Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-111 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Copeland, A Statutory Primer: Revised Article 3 of the U.C.C. — Negotiable Instruments, 1992 Ark. L. Notes 65.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Contracts, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 611.

Note, Professional Malpractice — Limitation of Actions — Arkansas Extends the Occurrence Rule to Accountants and Recognizes a Tolling Provision in Attorney Malpractice Actions, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 115.

Survey — Debtor/Creditor Relations, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 767.

Case Notes

Construction.

In a breach of contract action for alleged architectural defects, in which a written contract was involved, subsection (b) of this section was the applicable statute of limitations; the existence of § 16-56-112 did not extend the statute of limitations under subsection (b) or otherwise affect its applicability. Zufari v. Architecture Plus, 323 Ark. 411, 914 S.W.2d 756 (1996).

Applicability.

Holding that plaintiff suing on a note was a charitable institution and that statute of limitations did not apply to it was error. McCrite v. Hendrix College, 198 Ark. 1149, 133 S.W.2d 31 (1939).

The statute of limitations is inapplicable to a suit brought to enforce a trust. Sprigg v. Wilmans, 204 Ark. 863, 165 S.W.2d 69 (1942).

Actions by third persons based on written contracts which are made for their benefit are governed by the limitation of this section rather than § 16-56-105. H.B. Deal & Co. v. Bolding, 225 Ark. 579, 283 S.W.2d 855 (1955).

Although the trial court determined that the five-year statute of limitations applicable to written contracts applied, where the trial court based its finding of liability against the defendant completely upon the finding that the defendant breached his fiduciary duty to plaintiffs as their attorney and thereby committed malpractice, the applicable statute of limitations as to the defendant was three years. Smith v. Elder, 312 Ark. 384, 849 S.W.2d 513 (1993).

In an action involving fraud and a written instrument, the court looks to the gist of the action as alleged to determine which statute of limitations applies. Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. National Bank, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994).

Under the express terms of § 16-56-103(b), subsection (b) of this section does not apply to suits to enforce payment of any bills, notes, or evidences of any debt issued by any bank. Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. National Bank, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994).

In transferred employees' action under the Labor Management Relations Act, the state statute of limitations for breach of contract was not applicable; applying such would run counter to the policy of rapid final resolutions of labor disputes, and the employer did not actually repudiate the grievance process in the collective bargaining agreement. Arif v. AT & T Corp., 959 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D. Ark. 1997).

In a claim where it was unclear whether plaintiffs were complaining of the circumstances surrounding the execution of a 1993 agreement, or seeking to enforce a 1981 contract breached in 1996, summary judgment based on the running of the 3 year statute of limitations was improper. Ingram v. Chandler, 63 Ark. App. 1, 971 S.W.2d 801 (1998).

Loan papers between debtors and bank constituted evidence of a written agreement between debtors and guarantor, and subsection (a) of this section provides that actions to enforce a written obligation must commence within five years after the cause of action accrues; thus, the trial court erred when it found that the guarantor was seeking contribution and that the cause of action was barred by a three-year statute of limitations. Hendrickson v. Carpenter, 88 Ark. App. 369, 199 S.W.3d 100 (2004).

Court erred in awarding judgment to plaintiff in his breach of contract action against defendant because plaintiff's earlier failure to comply with the service requirements of Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i) resulted in a failure to commence the action so as to effectuate the one-year savings provision provided in § 16-56-126; hence, the action was barred by the five-year statute of limitations in subsection (a) of this section. Long v. Bonds, 89 Ark. App. 111, 200 S.W.3d 922 (Jan. 5, 2005).

Employee's ERISA claims for benefits under 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(a), (e)(1), and (f); penalties under § 1132(c)(1); and breach of fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C.S. § 1105(a) and (b), were dismissed because (1) the three-year statute of limitations set forth in § 16-56-105(3) applied to the employee's claim for penalties, the employee requested the plan summary in December 2001 and again in January 2002 but waited until April 2005 to make further inquiries and another year to file a complaint, and the employee did not act with “due diligence,” to enforce her rights so she was not entitled to equitable tolling; (2) with regard to the employee's long-term disability (LTD) claim, the employee knew by December 2001 that her short-term (STD) claim had been denied, such denial served as notification to the employee that no more disability benefits would be approved, the employee should have known that LTD benefits were included and should have taken reasonable steps to enforce her claims, and the employer's failure to send the employee a plan summary did not excuse a four-year delay, so the three-year statute of limitation was not equitably tolled, and the employee's LTD claim was barred; (3) the employee's claim based on the employer's breach of fiduciary duty was also made too late because under the ERISA's statute of limitations, such claims had to be brought within three years under 29 U.S.C.S. § 1113(2); and (4) defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to the employee's claim for STD benefits was construed as one for summary judgment and was granted because although the five-year limitations period set forth in this section applied to the claim, the statute of limitations was tolled because the amended claim for STD benefits related back to the original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2), the employer offered an affidavit and documentation of its STD payments to the employee, and the employee did not respond to the employer's offer of proof. Gonser v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 515 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. Ark. 2007).

Finding against the relatives in an action stemming from the relatives' default on a promissory note and security agreement previously executed was proper because the appellate court agreed with the circuit court's interpretation of the provision in the agreement to mean that the final payment, due on January 30, 2004, was to be a balloon payment of any unpaid balance on the note. Accordingly, the term “principal balance” was to include everything that remained unpaid on the date the last balloon payment came due; therefore, the damage claim included everything that remained unpaid throughout the course of the note and the circuit court's finding that the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations was proper. Housley v. Hensley, 100 Ark. App. 118, 265 S.W.3d 136 (2007).

In a nondischargeability action under 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(2)(A), where the debt to which the debtors' misrepresentations related arose from a breach of a limited liability company's operating agreement, the five year statute of limitations for breach of contract stated in this section applied, not the three year period for fraud. Lewis v. Spivey (In re Spivey), 440 B.R. 539 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2010).

