Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-526 (2026)

Case Notes

Construction.

The term “compensation” as used in this section refers to money benefits paid to the injured employee for disability. Brooks v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 247 Ark. 61, 444 S.W.2d 246 (1969).

Courts strictly construe the statute. Tyson Poultry, Inc. v. Narvaiz, 2012 Ark. 118, 388 S.W.3d 16 (2012), superseded, 2012 Ark. 118, 388 S.W.3d 16 (2012).

Applicability.

This section did not apply to a claimant who accepted employment and was later terminated not by his choice, but at the option of his employer. Superior Indus. v. Thomaston, 72 Ark. App. 7, 32 S.W.3d 52 (2000).

Provisions of § 11-9-522(b) and this section did not bar an employee's wage loss claim because, although there was testimony that the employee would have been “recommended” for employment, a possible recommendation for employment was not the same as an offer of employment and the statutory bar required an actual offer of employment. Hope Sch. Dist. v. Wilson, 2011 Ark. App. 219, 382 S.W.3d 782 (2011).

Substantial evidence failed to support the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that a truck driver employee failed to prove entitlement to temporary total disability benefits from December 21, 2017, to a date yet to be determined; although the employee had previously declined light-duty work within the restrictions for the knee strain, his family physician later totally restricted him from working due to the deep-vein-thrombosis injury. This section had no application because the employee was totally restricted from working and thus there was no work the employer could have offered that would have accommodated the employee's off-work status. Grant v. Westar Refrigerated Transp., 2020 Ark. App. 106 (2020).

No employment suitable to an employee's capacity is possible when an employee has been taken off work entirely. Grant v. Westar Refrigerated Transp., 2020 Ark. App. 106 (2020).

Acceptance of Work.

Substantial evidence supported the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that a claimant was terminated for his inability to perform his job as a result of his injury and not for misconduct. Accepting light duty work and returning to work for one full day before returning to light duty work did not bar his claim for TTD benefits, especially since, if he had refused, his claim would have been barred under this section. American Railcar Indus. v. Gramling, 2010 Ark. App. 625 (2010).

Pursuant to this section, an employee with a knee injury who refused light duty work offered to him by his employer following surgery on the knee was not entitled to temporary total disability (TTD) benefits because, under § 11-9-521(a), the failure to return to work must have been causally related to the injury. Gomez v. Crossland Constr. Co., 2011 Ark. App. 787 (2011).

Attendance.

Appellate review was not possible because it was unclear whether the Workers' Compensation Commission determined that a benefits claimant remained in his healing period or started a new healing period, whether he suffered a total incapacity to earn a meaningful wage, whether he returned to work within the meaning of § 11-9-521, whether his absenteeism was related to a compensable knee injury, and whether violations of the attendance policy did or did not affect temporary total disability eligibility under this section. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Turcios, 2015 Ark. App. 647, 476 S.W.3d 177 (2015).

Commission's Authority.

The commission is not authorized to dismiss a claim for the reason that its order to work has been violated although it may suspend payments during the period of refusal. Paragould Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co. v. Rogers, 210 Ark. 764, 197 S.W.2d 567 (1946) (decision under prior law).

Evidence.

Evidence supported determination that claimant had voluntarily chosen not to return to the job market and was not disabled. King v. Farmers Liquid Fertilizer, 267 Ark. 798, 590 S.W.2d 327 (Ct. App. 1979).

Evidence sufficient to support finding that claimant suffered a disability resulting from a condition existing prior to and at the time of his second injury. Second Injury Fund v. Robison, 22 Ark. App. 157, 737 S.W.2d 162 (1987).

There was substantial evidence from which the commission could determine that the claimant's refusal of the job was justifiable because the job was unsuitable. ITT/Higbie Mfg. v. Gilliam, 34 Ark. App. 154, 807 S.W.2d 44 (1991).

In a workers' compensation case, a claimant's refusal to work at the light-duty jobs offered to her barred her from receiving temporary-total disability benefits that she sought, pursuant to this section. It was shown that the claimant refused to take jobs in a medical clinic, refused to work in a laundry room, and she failed to show that her prescribed medications posed a danger to the patients at the medical clinic. Neal v. Sparks Reg'l Med. Ctr., 104 Ark. App. 97, 289 S.W.3d 163 (2008).

Section 11-9-520 contemplates a situation in which an employee returns to work but, because of a temporary-partial disability, is not earning the same wages as before the injury; where this section bars a claimant from receiving temporary-total-disability benefits for a designated period of time because of a refusal to accept suitable employment that is within the claimant's capacity to perform, the same rationale applies to bar the claimant from receiving temporary-partial disability. Therefore, in a case where a claimant refused to accept work within her capability at a medical clinic or in a laundry room after she suffered a compensable shoulder and neck injury, she was unable to receive temporary-partial disability. Neal v. Sparks Reg'l Med. Ctr., 104 Ark. App. 97, 289 S.W.3d 163 (2008).

There was substantial evidence to deny an employee's claim for temporary-total disability benefits on the basis that he refused suitable employment because an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that the testimony of the employer's executive director that she offered the employee a job within his restrictions, and he refused the job, that such refusal was unjustified, and that such refusal barred his claim for temporary-total disability benefits; the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ's findings, and the court of appeals was bound by the Commission's credibility decisions. Johnson v. Abilities Unlimited, Inc., 2009 Ark. App. 866, 372 S.W.3d 838 (2009).

Decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission to award an employee benefits for medical treatment and temporary total disability was supported by substantial evidence because the Commission found that the job of soil-coding, which was light duty work at the employee's same wages, was not actually available since there was not enough soil-coding work to be done; the Commission based its finding on the testimony of the employee's supervisor. Mack-Reynolds Appraisal Co. v. Morton, 2010 Ark. App. 142, 375 S.W.3d 6 (2010).

