug or drug paraphernalia was found on the employee's person, and, while the employee allegedly said that he ingested methamphetamine within 24 hours of the accident, no medical personnel were questioned about what he supposedly said, and the employee's testimony that he was still being treated for his injury was substantial evidence that he was within his healing period when the hearing occurred. Nat'l Transit Staffing, Inc. v. Norris, 2018 Ark. App. 229, 547 S.W.3d 730 (2018).

Appellate court affirmed the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision denying an employee's claim for benefits based on his failure to rebut the statutory presumption that the accident was substantially occasioned by alcohol; although witnesses testified that there was no indication that the employee was intoxicated, the employee's blood tested positive for alcohol at the hospital on the morning of his one-car accident, which had occurred while he was driving to the airport to travel to meet with an out-of-state customer, and a physician/toxicologist, who testified as an expert witness, opined that alcohol contributed significantly to the cause of the accident. Papageorge v. Tyson Shared Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 603, 590 S.W.3d 800 (2019).

Denial of benefits to a claimant was appropriate because the Workers' Compensation Commission found that the claimant failed to rebut the presumption that her injury was substantially occasioned by the use of illegal drugs when she severed part of her finger while using a cutting machine and tested positive for marijuana metabolites immediately after the accidental injury. The claimant, who had been at the job only five days when injured, offered no evidence except her self-serving testimony as to how and whether she was trained by the employer. Blair v. Am. Stitchco, Inc., 2020 Ark. App. 38 (2020).

Claimant, who tested positive for marijuana, failed to rebut the statutory presumption that his work-related injury was substantially occasioned by the use of illegal drugs; further, the Workers' Compensation Commission made express findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses and it is not the role of the appellate court to reweigh the evidence. Allen v. Employbridge Holding Co., 2020 Ark. App. 127 (2020).

—Medical Expenses.

Although claimant failed to prove a compensable injury, the employer was responsible for those medical expenses which were incurred by the claimant at the employer's direction. Southern Hospitalities v. Britain, 54 Ark. App. 318, 925 S.W.2d 810 (1996).

—Mental Injury.

This section and § 11-9-113(a)(1) set out a requirement that a physical injury precede and cause the mental injury in order for the mental injury to be compensable under this chapter. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 329 Ark. 336, 947 S.W.2d 382 (1997).

—Neck.

Medical tests detected only early degenerative neck changes and contained no findings supporting a neck injury attributable to a traumatic event at work; there was a failure of proof of objective medical findings to support a compensable neck injury. Lowe's Home Ctrs. v. Pope, 2016 Ark. App. 93, 482 S.W.3d 723 (2016).

—New Injury.

Workers' Compensation Commission properly awarded an employee temporary total disability compensation because he proved he had a compensable injury; the objective evidence showed that the employee's injuries prior to surgeries had been greatly improved, if not eradicated, by the time he returned to work after surgery and were aggravated by the work injury he received the day after he returned to work. City of El Dorado v. Smith, 2017 Ark. App. 307, 521 S.W.3d 523 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that an employee remained in his healing period after he saw a doctor. The doctor appeared to have given contrary opinions, one in which the employee experienced a new work injury that aggravated his pre-existing conditions and another in which he was not suffering from a new injury with his symptoms simply being a continuation of previous, pre-surgery symptoms, and the appellate court deferred to the commission's resolution of conflicting evidence. City of El Dorado v. Smith, 2017 Ark. App. 307, 521 S.W.3d 523 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in awarding an employee medical benefits in the form of surgery because the employee testified that a doctor was recommending surgery, and there was no evidence before the Commission to the contrary. City of El Dorado v. Smith, 2017 Ark. App. 307, 521 S.W.3d 523 (2017).

—Not Shown.

There was a substantial basis for the Workers' Compensation Commission to find that the claimant failed to establish a compensable lower-back injury, given the lapse of time between the injury and the claimant's complaints of lower-back pain and doctors' opinions that the lower-back MRI showed degenerative, preexisting changes. Newby v. Century Indus., 2017 Ark. App. 527, 530 S.W.3d 386 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly found that the claimant failed to prove that she sustained a compensable injury; there was simply no evidence of a specific injury other than the claimant's own testimony, and witness credibility was for the Commission to decide. Johnson v. NPC Int'l, Inc., 2018 Ark. App. 25, 538 S.W.3d 859 (2018).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly determined that a worker did not suffer a compensable injury when he allegedly slipped and fell on a sheet of ice on a freezer floor because the Commission specifically found the worker not to be a credible witness, there were no witnesses to corroborate his claim, the worker did not report the incident until over a month later after the accident, he gave competing reasons for his neck pain to his medical providers, and an MRI only noted degenerative changes. Collier v. Walmart Assocs., 2018 Ark. App. 129, 544 S.W.3d 69 (2018).

There was a substantial basis for the Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of a worker's claim where there was no indication in her medical records that her back injury was work-related, she had no witness to corroborate her story about the alleged cause of her neck or back problems, and she never reported any alleged work-related incident to her supervisor until her doctor sent her for an MRI almost a month after she claimed the alleged incident occurred. Gunter v. Bill's Super Foods, Inc., 2018 Ark. App. 134, 544 S.W.3d 571 (2018).

Claimant failed to prove that he sustained a compensable injury while employed by the logging company because the Commission believed the testimony of the logging company's witnesses that the claimant did not injure himself in the woods lifting a boulder on May 9, 2016, and did not complain of — or report — an injury or back pain; the logging company introduced evidence that the claimant had been involved in a traumatic high-speed ATV accident that had put him off work for two weeks just over a month before his alleged back injury; and the evidence before the Commission could have supported a finding that the claimant went to the emergency room on May 9, 2016, seeking drugs and was willing to fabricate an injury to obtain them. Hargis v. Lovett, 2018 Ark. App. 227, 547 S.W.3d 724 (2018).

Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that an employee's right-knee injury was not work-related was supported by the evidence because the employee did not experience pain or swelling in her right knee until after her knee popped and buckled while she was standing at church; the employee was able to complete her job duties and drive herself to church without any indication that she was injured. McCutchen v. Human Dev. Ctr., 2018 Ark. App. 239, 547 S.W.3d 508 (2018).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in denying medical treatment for the claimant's lower back, wrists, and thumbs as she failed to prove that she sustained any compensable injuries other than the stipulated compensable injuries to her right arm and left knee; claimant did not show that the additional injuries were causally connected to her work accident as the claimant did not report those injuries during her treatment on the day of the accident, another doctor's MRI of the claimant's lumbar spine showed chronic degenerative problems with no reference to an acute injury, and x-rays of her thumbs revealed degenerative arthritis. Davis v. Remington Arms Co., 2018 Ark. App. 390, 557 S.W.3d 894 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision to deny benefits to a pro se claimant because medical records revealed that, for years before the claimant's fall at work, the claimant suffered from the physical symptoms that she alleged were the result of the injury at work. Furthermore, there was no post-accident medical evidence to establish any of the claimant's alleged injuries with objective findings as required. Marshall v. Ark. Dep't of Corr., 2020 Ark. App. 112 (2020).

—Performing Employment Services.

Claimant, a staff pharmacist, sustained a compensable injury, as he was performing employment services when he broke his leg climbing the curb of the pharmacy because he approached the pharmacy to check on the building after the security alarm sounded. There was testimony that claimant and the pharmacy manager agreed that claimant had to go to the pharmacy to check the alarm; and there was testimony that the police refused to disclose whether the building had been physically breached, which related directly to claimant's job description that he was responsible for ensuring the premises were secure and for preventing loss. Kroger Ltd. P'ship I v. Bess, 2018 Ark. App. 404, 555 S.W.3d 417 (2018).

—Preexisting Infirmity.

Work-related activity aggravated preexisting injury which resulted in compensable injury. McGregor & Pickett v. Arrington, 206 Ark. 921, 175 S.W.2d 210 (1943) (decision under prior law); Triebsch v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 218 Ark. 379, 237 S.W.2d 26 (1951); W. Shanhouse & Sons v. Sims, 224 Ark. 86, 272 S.W.2d 68 (1954); Magnet Cove Barium Corp. v. Evans, 226 Ark. 524, 291 S.W.2d 237 (1956); Bryant Stave & Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 296 S.W.2d 436 (1956); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Harrison, 231 Ark. 10, 328 S.W.2d 131 (1959); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Robbins, 231 Ark. 158, 328 S.W.2d 489 (1959); Allen v. Clark, 233 Ark. 394, 345 S.W.2d 371 (1961); McGeorge Constr. Co. v. Taylor, 234 Ark. 1, 350 S.W.2d 313 (1961); Massey Ferguson, Inc. v. Flenoy, 270 Ark. 126, 603 S.W.2d 463 (1980).

An employee who collapses under an excessive work load is entitled to workers' compensation as suffering an accidental injury arising out of the employment, even though he had a preexisting weakness, known to him and his employer, which contributed to the collapse. Tri-States Constr. Co. v. Worthen, 224 Ark. 418, 274 S.W.2d 352 (1955).

An injury which brings about an aggravation of a preexisting condition is compensable under this chapter. McGregor & Pickett v. Arrington, 206 Ark. 921, 175 S.W.2d 210 (1943) (decision under prior law); Hamilton v. Kelley-Nelson Constr. Co., 228 Ark. 612, 309 S.W.2d 323 (1958); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Harrison, 231 Ark. 10, 328 S.W.2d 131 (1959); Minor v. Poinsett Lumber & Mfg. Co., 235 Ark. 195, 357 S.W.2d 504 (1962).