Circuit court did not err by dismissing appellants' legal malpractice claims against their attorney, because they were barred by the three-year statute of limitations under this section. Although appellants attempted to categorize the claims differently, the “gist” of their claim was legal malpractice; therefore, the five-year statute of limitations set forth in this section did not apply. Richardson v. Madden, 2012 Ark. App. 120 (2012).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the owners of a trailer park because the gravamen of the tenant's claim was for assault and battery and/or negligence, not breach of contract, and the claim was therefore untimely where the tenant filed his complaint over four years after the incident, and no breach of contract was alleged that would bring the action under the five-year statute of limitations. The rental form, which was not specific to the tenant, contained no promise, specific or general, on the part of the owners to protect the tenant from harm. Moody v. Tarvin, 2016 Ark. App. 169, 486 S.W.3d 242 (2016).

Acceleration Clauses.

Where the debtor defaulted and creditor accelerated the debt, the creditor's cause of action on the debt evidenced by a note did not depend upon any further contingency or condition precedent, as the creditor's right to a deficiency judgment was simply part of a remedial process the creditor initiated by accelerating the debt and could not be treated as a separate cause of action; therefore, the statute of limitations began to run when the creditor accelerated the debt, causing the creditor's complaint seeking a deficiency judgment against the debtor to be barred when brought more than five years after the date the note was accelerated. Oaklawn Bank v. Alford, 40 Ark. App. 200, 845 S.W.2d 22 (1992).

Attorneys.

A malpractice suit alleging that the defendant attorneys breached their contract by failing to act with diligence as required by the contract is an action for negligence rather than for breach of contract, and the three year statute of limitations should apply. Sturgis v. Skokos, 335 Ark. 41, 977 S.W.2d 217 (1998).

When the client sued the attorney in connection with the execution of a prenuptial agreement, her complaint was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for legal-malpractice claims under § 16-56-105. There was no written contract to bring the action under the five-year statute of limitations set forth in this section. Pounders v. Reif, 2009 Ark. 581 (2009).

Burden of Proof.

The burden of proof was on the plaintiff suing on notes to establish that they were not barred by limitations which had been pleaded as a defense. Rose v. Rose, 184 Ark. 430, 42 S.W.2d 567 (1931).

Plaintiff suing on a note relying upon payments to remove the bar of the statute of limitations has burden to show that the payments were made. McNeill v. Rowland, 198 Ark. 1094, 132 S.W.2d 370 (1939).

If in action on promissory note the debtor pleads the statute of limitations as a bar to the action and plaintiff alleges that there has been a part payment on the note, then burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove date of part payment, and mere endorsement on back of note is not sufficient proof of making of part payment. Smith v. Grimsley, 215 Ark. 279, 220 S.W.2d 428 (1949).

Certificate of Deposit.

Under § 4-3-104(j), a certificate of deposit is a negotiable instrument, and an action to enforce such an instrument under Article 3 of the UCC would be subject to the six-year limitation period under § 4-3-118(e), not the five-year limitation period under this section. Ernest F. Loewer, Jr. Farms, Inc. v. National Bank, 316 Ark. 54, 870 S.W.2d 726 (1994).

Child Support Agreements.

The period of time for which the mother may recover for the reasonable and definite amount she has expended for the support of the children is governed by the language of the original divorce decree and where, as in the present case, there was no provision in the original divorce decree for support, the obligation of the father would come within the three year statute for such definite amounts as she had expended for the support of the minor children. Wilder v. Garner, 235 Ark. 400, 360 S.W.2d 192 (1962).

Choice of Law.

Insured's claim against insurers was not time-barred, because under Arkansas Supreme Court precedent, Arkansas law applied and therefore a policy provision requiring suit to be filed before the statute of limitations expired was void under § 23-79-202. Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 863 F.3d 792 (8th Cir. 2017).

Civil Rights.

Although employee's 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim involved a collective bargaining agreement between a union and the employer, the alleged discriminatory practices did not arise from any breach of the collective bargaining agreement and therefore this statute of limitations for actions on written contracts was inapplicable. Martin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 568 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1977).

Where the plaintiff brought a civil rights complaint involving the termination of the plaintiff's written employment contract, § 16-56-105, governing liabilities created by statute, was the applicable statute of limitations, not this section which governs actions on written contracts. Wagh v. Dennis, 677 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1982).

Conditional Promise.

Statute does not run on a conditional promise until the contingency has happened. Perry v. Cunningham, 40 Ark. 185 (1882).

Corporations.

The appointment of a receiver will not stop the running of the statute against an insolvent corporation. Davis v. Scott, 129 Ark. 226, 195 S.W. 383 (1917).

A complete and present cause of action accrued when assets conveyed in a bill of sale were transferred by person executing bill of sale to a corporation and the stock distributed in violation of the bill of sale, and statute commenced to run from that time. Hunter v. Connelly, 247 Ark. 486, 446 S.W.2d 654 (1969).

Date of Accrual.

In a breach of contract action against architectural firm for alleged design defects, the relevant date for accrual of the cause of action for breach was the date the plans were rejected by the Health Department, since on that date the cause of action was complete, and plaintiff was entitled to sue for breach; when he chose not to do so but chose instead to allow defendant to attempt to rectify the problem, that did not alter the fact that a breach had occurred, and thus suit filed more than five years after the breach was untimely. Zufari v. Architecture Plus, 323 Ark. 411, 914 S.W.2d 756 (1996).

Court properly determined that employee's 2002 breach of contract action against employer was barred by the five-year statute of limitations; the action accrued at the point when employee could have first maintained his action, when the employer failed to apportion settlement funds to the Federal Railroad Retirement Board in 1990. Phillips v. Union Pac. R.R., 89 Ark. App. 223, 201 S.W.3d 439 (2005).

Insurance underwriter's breach of contract claim against its agent, arising from the agent's issuance of a general liability policy to an Alabama motel in violation of the parties' binding authority agreement, was time-barred under subsection (b) of this section because the underwriter filed its suit more than five years after the agent breached its contractual duty by issuing the policy. The underwriter's cause of action accrued when the contract was breached, not when it suffered injury arising from that breach, which occurred several years later, when lawsuits covered by the policy were filed against the insured motel and the agent refused to provide defense and indemnification in those suits. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. Regions Ins., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (E.D. Ark. 2009).