Finding against the employee in his workers' compensation action was appropriate under § 11-9-102(12) and this section because there was substantial evidence to support the finding that the employee failed to avail himself of the opportunity to work and that he was not entitled to temporary disability after May 8, 2008. A release to work stated that the employee be provided jobs within his sedentary restrictions and both the employee and his manager testified that he left that work with various complaints of inability to perform. Watts v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 2011 Ark. App. 529, 386 S.W.3d 19 (2011).

Workers’ Compensation Commission demonstrated a substantial basis for denying an employee’s claim for wage-loss disability because reasonable minds could conclude the employee failed to prove she was entitled to any wage loss disability in excess of the fifteen-percent whole body impairment awarded; the employee’s work experience was rather sedentary, and the functional-capacity evaluation concluded that despite her significant limitations, she was capable of performing sedentary tasks. Templeton v. Dollar General Store, 2014 Ark. App. 248, 434 S.W.3d 417 (2014).

Under this section, former employee was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits for a period of time because the evidence showed that she refused suitable employment that the employer made available within her physical restrictions; although the employee claimed the work offered was not within the doctor's restrictions, the work was not repetitive for the body part that was injured and for which the restrictions were designed — the employee's right shoulder. Davenport v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2018 Ark. App. 494, 558 S.W.3d 436 (2018).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied the employee, a school custodian, temporary total disability benefits because its finding that the employee chose to resign was supported by substantial evidence; although the employee testified that she resigned so she would not get a bad evaluation, the issue turned on credibility and the employee did not provide the reason for resigning on the resignation form. Lybyer v. Springdale Sch. Dist., 2019 Ark. App. 77, 568 S.W.3d 805 (2019).

Refusal Not Shown.

Although former employer suggested that employee might be rehired if she reapplied for a light-duty job, this does not constitute an offer of employment as contemplated by this section; because the employee was never offered a job, there was no substantial evidence to support the commission's findings that the employee unjustifiably refused employment suitable to her capacity. Barnette v. Allen Canning Co., 49 Ark. App. 61, 896 S.W.2d 444 (1995).

Workers' compensation claimant was not statutorily barred from receiving temporary total or partial disability, under § 11-9-521, because he undisputedly remained in his healing period and continued to work light duty and because there was no substantial evidence of unjustifiable refusal to work, such that this section would have been triggered. Walker v. Cooper Auto., 289 S.W.3d 184 (2008).

Employee stated that he attempted to do the work, but was sent home, and if the employee's testimony was accepted, he never refused suitable work, and if a coworker's testimony was accepted, then at best any refusal to do the work was justifiable given the employee's inability to do the work. United Farms, Inc. v. Gist, 2009 Ark. App. 717, 374 S.W.3d 23 (2009), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. App. LEXIS 998 (Dec. 9, 2009), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 94 (Feb. 12, 2010).

In holding that an employee was entitled to additional TTD benefits, wage loss benefits, and attorney fees, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission correctly interpreted the statute; the employee's misconduct, which resulted in termination, did not amount to a refusal of suitable employment. Tyson Poultry, Inc. v. Narvaiz, 2012 Ark. 118, 388 S.W.3d 16 (2012), superseded, 2012 Ark. 118, 388 S.W.3d 16 (2012).

Refusal of Employment.

Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied the employee, a school custodian, temporary total disability benefits because the employee chose to resign when the employers were providing her work within her restrictions; although the employee claimed she resigned rather than be terminated and get a bad evaluation, a voluntary resignation is a refusal of employment. Lybyer v. Springdale Sch. Dist., 2019 Ark. App. 77, 568 S.W.3d 805 (2019).

Cited: Lion Oil Co. v. Reeves, 221 Ark. 5, 254 S.W.2d 450 (1952); McGehee Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 234 Ark. 113, 350 S.W.2d 608 (1961); Abbott v. C. H. Leavell & Co., 244 Ark. 544, 426 S.W.2d 166 (1968); Bibler Bros. Lumber Co. v. Allen, 251 Ark. 593, 474 S.W.2d 116 (1971); Oak Lawn Farms v. Payne, 251 Ark. 674, 474 S.W.2d 408 (1971); Coleman's Bar-B-Que v. Fuller, 262 Ark. 645, 559 S.W.2d 714 (1978); Randall, Burkart/Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Daniels, 266 Ark. 1060, 599 S.W.2d 392 (1979); Model Laundry & Dry Cleaning v. Simmons, 268 Ark. 770, 596 S.W.2d 337 (Ct. App. 1980); Hammer v. Intermed N.W., 270 Ark. 262, 603 S.W.2d 913 (1980); Weeks v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 270 Ark. 151, 604 S.W.2d 566 (1980); Midwest Steel Co. v. Mulanax, 270 Ark. 914, 606 S.W.2d 606 (1980); Mountain Valley Superette, Inc. v. Bottorff, 4 Ark. App. 251, 629 S.W.2d 320 (1982); Vann v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ark. 1983); Crain Burton Ford Co. v. Rogers, 12 Ark. App. 246, 674 S.W.2d 944 (1984); C.J. Horner Co. v. Stringfellow, 14 Ark. App. 138, 685 S.W.2d 533 (1985); Gerber Prods. v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985); Franklin Collier Farms v. Chapple, 18 Ark. App. 200, 712 S.W.2d 334 (1986); General Indus. v. Gibson, 22 Ark. App. 217, 738 S.W.2d 104 (1987).