Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-202 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes and Rules Governing Requests for Postconviction DNA Testing. 72 A.L.R.6th 227.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Defendant's petition did not comport with the prevailing rules of procedure and his appeal was dismissed as he merely concluded that he was innocent and wished to have testing performed to prove that fact; defendant failed to state the basis for proving his innocence with scientific testing, identify the evidence to be tested and specify the scientific tests to be conducted on the evidence, and he made no showing that good cause prevented him from filing his petition within 36 months from the date of his conviction.Douthitt v. State, 366 Ark. 579, 237 S.W.3d 76 (2006).

Pursuant to subdivision (10) of this section, defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for testing was not timely; defendant's requests for testing did not point to any new technology that was more probative than what was available at trial and each of the items that he sought to have tested was available at the time of his trial. Scott v. State, 372 Ark. 587, 279 S.W.3d 66 (2008).

Guilty Plea.

There was no basis to find that the trial court erred when it denied the prisoner's petition for scientific testing of a hair recovered at the crime scene where (1) in entering the plea of guilty, the prisoner admitted that he committed the offense, (2) thus, the prisoner's identity was not in question, and (3) there was a remedy in place for challenging a plea of guilty on the grounds advanced by the prisoner. Graham v. State, 358 Ark. 296, 188 S.W.3d 893 (2004).

Identity Not at Issue.

Where appellant gave the police a statement in which he admitted shooting the murder victim, the trial court did not err by denying his petition to vacate or set aside the judgment pursuant to § 16-112-201 et seq. Appellant could not prove that the identity of the perpetrator was at issue during the investigation or prosecution of the offense, as required by subdivision (7) of this section. Leaks v. State, 371 Ark. 581, 268 S.W.3d 866 (2007).

Appellant's motion for retesting of DNA on a sock he used to clean himself with after raping a 15-year-old girl was properly denied because appellant failed to satisfy the predicate requirement for such retesting: that his identity have been at issue, as required by subdivision (7) of this section. The victim and other evidence clearly identified appellant as the only possible rapist. Strong v. State, 2010 Ark. 181, 372 S.W.3d 758 (2010).

Petition Denied.

Defendant's motion for scientific testing was properly denied because the motion was filed almost 16 years after the judgment was entered, but defendant failed to establish in the motion a rebuttal of the presumption arising from one of the five grounds listed in subdivision (10) of this section; the record did not support defendant's claim that he alleged his incompetence in the motion for testing or the proposed amendments and neither the motions nor the proposed amendments referenced the presumption against timeliness, any cause for delay, or incompetence of any kind. Defendant did not identify newly discovered evidence to be tested and failed to clearly identify the evidence that he did wish to be tested and, despite defendant's assertion, he did not include in the motion a showing that a new method of technology was available that was substantially more probative than prior testing. Aaron v. State, 2010 Ark. 249 (2010).

Petitioner was not entitled to mandamus relief (seeking a ruling on the motion for extension of time to lodge the record on appeal), because the petitioner filed his petition to vacate and or to set aside the judgment in the circuit court nearly five years after the date of his conviction. Subdivision (10)(B) of this section mandated that there shall be a rebuttable presumption against timeliness for any motion not made within thirty-six months of the date of conviction and since the DNA testing was available at the time of his trial, the petitioner's attempt to rebut the presumption against timeliness failed, and nothing in the record suggested that the prosecuting attorney was properly served and the petition for writ of mandamus did not allege that the prosecuting attorney was served. Mitchael v. State, 2012 Ark. 256 (2012).

Because appellant, convicted of capital murder as an accomplice, failed to state a basis on which the trial court could have ordered scientific testing, he could not prevail on appeal; appellant failed to satisfy the statutory requirements because the results of proposed testing to determine whether there were other individuals at the crime scene would not support the theory of defense he relied on in a way to establish his innocence or raise a reasonable probability that he did not commit the offense. Evidence connecting another person to the crime scene would not exonerate defendant. Bienemy v. State, 2016 Ark. 427, 504 S.W.3d 588 (2016).

Postconviction DNA Testing.

Postconviction DNA testing was properly denied as to some evidence for an African American inmate who was convicted of capital murder where: (1) caucasian hairs had not been tested at trial even though testing was available and, because it was stipulated that the inmate was not the donor, they were not materially relevant; and (2) a cigarette butt had already been retested with the result of decreasing the probability that the saliva was from a different donor; however, postconviction DNA testing of other evidence was improperly denied and the case was remanded to the trial court to have such tests conducted. Johnson v. State, 356 Ark. 534, 157 S.W.3d 151, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 932, 125 S. Ct. 326, 160 L. Ed. 2d 235 (2004).