Preexisting disease or injury held not aggravated by work-related activity. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Scroggins, 230 Ark. 936, 328 S.W.2d 97 (1959); C.P. Chaney Sawmill, Inc. v. Robertson, 233 Ark. 711, 348 S.W.2d 703 (1961); Mounts v. Bechtel Corp., 256 Ark. 318, 507 S.W.2d 99 (1974); Smith v. Gerber Prods., 54 Ark. App. 57, 922 S.W.2d 365 (1996).

The performance of labor by an employee who dies soon afterwards because of a heart attack may be considered as an aggravation of a preexisting condition, and it makes no material difference whether the attack precedes the labor or the labor precedes the attack if the labor performed hastens the death. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Robbins, 231 Ark. 158, 328 S.W.2d 489 (1959).

Where employee suffers a heart attack and then performs some labor after which he collapses and dies, the fact that he was only engaged in his ordinary and normal duties at the time of his death does not bar recovery. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Robbins, 231 Ark. 158, 328 S.W.2d 489 (1959); Rebsamen West, Inc. v. Bailey, 239 Ark. 1100, 396 S.W.2d 822 (1965).

When industrial injury precipitates disability from a latent prior condition, such as heart disease, cancer, back weakness and the like, the entire disability is compensable and no attempt is made to weigh the relative contribution of the accident and the preexisting condition to the final disability. McDaniel v. Hilyard Drilling Co., 233 Ark. 142, 343 S.W.2d 416 (1961).

It is not necessary that an injury be caused by unusual strain or exertion before it is compensable, but rather, the claim is compensable when the claimant's ordinary work aggravates a preexisting condition, and thus contributes to the injury. McGeorge Constr. Co. v. Taylor, 234 Ark. 1, 350 S.W.2d 313 (1961).

While Arkansas Supreme Court has not held that “any” heart attack on the job is compensable, where there is medical testimony that the work aggravated or hastened the occlusion the finding of the commission awarding disability benefits will not be reversed. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Cain, 243 Ark. 483, 420 S.W.2d 872 (1967).

Substantial evidence supported commission's finding of a separate and distinct injury rather than recurrence of former injury. Curtis Mathes of Ark., Inc. v. Summerville, 256 Ark. 340, 507 S.W.2d 108 (1974).

A preexisting disease or infirmity of an employee does not disqualify his claim under the requirement that the disability arise out of the employment where the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the disability for which compensation is sought. Little v. Delta Rice Mill, Inc., 11 Ark. App. 114, 667 S.W.2d 373 (1984).

When a preexisting injury is aggravated by a later compensable injury, compensation is in order. However, a claimant must prove that a compensable injury is the cause of any aggravation to a preexisting injury. Wade v. Mr. C. Cavenaugh's, 25 Ark. App. 237, 756 S.W.2d 923 (1988), superseded, 298 Ark. 363, 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989).

In workers' compensation law, the employer “takes the employee as he finds him” and employment circumstances that aggravate pre-existing conditions are compensable. Public Employee Claims Div. v. Tiner, 37 Ark. App. 23, 822 S.W.2d 400 (1992).

Where an employee's disability had been worsened by her diabetes and obesity, which in turn had been exacerbated by the failure to follow diets prescribed for her, there was no evidence to support the Workers' Compensation Commission's conclusions that the employee's disability would be less than total were it not for the flare up of her diabetic condition, and no substantial basis for the commission's conclusion that she failed to prove entitlement. Weller v. Darling Store Fixtures, 38 Ark. App. 95, 828 S.W.2d 858 (1992).

Evidence held sufficient to support determination that employee suffered a compensable injury when she dislocated her shoulder while reaching under a patient's bed, even though she had other episodes in her past when her shoulder popped out. St. Vincent Infirmary Medical Ctr. v. Brown, 53 Ark. App. 30, 917 S.W.2d 550 (1996).

An employee's second foot injury was a compensable consequence of his initial work-related injury where the employee dropped a sledge hammer on his foot at work and sustained a nondisplaced fracture, he returned to work in a few days wearing protective boots, and, a few days later, stepped on or tripped over a tree root while in a park for a church function and sustained a displaced fracture of his foot. Oak Grove Lumber Co. v. Highfill, 62 Ark. App. 42, 968 S.W.2d 637 (1998).

Substantial evidence supported the determination that a claimant's back injury did not aggravate a preexisting condition (a “propensity to obesity”), and the claimant was not entitled to an evaluation for weight-loss surgery and additional temporary total disability benefits. Oliver v. Guardsmark, Inc., 68 Ark. App. 24, 3 S.W.3d 336 (1999).

Decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that an employee did not prove that he suffered a compensable back injury, because the injury was the result of a preexisting degenerative disk disease and prior back surgeries, was supported by substantial evidence, particularly in light of the evidence that he had suffered a previous back injury and had undergone two neck surgeries and four back surgeries. Hickman v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, 372 Ark. 501, 277 S.W.3d 591 (2008).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied compensability because an employee failed to prove an aggravation of a preexisting condition and to support his claim with new objective medical findings where he had been diagnosed with significant left-knee problems prior to his employment with the employer, arthroscopic surgery had already been recommended, and the employee failed to disclose his preexisting condition on an employment questionnaire. Willis v. Great Dane Trailers, 2014 Ark. App. 547, 444 S.W.3d 423 (2014).

—Psychological Injury.

There is no reason why harm to the body of a worker should be limited to visible physical injury to the bones and muscles and should exclude work-related trauma which results in an injury to the mind; accordingly, psychological trauma injuries may be compensable under this chapter. Owens v. National Health Labs., Inc., 8 Ark. App. 92, 648 S.W.2d 829 (1983).

Where the psychological injury, if any, resulted from nontraumatically induced events, the claimant must show more than the ordinary day-to-day stress to which all workers are subjected in order to recover compensation for his psychological injuries. Owens v. National Health Labs., Inc., 8 Ark. App. 92, 648 S.W.2d 829 (1983); Barrett v. Arkansas Rehabilitation Servs., 10 Ark. App. 102, 661 S.W.2d 439 (1983).

Whether stress is more than ordinary and the psychological injury is causally connected to it or aggravated by it are questions of fact for the commission to determine. Barrett v. Arkansas Rehabilitation Servs., 10 Ark. App. 102, 661 S.W.2d 439 (1983).

Commission finding that claimant's disability due to mental illness did not arise out of and in course of employment was supported by evidence. Barrett v. Arkansas Rehabilitation Servs., 10 Ark. App. 102, 661 S.W.2d 439 (1983).

Conversion reaction is a compensable condition, and the court will award benefits for a psychological reaction to a compensable injury. Willmon v. Allen Canning Co., 38 Ark. App. 105, 828 S.W.2d 868 (1992).

Where employee's current psychological problems bore a causal relationship to his work-related injury, decision of Worker's Compensation Board mandating temporary total disability benefits was affirmed. CDI Contractors v. McHale, 41 Ark. App. 57, 848 S.W.2d 941 (1993).

—Rapid Repetitive Motion.

Motions of delivery truck driver, who briefly performed several different rapid motions, repeated at differing intervals and separated by periods of several minutes, did not constitute rapid repetitive motion under the meaning of subdivision (5)(A)(ii)( a ) of this section. Lay v. UPS, 58 Ark. App. 35, 944 S.W.2d 867 (1997).

Claimant's assembly line work of gripping, twisting, and squeezing wires to secure small components to boards all day long qualified as “rapid repetitive” in the ordinary and generally accepted meaning of the words. Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ, 58 Ark. App. 194, 948 S.W.2d 100 (1997), rev'd, 333 Ark. 335, 969 S.W.2d 190 (1998).

In the most compelling case demonstrating rapid repetitive motion to date, rapid repetitive motion shown where employee's assembly duties required her to attach a nut to a block at an average rate of one nut every fifteen seconds during the majority of her shift. High Capacity Prods. v. Moore, 61 Ark. App. 1, 962 S.W.2d 831 (1998).

A physician's letter and office notes constituted sufficient evidence to support the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that an employee's work aggravated his osteoarthritis where the letter stated that the employee's required use of his hands was “likely to aggravate osteoarthritis of the hands” and that the employee should avoid repetitive use of his hands and where the report stated that it seemed that the employee's repetitive motions had led to a large portion of his osteoarthritis and tendinitis. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Griffin, 61 Ark. App. 222, 966 S.W.2d 914 (1998).

Employee's job involved rapid repetitive motion where the job involved motions that were repeated 115 to 120 times per day separated by periods of only 1.5 minutes. Boyd v. Dana Corp., 62 Ark. App. 78, 966 S.W.2d 946 (1998).

The standard for determining “rapid repetitive motion” is a two-pronged test: (1) the tasks must be repetitive, and (2) the repetitive motion must be rapid. Malone v. Texarkana Pub. Sch., 333 Ark. 343, 969 S.W.2d 644 (1998).

The Workers' Compensation Commission erred by applying a definition of “rapid repetitive motion” that had been rejected and held to be too restrictive when it determined that, although the claimant's job involved the use of her hands in all of her duties, it did not require the exact or almost exact movement again and again for prolonged periods of time sufficient to constitute rapid, repetitive motion. Malone v. Texarkana Pub. Sch., 333 Ark. 343, 969 S.W.2d 644 (1998).

The claimant, who was a custodian in a public school, failed to establish an injury caused by rapid repetitive motion where the claimant performed several different tasks each day and her supervisor testified that her work was not rapid in nature. Malone v. Texarkana Pub. Sch., 333 Ark. 343, 969 S.W.2d 644 (1998).

An incisional hernia caused by gradual heavy lifting was not a compensable injury caused by rapid repetitive motion; although the motion which caused the injury was repetitive, it was not rapid. Jobe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 66 Ark. App. 114, 987 S.W.2d 764 (1999).

