Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-202 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Brill, Punitive Damages in Ark. — Expanded? Restricted?, 1990 Ark. L. Notes 25.

Ark. L. Rev.

Acts 1949 General Assembly — Act 35 Amendment of Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 3 Ark. L. Rev. 371.

Samuel T. Waddell, Comment: Examining the Evolution of Nonparty Fault Apportionment in Arkansas: Must a Defendant Pay More Than Its Fair Share?, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 485 (2013).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Arkansas Law Survey, Roberts and Deere, Torts, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 207.

Case Notes

Applicability.

Where, in an action for damages for personal injuries against joint tortfeasors the court was unable to determine from the jury's verdict that the verdict was based on any disproportionate fault on part of two defendants this section could not be applied to save or clarify the situation. Shearman Concrete Pipe Co. v. Wooldridge, 218 Ark. 16, 234 S.W.2d 382 (1950).

Hospital did not have a right of contribution under the Uniform Contribution among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) because the hospital and the rehabilitation center were not joint tortfeasors under the UCATA, as there was only several liability following the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Shelton, 2013 Ark. 38, 425 S.W.3d 761 (2013), superseded by statute as stated in, J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (2014).

Cause of Action.

A cause of action for contribution arises with the underlying tort, and not upon payment of common liability. Union Pac. R.R. v. Mullen, 966 F.2d 348 (8th Cir. 1992).

Entitlement to Contribution.

In action where wife recovered against defendants for damage to her car and husband recovered for personal injuries, defendants, upon discharging judgment obtained against them by wife, will be entitled to file motion for judgment for contribution from husband. Wymer v. Dedman, 233 Ark. 854, 350 S.W.2d 169 (1961).

Joint tortfeasor was required to contribute to the interest paid on judgment by other tortfeasor where no interest on payment between the date of payment and the date of the money judgment was allowed and where no more than the legal rate of interest was paid. International Harvester Co. v. Burks Motors, Inc., 252 Ark. 816, 481 S.W.2d 351 (1972).

Defendant was not entitled to contribution from plaintiff father who was not liable to injured children and who was not thereby a joint tortfeasor with defendant. Welter v. Curry, 260 Ark. 287, 539 S.W.2d 264 (1976).

The adoption of comparative fault did not prevent a joint tortfeasor whose fault had been determined to be in the amount of 50 percent or more from having contribution from his fellow tortfeasor who was less negligent. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Star City Gravel Co., 452 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 592 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1979).

A claim for contribution among tortfeasors is a derivative or conditional action in that the contribution-claimant, e.g., the third-party plaintiff (defendant), is not entitled to a money judgment against the party from whom contribution is sought, e.g., the third-party defendant, until the third-party plaintiff has paid more than his pro rata share of their common liability. Martin Farm Enters., Inc. v. Hayes, 320 Ark. 205, 895 S.W.2d 535 (1995).

—Apportionment.

When the evidence is sufficient, the jury is permitted to appraise the conduct of each defendant and to undertake, as fairly as practicable, to fix the responsibility of each. Little v. Miles, 213 Ark. 725, 212 S.W.2d 935 (1948).

Where apportionment of damages required payment of shares solely for the purpose of determining rights of contribution among joint tortfeasors, each tortfeasor remaining severally liable to the injured person for the whole injury as at common law, determination of apportioned judgments by jury would not be disturbed. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 240 Ark. 280, 399 S.W.2d 258 (1966).

In a wrongful death action against two or more joint tortfeasors, plaintiff was not required to prove the precise injury to the decedent caused by the negligence of each tortfeasor. Woodward v. Blythe, 249 Ark. 793, 462 S.W.2d 205 (Ark. 1971).

Jury found that one defendant was partially responsible for plaintiff's damages and second defendant was also responsible; this meant that first defendant was entitled to contribution from the second defendant to the extent of his liability. Burks Motors, Inc. v. International Harvester Co., 250 Ark. 29, 466 S.W.2d 907 (1971).

Defendant against whom a joint and several judgments had been entered was not entitled to a judgment against codefendant until it had paid more than its pro rata share. Burks Motors, Inc. v. International Harvester Co., 250 Ark. 641, 466 S.W.2d 943 (1971); Shelton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 281 Ark. 100, 662 S.W.2d 473 (1983).

Since the defendant did not ask the trial court to apportion the damages according to relative degrees of fault, as allowed by subdivision (4), and the jury made no factual findings which would support such apportionment, the defendant was only entitled to contribution from the codefendant for any amounts which it paid above one half of the judgment. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 774 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1985).

Immune Employer.

In employee's products liability action against the manufacturer of the product that injured him while he was working, the circuit court properly precluded the manufacturer's attempt to allocate fault to the nonparty employer in its amended answer; because the employer was clothed with immunity from liability in tort under the exclusive-remedy provision of the workers' compensation statutes, § 11-9-105, the employer could not have joint or several “liability” in tort and therefore did not meet the definition of “joint tortfeasor” in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 16-61-201 et seq., or fall within the confines of that act. Indus. Iron Works, Inc. v. Hodge, 2020 Ark. App. 56 (2020).