Subdivision lot owner's action for breach of restrictive covenants and a declaration that such covenants were unenforceable was barred by the applicable statute of limitations under this section, as the cause of action accrued when a golf club and a successor-in-interest to the developer of the subdivision sold the first lot that they deferred a monthly fee for, not with each deferred lot sold. Beckworth v. Diamante, 2010 Ark. App. 815, 379 S.W.3d 752 (2010).

Plaintiff's action was properly dismissed because his claims were clearly time-barred under this section and §§ 16-56-105, 4-88-115, and by failing to allege when and how he discovered defendant's alleged fraud, plaintiff failed to meet his burden under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), (f) of sufficiently pleading that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment saved his otherwise time-barred claims. Summerhill v. Terminix, Inc., 637 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 2011).

Debts.

The statute does not begin to run against a note that may be declared due on default in interest until the end of its regular term, unless the payee exercises his option. Sherwood v. Wilkins, 65 Ark. 312, 45 S.W. 988 (1898).

The statute runs from the date of a new promise. Kelley v. Telle, 66 Ark. 464, 51 S.W. 633 (1899); Williams v. Young, 71 Ark. 164, 71 S.W. 669 (1903).

Cause of action accrues at maturity of note. Rock Island Plow Co. v. Masterston, 96 Ark. 446, 132 S.W. 216 (1910).

A right to enforce a mortgage lien acquired by the right of subrogation will not be barred where the debt has been kept alive by a new note executed by the debtor. Roark v. Matthews, 125 Ark. 378, 188 S.W. 841 (1916).

The statute of limitations begins to run against the creditor of an insolvent corporation whenever he has notice that the corporation is insolvent, and notice may be presumed when the insolvency becomes a matter of general notoriety. Davis v. Scott, 129 Ark. 226, 195 S.W. 383 (1917).

Demand paper is due immediately, and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the instrument. McCollum v. Neimeyer, 142 Ark. 471, 219 S.W. 746 (1920).

A cause of action on a note is not barred where an action was brought on it within five years from maturity where the action was dismissed and new action brought within a year on the same cause of action. Felker v. Boatmen's Bank, 146 Ark. 186, 225 S.W. 306 (1920).

Evidence held to sustain a finding that the defendant's consent to the crediting of the amount owed by the payee of a note to the defendant on the note which the defendant had executed did not constitute an acknowledgement of the debt sufficient to form a basis of a new promise, tolling the statute of limitations on the note. Sanders v. McClintock, 175 Ark. 633, 300 S.W. 408 (1927).

The cause of action on a promissory note does not accrue until the day following the date of its maturity. Shanks v. Clark, 175 Ark. 883, 300 S.W. 453 (1927).

Where a cause of action on a note is barred by limitations, a mortgage securing the note is likewise barred. Taylor v. Cheairs, 181 Ark. 4, 24 S.W.2d 852 (1930).

The right of action by a joint maker of a note who paid it for contribution is based on an implied obligation, and not governed by the limitation prescribed by this section. Hazel v. Sharum, 182 Ark. 557, 32 S.W.2d 315 (1930).

Where a debt is secured by a pledge, the running of the statute of limitations destroys the right of recovery on the debt, but it has no effect on the right of the pledgee to retain the property or enforce his claim against it, until the debt is paid. Hill v. Bush, 192 Ark. 181, 90 S.W.2d 490 (1936).

Plaintiffs took title free from lien of mortgages which had been kept alive by tax payments made by mortgagee. Polster v. Langley, 201 Ark. 396, 144 S.W.2d 1063 (1940).

Recital in notes that drawers and endorsers waived presentation for payment, protest and nonpayment, and granted to holder right to grant extensions without notifying them, was held not to apply to payee who subsequently endorsed the notes and who could only be bound for five years from due date of notes. Mayberry v. Penn, 201 Ark. 756, 146 S.W.2d 925 (1941).

When recovery is sought on an obligation payable in installments, this statute runs against each installment from the time it becomes due. Linke v. Kirk, 204 Ark. 393, 162 S.W.2d 39 (1942); Wilson v. Wilson, 231 Ark. 416, 329 S.W.2d 557 (1959).

Written contract for repurchase, executed by parties thereto for specific purpose of preventing foreclosure of deed of trust, including original debt as the consideration thereof, tolled the statute of limitations and made a new point for it to begin to run. Walker v. Mullins, 204 Ark. 939, 165 S.W.2d 607 (1942).

A note payable on demand is due immediately upon its execution, and the statute of limitations runs from that date, unless there is a subsequent unconditional promise to pay by the party from whom the debt is due, which is sufficient to toll the statute. McMahon v. O'Keefe, 213 Ark. 105, 209 S.W.2d 449 (1948).

Where the maker of a note payable on demand writes letters acknowledging the validity of the debt due and by inference promises to pay, the acts on the part of the debtor are sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. McMahon v. O'Keefe, 213 Ark. 105, 209 S.W.2d 449 (1948).

Where plaintiff filed suit on promissory note more than five years after due date and unauthorized payments were made on the note, the payments did not toll the statute, and action upon the note was therefore barred. Sutterfield v. Smith, 216 Ark. 41, 223 S.W.2d 1018 (1949).

Suit, by holders of unpaid installment bonds of drainage district, to collect bonds and interest was not barred where each annual report of district's receiver acknowledged the bonds and interest as obligations of the drainage district. Greer v. Blocker, 218 Ark. 259, 236 S.W.2d 68 (1951).

Three year limitation of § 16-56-105 applicable to oral contracts governed the transaction where borrower pledged a note for repayment of oral loan rather than the limitation of this section. Shelton v. Harris, 225 Ark. 855, 286 S.W.2d 20 (1956).

Where parties enter into a written stipulation as to the amount of indebtedness which is sworn to before a notary public, the instrument constitutes an account stated and starts the running of this section anew. Johnson v. Gammill, 231 Ark. 1, 328 S.W.2d 127 (1959).

In action to recover delinquent payments which is filed more than five years after the last payment was made, plaintiff can recover only those installments due and accruing within five years before the filing of petition. Wilson v. Wilson, 231 Ark. 416, 329 S.W.2d 557 (1959).

A suit on a note filed less than five years after the note was executed was within the limitation of this section. Wallace v. Hamilton, 238 Ark. 406, 382 S.W.2d 363 (1964).