Evidence established that rapid repetitive motion caused the claimant's bilateral knee injuries where she spent a substantial amount of time making back and forth motions on her knees while stocking store shelves. Patterson v. Frito Lay, Inc., 66 Ark. App. 159, 992 S.W.2d 130 (1999).

Epicondylitis, or “tennis elbow,” has not been designated as a specifically recognized injury under “rapid repetitive motion,” and, consequently, a claimant bears the burden of proving that rapid repetitive motion caused such condition. Freeman v. Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 27 S.W.3d 762 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000).

The claimant established that her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral epicondylitis, or “tennis elbow,” arose out of and in the course of her employment, which involved assembling frozen dinner trays on a production line, where (1) she testified that her duty on the production line was to place the correct portion of food into the frozen dinner tray, making certain that there was not too much nor too little food in each triangle portion of the tray, and that she was responsible for filling approximately 65 dinners per minute, and (2) a physician opined that her conditions were consistent with her job description. Freeman v. Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 27 S.W.3d 762 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000).

Evidence was sufficient to establish that the claimant's neck injury was caused by rapid repetitive movement where (1) over the course of a nine to ten hour shift, the claimant completed 316 units, each of which had six screws, and (2) the claimant testified that she had to stoop over and bend her head or neck a little for each screw inserted into every unit. Hapney v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 342 Ark. 11, 26 S.W.3d 777 (2000).

The Workers' Compensation Commission erred in denying benefits for the claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome, notwithstanding that she first experienced shooting pains in her wrists while wiping up some spilled tea from a kitchen counter in her home and admitted that she did not initially report problems she had with her hands because she believed that pain was simply a “part of the job,” where (1) the claimant testified in detail about her job duties that required extensive use of her hands and wrists and also testified that she had no prior injury that could be related to her current problems and denied engaging in any outside activities that could have caused carpal tunnel syndrome, (2) the claimant submitted her medical records, which included the medical opinions of two of her treating physicians, (3) one physician stated in his letter that the claimant's injuries were overuse-type injuries consistent with her job duties, and (4) the second physician concurred with the first physician that the claimant's injuries were usage-related type injuries often associated with repetitive motions, but declined to state definitively whether the claimant's job, or some outside activities, were the cause of her injuries. Freeman v. Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 344 Ark. 296, 40 S.W.3d 760 (2001).

Employee, a volleyball coach and physical-education teacher, did not establish that she sustained a gradual-onset throat injury caused by rapid repetitive motion as the Workers' Compensation Commission improperly applied prior case law in finding the internal vibrations of the vocal cords to be tasks as opposed to the act of speech. Westside High Sch. v. Patterson, 79 Ark. App. 281, 86 S.W.3d 412 (2002).

Workers' compensation benefits were properly awarded to a claimant due to a cumulative trauma to her left knee as a rapid repetitive motion injury under this section where the claimant had to move constantly, had to climb ladders for 5 hours of an 8-hour shift, and had to move quickly in order to make quota. Substantial evidence supported the findings that the repetitive and rapidity elements were met. Gates Corp. v. Friend, 2015 Ark. App. 89 (2015).

Argument that the Workers' Compensation Commission erred as a matter of law in finding that a benefits claimant had sustained a cumulative trauma injury to her left knee and awarding benefits was rejected because the issue of whether an injury meets the rapid-repetitive-motion requirement is a question of fact. Gates Corp. v. Friend, 2015 Ark. App. 89 (2015).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that a highway employee's weed-eating activities did not equate to a rapid-repetitive movement for purposes of his workers' compensation claim was supported by substantial evidence; weed-eating was a “second duty” to his other tasks, it only occurred during mowing season, and the amount of time he spent actually weed-eating varied depending on where the mowing crews were working. Carlat v. Ark. Highway & Transp. Dep't, 2018 Ark. App. 157, 546 S.W.3d 514 (2018).

—Recurrence.

If an injury flares up a second time without an intervening cause and creates a second disability, it is a recurrence of the first compensable injury and the employer remains liable; a recurrence is not a new injury but simply another period of incapacitation resulting from the previous injury. Atkins Nursing Home v. Gray, 54 Ark. App. 125, 923 S.W.2d 897 (1996).

—Sexual Harassment.

This chapter does not exclude sexual harassment claims where the claimant sustains a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of the employment relationship. Phillips v. Arkansas State Hwy. & Transp. Dep't, 52 Ark. App. 170, 916 S.W.2d 128, 1996 Ark. App. LEXIS 116 (1996).

To determine whether an injury arises out of employment, the Commission should apply the same rule to sexual harassment cases that it applies in assault cases: an injury arises out of the employment if the risk is increased by the nature or setting of the work; whether sexual harassment is a risk to which an employee is exposed because of the nature of the work environment is a fact that should be decided on a case-by-case basis. Phillips v. Arkansas State Hwy. & Transp. Dep't, 52 Ark. App. 170, 916 S.W.2d 128, 1996 Ark. App. LEXIS 116 (1996).

—Specific Incident.

Employee was denied benefits for injury allegedly caused by a specific traumatic incident, where the medical evidence was silent as to the causal connection between his disability and a specific traumatic incident. Lay v. UPS, 58 Ark. App. 35, 944 S.W.2d 867 (1997).

The claimant's neck injury was not compensable on the basis that it was caused by a specific incident and was identifiable by time and place of occurrence where the claimant's own deposition testimony reflected that she did not know how she was injured, that she did not recall anything specific happening, and that she did not tell her treating physician that her pain was associated with any particular, specific incident. Hapney v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 342 Ark. 11, 26 S.W.3d 777 (2000).

Employee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained an injury to her left shoulder resulting from a specific incident where employer's medical department supervisor testified that she helped employee file the first report of injury and that employee described the injury to herself as something that gradually happened to her shoulder after shoveling ice the previous month; the court could not say that no reasonable, fair-minded person could have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission. Dorris v. Townsends of Ark., Inc., 93 Ark. App. 208, 218 S.W.3d 351 (2005).

Finding that the employee failed to prove a compensable injury caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence was proper under subdivision (4)(A) of this section because his treating physicians reported no acute event but instead indicated that he developed an injury to his toe by working in work boots that were too narrow. The employee testified that he did not feel any soreness until he had been working his regular duties for a couple of hours. Pearson v. Worksource, 2011 Ark. App. 751, 387 S.W.3d 274 (2011), rehearing denied, Pearson v. Worksource & Wausau Ins. Co., — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Ark. App. LEXIS 32 (Ark. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2012), vacated, 2012 Ark. 406, 424 S.W.3d 311 (2012).

Workers' Compensation Commission found the record devoid of credible evidence to support the worker's contention that a fracture was the result of a specific, work-related incident; the Commission did not believe the worker's testimony that he had injured his foot while working, and the appellate court was bound by that credibility determination. Yates v. Boar's Head Provisions Co., 2017 Ark. App. 133, 514 S.W.3d 514 (2017).

Claimant proved that he sustained a compensable left-knee injury because he testified he was escorting a prisoner down the stairs with his supervisor when he felt his knee pop, and he reported it to the supervisor; although he knew an incident report needed to be filled out, he explained that he did not as they were busy; the claimant did not report the injury until two days after going to the doctor when he returned for his shift as he knew there was no light-duty work; and the administrative law judge found that the claimant suffered a new knee injury as the claimant felt his left knee pop, he developed edema and a limp, and fluid had to be aspirated from his knee. Ark. Dep't of Corr. v. Clary, 2018 Ark. App. 51, 541 S.W.3d 486 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported the finding that the claimant suffered a compensable injury in the form of a brain injury and neuropathy by inhaling sulfuric acid fumes that had leached from the battery in his patrol car as there was no convincing argument or legal authority otherwise, the court had previously awarded benefits for such injuries, and the Workers' Compensation Commission has the authority to resolve conflicting evidence, including the medical evidence, and to accept or reject medical opinion. White Cty. Judge v. Menser, 2019 Ark. App. 523, 589 S.W.3d 384 (2019), review granted, 2020 Ark. LEXIS 42 (Jan. 23, 2020).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in awarding benefits to an employee arising out of a motor vehicle accident because the issue of whether the driver of the other vehicle was traveling 30 miles an hour at the time of the accident and rear-ended the employee at a stop light or instead the employee backed into the other driver was one of credibility and weight to be accorded to the evidence. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Brown, 2020 Ark. App. 93 (2020).

—Work-Related.

Where the Commission reversed the decision of the ALJ and awarded no benefits pursuant to its finding that complainant failed to prove that his back condition was the result of any work-related incident, the court reversed the Commission's decision because their denial of compensability was not supported by any substantial evidence. Frances v. Gaylord Container Corp., 69 Ark. App. 26, 9 S.W.3d 550 (2000), aff'd, 341 Ark. 527, 20 S.W.3d 280 (2000).

While the removal of gravel from a temoprary dump site by the employee may have advanced the employer's interests, at least indirectly, the removal of it for his own personal use was not inherently necessary to his job; it also was not necessary at the time and place of the occurrence for the employee to have been loading gravel at all. Smith v. City of Fort Smith, 84 Ark. App. 430, 143 S.W.3d 593 (2004).

Going-and-coming rule precluded the employee's recovery as his accident occurred while he was simply traveling home; the Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in concluding that the employer provided the employee with transportation as a gratuity to the employee, rather than for a benefit to the employer. Swearengin v. Evergreen Lawns, 85 Ark. App. 61, 145 S.W.3d 830 (2004).

Where a claimant suffers an unexplained injury at work, it is generally compensable; thus, employee who twisted his knee exiting the driver's compartment of a cement truck suffered a compensable injury. Crawford v. Single Source Transp., 87 Ark. App. 216, 189 S.W.3d 507 (2004).