In appellant's rape case, a court properly denied DNA testing of other hairs found at the scene because genetic material from two individuals was discovered, with the major component attributable to appellant, and another person's hair at the scene would in no way preclude appellant's having committed the offenses. Pankau v. State, 2013 Ark. 162 (2013).

Testimony from appellant’s girlfriend that the drugs and gun were hers did not serve to exonerate appellant, as her ownership would not preclude appellant’s possession of them and did not place identity in question such that DNA testing should have been ordered. Edwards v. State, 2014 Ark. 185 (2014).

Defendant's motion for postconviction forensic DNA testing was improperly denied without an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant satisfied the chain-of-custody requirements. Defendant alleged in his petition that the knife was in the possession of the State, that the knife had been subject to a chain of custody, and that the knife had been retained under sufficient conditions for testing; and the State did not present any evidence that a break in the chain of custody had occurred, or that the knife had not been retained under conditions sufficient to ensure that it had not been contaminated, tampered with, or altered in any respect material to the proposed testing. Carter v. State, 2015 Ark. 57 (2015).

Circuit court erred in ruling that defendant was not entitled to seek postconviction forensic DNA testing based on his motion amounting to a successive petition for similar relief because defendant's previous petitions did not request the use of the DNA technologies requested in the current petition, specifically STR and Y-STR testing. Carter v. State, 2015 Ark. 57 (2015).

Appellant could not prevail on his habeas petition where he had not demonstrated that an electron microscope was unavailable at the time of his original trial, that the proposed testing would have been more probative than testing available, or that any evidence was available for testing other than the victim's own hair and blood. Hall v. State, 2017 Ark. 77, 511 S.W.3d 842 (2017).

Circuit court did not clearly err in denying a postconviction petition for DNA testing of a hair ascribed to an accomplice where even if the hair had not come from the accomplice, it only showed that someone had been in the abandoned house before the murder or during the several-month interlude between the crime and the discovery of the victim's body, and the State had presented sufficient evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony to implicate petitioner in the murder. Martin v. State, 2018 Ark. 176, 545 S.W.3d 763 (2018).

Petitioner's request for DNA testing of the victim's clothing and the materials used to bind the victim's body was properly denied as untimely where all of the evidence was available at the time of trial, petitioner's desire to test additional evidence based on a different theory of the crime was at best a bare assertion of innocence, and the methods of testing he sought were available at the time of trial. Martin v. State, 2018 Ark. 176, 545 S.W.3d 763 (2018).

Trial court did not clearly err in holding that death row defendant, convicted of a 1993 murder, failed to meet the predicate requirements for DNA testing of 26 pieces of evidence because the proposed testing could not have raised a reasonable probability that defendant did not commit the offense given the significant evidence tying him to the murder; the presence of another male's DNA from testing of items such as the Caucasian hairs could not significantly advance defendant's claim of innocence. Johnson v. State, 2019 Ark. 391, 591 S.W.3d 265 (2019).

Prima Facie Case.

Writ of habeas corpus could issue based upon new scientific evidence proving a person was actually innocent of the offense for which he was convicted; however, defendant's identity was not an issue at trial, such that he failed to state a prima facie case of actual innocence or to produce any evidence to bring his petition within the purview of § 16-112-201 et seq.Orndorff v. State, 355 Ark. 261, 132 S.W.3d 722 (2003).

Scientific Testing.

Prisoner's petition to vacate and set aside the judgment against him was properly denied as the petition failed to identify a generally accepted scientific testing method that would have produced new and non-cumulative evidence materially relevant to prisoner's assertion of actual innocence; the prisoner failed to reveal in his pleadings a generally accepted scientific method that could have proved that the victims were virgins after July 12, 1997, based on blood, tissue, or other samples taken nearly a decade later and, by the prisoner's own admission, the requested scientific testing would have merely duplicated medical records in existence at the time of his conviction. Davis v. State, 366 Ark. 401, 235 S.W.3d 902 (2006).