An alleged oral extension agreement for which the record shows no semblance of valid consideration is not sufficient to toll the running of the statute. Holmes v. Thompson, 240 Ark. 818, 402 S.W.2d 400 (1966).

Creditor's action was not barred by the statute of limitations on default on balloon payment. Delta Oil Co. v. Catalani, 276 Ark. 66, 633 S.W.2d 1 (1982).

If a check, pledged as security was nonnegotiable, that fact alone would not discharge the liability of the drawer of the check who remained secondarily liable on the check until the statute of limitations ran or until its liability was otherwise discharged. Wildman Stores, Inc. v. Carlisle Distrib. Co., 15 Ark. App. 11, 688 S.W.2d 748 (1985).

When recovery is sought on an obligation payable in installments, the statute of limitations runs against each installment from the time it becomes due; therefore, where the debtor made partial payments in each year since the execution of the note, with the most recent payment being made in 1985, the statute of limitations would not run for actions on the note until 1990, five years from the date of the last payment. In re Borum, 60 B.R. 516 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986).

When recovery is sought on an obligation payable in installments, the statute of limitations runs against each installment from the time it becomes due; that is, from the time when an action might be brought to recover it. Bank of N.Y. v. University Partners, Ltd., 719 F. Supp. 1479 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

Where a foreclosure suit was filed on March 13, 1991 regarding a promissory note that was signed on March 15, 1982, with the first payment due on March 15, 1983, and where no payments were made, plaintiffs were barred by law from recovering those payments that became due prior to March 13, 1986, due to the five-year statute of limitations. Karnes v. Marrow, 315 Ark. 37, 864 S.W.2d 848 (1993).

Breach of contract claim involving a loan that was secured by a property deed was not barred by the statute of limitations because the breach claim did not accrue until just a few months before the filing of the complaint, when the lenders refused further payments and claimed the payments were merely rent because they owned the property at issue. Smith v. Eisen, 97 Ark. App. 130, 245 S.W.3d 160 (2006).

Five-year statute of limitations for written contracts applied under this section, and the last payments on June 24, July 7, and July 10, 2004, were made within the 5-year period after the creditors filed the claims on November 28, 2007, and April 3, 2008, because the debtor's use of the cards represented an intent to perform a unilateral contract by repaying the amount charged; the issuance of the card to the debtor to be accepted by her in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth by the card member agreements or rejected by non-use was an offer; and the contract became binding when the debtor retained the card, made use of it, and thereby agreed to the terms of the written agreement. In re Pettingill, 403 B.R. 624 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2009).

Bank's claim upon promissory note was not barred by the statute of limitations under this section as the note maker made a payment before the bar attached and created a new starting point for the limitations period. Valley v. Helena Nat'l Bank, 2010 Ark. App. 560 (2010).

Because appellee lender received insurance payments when the collateral for a promissory note was damaged in a fire, the trial court did not err in finding that the five-year statute of limitations for an action on the note was tolled under subsection (b) of this section by partial payments. Payton v. Coleman, 2012 Ark. App. 160 (2012).

In a creditor's breach of contract suit arising from cross-defaulted loan agreements, counterclaims asserting causes of action for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, breach of contract, and deceptive trade practices were time-barred. Bank of Am., N.A. v. JB Hanna, LLC, 766 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2014).

—Acceleration Clauses.

Acceleration clause contained in note and mortgage for benefit of payee and enforceable at his option was held not to start the statute of limitations running upon failure to make payment of interest. Hodges v. Taft, 194 Ark. 259, 106 S.W.2d 605 (1937).

Statute of limitations began to run when default was made in payment of first note. Hodges v. Dilatush, 199 Ark. 967, 136 S.W.2d 1018 (1940).

Where an automatic acceleration clause occurs if an installment of interest is not paid within thirty days after due date, but there is no declaration that a default in the payment of an installment of the principal accelerates the maturity of the debt, the statute is a bar only to those installments over five years due, where there is no testimony as to a default in interest. Holmes v. Thompson, 240 Ark. 818, 402 S.W.2d 400 (1966).

—Assumption of Debts.

Whether an incoming partner becomes liable on an existing note of the old partnership depends on whether he assumed the indebtedness; in the absence of assumption he will not be bound by payments made by a member of the old firm nor precluded from pleading the statute of limitations against the note. Stephens v. Neely, 161 Ark. 114, 255 S.W. 562, 45 A.L.R. 1236 (1923).

The right of a husband to be subrogated to the lien of a mortgagee on his wife's land which he had discharged after her death is to use the mortgage just as the original holder thereof might have done, and the devolution of the cause of action does not interrupt the running of the statute. Ogden v. Watts, 186 Ark. 500, 54 S.W.2d 292 (1932).

Since the assumption of payment of the note by the different grantees in the deeds appearing in the plaintiff's chain of title was made within five years before the institution of the suit, the lien of the mortgage was kept alive, although the debt as against the original payor was barred by the statute of limitations. Webb v. Alexander, 195 Ark. 727, 113 S.W.2d 1095 (1938).

—Credit Card Debt.

Claim Nos. 7, 8, and 9 complied with the applicable Bankruptcy Rules and were presumed to be prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of each claim; the creditors were not required to attach the writings on which the debts were based to the proofs of claim. Underlying credit card debts were subject to the Arkansas five-year statute of limitations period. In re Richardson, 557 B.R. 686 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2016).

—Endorsement of Payments.

Payments, endorsed on a note, which were admitted by the debtor to be correct or were impliedly assented to by him are sufficient to stop the running of the statute of limitations. McAbee v. Wiley, 92 Ark. 245, 122 S.W. 623 (1909).

The date of a payment on a note and not the endorsement or entry of it marks the time of the interruption of the statute unless a future date is agreed upon by the parties. Slagle v. Box, 124 Ark. 43, 186 S.W. 299 (1916).

The running of the statute of limitations is not estopped by endorsements of payments on a note not shown to have been made by the defendant. Kory v. East Ark. Lumber Co., 181 Ark. 478, 26 S.W.2d 896 (1930).

The presence or absence of endorsement of credits or other payments on the back of a note is not conclusive proof that payments tolling the statute were or were not made. Schaefer v. Baker, 181 Ark. 620, 27 S.W.2d 83 (1930).