Where employee of a medical center was headed off to lunch and slipped on a puddle of spilled coffee outside the elevator, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied her claim for benefits because she was not performing employment services at the time of her injury. Robinson v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 88 Ark. App. 168, 196 S.W.3d 508 (2004).

Employee is performing “employment services” when he is engaging in an activity that carries out an employer's purpose or advances the employer's interest; thus, where employee stepped off the elevator to retrieve her lunch and slipped in a puddle of coffee, the employee did not suffer a compensable injury because she was not performing employment services at the time of her injury. Robinson v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 88 Ark. App. 168, 196 S.W.3d 508 (2004).

Accident that occurred while employee was going to get breakfast for all nurses in an intensive care unit was compensable under this section because the activity served to at least indirectly advance the interest of the employer by reducing the time that the unit was short-staffed. Ark. Methodist Hosp. v. Hampton, 90 Ark. App. 288, 205 S.W.3d 848 (2005).

Where employee fell while walking across a board over a ditch while returning from his break, he was entitled to benefits as he was performing employment services at the time of injury; employee had remained on the clock and was not able to leave the workplace during his break. Wallace v. West Fraser South, Inc., 365 Ark. 68, 225 S.W.3d 361 (2006).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that employee's carpal-tunnel and cubital-tunnel injuries were compensable was proper given the employee's extensive testimony and testimony from her coworkers; further, employee's physician opined that employee's injuries were related to her repetitive duties as a grill cook. Cottage Cafe, Inc. v. Collette, 94 Ark. App. 72, 226 S.W.3d 27 (2006).

There was no substantial evidence to support the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's conclusion that employee was not performing employment services when he was injured as employee was carrying out the employer's purpose and advancing its interest when the injury occurred. Richard Kimbell v. Ass'n of Rehab Indus. & Business Companion Property & Casualty, 366 Ark. 297, 235 S.W.3d 499 (2006).

Workers’ Compensation Commission did not err in finding that the claimant failed to prove a work-related injury to his back, as there were numerous inconsistencies in the evidence, including the claimant’s testimony that the injury occurred on one date and medical records showing that the injury occurred two days earlier, and testimony that the claimant told a co-worker he had hurt his back at home over the weekend. Ayers v. City of Ashdown, 2014 Ark. App. 270 (2014).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied an employee's claim for benefits because the employee failed to prove that she had sustained a compensable injury; the employee admitted that she was not carrying out any tasks related to her job activity when she went to the cafeteria to get something to eat and that she was not required to perform any job duties during her break, she had no medical condition that required her to have a mid-morning snack, and her job was not particularly physically demanding, such that a snack would be necessary to continue working until she was able to eat lunch. Fulbright v. St. Bernard's Med. Ctr. Risk Mgmt. Res., 2016 Ark. App. 417, 502 S.W.3d 540 (2016).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that the injury was compensable where it acknowledged that the treating physician checked “no” in answering whether the disability arose from employment, but weighed that against the other medical evidence in the record. St. Jean Indus. v. Ezell, 2016 Ark. App. 516, 504 S.W.3d 679 (2016).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding a causal connection between the injury and the employment, given the claimant's testimony that a coolant had soaked his boots, socks, and feet, as well as the treating physician's notes that the claimant worked in coolant water that caused his boots to fall apart and recommending that the claimant get waterproof chemical-resistant boots. St. Jean Indus. v. Ezell, 2016 Ark. App. 516, 504 S.W.3d 679 (2016).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in concluding that the claimant's right shoulder injury was compensable because the claimant's failure to immediately report an injury or provide corroboration regarding the incident was not fatal to her claim as the administrative law judge and the Commission apparently found her to be a credible witness; while the emergency room records did not reflect that the claimant reported her injury being work-related, the claimant testified that she did inform hospital personnel of that fact; and the fact that the family physician's notes did not state that the injury was work-related was immaterial as those notes did not include any remarks regarding how the injury occurred. M.A. Mortenson Cos. v. Reed, 2019 Ark. App. 569, 589 S.W.3d 487 (2019).

Intoxicants.

Workers' Compensation Commission had a substantial basis for denying relief to an employee because the presence of marijuana metabolites in his urine sample created a rebuttable presumption, not overcome, that the injury was substantially occasioned by the use of illegal drugs. Waldrip v. Graco Corp., 101 Ark. App. 101, 270 S.W.3d 891 (2008), review denied, 2008 Ark. LEXIS 273 (Ark. Apr. 24, 2008).

Employee's refusal of his employer's request to take a hair-follicle test four days after he wrecked a large truck did not trigger the statutory presumption of intoxication found in subdivision (4)(B)(iv) (b) of this section. The police officer at the scene of the accident indicated that the employee appeared normal and no alcohol or drugs were observed. Curt Bean Transp., Inc. v. Hill, 2009 Ark. App. 760, 348 S.W.3d 56 (2009), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. App. LEXIS 1000 (Dec. 16, 2009), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 127 (Feb. 25, 2010).

Injured employee's negligence action against an employer was barred by subdivisions (4)(B)(iv) (a)-(d) of this section and the Worker's Compensation Commission's decision that the claim was not compensable because the employee tested positive for illegal drugs at the time of the accident. Hickey v. Gardisser, 2010 Ark. App. 464, 375 S.W.3d 733 (2010), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 591 (July 28, 2010), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Ark. LEXIS 350 (Ark. Feb. 3, 2011).

Substantial evidence supported a decision by the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that an employee rebutted the presumption in subdivision (4)(B)(iv) (b) of this section that a work-related injury was substantially occasioned by the employee's use of methadone because the Commission found credible: (1) the employee's testimony he ingested the methadone days before the accident; (2) the testimony by the employee's expert toxicologist that effects of the drug would have dissipated within 24 hours; (3) testimony by a co-worker and a supervisor that the employee did not seem impaired the day of the accident; and (4) testimony describing the accident as a highly unusual event and there was nothing the employee did to cause the accident or could have done to prevent its occurrence. Telling Indus. v. Petty, 2010 Ark. App. 602, 378 S.W.3d 167 (2010).

Finding that the employee failed to rebut the presumption that an injury he sustained was substantially occasioned by his use of marijuana was appropriate pursuant to subdivision (4)(B)(iv) (b) of this section because there was evidence that his injury occurred through no fault of the twist-and-tuck winder, contrary to his assertion. Townley v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 2012 Ark. App. 48, 388 S.W.3d 475 (2012).

Workers' compensation benefits claimant failed to rebut by a preponderance of the evidence the presumption under subdivision (4)(B)(iv) of this section that an accident involving the severance of his fingers was substantially occasioned by the use of marijuana. The evidence showed that the claimant was using a machine in a manner other than how he was instructed, he tested positive for marijuana metabolites, and he admitted that marijuana made him less attentive, made it harder for him to concentrate, and made it more difficult for him to react quickly. Hudgens v. Aid Temp. Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 471 (2012).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in affirming the award of benefits for a left-wrist injury sustained by claimant in a fall from a ladder. Because no test was performed on claimant in proximity to his work accident to establish the presence of drugs or alcohol in his system, the presumption of non-compensability under subdivision (4)(B)(iv) (b) of this section was not triggered; therefore, the burden did not shift to claimant to disprove that his work accident was substantially occasioned by the use of marijuana or alcohol. Weld Rite, Inc. v. Dungan, 2012 Ark. App. 526, 423 S.W.3d 613 (2012).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied an employee's claim for benefits based on his failure to rebut the statutory presumption that the accident was substantially occasioned by his use of illegal drugs; after the employee fell from a ladder, he was taken to a hospital where a urine sample tested positive for methamphetamine, there was no evidence that the employee ingested a medicine that contained legal methamphetamine, which might cause a false-positive result, and the employee did not prove that the angle iron behind the ladder caused his fall. Reed v. Turner Indus., 2015 Ark. App. 43, 454 S.W.3d 237 (2015).

Legislative Intent.

With respect to this section and § 11-9-527, which were unconstitutionally gender-based statutes, it was the legislature's intent to provide compensation for the death of an employee, and to make compensation available equally for a widow and widower would be more consistent with the legislative purpose than to exclude widows; thus, the employer could not successfully argue that deletion of the unconstitutional portions of these sections was not the proper way to equalize treatment for widows and widowers. Russell v. International Paper Co., 2 Ark. App. 355, 621 S.W.2d 867 (1981) (decision prior to 1981 amendment).

Major Cause.

For an accidental injury, it is not necessary that the claimant prove that the injury is the major cause of the disability or need for treatment. Estridge v. Waste Mgmt., 343 Ark. 276, 33 S.W.3d 167 (2000).

Substantial evidence did not support the conclusion that the claimant's motor vehicle accident was substantially occasioned by his use of alcohol where (1) both drivers had a blood alcohol content of more than twice the legal limit at the time of the accident, but (2) the other driver came completely over into the claimant's lane and struck his vehicle head-on, and (3) although a time stamped receipt in the claimant's vehicle showed that he had been speeding at some point, there was no evidence that he was speeding at the time of the accident or that he could have avoided the accident. Clark v. Sbarro, Inc., 67 Ark. App. 372, 1 S.W.3d 38 (1999).

