42 U.S.C. § 1981

Equal rights under the law

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(a) Statement of equal rights

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined

For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

(c) Protection against impairment

The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

(R.S. § 1977; Pub. L. 102–166, title I, § 101, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071.)Editorial NotesCodification

R.S. § 1977 derived from act May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144.

Section was formerly classified to section 41 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality.

Amendments

1991—Pub. L. 102–166 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a) and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 1991 Amendment

Pub. L. 102–166, title IV, § 402, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1099, provided that:“(a)In General.—Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Act [see Short Title of 1991 Amendment note below] and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment [Nov. 21, 1991].“(b)Certain Disparate Impact Cases.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983.”

Short Title of 1991 Amendment

Pub. L. 102–166, § 1, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, provided that: “This Act [enacting section 1981a of this title and sections 60l and 1201 to 1224 of Title 2, The Congress, amending this section and sections 1988, 2000e, 2000e–1, 2000e–2, 2000e–4, 2000e–5, 2000e–16, 12111, 12112, and 12209 of this title, and section 626 of Title 29, Labor, and enacting provisions set out as notes under this section and sections 2000e and 2000e–4 of this title, and section 1a–5 of Title 16, Conservation] may be cited as the ‘Civil Rights Act of 1991’.”

Short Title of 1976 Amendment

Pub. L. 94–559, which amended section 1988 of this title, is known as “The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976”, see note set out under section 1988 of this title.

Severability

Pub. L. 102–166, title IV, § 401, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1099, provided that: “If any provision of this Act [see Short Title of 1991 Amendment note above], or an amendment made by this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances is held to be invalid, the remainder of this Act and the amendments made by this Act, and the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances, shall not be affected.”

Congressional Findings

Pub. L. 102–166, § 2, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, provided that: “The Congress finds that—“(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace;“(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections; and“(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful discrimination in employment.”

Purposes of 1991 Amendment

Pub. L. 102–166, § 3, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, provided that: “The purposes of this Act [see Short Title of 1991 Amendment note above] are—“(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace;“(2) to codify the concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989);“(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.); and“(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.”

Legislative History for 1991 Amendment

Pub. L. 102–166, title I, § 105(b), Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1075, provided that: “No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) [Cong. Rec., vol. 137, pt. 19, p. 28680, Oct. 25, 1991] shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act [see Short Title of 1991 Amendment note above] that relates to Wards Cove—Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.”

Construction of 1991 Amendment

Pub. L. 102–166, title I, § 116, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1079, provided that: “Nothing in the amendments made by this title [enacting section 1981a of this title and amending this section, sections 1988, 2000e, 2000e–1, 2000e–2, 2000e–4, 2000e–5, 2000e–16, 12111, and 12112 of this title, and section 626 of Title 29, Labor] shall be construed to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements, that are in accordance with the law.”

Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution

Pub. L. 102–166, title I, § 118, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1081, provided that: “Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title [enacting section 1981a of this title and amending this section, sections 1988, 2000e, 2000e–1, 2000e–2, 2000e–4, 2000e–5, 2000e–16, 12111, and 12112 of this title, and section 626 of Title 29, Labor].”

Executive DocumentsExecutive Order No. 13050

Ex. Ord. No. 13050, June 13, 1997, 62 F.R. 32987, which established the President’s Advisory Board on Race, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 13138, § 3(e), Sept. 30, 1999, 64 F.R. 53880, formerly set out as a note under section 14 of the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24,605 cases (6,274 in the last 5 years), 1954–2026 · leading case: Runyon v. McCrary
Runyon v. McCrary (1976) scotus · cites it 51× “The principal issue presented by these consolidated cases is whether a federal law, namely 42 U. S. C. § 1981 , prohibits private schools from excluding qualified children solely because they are Negroes.”
Glenn R. Mahone and Harvey L. Mahone v. David S. Waddle, Albert B. Ellway, Jr. And the City of Pittsburgh (1977) ca3 · cites it 43× “Plaintiffs brought their action in the district court against the individual defendants and against the City on the grounds that plaintiffs’ rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 , 1983, and 1985 and the United States Constitution were violated.”
Jett v. Dallas Independent School District (1989) scotus · cites it 22× “The questions before us in these cases are whether 42 U. S. C. § 1981 provides an independent federal cause of action for damages against local governmental entities, and whether that cause of action is broader than the damages remedy available under 42 U.”
General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania (1982) scotus · cites it 20× “Respondents, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the representatives of a class of racial minorities who are skilled or seek work as operating engineers in the construction industry in Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware, commenced this action under a variety of federal statutes…”
Michael Woods v. City of Greensboro (2017) ca4 · cites it 9× “3 discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . The City argued, in support of its motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that its willingness to grant BNT a loan fully secured by a second-position lien on the personal…”
Reya Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corporation (2015) ca4 · cites it 13× “This action against the Fontainebleau Corporation and Berger ensued, with Liberto asserting claims of hostile work environment and retaliation, under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . The district court awarded summary judgment to the…”
Brown v. State of New York (1996) ny · cites it 24× “the law, are not cognizable claims in any court in the State absent some link to a common-law "traditional" tort; (c) that actions for negligent training and supervision are not cognizable claims in the Court of Claims where the underlying harm — in this case, constitutional…”
Susan Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc. (2020) ca11 · cites it 11× “Count III, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for unlawful racial discrimination, mentioned retaliation in passing but only in a concluding paragraph alleging that Worldpay was liable for damages.”
Jin Ku Kim, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Nash Finch Company, Appellee/cross-Appellant (1997) ca8 · cites it 20× “On cross-appeal, Nash Finch argues the district court erred in holding (1) Kim’s claim that he was unlawfully denied a promotion from leadman to foreman in November 1990 was actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 , (2) there was sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination, (3)…”
County of Los Angeles v. Davis (1979) scotus · cites it 12× “We granted certiorari to consider questions presented as to whether the use of arbitrary employment criteria, racially exclusionary in operation, but not purposefully discriminatory, violates 42 U. S. C. § 1981 and, if so, whether the imposition of minimum hiring quotas for…”
Comcast Corp. v. National Assn. of African-American Owned Media (2020) scotus · cites it 5× “The plaintiffs before us suggest that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 departs from this traditional arrangement.”
Magloire Etoh v. Fannie Mae (2013) cadc · cites it 12× “A Ayissi-Etoh claims that he was denied a raise because of his race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . Section 1981 prohibits private employers from intentionally discriminating on the basis of race with respect to the “benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions” of employment.”
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981(2003) — 2 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) — 33 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1) — 1 case
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b) — 2 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)(3)(A) — 2 cases
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) — 10 cases
Sillah v. Burwell (2017) mdd
— 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.