It is the fact of payment on the note and not the endorsement thereon that tolls the statute. Reynolds v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 182 Ark. 861, 33 S.W.2d 403 (1930).

Payments need not be endorsed as credits on back of note to arrest the running of the statute of limitations; it is the fact of payment and not its endorsement that tolls the statute. McNeill v. Rowland, 198 Ark. 1094, 132 S.W.2d 370 (1939).

Where order of dismissal in 1938 was final determination of mortgage foreclosure suit filed in 1931 with notice of lis pendens and it reinstated the mortgage in full force and effect as though no suit had been filed, order was binding on judgment creditors of mortgagor who secured judgment after beginning of suit and precluded them from contending that subsequent foreclosure suit was barred by limitations for failure to make marginal endorsements of payment within five years. Mitchell v. Federal Land Bank, 206 Ark. 253, 174 S.W.2d 671 (1943), superseded by statute as stated in, Croft v. Croft, 8 Ark. App. 20, 648 S.W.2d 511 (1983).

—Multiple Debts.

Where one owed a note at a bank barred by the statute of limitations and thereafter made a deposit in the bank, it was held that the bank had the right to credit this deposit on the note but the right to so credit the deposit did not toll the statute of limitations. Desha Bank & Trust Co. v. Quilling, 118 Ark. 114, 176 S.W. 132 (1915).

A creditor may not arbitrarily apply payments made upon unmatured obligations where there are debts past due upon which the same may be applied; so payments by a debtor cannot be arbitrarily applied by the creditor to the payment of unearned interest to create a presumption that the statute of limitations was to run from that time. Gunther v. Cotner, 192 Ark. 498, 92 S.W.2d 865 (1936).

Holder of note could not apply payment for one debt to another debt so as to toll the statute of limitations. Piggott Nursery Co. v. Davis, 195 Ark. 738, 113 S.W.2d 1102 (1938); Higginbotham v. Ritter, 202 Ark. 412, 150 S.W.2d 620 (1941); Nelson v. Rutledge, 229 Ark. 464, 316 S.W.2d 346 (1958).

Where deed of trust was executed by defendant to secure a single indebtedness evidenced by three notes, payments which were an acknowledgment of the entire indebtedness should have first been credited to interest on entire indebtedness and not to any single note, and payment within five years kept the entire debt alive so that none of the notes were barred by this statute. Rich v. Hankins, 203 Ark. 1082, 160 S.W.2d 44 (1942).

—Payments.

If payment of a promissory note is demanded on the third day of grace, and refused, the statute runs from that day; otherwise not till the next day. Holland v. Clark, 32 Ark. 697 (1878).

County warrants are always receivable for taxes, regardless of the date of their issue. Daniel v. Askew, 36 Ark. 487 (1880); Howell v. Hogins, 37 Ark. 110 (1881); Whitthorne v. Jett, 39 Ark. 139 (1882); Lusk v. Perkins, 48 Ark. 238, 2 S.W. 847 (1887); Hill v. Logan County, 57 Ark. 400, 21 S.W. 1063 (1893).

The five year limitation may be pleaded in bar for a petition for mandamus to compel the payment of warrants. Crudup v. Ramsey, 54 Ark. 168, 15 S.W. 458 (1891).

Where more than five years elapsed between the last payment on a note and the date action thereon was commenced against the principal and sureties, the claim is barred as against the sureties. Polk v. Stephens, 118 Ark. 438, 176 S.W. 689 (1915).

Part payment of a debt by a joint and several debtor before the bar of the statute of limitations attaches binds the other joint debtors. Fendley v. Shults, 142 Ark. 180, 218 S.W. 197 (1920).

Payment of interest on a note within the statutory period stops the running of the statute of limitations. Conley v. Archillion, 146 Ark. 64, 225 S.W. 5 (1920).

Where a note sued on was barred by the statute of limitations at the time when the last payment thereon was made, the payment revived the deed and it was not necessary to pay in money where the satisfaction of demands of the maker against others was treated by all parties as payment of the amount endorsed on the note. Johnson v. Spangler, 176 Ark. 328, 2 S.W.2d 1089, 59 A.L.R. 899 (1928).

A sale of mortgaged chattels by the mortgagee and application of the proceeds on a mortgage note was in effect the foreclosure of the mortgage and not such voluntary payment as would toll the statute of limitations. Taylor v. White, 182 Ark. 433, 31 S.W.2d 745 (1930).

Where a mortgage executed by a wife was barred by the statute of limitations when the husband paid the note, the payment did not revive the lien nor was the lien acquired by subrogation. Ogden v. Watts, 186 Ark. 500, 54 S.W.2d 292 (1932).

Where, in an action on a promissory note, the only issue involved was whether payments had been made which tolled the statute of limitations, an instruction by the court in which the jury was told that the burden rested on the plaintiff to prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence, necessarily meant that the burden rested upon him to show that payments were made which prevented the note from being barred by the statute. Vittitow v. Lewis, 193 Ark. 318, 100 S.W.2d 89 (1936).

A payment by the trustee in bankruptcy to the creditor of a bankrupt will not prevent the running of the statute of limitations since the payment was not a voluntary payment. Bank of Searcy v. Kroh, 195 Ark. 785, 114 S.W.2d 26 (1938).

Maker's subsequent promise, in answer to request for payment of note, to pay $500 at a certain date and $100 a month thereafter, was evidence sufficient to toll statute of limitations. Cady v. Guess, 197 Ark. 611, 124 S.W.2d 213 (1939); Dunnington v. Taylor, 198 Ark. 770, 131 S.W.2d 627 (1939); Young v. Blocker, 201 Ark. 802, 146 S.W.2d 902 (1941); Hobson v. Priddy, 204 Ark. xviii, 165 S.W.2d 73 (1942).

Payments on a debt after the bar of the statute of limitations had attached, as between the parties, removes the bar and revives the debt. McNeill v. Rowland, 198 Ark. 1094, 132 S.W.2d 370 (1939).

Suits on notes upon which no payments have been made are barred in five years after maturity. Leverett v. Williamson, 199 Ark. 910, 136 S.W.2d 478 (1940).