Where worker began to experience pain and it was determined that her rapid repetitive motion injury was an aggravation of a preexisting condition, the appellate court held that the Workers' Compensation Commission was clearly wrong in its decision that the “major cause” requirement of subdivision (4)(E) of this section categorically could not be established by a showing that an asymptomatic preexisting condition became symptomatic and required treatment due to a work-related aggravation of that condition. Parker v. Atl. Research Corp. Ins. Co., 87 Ark. App. 145, 189 S.W.3d 449 (2004).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission wrongfully denied employee permanent disability benefits as it erred in finding that an aggravation of a preexisting back condition was not capable of meeting the major-cause requirement of subdivision (4)(F)(ii) of this section.Pollard v. Meridian Aggregates, 88 Ark. App. 1, 193 S.W.3d 738 (2004).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred under subdivisions (4)(F)(ii) (a) and (b) of this section in finding that an employee was not entitled to permanent partial disability benefits because his permanent impairment was caused solely by his degenerative condition rather than by a work accident, as his degenerative condition was asymptomatic prior to the accident and then symptomatic thereafter, such that the major-cause requirement was satisfied Leach v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 2011 Ark. App. 571 (2011).

In a workers' compensation case, a five-percent permanent-partial disability rating was supported by substantial evidence because there was reliance upon a medical report for objective findings to support the rating. The major cause of the rating was a compensable thoracic injury, which required surgical intervention. Walgreen Co. v. Goode, 2012 Ark. App. 196, 395 S.W.3d 398 (2012).

Worker had bilateral quadriceps tendon tears, a doctor assigned a disability rating of 35 and 32 percent to the right and left lower extremities respectively, and the Workers' Compensation Commission accepted the ratings and found that the worker had proven her compensable injuries to be the major cause of impairment; the Commission exercised its duty to assess the evidence to make a finding of permanent impairment, and substantial evidence supported this decision. Firestone Bldg. Prods. v. Hopson, 2013 Ark. App. 618, 430 S.W.3d 162 (2013).

Neck injury was not compensable because physician failed to state that the alleged work injury was the major cause for the need for treatment, and claimant testified that she could not figure out where else she would have sustained extensive wear and tear on her neck. Claimant first asserted this conclusion nearly two years after she left work without ever reporting a neck injury, and speculation and conjecture did not take the place of proof. Weaver v. Ark. Dep't of Corr., 2015 Ark. App. 346, 464 S.W.3d 133 (2015).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that the employee suffered a gradual-onset injury to his neck was supported by substantial evidence where the Commission relied on a physician's letter that clearly stated that the significant work-obligations that the employee performed most likely contributed to the underlying condition and the development of neck pain and radiculopathy, thereby showing that the injury was a major cause of the disability or need for medical treatment. Harrison v. Street & Performance, Inc., 2017 Ark. App. 611, 533 S.W.3d 648 (2017).

Workers' Compensation Commission's finding of a 37% impairment rating was affirmed; although a doctor opined that claimant's workplace injury was only 50% caused by the compensable injury, the claimant testified that he had remained quite physically active prior to the accident despite having polio, he had been able to move around with a right-leg brace and a crutch, but after the accident he was confined to a wheelchair or scooter. Ark. State Military Dep't v. Jackson, 2019 Ark. App. 92, 568 S.W.3d 811 (2019).

Medical Opinions.

The use of the word “probably” is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of subdivision (16)(B) that medical opinions addressing compensability must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Wackenhut Corp. v. Jones, 73 Ark. App. 158, 40 S.W.3d 333 (2001).

Neither the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission nor the court has the authority to extend or limit coverage by finding a constructive release when subdivision (16)(B) of this section specifically requires a medical opinion regarding impairment and compensability to be within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Bingle v. Quality Inn, 96 Ark. App. 312, 241 S.W.3d 271 (2006).

Order from the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that employee was entitled to temporary total disability only through August 14, 2001, was overturned where the Commission's substitution of a medical opinion with its own finding of a constructive release was arbitrary and contrary to subdivision (16)(B) of this section. Bingle v. Quality Inn, 96 Ark. App. 312, 241 S.W.3d 271 (2006).

Where a neurosurgeon wrote that the employee suffered a work injury when she fell from a ladder, his opinion regarding the cause of the employee's herniated discs was unequivocal; the appellate court concluded that his opinion was stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as required by subdivision (16)(B) of this section. Wal-Mart Assocs. v. Davis, 98 Ark. App. 422, 256 S.W.3d 517 (2007).

Finding that an employee in a workers' compensation action was not entitled to medical treatment from a doctor in connection with the employee's compensable back injury was appropriate because the doctor's statement that the injuries “could” have been caused by her accident at work was insufficient under subdivision (16)(B) of this section. Hawley v. First Sec. Bancorp, 2011 Ark. App. 538, 385 S.W.3d 388 (2011).

For purposes of § 11-9-508(a), substantial evidence supported the determination that the treatment given by one doctor was causally related to and necessary for treating the claimant's compensable injury; a 2006 MRI showed a moderate herniation, but a 2010 MRI showed a large herniation, and although a medical center claimed that a physican's opinion concerning compensability was not stated within a reasonable degree of certainty under subdivision (16)(B) of this section, the court disagreed because the physician and doctor related the treatment and surgery to the compensable cervical-spine injury, the Workers' Compensation Commission credited their opinions, and the court left the weighing of the medical evidence to the Commission. St. Edward Mercy Med. Ctr. & Sisters of Mercy Health Sys. v. Chrisman, 2012 Ark. App. 475, 422 S.W.3d 171 (2012).

Medical Services.

Employee would be permitted treatment by out-of-state physician, where it would violate the employer's statutory duty to provide medical care if that care was denied simply because there was no medical service provider in Arkansas qualified and willing to provide the service. Milligan v. West Tree Serv., 57 Ark. App. 14, 946 S.W.2d 697 (1997), supp. op., Clark v. Director, Empl. Sec. Dep't, 58 Ark. App. 1, 944 S.W.2d 862.

Objective Findings.

Physician's diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome was not supported by “objective findings” as defined by subdivision (16)(A)(i) where the results of each of the tests performed by the physician were based on the patient's description of the sensations produced by various stimuli; such descriptions are clearly under the voluntary control of the patient and therefore, by statutory definition, do not constitute objective findings. Duke v. Regis Hairstylists, 55 Ark. App. 327, 935 S.W.2d 600 (1996).

Doctor's direct observation of a 5 cm fibrous mass constituted an “objective finding” under subdivision (16). Daniel v. Firestone Bldg. Prods., 57 Ark. App. 123, 942 S.W.2d 277 (1997).

Claimant's inability to bend more than ninety degrees was not an “objective finding” under subdivision (16). Cox v. CFSI Temporary Emp., 57 Ark. App. 310, 944 S.W.2d 856 (1997).

Physician's remarks about an acidic solution such as wheel cleaner being able to cause irregular corneal astigmatism were stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty as required by subdivision (16)(B). Service Chevrolet v. Atwood, 61 Ark. App. 190, 966 S.W.2d 909 (1998).

There was no objective medical evidence of the claimant's injury where the only arguably objective medical evidence of the injury was a notation at a clinic that there was a contusion of the lumbar spine, but reasonable minds could conclude that a contusion to such an internal structure could not be seen and therefore did not constitute objective medical evidence of an injury. Meister v. Safety Kleen, 65 Ark. App. 259, 987 S.W.2d 749 (1999), rev'd, Meister v. Kleen, 339 Ark. 91, 3 S.W.3d 320 (Ark. 1999).

The findings of muscle spasms by a physical therapist can constitute objective findings, notwithstanding that a physical therapist is unqualified to state a medical opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty; an objective finding is not synonymous with or otherwise based on medical opinion. Continental Express, Inc. v. Freeman, 66 Ark. App. 102, 989 S.W.2d 538 (1999), aff'd, 339 Ark. 142, 4 S.W.3d 124 (Ark. 1999).

Objective medical evidence is necessary to establish the existence and extent of an injury but not essential to establish the causal relationship between the injury and a work-related accident. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999).

Although muscle spasms are involuntary and constitute an objective finding, muscle tenderness is measured by a patient's subjective reaction to stimuli and does not constitute an objective finding. Kimbrell v. Arkansas Dep't of Health, 66 Ark. App. 245, 989 S.W.2d 570 (1999).

The claimant provided objective evidence of an internal contusion where a orthopedist conducted an x-ray examination about one month after the claimant's fall which corroborated the contusion that the claimant's treating physician originally diagnosed. Meister v. Kleen, 339 Ark. 91, 3 S.W.3d 320 (Ark. 1999).

Muscle spasms constitute objective findings. Continental Express, Inc. v. Freeman, 339 Ark. 142, 4 S.W.3d 124 (Ark. 1999).

An objective finding is not synonymous with and need not be based on a medical opinion. Continental Express, Inc. v. Freeman, 339 Ark. 142, 4 S.W.3d 124 (Ark. 1999).

A medical opinion addressing compensability of the claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome was given within a reasonable degree of medical certainty as required by subsection (16) of this section where the physician gave the opinion that if the work was repetitive (which it was), it likely could precipitate or aggravate the wrist condition. Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc., 69 Ark. App. 206, 11 S.W.3d 567 (2000), rev'd, 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000).

A medical opinion addressing the compensability of the claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome did not satisfy the statutory requirement that such opinions be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty where the medical opinion stated only that the claimant's working conditions “could have” caused his symptoms and that a review of his working conditions would make it easier to determine if the carpal tunnel syndrome was related to the claimant's employment. Crudup v. Regal Ware Inc., 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000).

A range-of-motion test performed on the claimant constituted objective findings under subdivision (16)(A)(i) where the test performed was not one in which the limb was actively moved by the claimant, but instead was a test in which the limb was moved passively by the examiner. Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 71 Ark. App. 207, 29 S.W.3d 751 (2000).

A finding of muscle tightness was not equivalent to a finding of muscle spasms and did not constitute an objective finding since there was no evidence to suggest that the findings of muscle tightness were actually muscle spasms or that the tightness was involuntary. Carman v. Haworth, Inc., 74 Ark. App. 55, 45 S.W.3d 408 (2001).

