Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-101 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Adverse Employment Action Taken Against Employee for Social Media Communications. 103 A.L.R.6th 19 (2015).

Case Notes

In General.

Mayor was entitled to summary judgment on police chief's claim under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq., because the mayor was entitled to qualified immunity; the mayor could not have reasonably known that his termination of the police chief's employment, which was done upon the discovery of missing or incomplete police reports 15 days after the police chief made a statement at a city council meeting, would violate the police chief's constitutional right to free speech under Ark. Const. art. 2, § 6. Smith v. Brt, 363 Ark. 126, 211 S.W.3d 485 (2005).

In a certified question, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the federal deliberate indifference standard as the proper standard to apply to claims under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Thus, a federal district court applied the correct standard to a pretrial detainee's state claims under the Act. Grayson v. Ross, 483 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 2007).

Motorist's complaint brought under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., alleging that county officers were without jurisdiction to set up a roadblock and that the motorist's subsequent stop, detention, and arrest violated Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 15, was properly dismissed because the motorist failed to state a claim where the complaint did not assert that the officers' actions were unreasonable. Wade v. Ferguson, 2009 Ark. 618 (2009).

College, which was a community college, was an agency of the state and, thus, enjoyed Eleventh Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. XI, sovereign immunity from the teacher's lawsuit against it alleging race discrimination and retaliation claims for not renewing the teaching contract of the teacher. As a result, the teacher's claims under Title V of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12201 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., had to be dismissed as claims against the state, but the teacher could still maintain an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.Reed v. College of the Ouachitas, No. 6:11-CV-6020, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56227 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 23, 2012).

City was not entitled to summary judgment on employee's claim under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-123-101 et seq., for failure to promote her on account of race, because the trial court failed to engage in the burden-shifting analysis required by McDonnell-Douglas. Additionally, the trial court erred in characterizing her failure to promote claim as a constructive discharge claim. Brodie v. City of Jonesboro, 2012 Ark. 5 (2012).

Accommodation.

Where an employee was demoted from manager to supervisor after the employee made an inappropriate remark about race, the employee's failure-to-accommodate claim failed because the employee's request that the employer allow the employee to stay in the employee's current position, even if considered an accommodation request, was untimely because it came after the employee's comment. Schaffhauser v. UPS, 794 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2015).

Burden Shifting.

Summary judgment was improperly granted in a case alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, §§ 16-123-101 to 16-123-108, because the trial court should have used the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis and explained its findings. Johnson v. Windstream Communs., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 590 (2012), dismissed without prejudice, 2016 Ark. App. 419 (2016).

Deliberate Indifference.

Judgment entered against a prison warden in a state prison inmate's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq., suit was reversed because the evidence did not support the district court's finding that the warden was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's safety, in violation of the inmate's rights under U.S. Const., Amend. VIII, and the Arkansas Constitution: (1) the warden had investigated the grievances that were filed against two corrections officers, arising from their alleged mistreatment of prisoners, he had found that they were typical of grievances that were generally filed against corrections officers, and he had taken disciplinary action against the offending officer with regard to the one grievance that he found was substantiated; (2) the officers' employment records did not give the warden cause to believe that they presented a substantial risk to the safety of prisoners; and (3) the district court's disagreement with the warden's disciplinary choices, specifically the warden's failure to require the offending officer to participate in a remedial program in addition to the one-week suspension, temporary job reassignment, and reprimand that he received, was not sufficient to support the deliberate indifference finding. Lenz v. Wade, 490 F.3d 991 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 998, 128 S. Ct. 504, 169 L. Ed. 2d 353 (2007).

Due Process.

Circuit court properly denied the city a directed verdict in a class action alleging that the assessment of installment fees in Little Rock District Court, Second Division violated due process in charging installment fees even if the fine was paid off early. The lack of notice, as established by the evidence at trial, precluded satisfaction of due process; there was no evidence showing that plaintiff mother was advised of a refund or reconsideration of the fee, but instead, she was simply told by the court cashier that she had to pay the entire sum. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34 (2020).

Immunity.

Statutory immunity under § 19-10-305 barred the employee's claims under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq., against the supervisor in her individual capacity where the employee's bare allegation of willful and wanton conduct was not enough to demonstrate malice. Ark. State Med. Bd. v. Byers, 2017 Ark. 213, 521 S.W.3d 459 (2017).