To extend time for the filing of an action upon the indebtedness, the acknowledgement thereof must be an unconditional promise to pay or must be under such circumstances that an unconditional promise to pay may be inferred and it must be made by the party from whom the debt is due to one whom it is due or to his or her authorized agent. Root v. Thomas, 203 Ark. 1078, 160 S.W.2d 46 (1942).

Where part payment is accompanied by circumstances or declarations by the debtor showing it was not his intention to admit by the payment continued existence of the debt and his obligation to pay the balance, the law does not imply a promise. Buss v. Cooley, 205 Ark. 42, 167 S.W.2d 867 (1942).

Part payment of a debt by one joint and several debtors before action on note is barred by statute of limitations, is binding on the other debtors. Smith v. Grimsley, 215 Ark. 279, 220 S.W.2d 428 (1949).

Part payment by one joint and several debtor after action on the debt is barred by statute of limitations is not binding on the other debtors. Smith v. Grimsley, 215 Ark. 279, 220 S.W.2d 428 (1949).

If part payment is made on a promissory note, statute of limitations starts running from the date of the part payment. Smith v. Grimsley, 215 Ark. 279, 220 S.W.2d 428 (1949).

Bank, which advanced additional money on first mortgage loan after knowledge that agent of mortgagor had made an unrecorded payment within five year period on prior mortgage, was entitled to recover entire amount of loan, since prior mortgage was in effect a prior unrecorded mortgage. Tucker v. Atkinson, 219 Ark. 921, 245 S.W.2d 388 (1952).

Signer of mortgage notes was estopped to plead statute of limitations in suit by mortgagee to foreclose where payment was made on the obligation within five year period by virtue of apparent authority to make payment as agent. Tucker v. Atkinson, 219 Ark. 921, 245 S.W.2d 388 (1952).

Trustee of property was not a third party within meaning of § 18-49-101 (a)-(c), hence he was bound by payments made on mortgage. Tucker v. Atkinson, 219 Ark. 921, 245 S.W.2d 388 (1952).

Where evidence sustained finding that there had been payments of interest on notes then suit on notes and to foreclose vendor's lien would not be barred by five year statute of limitation. Affholter v. McCarley, 226 Ark. 735, 293 S.W.2d 698 (1956).

Part payment interrupts the running of this section. Johnson v. Gammill, 231 Ark. 1, 328 S.W.2d 127 (1959).

Where a mortgage was given to secure an initial loan and future advances and, at a time when there were several notes outstanding, the debtor wrote to the creditor offering to pay part but not all of the amount but not on his account identifying the notes he was offering to pay on, the letter was presumed to be an acknowledgement of the entire indebtedness and revived the statute as to the whole. McHenry v. Littleton, 237 Ark. 483, 374 S.W.2d 171 (1964).

The ledger crediting of the maker's credit balance on an open account with the holder of notes as payment on the notes, with the consent of the maker, stopped the running of the statute of limitations, notwithstanding failure of the holder of the notes and the mortgage securing them to endorse the payment on the margin of the recorded mortgage. Misenhimer v. Perkins Oil Co., 248 Ark. 434, 451 S.W.2d 864 (1970).

Decedent's Estate.

Running of statute is not suspended by death of maker of note until letters of administration are granted. Whipple v. Johnson, 66 Ark. 204, 49 S.W. 827 (1899); Salinger v. Black, 68 Ark. 449, 60 S.W. 229 (1900); A.R. Bowdre & Co. v. Pitts, 94 Ark. 613, 128 S.W. 57 (1910).

A suit on a contract to make a will accrues against the co-heirs on the promisor's death, and is governed by this statute as to limitations. Goff v. Beaty, 157 Ark. 212, 247 S.W. 787 (1923).

Conveyance of property in return for promise to care for person did not bar person from seeking accounting, and trial court correctly applied five-year, rather than three-year, statute of limitations to accounting since daughter's obligation arose from written deeds not oral or implied promise. Cluck v. Mack, 278 Ark. 506, 647 S.W.2d 442 (1983).

Ejectment.

In an ejectment matter, the statute of limitations for removal of a person from land, rather than the statute of limitations for cancellation of instruments, applies. Schwarz v. Colonial Mtg. Co., 326 Ark. 455, 931 S.W.2d 763 (1996).

Goods.

A shipper of freight may recover damages for delay in the transportation and delivery of freight in an action founded on the contract, and the five year statute applies to a claim founded on such a contract. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Cunningham Comm. Co., 127 Ark. 246, 192 S.W. 211 (1917).

Insurance.

An action on a policy of disability insurance for monthly disability benefits was held not barred by the five year statute of limitations though recovery was limited to the five years preceding the filing of the action. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Langston, 189 Ark. 1067, 76 S.W.2d 50 (1934); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 190 Ark. 941, 82 S.W.2d 250 (1935).

Where insured and beneficiary assigned life policy to secure indebtedness, beneficiary was not entitled, after insured's death, to maintain an action for the proceeds of the policy without paying the debt, even though the debt was barred by limitations. Hill v. Bush, 192 Ark. 181, 90 S.W.2d 490 (1936).

Suit instituted more than five years after injury to recover under disability clause of insurance policy was barred by limitations. Teague v. National Life Co., 204 Ark. 196, 161 S.W.2d 754 (1942).

Where tie-in line was not constructed under original contract for electrical construction on which the statute would have run but was constructed under separate agreement which was not yet barred, contractee's suit for indemnity against contractor on indemnity agreement on judgment recovered by employee for injuries sustained was not barred by this section. Kincade v. C & L Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 227 Ark. 321, 299 S.W.2d 67 (1957).

There was no evidence of record that insurance company attempted to fraudulently conceal, cover-up, or misrepresent to an estate the problem of determining the proper beneficiary of an insurance policy, so that fraud did not suspend the running of the statute of limitations. First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stoltz, 311 Ark. 313, 843 S.W.2d 842 (1992), rehearing denied, First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Stoltz, 312 Ark. 95, 843 S.W.2d 842 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908, 114 S. Ct. 290 (1993).

Insured's declaratory relief action to determine the availability of underinsured motorist benefits was an action to recover a claim arising under a policy of insurance and was governed by the five-year statute of limitation in this section; in addition, the running of the statute of limitation was triggered by the breach of the contract and not the underlying accident. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nash, 357 Ark. 581, 184 S.W.3d 425 (2004).