While the pulmonary-function test results required the worker to give maximum effort, whether she did so could be shown by objective chemical data; thus, the test was an “objective finding” that supported the award of workers' compensation benefits. Emerson Elec. v. Gaston, 75 Ark. App. 232, 58 S.W.3d 848 (2001).

Though the worker could control her responses to the neuropsychological testing, as there was no evidence that she manipulated the testing, and there was other objective evidence that showed she suffered a compensable brain injury, the workers' compensation commission erred in denying her claim for additional benefits. Wentz v. Service Master, 75 Ark. App. 296, 57 S.W.3d 753 (2001), overruled, Parson v. Ark. Methodist Hosp., — Ark. App. LEXIS —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. App. LEXIS 619 (Sept. 24, 2008).

Notation in the medical records of an employee who claimed to have injured his back while lifting a large mixing pot at work that the employee was suffering muscle spasms was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of subdivision (4)(D) that a workers' compensation claim based on accidental injury be supported by objective medical findings. Edens v. Superior Marble & Glass, 346 Ark. 487, 58 S.W.3d 369 (2001).

Evidence that a worker suffered muscle spasms and that an MRI examination revealed an injury to a disk in her back as a result of being hit by a cart that was being pushed by a co-worker, was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a worker's compensation claim be supported by objective medical findings, as that term was defined in subdivision (16) of this section. Wal-Mart Stores v. Sands, 80 Ark. App. 51, 91 S.W.3d 93 (2002).

Order awarding temporary total disability benefits to an employee who fell off a ladder and landed on a concrete floor was upheld because substantial evidence was presented that her compensable injury was established by medical evidence supported by “objective findings,” as required by subdivision (4)(D) of this section. Fred's, Inc. v. Jefferson, 361 Ark. 258, 206 S.W.3d 238 (2005).

Objective medical evidence, including pulmonary function test results and a doctor's opinion, showed that employee seeking workers' compensation had a 50% impairment due to silicosis and, for purposes of this section and § 11-9-704(c)(1)(B), the pulmonary-function test was an objective test despite the fact that the employee was at least partially able to control his breathing and may not have made a full effort during each breathing test. DeQueen Sand & Gravel Co. v. Cox, 95 Ark. App. 234, 236 S.W.3d 5 (2006).

Pursuant to this section, the employee failed to set forth two objective findings supporting her claim of a compensable injury where there was nothing in the medical records indicating why the employee was prescribed the medication at issue and the physician testified that her neurological examination was within the normal limits. Rodriguez v. M. McDaniel Co., 98 Ark. App. 138, 252 S.W.3d 146 (2007).

Workers' compensation benefits claimant failed to prove that he sustained a work-related organic brain injury because his neuropsychological testing and his own testimony, without more, did not constitute objective findings under subdivision (16)(A)(i) of this section and did not establish an organic brain injury under subdivision (4)(D) of this section. Rippe v. Delbert Hooten Logging, 100 Ark. App. 227, 266 S.W.3d 217 (2007).

Where the employee allegedly sustained a left-knee injury, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred by finding that she had a compensable injury without making a finding about whether the employee's muscle “guarding” constituted an objective or subjective finding under subdivisions (4)(A)(i) and (4)(D) of this section. The Commission's opinion lacked a finding about whether the doctor concluded that the employee's muscle “guarding” was voluntary or involuntary. The Steak House v. Weigel, 101 Ark. App. 81, 270 S.W.3d 365 (2007).

Judgment of Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that an employee failed to prove that he suffered compensable knee and shoulder injuries was reversed because the contusion diagnosis with no conflicting testimony about the nature of the contusion satisfied the objective-nature findings requirement of subdivisions (4)(A)(i) and (4)(D) of this section. Ellis v. J.D. & Billy Hines Trucking, Inc., 104 Ark. App. 118, 289 S.W.3d 497 (2008).

Workers' compensation claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that impairment ratings to the left hand and elbow were associated with a work-related injury because the claimant failed to cite any medical authority for such a connection, instead presenting only the claimant's own testimony and subjective responses to active range-of-motion testing, which did not amount to objective findings. Wilson v. Smurfit, 2009 Ark. App. 800, 373 S.W.3d 347 (2009).

Decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that an employee's neck injury was compensable was supported by substantial evidence because on the day of the incident, the employee sought treatment in an emergency room (ER), and the ER doctor noted twice that she was having muscle spasms in her neck on the day she was injured; those findings satisfied the objective-medical-evidence requirement of subdivision (4)(D) of this section. St. Vincent Health Servs. v. Bishop, 2010 Ark. App. 141 (2010).

Scar across the forehead of a workers' compensation claimant, who suffered a fall while tightening a nylon strap on a load of baled cardboard, was sufficient objective evidence of permanent physical injury under subdivision (16)(A) of this section where the medical expert supported his opinion that there was damage to the trigeminal nerve with the claimant's history, an examination, the scar, and the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (4th Ed. 1993). Wayne Smith Trucking, Inc. v. McWilliams, 2011 Ark. App. 414, 384 S.W.3d 561 (2011).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that an employee failed to prove that the employee was permanently and totally disabled after a 400-pound steel bar hit the employee on top of the head; while the employee's chief complaint was ongoing pain, under subdivision (16)(A)(ii)( a ) of this section, the Commission could not consider complaints of pain. Kelley v. Cooper Std. Auto., 2011 Ark. App. 665, 386 S.W.3d 570 (2011).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's opinion fell short of the minimum requirements and could not be reviewed in any meaningful way because the Commission failed to perform its duty in conducting a de novo review of the administrative law judge's opinion. The Commission merely attacked one finding the ALJ made. Serrano v. Westrim, Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 771, 387 S.W.3d 292 (2011).

Objective findings under subdivision (16)(A)(i) of this section, including medical reports, x-rays, and MRI results, provided substantial evidence to support the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that appellant suffered from a degenerative condition in his low back - not an aggravation or new injury. A medical report documented appellant's prior history of back complaints; and x-rays taken the day after the incident demonstrated degenerative changes. Barber v. Pork Group, Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 138 (2012).

In a workers' compensation case, medical treatment provided for shortness of breath and chest pain was reasonable and necessary medical treatment for a work-related ankle injury; after the claimant began medication due to ongoing problems with his ankle, he sought treatment in the emergency room for a cardiac evaluation and diagnostic testing. Although objective medical evidence is necessary to establish the existence and extent of an injury, it is not essential to establish the causal relationship between the injury and a work-related accident. Centria, Inc. v. Bailey, 2015 Ark. App. 270 (2015).

X-ray showed soft tissue swelling in the worker's right ankle, which could be an objective medical finding, plus an MRI, which showed swelling and that a tendon was torn, was a diagnostic test that was objective and outside the workers's control; there was no prior medical history showing that the worker had been diagnosed with a torn tendon before the fall at work, and thus there was substantial medical evidence supported by objective findings. Lexicon Holding Co. v. Howard, 2015 Ark. App. 292, 462 S.W.3d 696 (2015).

“Objective findings” under this section are those findings which cannot come under the control of the patient, and all of the medical evidence related to the injury, other than the x-ray, were based on the worker's subjective complaints; thus, the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision finding that the worker failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a compensable back injury was supported by substantial evidence. Leming v. La-Z-Boy, Inc., 2015 Ark. App. 336, 463 S.W.3d 719 (2015).

Workers' Compensation Commission determined that the claimant was entitled to a 10% permanent partial-disability rating because the 10% rating was supported by objective medical findings, including the post-injury MRI, which confirmed abnormalities in the claimant's brain; the abnormalities were causally related to the October 31, 2011, compensable injury; the claimant proved that the compensable injury was the major cause of his 10% permanent anatomical-impairment rating; and the doctor, based upon patient history, examination, the MRI, and the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, used his medical expertise to render an opinion concerning the claimant's permanent impairment. St. Francis County v. Watlington, 2015 Ark. App. 497, 470 S.W.3d 684 (2015).

Substantial evidence supported the findings and conclusion of the Workers' Compensation Commission that the worker suffered a 40% permanent impairment to his wrist; the Commission interpreted pin-prick test results to reflect the partial wrist denervation mentioned in the surgical report and concluded that the rating corresponded with the median nerve distribution, and implicit in the Commission's decision was a finding that the claimant credibly testified that the doctor had manipulated his hand during the examination. Emergency Ambulance Servs. v. Pritchard, 2016 Ark. App. 366, 498 S.W.3d 774 (2016).

Opinion of the Workers' Compensation Commission displayed a substantial basis for the denial of relief because there were no objective medical findings to support the employee's claim; the Commission was entitled to rely on the opinion of the doctor who reviewed x-rays and MRIs but reported no objective medical findings related to the employee's injuries or an aggravation of any preexisting condition. Bittle v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 2017 Ark. App. 639, 537 S.W.3d 753 (2017).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that a claimant was entitled to a 29% permanent impairment rating to the body as a whole for a brain injury because the severity of the claimant's skull fractures and the presence of pneumocephalus on the claimant's CT scan, coupled with the testimony of a clinical psychologist and a board-certified neurologist that the claimant suffered a brain injury, established that the claimant did, in fact, suffer a compensable injury to the brain. Multi-Craft Contrs., Inc. v. Yousey, 2018 Ark. 107, 542 S.W.3d 155 (2018).

Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that a claimant was not entitled to permanent impairment benefits for the claimant's nerve-injury claims was appropriate because the impairment rating established by a board-certified neurologist was based solely on the claimant's level of pain. Multi-Craft Contrs., Inc. v. Yousey, 2018 Ark. 107, 542 S.W.3d 155 (2018).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in awarding benefits to the claimant because objective medical findings supported the existence of an injury to the claimant's low back as she had significant soft-tissue swelling. Ark. Sec'y of State v. Young, 2018 Ark. App. 508, 559 S.W.3d 331 (2018).