State inmate's federal habeas claim that the state courts violated his federal constitutional rights to due process and to present a complete defense by denying his postconviction petition to require additional fingerprint testing of the gun found near victim's body pursuant to the new state habeas cause of action under this section was procedurally barred because the inmate raised no issue of federal constitutional law and cited no federal authority in the state courts, and even if it had been raised, the inmate cited no Supreme Court decision clearly establishing that the right to present a complete defense applies to postconviction proceedings, or that due process includes the right to postconviction testing using new technological advances; the district court also did not abuse its discretion by not ordering the fingerprint testing he requested under R. Governing § 2254 Cases U.S. Dist. Cts. 6(a) because the federal claim was procedurally barred, and the state courts' decision that the inmate failed to show “more than a slight chance” that additional testing would yield a favorable result was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Rucker v. Norris, 563 F.3d 766 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 950, 130 S. Ct. 401, 175 L. Ed. 2d 275 (2009).

Petitioner seeking scientific testing of crime evidence from his 21-year-old rape conviction did not offer a factual basis for his claim that the evidence was available with an unbroken chain of custody as required by this section; therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that his petition was a successive petition and subject to summary denial under § 16-112-205(d). Carter v. State, 2010 Ark. 29 (2010).

Whether or not the court correctly determined identity was not at issue as required to grant a motion for testing under this section, and appellant, an inmate, was not entitled to relief. More fundamentally, he failed to show a basis to commence a proceeding for the writ under either basis set out in § 16-112-201(a). Guy v. State, 2011 Ark. 305 (2011).

Time Limitations.

Inmate's motion for scientific testing was properly denied by the trial court because the motion was not made within 36 months of defendant's original conviction and the inmate had not provided any evidence to rebut the presumption that the petition was not timely; there was no showing that incompetence contributed to the delay, that the evidence to be tested was newly discovered, or that a new method of technology was available. Brown v. State, 367 Ark. 315, 239 S.W.3d 481 (2006).

Under subdivision (10)(B) of this section, there was a rebuttable presumption of untimeliness for a petition for DNA testing filed more than 36 months after a conviction. The circuit court correctly determined that the petition was untimely because the petition failed to establish any of the enumerated grounds for rebutting the presumption. Cooper v. State, 2012 Ark. 123 (2012).

Trial court did not err in dismissing defendant's petition for postconviction relief because defendant's petition failed to establish the required rebuttal of the presumption of untimeliness, pursuant to subdivision (10)(B) of this section, and, therefore, failed to provide a basis for the court to assume jurisdiction under §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208. Hill v. State, 2012 Ark. 204 (2012).

Habeas corpus petitioner failed to rebut the presumption against timeliness pursuant to subdivision (10)(B) of this section; while petitioner alleged that petitioner was placed in administrative segregation, no other reference was made to the nearly five years that elapsed between petitioner's conviction and the filing of the petition. Garner v. State, 2012 Ark. 271 (2012).

Circuit court did not err by denying appellant's petition for DNA testing under Acts 2001, No. 1780 (codified as §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208), because it was filed 44 months after entry of the judgment convicting him of murder and he failed to rebut the presumption against timeliness under subdivision (10) of this section. Foster v. State, 2013 Ark. 61 (2013).

Habeas corpus relief was not warranted under §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208 because, even if appellant's deoxyribonucleic acid and fingerprints were not found on a mask, his actual innocence would not have been established in light of the evidence as a whole where a witness recognized appellant's clothing and voice; no evidentiary hearing was required because the petition, files, and records showed that appellant was entitled to no relief. Moreover, appellant was not entitled to relief on the grounds of errors made by the trial court and ineffectiveness of counsel because petitions under §§ 16-112-201 to 16-112-208 were limited to claims related to scientific testing of evidence, and appellant failed to rebut the presumption against timeliness where the testing suggested by appellant was either available at the time of his trial or not shown to be substantially more probative than technology available at the time. King v. State, 2013 Ark. 133 (2013).

Dismissal of a habeas petition as untimely was proper where appellant had not rebutted the presumption against timeliness by establishing his incompetence, the existence of newly discovered evidence, or that the denial of his petition would result in a manifest injustice. Hall v. State, 2017 Ark. 77, 511 S.W.3d 842 (2017).

—Presumption Rebutted.

For purposes of defendant's motion for postconviction forensic DNA testing, defendant rebutted the presumption against untimeliness by showing that a new method of technology that was substantially more probative than prior testing was available because no DNA testing methods were available at the time of his trial in 1987, and today's DNA testing methods were, by definition, substantially more probative. Carter v. State, 2015 Ark. 57 (2015).