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U.S. CodeTitle 42Chapter 21— Civil RightsSubchapter I— Generally

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2026)

Equal rights under the law

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1954–2026 24,605citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 24,605 opinions since 1954, 6,274 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (37 cases).

(a) Statement of equal rights

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined

For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

(c) Protection against impairment

The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

(R.S. § 1977; Pub. L. 102–166, title I, § 101, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071.)Editorial NotesCodification

R.S. § 1977 derived from act May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144.

Section was formerly classified to section 41 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality.

Amendments

1991—Pub. L. 102–166 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a) and added subsecs. (b) and (c).

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 1991 Amendment

Pub. L. 102–166, title IV, § 402, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1099, provided that:“(a)In General.—Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Act [see Short Title of 1991 Amendment note below] and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment [Nov. 21, 1991].“(b)Certain Disparate Impact Cases.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983.”

Short Title of 1991 Amendment

Pub. L. 102–166, § 1, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, provided that: “This Act [enacting section 1981a of this title and sections 60l and 1201 to 1224 of Title 2, The Congress, amending this section and sections 1988, 2000e, 2000e–1, 2000e–2, 2000e–4, 2000e–5, 2000e–16, 12111, 12112, and 12209 of this title, and section 626 of Title 29, Labor, and enacting provisions set out as notes under this section and sections 2000e and 2000e–4 of this title, and section 1a–5 of Title 16, Conservation] may be cited as the ‘Civil Rights Act of 1991’.”

Short Title of 1976 Amendment

Pub. L. 94–559, which amended section 1988 of this title, is known as “The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976”, see note set out under section 1988 of this title.

Severability

Pub. L. 102–166, title IV, § 401, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1099, provided that: “If any provision of this Act [see Short Title of 1991 Amendment note above], or an amendment made by this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances is held to be invalid, the remainder of this Act and the amendments made by this Act, and the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances, shall not be affected.”

Congressional Findings

Pub. L. 102–166, § 2, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, provided that: “The Congress finds that—“(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace;“(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections; and“(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful discrimination in employment.”

Purposes of 1991 Amendment

Pub. L. 102–166, § 3, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, provided that: “The purposes of this Act [see Short Title of 1991 Amendment note above] are—“(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace;“(2) to codify the concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989);“(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.); and“(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.”

Legislative History for 1991 Amendment

Pub. L. 102–166, title I, § 105(b), Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1075, provided that: “No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) [Cong. Rec., vol. 137, pt. 19, p. 28680, Oct. 25, 1991] shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act [see Short Title of 1991 Amendment note above] that relates to Wards Cove—Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.”

Construction of 1991 Amendment

Pub. L. 102–166, title I, § 116, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1079, provided that: “Nothing in the amendments made by this title [enacting section 1981a of this title and amending this section, sections 1988, 2000e, 2000e–1, 2000e–2, 2000e–4, 2000e–5, 2000e–16, 12111, and 12112 of this title, and section 626 of Title 29, Labor] shall be construed to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements, that are in accordance with the law.”

Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution

Pub. L. 102–166, title I, § 118, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1081, provided that: “Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title [enacting section 1981a of this title and amending this section, sections 1988, 2000e, 2000e–1, 2000e–2, 2000e–4, 2000e–5, 2000e–16, 12111, and 12112 of this title, and section 626 of Title 29, Labor].”

Executive DocumentsExecutive Order No. 13050

Ex. Ord. No. 13050, June 13, 1997, 62 F.R. 32987, which established the President’s Advisory Board on Race, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 13138, § 3(e), Sept. 30, 1999, 64 F.R. 53880, formerly set out as a note under section 14 of the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