Although compensable injuries must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings, and complaints of pain are not objective medical findings as objective findings are those that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient, a claimant who has sustained a compensable injury is not required to offer objective medical evidence to prove entitlement to additional benefits. Macsteel v. Hindmarsh, 2019 Ark. App. 458, 588 S.W.3d 53 (2019).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not arbitrarily disregard an orthopedic surgeon's medical opinion without a rational basis or based on an erroneous view of the law when it specifically considered the opinion, but noted that there was no evidence of the bus driver's left-shoulder injury before he fell in a gravel parking lot. Lonoke Exceptional Sch., Inc. v. Coffman, 2019 Ark. App. 80, 569 S.W.3d 378 (2019).

Because the Workers' Compensation Commission did not arbitrarily reject the orthopedic surgeon's medical opinion, the opinion was not considered in determining whether substantial evidence supported the decision that the bus driver sustained a compensable injury. Without the opinion, the bus driver's credible testimony and the post-accident medical evidence showed a left shoulder sprain, the subsequent MRI showed a tear in the left shoulder, and thus substantial evidence supported the decision that the driver sustained a compensable injury. Lonoke Exceptional Sch., Inc. v. Coffman, 2019 Ark. App. 80, 569 S.W.3d 378 (2019).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in finding that a diagnosis of “contusion” met the claimant's burden of proving a compensable back injury supported by objective medical findings; the alleged conflict about a contusion diagnosis was contained within the same emergency-room record, and the Commission gave little weight to a physician's subsequent opinion over one month after the incident that there was no objective evidence of an injury. TJX Cos. v. Lopez, 2019 Ark. App. 233, 574 S.W.3d 230 (2019).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that there were no objective findings of injuries to the claimant's lumbar, thoracic, and cervical-spine areas from the second incident, as a doctor found no evidence of spasms on the day of the incident or on a follow-up visit approximately one month later, and the notation in a physical-therapy note was made two months after the incident and did not indicate the location of the spasms. Reed v. First Step, Inc., 2019 Ark. App. 289, 577 S.W.3d 424 (2019).

There was a substantial basis for denying an employee's whole-hand/wrist and permanent impairment claims because (1) the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the employee lacked credibility, (2) aside from an MRI report supporting the compensated thumb injury, the ALJ concluded that there were no objective medical findings of a hand injury attributable to the work injury and no impairment reports aside from an active range-of-motion evaluation, which was given little weight, and (3) swelling in the hand was slight and attributed to the effects of wearing an elastic hand brace. Evans v. Firestone Bldg. Prods., 2020 Ark. App. 80 (2020).

Performing Employment Services.

Workers' Compensation Commission properly awarded an employee benefits because the employee sustained a compensable injury when he slipped on the ice while walking from the main gate of a construction site to his employer's work trailer prior to clocking in. The employee was clearly advancing his employer's interests when he complied with the general contractor's rules regarding access to the job site by donning his personal protective equipment and swiping his access card at the front gate, and the employee was not paid until he clocked in each day. Cont'l Constr. Co. v. Nabors, 2015 Ark. App. 60, 454 S.W.3d 762 (2015).

Physical Impairment.

The term “anatomical impairment” means the anatomical loss as reflected by the common usage of medical impairment ratings; wage-loss disability is something entirely different. Foxx v. American Transp., 54 Ark. App. 115, 924 S.W.2d 814 (1996).

Because an employee failed to prove a permanent impairment under § 11-9-704(c)(1)(B) and subdivision (16)(A)(i) of this section, and because the Workers' Compensation Commission could consider the conflicting medical evidence and give less weight to one opinion, there was substantial evidence to support the denial of the employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits. Pruitt v. Healthsouth Corp., 2011 Ark. App. 776 (2011).

Substantial Evidence.

Order denying an employee workers' compensation benefits was upheld where there was substantial evidence to support the determination that the employee was engaged in horseplay at the time of the injury, when the employee demonstrated some type of kick or aerobic exercise, which was not performance of employment services. The injury was not compensable under subdivision (4)(B)(i) of this section. Mize v. Res. Power, 99 Ark. App. 415, 261 S.W.3d 477 (2007).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of benefits based on an alleged work-related injury in September 2003 because the claimant failed to put forth any medical evidence supported by objective findings demonstrating that he suffered a compensable aggravation of his previous back injury. It was undisputed that the claimant suffered from chronic, severe back pain since at least 1997 and he admitted that he never fully recovered from that injury, and continued seeking treatment and medication without significant improvement; after the claimant's injury in September 2003, his treating physician did not indicate any sort of work-related accident or injury in his notes from an examination of the claimant two days after the incident and did not indicate any objective findings such as bruising, swelling, or spasms in the claimant's back. Long v. Wal-Mart Stores, 98 Ark. App. 70, 250 S.W.3d 263 (2007).

There was substantial evidence to support the findings of a twelve percent anatomical impairment, because the first doctor's opinion that the compensable injury was the major cause of the claimant's anatomical impairment was substantial evidence to support the finding to that effect, and the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission simply decided to believe the testimony of one doctor rather than the other and the appellate court was powerless to reverse the Commission. Gaither Appliance v. Stewart, 103 Ark. App. 276, 288 S.W.3d 690 (2008).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's award of benefits to an employee was affirmed because there was substantial evidence to show that the employee proved the gradual onset, work-relatedness, and major cause elements necessary to establish a compensable injury pursuant to subdivision (4) of this section. The evidence showed that the employee worked for an employer at the same task with approximately 1,000 shoes per day for 30 years. Addison Shoe Co. v. Moody, 2009 Ark. App. 797 (2009).

Judgment from the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denying an employee's request for benefits related to a back injury based on the employee's failure to prove a causal connection under this section was affirmed because the Commission did not arbitrarily disregard evidence but rather deciphered the evidence without resort to speculation or conjecture. Ausler v. Hunt, 2009 Ark. App. 801 (2009).

Substantial evidence supported the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's determination that an employee did not sustain a compensable injury under this section when the employee fell at work because the Commission had the authority to accept or reject medical opinions and its resolution of the medical evidence had the force and effect of a jury verdict. Osborne v. Booneville Human Dev. Ctr., 2010 Ark. App. 315 (2010).

Substantial evidence supported the determination by the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission that an employee's back injury was compensable as a new injury or as an aggravation of his previously asymptomatic degenerative condition pursuant to subdivision (4)(A)(i) of this section. Leach v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 2011 Ark. App. 571 (2011).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's opinion that a claimant did not suffer a compensable injury where his owned signed statement and the testimony of two coworkers indicated that his back injury was not work related, the court deferred to the ALJ's finding that the claimant's testimony about the statement was not credible, the claimant had a history of back problems, and he could not point to a specific incident at work that prompted his injury. Sandeford v. UPS, 2014 Ark. App. 228 (2014).

Temporary Total Disability.

Where appellee employee sustained a compensable injury when a forklift struck him in his right hip and back area, substantial evidence supported the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denying him temporary disability benefits under subdivision (12) of this section because the employee had a medical release to work for two years after he suffered his injury before he was terminated from his employment. Tyson Chicken, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 2012 Ark. App. 99 (2012).

Claimant was released to perform light-duty work and there was no evidence that she was totally incapable of earning wages; there was substantial evidence to support the decision that she was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits. Mullin v. Duckwall ALCO, 2016 Ark. App. 122, 484 S.W.3d 283 (2016).

Timeliness.

Workers' Compensation Commission properly awarded an employee additional-medical benefits because he had been receiving various benefits for nearly two years before he filed an AR-C Form, the first hearing on the employee's claim for additional-medical benefits was held more than eight years later, the “additional follow-up care” sought by the employee was reasonably necessary medical treatment, and a subsequent car wreck was not an independent intervening cause of the employee's need for further medical treatment where his conduct was not unreasonable and he was never restricted from driving by any doctor. Nabholz Constr. Corp. v. White, 2015 Ark. App. 102 (2015).

Wages.

The clear wording of the statutory definition of wages makes no provision for combining wages from concurrent employments in determining benefits. Curtis v. Ermert Funeral Home & Ins. Co. of N. Am., 4 Ark. App. 274, 630 S.W.2d 57 (1982).

Section 11-9-518 concerns itself exclusively with the determination of average weekly wage, and the definition of the word wage is controlled and supplied by subdivision (8); it makes no provision for combining those wages with concurrent employment. Curtis v. Ermert Funeral Home & Ins. Co. of N. Am., 4 Ark. App. 274, 630 S.W.2d 57 (1982).

In determining an employee's wage rate for compensation benefits, an employer's contributions to an employee's fringe benefits of medical, life, and disability insurance should not be included in the term “wages.” Tabor v. Levi Strauss & Co., 33 Ark. App. 71, 801 S.W.2d 311 (1990).

Subdivision (19) of this section embraces a much more inclusive concept of what constitutes compensation than does the National Council on Compensation Insurance guidelines. Eckhardt v. Willis Shaw Express, Inc., 62 Ark. App. 224, 970 S.W.2d 316 (1998).

Per diem payments to an employee to reimburse him for meals, lodging, and incidentals should have been included in the calculation of his average weekly wage under § 11-9-518(a)(1) because they fell within the definition of wages under subdivision (19) of this section. The per diem payments saved the employee from expending other funds to acquire those advantages, and the employee had the option to retaining any unused per diem funds, thereby increasing his income. Plane Techs v. Keno, 103 Ark. App. 121, 286 S.W.3d 774 (2008).