Insured's breach of contract suit, which was brought outside an accidental death and dismemberment policy's three-year time limit, was timely. Section 23-79-202 precluded the insurer from contractually shortening the limitations period to less than the five-year period for breach of contract actions under subsection (a) of this section. Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 677 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 2012).

Installment payments.

When an obligation is made payable by installments, the statute of limitations runs against each installment as it becomes due and unpaid. Riley v. Riley, 61 Ark. App. 74, 964 S.W.2d 400 (1998).

Lease.

Air conditioner installation, undertaken without written consent in violation of the terms of the lease, was completed by March 5, 2003, and the limitations period ended on March 5, 2008, which expired before this case began, and thus the trial court erred in finding that the action was not barred. Filat v. Rand, 2015 Ark. App. 316, 463 S.W.3d 301 (2015).

Medical Services.

Section 16-56-106, and not this section, covers all actions brought to recover charges for medical services. Ballheimer v. Service Fin. Corp., 292 Ark. 92, 728 S.W.2d 178 (1987).

Limitations period contained in § 16-56-106, and not that of this section, is applicable to a debt for hospital services. Thomas v. Service Fin. Corp., 293 Ark. 190, 736 S.W.2d 3 (1987).

Pleadings.

Amendment to more than five years after cause accrued, where the original complaint was filed within the five year period, was not the bringing of a new cause of action, and the cause of action was not barred. McGraw v. Miller, 184 Ark. 916, 44 S.W.2d 366 (1931).

If a party had such an interest in the note sued on as entitled it to maintain a suit for the use and benefit of another, the filing of its complaint would serve to toll the statute of limitations, and any pleading filed thereafter by way of amendment would relate back to the institution of the original action; but if it did not have such a cause of action, the amendment to the complaint offered by the second party was only an effort to substitute the party in interest for one who had no cause of action which cannot be permitted. Floyd Plant Food Co. v. Moore, 197 Ark. 259, 122 S.W.2d 463 (1938), superseded by statute as stated in, St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court of Craighead County, 348 Ark. 197, 73 S.W.3d 584 (Ark. 2002).

The defense of limitations may be raised by motion to dismiss. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

Property Settlement Agreement.

Former wife's claims in her motion for contempt that a former husband failed to comply with certain provisions in their property settlement agreement was barred by the five-year statute of limitations in this section that applied to written contracts as the settlement was an independent contract that did not merge with the divorce decree. The husband's mental health problems were not sufficient to make him insane for purposes of tolling the statute under § 16-56-116, and in any event, the wife, not the husband, was the one bringing the action. Wall v. Wall, 2011 Ark. App. 143 (2011).

Real Estate Interests.

An action for breach of a contract by the plaintiff's predecessor in title to open an alley between the lot conveyed and an adjacent lot before selling the latter which he sold three years prior to bringing suit was held not barred by the statute of limitations. Holthoff v. Joyce, 174 Ark. 248, 294 S.W. 1006 (1927).

Where mortgagee within five years from maturity date of note and institution of foreclosure suit had redeemed the land from tax sale and paid the taxes thereon, under the power so to do given in the mortgage, foreclosure suit was not barred by this statute. Dalton v. Polster, 200 Ark. 168, 138 S.W.2d 64 (1940).

Lien of attorney on land of estate made a part of the conveyance by the executrix could not be asserted after eight years. Tellier v. Darragh, 220 Ark. 363, 247 S.W.2d 960 (1952).

Where claimant did not file his affidavit with the real estate commission until more than five years after he signed the purchase agreements, his claim was not barred as the period of limitations for contracts runs from the point at which the cause of action accrues, rather than from the date of the agreement. Eckels v. Ark. Real Estate Comm'n, 30 Ark. App. 69, 783 S.W.2d 864 (1990).

Breach of warranty case against the sellers of real property was barred by the five-year statute of limitations because the cause of action accrued at the time of the sale, but not at the time of a court order quieting title in a portion of the property to several neighbors. The breach and constructive eviction occurred on the date of the deed. Riddle v. Udouj, 99 Ark. App. 10, 256 S.W.3d 556 (2007), aff'd, 371 Ark. 452, 267 S.W.3d 586 (2007).

In a declaratory judgment action, even if the five-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until there was notice that a first lease was being relied on, a complaint was time-barred due to a recordation of an assignment; the recording served as constructive notice from the time the instrument was filed for record, and the case was filed more than 5 years after an assignment was recorded. The circuit court did not err by treating the claim as raising contract enforcement issues and applying the relevant statutory period of limitations. McDougal v. Sabine River Land Co., 2015 Ark. App. 281, 461 S.W.3d 359 (2015).

—Abstractors.

The right of action against an abstractor for damages resulting from errors, defects, or omissions in an abstract of title prepared by him is not and cannot be based on the written certificate attached to the abstract because the written certificate is only evidence of the provisions of the preexisting oral or implied contract of employment. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

The right of action against an abstractor for damages resulting from errors, defects, or omissions in an abstract of title prepared by him accrues at the time of the delivery of the abstract. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

In action for dissolution of alleged partnership formed for the purpose of selling lots and on accounting for plaintiff's alleged interest in the property covering the lots, recovery could not be had where it was shown that suit was commenced after the five-year period. Booth v. Hayde, 228 Ark. 244, 307 S.W.2d 227 (1957).

—Deeds.

A deed, signed by grantor alone when accepted by the grantee, becomes the mutual contract of the parties and any promise of the grantee therein provided for is governed by the provision of the statute of limitations respecting written instruments. Parker v. Carter, 91 Ark. 162, 120 S.W. 836 (1909).

Where the grantee in a deed as consideration undertook to maintain the grantors during life, the contract was not barred by limitations where the grantee never repudiated the obligation. Federal Land Bank v. Miller, 184 Ark. 415, 42 S.W.2d 564 (1931).

Grantor's action for breach of covenant in deed was barred by limitation of this section where action was commenced more than five years after right of action occurred. Roemhild v. Jones, 283 F.2d 70 (8th Cir. 1960).

In suit to cancel deed, plaintiff could not invoke the aid of equity without first doing equity herself by recognizing the validity of the grantee's lien; therefore, she could not contend that his claims were barred by the five-year statute of limitations. Daniels v. Johnson, 234 Ark. 315, 351 S.W.2d 853 (1961).

