Ark. Code Ann. § 16-44-203 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Gitelman and Watkins, No Requiem for Ricarte: Separation of Powers, the Rules of Evidence, and the Rules of Civil Procedure, 1991 Ark. L. Notes 27.

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Notes, McGuire v. State: Arkansas Child Abuse Videotape Deposition Laws, Etc., 41 Ark. L. Rev. 155.

Jones, Lex, Lies & Videotape, 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 613.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 583.

Arkansas Law Survey, Junean, Constitutional Law, 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 111.

Survey—Evidence, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 205.

Note, Evidence — The Confrontation Clause — A Literal Right to a Face-to-Face Meeting, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 487 U.S. 1012, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857 (1988), 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 591.

Survey, Criminal Procedure, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 349.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section affords due process because it only applies to situations where the state has a compelling interest, the protection of children from sexual crimes against which children are virtually defenseless, and uses the least restrictive means of protecting that interest by applying only to sexual offenses against children. McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 706 S.W.2d 360 (1986).

The state has a legitimate interest in the general welfare of minor victims of sex crimes and their protection against further trauma in relating the incident in a crowded courtroom, and this section applies the least restrictive means of carrying out that interest and adequately protects basic constitutional rights of the accused. Chappell v. State, 18 Ark. App. 26, 710 S.W.2d 214 (1986).

This section provides a reasonable rule of thumb to guide judges in determining whether a videotaped deposition is justified; therefore, the term “good cause” is not unconstitutionally vague. McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 706 S.W.2d 360 (1986); Davis v. State, 24 Ark. App. 152, 751 S.W.2d 11 (1988).

This section requires face-to-face confrontation between the victim, the defendant, and his attorney at the time the deposition is taken and provides the opportunity for cross-examination of the victim by the defendant; therefore, the defendant is not deprived of the right to confront his accuser or witnesses against him. McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 706 S.W.2d 360 (1986).

This section involves procedure and evidence, but has not been preempted by rules of court, and is not an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Curtis v. State, 301 Ark. 208, 783 S.W.2d 47 (1990).

Construction.

The mandatory language of this section is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, when a videotaped deposition is taken of a minor victim, the victim's videotaped depositions must be viewed and heard at trial and entered into the record in lieu of the direct testimony of the alleged victim. State v. Lee, 277 Ark. 142, 639 S.W.2d 745 (1982).

Calling of Victim to Testify.

The provision in this section which permits the prosecutor to call the minor victim to testify even though the victim's testimony has been videotaped is not discriminatory; the advantage to the state, if any, resulting from that provision is rationally related to the state's interest in protecting young witnesses to the extent that the ends of justice will permit, and its exercise is conditioned upon a showing of necessity to serve the interest of justice. Chappell v. State, 18 Ark. App. 26, 710 S.W.2d 214 (1986).

Competency.

The trial court did not err in failing to suppress a videotaped deposition of children's testimony on the ground that it contained no evidence that the children were qualified as to their competency to testify where, although the deposition as presented to the jury contained no questions pertaining to the children's competency to testify, the record clearly indicated that such questions were asked and answered but were inadvertently left off the videotape. Hendricks v. State, 15 Ark. App. 378, 695 S.W.2d 843 (1985).

The court declined to accept defendant's suggestion that it should alter its standard when reviewing the competency of witnesses in cases where testimony has been videotaped. In Arkansas the competency of children to testify in criminal matters has been found to be within the discretion of the trial court since at least 1869, and the court could see no good reason to adopt two different standards of review; one for cases where testimony is preserved on videotape, and another standard for when the witness testifies in person. Davis v. State, 24 Ark. App. 152, 751 S.W.2d 11 (1988).

Where competency of a witness is at issue on appellate review, there is no good reason to employ de novo review when testimony is by videotape and to employ an abuse-of-discretion standard of review when the witness testifies in person. Curtis v. State, 301 Ark. 208, 783 S.W.2d 47 (1990).

Where the victim's answers to questions were at times inconsistent, but more often than not she displayed a clear understanding of the undesirable consequences of telling a falsehood, and conversely, she understood the positive and desirable consequences of telling the truth, she clearly had “a moral awareness of the duty to tell the truth,” and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the victim was competent and in allowing her to testify by means of a videotaped deposition. Richard v. State, 306 Ark. 543, 815 S.W.2d 941 (1991).

Credibility.

Videotaped testimony does not deprive the jury of the opportunity of determining the victim's credibility. McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 706 S.W.2d 360 (1986).

Good Cause.

Where the testimony of the grandparents indicated that the child could be seriously harmed if forced to appear before a jury, the evidence substantiated the trial judge's decision that it was in the best interest of the child to allow the videotaped deposition. McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 706 S.W.2d 360 (1986).

This section does not require the state to submit its showing of good cause by expert testimony; therefore, the case-worker's testimony was properly accepted by the court as establishing good cause sufficient to allow a videotaped deposition, even though she had received no specialized training in dealing with victims of sexual abuse and had no contact with this victim prior to the crime. Chappell v. State, 18 Ark. App. 26, 710 S.W.2d 214 (1986).

Trial judge made a finding of good cause, and in view of the girls' ages, the sexual abuse they had endured, and the social worker's testimony, judge did not abuse his discretion in permitting videotaped deposition. Cope v. State, 293 Ark. 524, 739 S.W.2d 533 (1987).

Although testimony about the emotional impact on the child witness would be desirable, under the facts in the case, the absence of such testimony was not fatal to the trial court's finding of good cause. Davis v. State, 24 Ark. App. 152, 751 S.W.2d 11 (1988).

Testimony of victim's mother provided ample basis for a finding of good cause. Greenlee v. State, 318 Ark. 191, 884 S.W.2d 947 (1994).

Prejudicial Error.

Admission of videotaped deposition into evidence was prejudicial error in that the defendant was denied the right to cross-examine the child at the time she made her videotaped statement and the state was in effect permitted to offer the direct testimony of the victim twice, once through the videotape and once through live testimony. Cogburn v. State, 292 Ark. 564, 732 S.W.2d 807 (1987).

Cited: Lasiter v. State, 290 Ark. 96, 717 S.W.2d 198 (1986); Hegwood v. State, 297 Ark. 218, 760 S.W.2d 859 (1988); Logan v. State, 299 Ark. 255, 773 S.W.2d 419 (1989); Kester v. State, 303 Ark. 303, 797 S.W.2d 704 (1990); Cranford v. State, 303 Ark. 393, 797 S.W.2d 442 (1990).