The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 16-61-201 et seq., does not allow for the apportionment of fault to an immune nonparty employer. Indus. Iron Works, Inc. v. Hodge, 2020 Ark. App. 56 (2020).

The language of § 16-55-201 is clear; it speaks in terms of the allocation of fault among the “defendants” to the action but is silent as to the allocation of nonparty fault. Instead, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 16-61-201 et seq., addresses the allocation of nonparty fault. Indus. Iron Works, Inc. v. Hodge, 2020 Ark. App. 56 (2020).

Indemnity.

Suit by utility to recover from contractor amount of damages it was required to pay for injuries sustained by employee of contractor under agreement by contractor to hold utility harmless from suits for personal injuries was not a suit for contribution of joint tortfeasor but a suit under indemnity agreement. Bruno v. Bruno, 221 Ark. 759, 256 S.W.2d 341 (1953).

Contribution and indemnity are mutually exclusive remedies because the former distributes the loss among tortfeasors while the latter shifts the entire loss from one tortfeasor who has been compelled to pay it to the shoulders of another who should bear it instead. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Star City Gravel Co., 452 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 592 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1979).

Limitation of Actions.

In suit by injured person to recover damages from defendant, the latter was not prevented from filing third party complaint for contribution from joint tortfeasor notwithstanding right of plaintiff in suit against the third party defendant was barred by statute of limitations. Schott v. Colonial Baking Co., 111 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1953).

A cause of action for contribution accrues when one joint tortfeasor pays more than his or her pro rata share of common liability; thus, the three-year statute of limitations under § 16-56-105 had not yet expired due to the fact that a settlement had just been entered where an executor and his wife agreed to pay more of their fair share in a trust dispute. Heinemann v. Hallum, 365 Ark. 600, 232 S.W.3d 420 (2006).

When homeowners sued a general contractor, who sought contribution and indemnity from subcontractors, the general contractor's claims were not time-barred because, under subsection (b) of this section, the statute of limitations did not begin until a joint tortfeasor paid more than his or her share of liability. J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (2014).

Retroactivity.

This subchapter is not retroactive and it appears to have been settled prior to its enactment that contribution among joint tortfeasors did not exist. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 210 Ark. 575, 196 S.W.2d 919 (1946).

Section 16-61-201 et seq., as amended by Acts 2013, No. 1116, did not apply retroactively to a medical malpractice action because Act 1116 added a new provision in subsection (c) of this section providing that the right to contribution is not limited to money damages but also includes the right to allocation of fault as among all joint tortfeasors and the rights provided for in § 16-61-204. English v. Robbins, 2014 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.3d 566 (2014).

Settlements.

Joint tortfeasor was not entitled to judgment of contribution against other tortfeasor, as each tortfeasor settled his liability separately from the other. Lacewell v. Griffin, 214 Ark. 909, 219 S.W.2d 227, 8 A.L.R.2d 189 (1949).

Where the settlement of a judgment by a tortfeasor provided that the payment was in full for all claims accruing to the injured person but did not mention joint tortfeasors, settlement did not release the joint tortfeasor of liability and the tortfeasor was not entitled to contribution from the joint tortfeasor. Allbright Bros., Contractors ex rel. Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. Hull-Dobbs Co., 209 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953).

In an action for damages arising out of train-truck collision at railroad crossing, the fact that an employee of railroad might have had cause of action against owner of truck for the injuries suffered and that the railroad's settlement with its employee was purely voluntary, would not in itself justify withdrawing this part of claim, which was made by the railroad against driver of truck on the basis of contribution between joint tortfeasors, from the consideration of the jury. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ellison, 250 Ark. 160, 465 S.W.2d 85 (1971).

When homeowners sued a general contractor, who sought contribution and indemnity from subcontractors, the general contractor's settlement with the homeowners did not moot the contractor's contribution and indemnity claims because the settlement extinguished the subcontractors' liability to the homeowners. J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd., 2014 Ark. 282, 436 S.W.3d 458 (2014).

Cited: Ward v. Walker, 206 Ark. 988, 178 S.W.2d 62 (1944); Citizens Coach Co. v. Wright, 228 Ark. 1143, 313 S.W.2d 94 (1958); Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 6 V.I. 163 (3d Cir. 1968); Morison v. GMC, 428 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1970); W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982); Douglas v. United States Tobacco Co., 670 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1982); Arhart v. Micro Switch Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1986); Stewman v. Mid-South Wood Prods. of Mena, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 611 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Boatmen's Nat'l Bank v. Cole, 329 Ark. 209, 947 S.W.2d 362 (1997); Redland Ins. Co. v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 1999).