Sovereign immunity under Ark. Const., Art. 5, § 20, barred an employee's state civil rights claims against a state agency and a supervisor in her official capacity where the employee had not developed her arguments as to the ultra vires or bad faith exceptions below, and a judgment for the employee would have subjected the state to liability. Ark. State Med. Bd. v. Byers, 2017 Ark. 213, 521 S.W.3d 459 (2017).

No Due Process Violation.

Police chief did not show a due process violation when the chief was summarily terminated by the mayor because § 14-42-110 did not give the chief a right to a hearing before city council, so the termination did not violate the chief's rights under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, § 16-23-101 et seq.Sullivan v. Coney, 2013 Ark. 222, 427 S.W.3d 682 (2013).

Pretext.

Employee's racial discrimination claim against a school district under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 2000e and this section failed because there was insufficient evidence of pretext. There was no showing that the employee's qualifications for a new position were comparable to those of the successful applicant, and evidence that the school district did not follow its own hiring procedures was insufficient to establish pretext for discrimination. Dixon v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 578 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2009).

Terminated employee's race discrimination claims failed because the employer stated that it discharged the employee for failing to follow a supervisor's directive, and the employee did not show pretext since nineteen youth care workers were not valid comparators because they had different immediate supervisors from the employee and did not engage in the same conduct as the employee, and the employee's allegations of shifting explanations amounted to nothing more than a semantic dispute as to whether the employer's ultimatum to resign or be fired was a resignation or a termination. Bone v. G4S Youth Servs., LLC, 686 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1159, 133 S. Ct. 1252, 185 L. Ed. 2d 181 (2013).

Where a nursing home employee was terminated based on reports of improper sexual contact with a male resident, the employee's discrimination claims failed because (1) the employee's termination was not direct evidence of discrimination, and (2) the employee did not show pretext since the employee did not provide any evidence that any other employees who were not Pentecostal, female, or disabled were accused of the exact or similar behavior as the employee was. Evance v. Trumann Health Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 673 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 799, 187 L. Ed. 2d 596 (2013).

Where a white employee was demoted from manager to supervisor after the employee made an inappropriate remark about race, the employee's race discrimination claim failed because the union's statements or motives were not direct evidence, nothing in the facts showed that the employer was more likely motivated by race than by its proffered justification, the comparators were not similarly situated, and the employee did not show pretext. Schaffhauser v. UPS, 794 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2015).

Respondeat Superior.

Just like 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, §§ 16-123-101 through 16-123-108; therefore, summary judgment was properly granted to the Arkansas Crime Information Center, its director, and a state governor, in an action alleging misuse of expunged records where someone allegedly accessed them inappropriately and posted them on the Internet. Jones v. Huckabee, 369 Ark. 42, 250 S.W.3d 241 (2007).

Circuit court properly denied the city a directed verdict in a class action alleging that the assessment of installment fees in Little Rock District Court, Second Division violated due process because the installment fee policy constituted a governmental policy or custom to which municipal liability could attach; the district court judge consulted with deputy city attorneys and others in implementing the policy and the policy was automatically applied to all district court defendants on an installment plan. City of Little Rock v. Nelson, 2020 Ark. 34 (2020).

Retaliation.

Because plaintiff employee claimed that defendant city and supervisors retaliated against her because she filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint, her retaliation claims were based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, §§ 16-123-101 through 16-123-108, not on whatever statute might apply to the underlying conduct of which she complained. Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 711 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2013).

Employee's retaliation claim failed because defendant and supervisors consistently had explained they terminated the employee's employment for two legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons (her work performance was unacceptable and her behavior toward other employees created a hostile work environment); the evidence supporting the explanation was strong, and the employee had presented no evidence that these legitimate reasons were pretextual. Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 711 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2013).

Specific Cases.

Where a deceased's estate appealed a district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants as to its Fourth Amendment and Arkansas Civil Rights Act excessive force claim, not only were two officers entitled to qualified immunity, but one officer's use of a taser and second officer's subsequent use of deadly force were reasonable. Frederick v. Motsinger, 873 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 2017).

Cited: Ford v. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 335 Ark. 245, 979 S.W.2d 897 (1998); Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (E.D. Ark. 2000); Hudson v. Norris, 227 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2000); City of Farmington v. Smith, 366 Ark. 473, 237 S.W.3d 1 (2006).