An action for breach of warranty in a deed was not barred by the three year statute, as actions on writings under seal are not barred until five years after the cause of action accrues. Booth v. Mason, 241 Ark. 144, 406 S.W.2d 715 (1966).

In a case concerning a real estate transaction in which the deed was held in escrow until purchaser's six-month note came due, five-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until the note became due. Woods v. Wright, 254 Ark. 297, 493 S.W.2d 129 (1973).

—Property Settlement Agreement.

Where the property settlement agreement was an independent contract that was incorporated into the court decree, it did not merge into the decree and was, therefore, subject to the five-year statute of limitations under this section, and not the ten-year limitations period in § 16-56-114. Meadors v. Meadors, 58 Ark. App. 96, 946 S.W.2d 724 (1997).

Retirement Benefits.

This section applied to a claim in federal court for retirement benefits under federal statute. Bennett v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 1998).

Service Contracts.

Where the services in question were rendered upon a written contract to which the five-year statute of limitations applied, the plea of the statute was unavailing where the services were rendered within such period. Central Clay Drainage Dist. v. Hunter, 174 Ark. 293, 295 S.W. 19 (1927).

Waiver.

An agreement to waive the statute of limitations for all time, made at the inception of a contract, is void because it violates public policy. First Nat'l Bank v. Arkansas Dev. Fin. Auth., 44 Ark. App. 143, 870 S.W.2d 400 (1994).

Written Acknowledgement of Oral Contract.

Written security agreement was a sufficient acknowledgment of a valid existing debt for attorney's fees so as to start the statute of limitations running anew. However, the written acknowledgement did not transform the oral agreement for fees into a written one, and the three-year statute applicable to oral agreements under § 16-56-105 still applied, rather than the five-year statute for written agreements under this section, thereby barring an attorney's claim for fees. Still v. Perroni Law Firm, 2011 Ark. 447, 385 S.W.3d 182 (2011).

Written Instruments.

Where the various written communications between the parties contain all the terms of sale, the five-year limitation applies. Sims v. Miller, 151 Ark. 377, 236 S.W. 828 (1922).

Where the plaintiff entered into a written contract for the sale of merchandise, and certain of the defendants at the time of the execution of the contract joined therein for the purpose of becoming guarantors of the purchasers, a suit upon the agreement is upon a written contract to which the five-year statute of limitations applies, though an account of the purchases under the agreement is filed with the complaint. W.T. Rawleigh Co. v. Pritchard, 151 Ark. 390, 236 S.W. 833 (1922).

A bill of lading is an instrument in writing, and the five-year statute applies to suit to recover on it. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Pfeiffer Stone Co., 166 Ark. 226, 266 S.W. 82 (1924).

This section applies to a buyer's action for damages for breach of warranty arising from a written contract of sale. Louisville Silo & Tank Co. v. Thweatt, 174 Ark. 437, 295 S.W. 710 (1927).

An order for merchandise, given over the telephone but later confirmed in writing and accepted by the seller shipping the hose and rendering an invoice, was held a written contract within the five-year statute. City of Ft. Smith v. United States Rubber Co., 184 Ark. 588, 42 S.W.2d 1004 (1931).

The fact that oral proof was required to identify plaintiffs as third party beneficiaries under a written contract and to establish the amount due each under the provisions of the contract did not prevent the five-year limitation of this section rather than the three year limitation of § 16-56-105 from applying. H.B. Deal & Co. v. Bolding, 225 Ark. 579, 283 S.W.2d 855 (1955).

Suit on written support contract made in contemplation of divorce is a suit on a written instrument and is governed by the five-year statute of limitations. Altman v. Altman, 240 Ark. 370, 399 S.W.2d 501 (1966).

District court's verdict was reversed on appeal where the applicable statute of limitations began to run at the latest date the plaintiff lessor learned its land had suffered a remediable injury, though it did not yet know the extent of the injury; thus, the breach of contract claim was timely. Highland Indus. Park, Inc. v. BEI Def. Sys. Co., 357 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2004).

Trial court properly ruled that the handwritten agreement was a final, binding contract rather than a preliminary negotiation, and thus properly applied the five-year limitations period under this section rather than the three-year limitations period in § 16-56-105. Patel v. Patel, 2015 Ark. App. 726, 479 S.W.3d 580 (2015).

Five-year statute of limitations for contract claims applied to an investor's amended complaint against the investor's investment account manager, rather than the three-year statute of limitations for negligence claims, because the investor pleaded a breach of contract and a specific promise; the investor alleged there was a contract between the investor and the manager, that the manager specifically promised to process an account transaction in a timely manner, that the manager breached this specific promise, and that the investor suffered damages. Farris v. Conger, 2017 Ark. 83, 512 S.W.3d 631 (2017).

Cited: Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Gordy, 228 Ark. 643, 309 S.W.2d 330 (1958); Fuller v. Fuller, 240 Ark. 475, 400 S.W.2d 283 (1966); Carter v. Zachary, 243 Ark. 104, 418 S.W.2d 787 (1967); Federal Land Bank v. Wilson, 533 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Broadhead v. McEntire, 19 Ark. App. 259, 720 S.W.2d 313 (1986); Coast-to-Coast Stores, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 676 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Ark. 1987); Refco, Inc. v. Farm Prod. Ass'n, 844 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1988); O'Bryant v. Horn, 297 Ark. 617, 764 S.W.2d 445 (1989); Morgan Distrib. Co. v. Unidynamic Corp., 868 F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1989); Ferguson v. Order of United Com. Travelers of Am., 307 Ark. 452, 821 S.W.2d 30 (1991); Hampton v. Taylor, 318 Ark. 771, 887 S.W.2d 535 (1994); Kinkead v. Estate of Kinkead, 51 Ark. App. 159, 912 S.W.2d 442 (1995); Chalmers v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 326 Ark. 895, 935 S.W.2d 258 (1996); Federal Fin. Co. v. Noe, 335 Ark. 78, 983 S.W.2d 107 (1998); Martin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 344 Ark. 177, 40 S.W.3d 733 (2001); Wilkins v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 299 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2002).