“Full wages” under § 11-9-807(b) refers to the money rate paid to recompense services rendered, and vacation pay is that sum received as an employee benefit when no services are rendered. Therefore, in a workers' compensation case, a benefits claimant was entitled to receive temporary-total disability benefits because he did not receive his full wages during his period of disability where he received vacation pay; vacation pay was the sum received as an employee benefit when no services were rendered. St. Edward Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Howard, 2012 Ark. App. 673, 424 S.W.3d 881 (2012).

Widows and Widowers.

Where there was evidence that woman was not living with decedent nor dependent on him for support at the time of his death she did not meet the statutory requirements necessary to entitle her to receive a widow's benefits. Stephens & Stephens v. Logan, 260 Ark. 78, 538 S.W.2d 516 (1976).

Claimant, who was not living with the deceased nor dependent upon him at the time of his death, was entitled to no benefits under this chapter as a widow. Spratlin v. Evans, 260 Ark. 49, 538 S.W.2d 527 (1976).

The addition of the word actually, in § 11-9-527(c), was intended to change what amounted to a conclusive presumption of dependency under prior cases; it follows that when the widow was not living with the employee at the time of his death, there must be some showing of actual dependency. Roach Mfg. Co. v. Cole, 265 Ark. 908, 582 S.W.2d 268 (1979).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission was required to reconsider whether or not an executrix, who married an employee after his injury but before his death, was entitled to widow's benefits because it misapplied § 11-9-527 in that it failed to reconcile the definition of widow under subdivision (20)(A) of this section with the requirements of § 11-9-527(c) and (h). The executrix was required to show that she was a widow and that she was dependent upon the employee at the time of the injury; marriage at the time of the injury was not required. Estate of Slaughter v. City of Hampton Mun. League WC Trust, 102 Ark. App. 373, 285 S.W.3d 669 (2008), review denied, Estate of Slaughter v. City of Hampton, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. LEXIS 786 (Dec. 19, 2008).

Cited: Wilson v. Border Queen Kitchen Cabinet Co., 221 Ark. 580, 254 S.W.2d 682 (Ark. 1953); Layne-Arkansas Co. v. Henderson, 221 Ark. 691, 255 S.W.2d 423 (1953); Clark v. Ottenheimer Bros., 229 Ark. 383, 314 S.W.2d 497 (1958); Bottoms Baptist Orphanage v. Johnson, 240 Ark. 175, 398 S.W.2d 544 (1966); McNeely v. Clem Mill & Gin Co., 241 Ark. 498, 409 S.W.2d 502 (1966); Neal v. Oliver, 246 Ark. 377, 438 S.W.2d 313 (1969); Ray v. Shelnutt Nursing Home, 246 Ark. 575, 439 S.W.2d 41 (1969); Irby v. Davis, 311 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Empire Life & Hosp. Ins. Co. v. Armorel Planting Co., 247 Ark. 994, 449 S.W.2d 200 (1970); International Paper Co. v. McGoogan, 255 Ark. 1025, 504 S.W.2d 739 (1974); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Rowe, 256 Ark. 221, 506 S.W.2d 569 (1974); Mohawk Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brider, 257 Ark. 587, 518 S.W.2d 499 (1975); Aluminum Co. of America v. McClendon, 259 Ark. 675, 535 S.W.2d 832 (1976); Mohawk Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 265 Ark. 16, 576 S.W.2d 216 (1979); Shippers Transp. v. Stepp, 265 Ark. 365, 578 S.W.2d 232 (1979); Lybrand v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 266 Ark. 946, 588 S.W.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1979); Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Birdsong, 267 Ark. 922, 593 S.W.2d 54 (1979); Alred v. Jackson Atl., Inc., 268 Ark. 695, 595 S.W.2d 249 (1980); Hart's Exxon Serv. Station v. Prater, 268 Ark. 961, 597 S.W.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1980); Hunter Mem. United Methodist Church v. Millirons, 268 Ark. 975, 597 S.W.2d 845 (Ct. App. 1980); Halstead Indus. v. Jones, 270 Ark. 85, 603 S.W.2d 456 (Ct. App. 1980); Pyles v. Triple F. Feeds of Texas, Inc., 270 Ark. 729, 606 S.W.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1980); Arkansas State Highway & Transp. Dep't v. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 S.W.2d 392 (Ark. 1981); Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 6 Ark. App. 333, 641 S.W.2d 723 (1982); Bearden Lumber Co. v. Bond, 7 Ark. App. 65, 644 S.W.2d 321 (1983); Cornish Welding Shop v. Galbraith, 278 Ark. 185, 644 S.W.2d 926 (1983); Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Grooms, 10 Ark. App. 92, 661 S.W.2d 433 (1983); Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v. Leisure, 12 Ark. App. 274, 675 S.W.2d 841 (1984); Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1985); State Second Injury Fund v. Girtman, 16 Ark. App. 155, 698 S.W.2d 514 (1985); State Treasurer, Second Injury Fund v. Coleman, 16 Ark. App. 188, 699 S.W.2d 401 (1985); Masonite Corp. v. Mitchell, 16 Ark. App. 209, 699 S.W.2d 409 (1985); Marianna School Dist. v. Vanderburg, 16 Ark. App. 271, 700 S.W.2d 381 (1985); Mid-State Constr. Co. v. Second Injury Fund, 295 Ark. 1, 746 S.W.2d 539 (1988); INA/Cigna Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 27 Ark. App. 222, 772 S.W.2d 353 (1989); County Mkt. v. Thornton, 27 Ark. App. 235, 770 S.W.2d 156 (1989); Eureka Log Homes v. Mantonya, 28 Ark. App. 180, 772 S.W.2d 365 (1989); Wade v. Mr. C. Cavenaugh's, 298 Ark. 363, 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989); Baldwin v. Club Prods. Co., 302 Ark. 404, 790 S.W.2d 166 (1990); Weaver v. Tyson Foods, 31 Ark. App. 147, 790 S.W.2d 442 (1990); Holiday Inn-West v. Coleman, 31 Ark. App. 224, 792 S.W.2d 345 (1990); King v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 763 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Ark. 1991); Cook v. ALCOA, 35 Ark. App. 16, 811 S.W.2d 329 (1991); Lively v. Libbey Mem. Physical Medical Ctr., 317 Ark. 5, 875 S.W.2d 507 (1994); Maxwell v. Carl Bierbaum, Inc., 48 Ark. App. 159, 893 S.W.2d 346 (1995); Couch v. First State Bank, 49 Ark. App. 102, 898 S.W.2d 57 (1995); Crossett Sch. Dist. v. Gourley, 50 Ark. App. 1, 899 S.W.2d 482 (1995); Craig v. Traylor, 323 Ark. 363, 915 S.W.2d 257 (1996); Cook v. Recovery Corp., 322 Ark. 707, 911 S.W.2d 581 (1995); Dugan v. Jerry Sweetster, Inc., 54 Ark. App. 401, 928 S.W.2d 341 (1996); Jefferson v. Munsey Prods., Inc., 55 Ark. App. 105, 930 S.W.2d 396 (1996); City of Blytheville v. McCormick, 56 Ark. App. 149, 939 S.W.2d 855 (1997); Service Chevrolet v. Atwood, 61 Ark. App. 190, 966 S.W.2d 909 (1998); GE Railcar Repair Servs. Workers' Comp. v. Hardin, 62 Ark. App. 120, 969 S.W.2d 667 (1998); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Carter, 62 Ark. App. 162, 969 S.W.2d 677 (1998); Williford v. City of Little Rock, 62 Ark. App. 198, 969 S.W.2d 687 (1998); Swift-Eckrich, Inc. v. Brock, 63 Ark. App. 118, 975 S.W.2d 857 (1998); Williams v. Prostaff Temporaries, 64 Ark. App. 128, 979 S.W.2d 911 (1998); Needham v. Harvest Foods, 64 Ark. App. 141, 987 S.W.2d 278 (1998); Srebalus v. Rose Care, Inc., 69 Ark. App. 142, 10 S.W.3d 112 (2000); Mayweather v. Mangum Constructing, Inc., 71 Ark. App. 322, 29 S.W.3d 783 (2000); Tucker v. Roberts-McNutt, Inc., 342 Ark. 511, 29 S.W.3d 706 (2000); Polk County v. Jones, 74 Ark. App. 159, 47 S.W.3d 904 (2001); Hislip v. Helena/West Helena Schs., 74 Ark. App. 395, 48 S.W.3d 566 (2001); Cromwell v. Univ. of Ark., 76 Ark. App. 5, 61 S.W.3d 864 (2001); Bell v. Tri-Lakes Servs., 76 Ark. App. 42, 61 S.W.3d 867 (2001); Cross v. Magnolia Hosp. Reciprocal Group of Am., 82 Ark. App. 406, 109 S.W.3d 145 (2003); Automated Conveyor Sys. v. Dooley, 360 Ark. 218, 200 S.W.3d 442 (2004); Dixon v. Salvation Army, 360 Ark. 309, 201 S.W.3d 386 (2005); Garcia v. A&M Roofing, 89 Ark. App. 251, 202 S.W.3d 532 (2005); Cloverleaf Express v. Fouts, 91 Ark. App. 4, 207 S.W.3d 576 (2005); Rutherford v. Mid-Delta Cmty. Servs., 102 Ark. App. 317, 285 S.W.3d 248 (2008); Finley v. Farm Cat, Inc., 103 Ark. App. 292, 288 S.W.3d 685 (2008); Dick v. Conley Transp., 2009 Ark. App. 789, 358 S.W.3d 904 (2009); Vite v. Vite, 2010 Ark. App. 565, 377 S.W.3d 453 (2010); Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Gerard, 2018 Ark. 97, 541 S.W.3d 422 (2018).