The 20 cases that cite 42 U.S.C. § 1981 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENRunyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
cites § 1981 51×cited by 1,377 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“The principal issue presented by these consolidated cases is whether a federal law, namely 42 U. S. C. § 1981 , prohibits private schools from excluding qualified children solely because they are Negroes.”
Holding on this section
Private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools violate section 1981 when they deny admission to prospective students based on race.
Later courts cite it for
“prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts.” · 33 citing courts
2
GREENGlenn R. Mahone v. David S. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977).
cites § 1981 43×cited by 209 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“Plaintiffs brought their action in the district court against the individual defendants and against the City on the grounds that plaintiffs’ rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 , 1983, and 1985 and the United States Constitution were violated.”
Holding on this section
Municipal immunity under section 1983 does not extend to section 1981 because the two statutes derive from different constitutional sources and legislative histories.
Later courts cite it for
“sweeping legislation implementing the thirteenth amendment to abolish all the remaining badges and vestiges of the slavery system.” · 5 citing courts
3
YELLOWJett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
cites § 1981 22×cited by 2,059 cases
Abrogated by statute on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 1981
“The questions before us in these cases are whether 42 U. S. C. § 1981 provides an independent federal cause of action for damages against local governmental entities, and whether that cause of action is broader than the damages remedy available under 42 U.”
Holding on this section
Section 1983 constitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violations of the rights guaranteed in section 1981 by state governmental units.
Later courts cite it for
“provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by section 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor.” · 80 citing courts
cites § 1981 20×cited by 1,054 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“Respondents, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the representatives of a class of racial minorities who are skilled or seek work as operating engineers in the construction industry in Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware, commenced this action under a variety of federal statutes…”
Holding on this section
Liability under section 1981 requires proof of purposeful discrimination rather than mere disparate impact.
Later courts cite it for
“can be violated only by purposeful discrimination” · 34 citing courts
5
GREENMichael Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639 (4th Cir. 2017).
cites § 1981 9×cited by 443 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“3 discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . The City argued, in support of its motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that its willingness to grant BNT a loan fully secured by a second-position lien on the personal…”
The case’s holding
A court may infer discriminatory intent from evidence of a general pattern of discriminatory practices by a defendant.
Later courts cite it for
“must be sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” · 55 citing courts
6
GREENReya Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015).
cites § 1981 13×cited by 650 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“This action against the Fontainebleau Corporation and Berger ensued, with Liberto asserting claims of hostile work environment and retaliation, under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . The district court awarded summary judgment to the…”
The case’s holding
An isolated incident of harassment may create a hostile work environment if the conduct is extremely serious and the harasser is perceived as a supervisor.
Later courts cite it for
“the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” · 36 citing courts
7
GREENBrown v. State of New York, 674 N.E.2d 1129 (N.Y. 1996).
cites § 1981 24×cited by 238 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“the law, are not cognizable claims in any court in the State absent some link to a common-law "traditional" tort; (c) that actions for negligent training and supervision are not cognizable claims in the Court of Claims where the underlying harm — in this case, constitutional…”
The case’s holding
A private right of action for monetary damages exists under the State Constitution for violations of equal protection and search and seizure rights where no other remedy is available.
Later courts cite it for
“necessary and appropriate to ensure the full realization of the rights they state.” · 7 citing courts
8
GREENSusan Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 2020).
cites § 1981 11×cited by 125 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“Count III, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for unlawful racial discrimination, mentioned retaliation in passing but only in a concluding paragraph alleging that Worldpay was liable for damages.”
The case’s holding
Title VII retaliation claims are actionable if the mistreatment well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.
Later courts cite it for
“tangible employment actions consist of things that affect continued employment or pay-things like terminations, demotions, suspensions without pay, and pay raises or cuts-as well as other things that are similarly significant standing alone.” · 18 citing courts
9
GREENJin Ku Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046 (8th Cir. 1997).
cites § 1981 20×cited by 338 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“On cross-appeal, Nash Finch argues the district court erred in holding (1) Kim’s claim that he was unlawfully denied a promotion from leadman to foreman in November 1990 was actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 , (2) there was sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination, (3)…”
The case’s holding
Retaliatory conduct may consist of actions less severe than discharge, such as reduced duties, disciplinary actions, and negative performance evaluations.
Later courts cite it for
“affected the substantial rights of the parties.” · 4 citing courts
10
GREENCnty. of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
cites § 1981 12×cited by 1,750 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“We granted certiorari to consider questions presented as to whether the use of arbitrary employment criteria, racially exclusionary in operation, but not purposefully discriminatory, violates 42 U. S. C. § 1981 and, if so, whether the imposition of minimum hiring quotas for…”
The case’s holding
A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.
Later courts cite it for
“interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” · 283 citing courts
cites § 1981 5×cited by 988 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“The plaintiffs before us suggest that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 departs from this traditional arrangement.”
Holding on this section
A plaintiff must plead and prove that race was a but-for cause of the discriminatory action to prevail under Section 1981.
Later courts cite it for
“a plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, it would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” · 340 citing courts
12
GREENMagloire Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
cites § 1981 12×cited by 275 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“A Ayissi-Etoh claims that he was denied a raise because of his race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . Section 1981 prohibits private employers from intentionally discriminating on the basis of race with respect to the “benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions” of employment.”
The case’s holding
A single sufficiently severe incident of discriminatory conduct may be enough to establish a hostile work environment.
Later courts cite it for
“for a young black man smart like you, we are happy to have your expertise; i think i'm already paying you a lot of money.” · 9 citing courts
13
GREENBurnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984).
cites § 1981 16×cited by 444 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“The question presented is whether a state law, establishing a procedure for administrative resolution of employment discrimination complaints, provides an appropriate statute of limitations for actions brought under the Reconstruction-Era Civil Rights Acts, 42 U. S. C. § 1981 et…”
The case’s holding
Employment discrimination provisions of Article 49B are modeled on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Later courts cite it for
“so far as such laws are suitable to carry the civil and criminal civil rights statutes into effect.” · 19 citing courts
14
GREENKremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
cites § 1981 10×cited by 2,331 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“The District Court initially denied Chemico's motion to dismiss. 464 F.”
The case’s holding
Federal courts must accord state court judgments the same preclusive effect that the state's own courts would provide under 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
Later courts cite it for
“section 1738 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the state from which the judgments emerged.” · 139 citing courts
15
GREENSosa v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ. & Marcy Berger, 368 F. Supp. 3d 489 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
cites § 1981 10×cited by 94 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“CHEN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Alice Sosa ("Plaintiff") brings this action against the New York City Department of Education and Marcy Berger ("Defendants"), alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 , 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , 42 U.”
The case’s holding
A failure to accommodate is insufficient to establish an adverse employment action, and disparate treatment claims require factual allegations that similarly situated employees were treated differently.
Later courts cite it for
“while courts may consider the underlying conduct of an alleged failure to accommodate, a failure to accommodate, by itself, is not sufficient for purposes of establishing an adverse employment action.” · 6 citing courts
16
GREENJacqueline Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019).
cites § 1981 5×cited by 752 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“NEWSOM, Circuit Judge: Faced with a defendant's motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff asserting an intentional-discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Protection Clause, or 42 U.S.C. § 1981 must make a sufficient factual showing to…”
The case’s holding
To establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she and her proffered comparators are similarly situated in all material respects.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) that she was qualified to perform the job in question, and (4) that her employer treated 'similarly situated' employees outside her class more favorably.” · 81 citing courts
17
GREENGrinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2008).
cites § 1981 7×cited by 1,484 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“A Kentucky prisoner proceeding pro se appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 for violations of due process, equal protection, the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment during a mandatory screening…”
The case’s holding
Failure to follow proper procedures alone is insufficient to establish an infringement of a liberty interest.
Later courts cite it for
“the 'denial of administrative grievances or the failure to act' by prison officials does not subject supervisors to liability under 1983.” · 108 citing courts
18
GREENBryant v. CEO DeKalb Co., 575 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009).
cites § 1981 9×cited by 527 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“§ 1983 , sued the county’s Chief Executive Officer, Vernon Jones, who devised the plan and monitored its execution, and three subordinates who assisted him, Marilyn Boyd Drew, Morris Williams, and Richard Stogner, for discriminating against them on account of their race in…”
The case’s holding
Constructive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately makes working conditions intolerable to force an employee to quit their job.
Later courts cite it for
“established a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.” · 27 citing courts
19
GREENCBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008).
cites § 1981 8×cited by 779 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“§ 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981 (a). The basic question before us is whether the provision encompasses a complaint of retaliation against a person who has complained about a violation of another person’s contract-related “right.”
Holding on this section
Section 1981 encompasses claims of retaliation.
Later courts cite it for
“42 u.s.c. 1981 encompasses claims of retaliation.” · 11 citing courts
20
GREENGregory v. Dillard's, Inc., 565 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2009).
cites § 1981 12×cited by 202 cases
Where it cites § 1981
“We affirm the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 , and remand with directions to modify the final judgment so as to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act without prejudice.”
Holding on this section
A claim under section 1981 requires proof of membership in a protected class, discriminatory intent, engagement in protected activity, and interference with that activity by the defendant.
Later courts cite it for
“is not required to divine the litigant's intent and create claims that are not clearly raised, . . . and it need not conjure up unpled allegations to save a complaint.” · 52 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
195419902026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 2,504 cases in 2024–2025. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
S.D.N.Y.1,5755th Cir.1,1537th Cir.97411th Cir.966N.D. Ill.9462d Cir.804D.D.C.801E.D. Pa.771

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 261 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)37 cases
Isbell v. City of N.Y., 316 F. Supp. 3d 571 (S.D. Ill. 2018).
Henley v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 1341 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
Burnett v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 102 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D.D.C. 2015).
Anderson v. State of NY, 614 F. Supp. 2d 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Murray v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 984 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Showing the top 5 of 37. More in the list view →
(b)10 cases
Sillah v. Burwell, 244 F. Supp. 3d 499 (D. Md. 2017).
Henley v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 1341 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
Burnett v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 102 F. Supp. 3d 183 (D.D.C. 2015).
Stone v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 135 F. Supp. 2d 873 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
Showing the top 5 of 10. More in the list view →
(c)1 case
Harvey v. Maxwell & Morgan P.C., No. 2:24-cv-00276 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2024).

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Enactment and amendments
(R.S. § 1977; Pub. L. 102–166, title I, § 101, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071.)
Amendment years (notes): 1991
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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