Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-204 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Samuel T. Waddell, Comment: Examining the Evolution of Nonparty Fault Apportionment in Arkansas: Must a Defendant Pay More Than Its Fair Share?, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 485 (2013).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Notes, Tort Law — General Release Forms — The Free Ride for Joint Tortfeasors Is Over, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 791.

Case Notes

Purpose.

It was the intention of the Arkansas Legislature in enacting this section to abrogate the common law rule that a release of one tortfeasor released all other tortfeasors jointly liable for the occurrence, thereby retaining the liability of joint tortfeasors. Moore v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 299 Ark. 232, 773 S.W.2d 78, 6 A.L.R.5th 1188 (1989).

Agreements.

Injured patient and a hospital agreed that they would inform the jury about a nurse anesthetist's settlement with the patient and that the hospital would waive its right to a credit; in other words, they agreed that the jury would solely determine the hospital's liability and award monetary damages for harm caused by the hospital. An appellate court therefore refused to grant the patient's request that the jury assess the hospital's share alone and that the hospital pay its fair share of the damages. Villines v. N. Ark. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2011 Ark. App. 506, 385 S.W.3d 360 (2011).

Reduction in Damages.

In a vehicle rollover case, the manufacturer was not entitled to have the compensatory damage award reduced by 50 percent based on the fault of another driver, who had settled, because although the jury found the other driver was 50 percent at fault, the jury instructions asked the jury to find damages caused only by the vehicle manufacturer. Ford Motor Co. v. Washington, 2013 Ark. 510, 431 S.W.3d 210 (2013).

Release.

Where the settlement of a judgment by a tortfeasor provided that the payment was in full for all claims accruing to the injured person but did not mention joint tortfeasors, settlement did not release the joint tortfeasor of liability and the tortfeasor was not entitled to contribution from the joint tortfeasor. Allbright Bros., Contractors ex rel. Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. Hull-Dobbs Co., 209 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953).

In an action against an automobile manufacturer for injuries sustained in an accident, the passenger's release of driver and her liability insurer contained a clause releasing “all other persons, firms, or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable,” therefore barring the action, even though the parties did not intend to release the manufacturer and the manufacturer paid no consideration. Morison v. GMC, 428 F.2d 952 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, Morison v. General Motors Corp., 400 U.S. 904, 91 S. Ct. 142 (1970).

Where plaintiff, who had brought a malpractice action, settled and dismissed the action for the consideration and executed a general release discharging her doctor and “all other persons, firms, corporations…,” that general release was sufficient to release joint tortfeasors who were not parties to the release since this section provides that other tortfeasors are discharged “if the release so provides.” Douglas v. United States Tobacco Co., 670 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1982).

In a medical malpractice case, a release executed by a patient and a hospital was insufficient to release a doctor from liability under this section based on language in the release referencing the hospital's employees. Luu v. Still, 102 Ark. App. 11, 279 S.W.3d 481 (2008).

—Content or Form.

In order to satisfy the language of this section, a release must name or otherwise specifically identify the tortfeasors to be discharged. Broad boilerplate language is not sufficient. Moore v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 299 Ark. 232, 773 S.W.2d 78, 6 A.L.R.5th 1188 (1989).

—Release Before Verdict.

Under this subchapter, joint tortfeasors are entitled to have the amount due plaintiff reduced by the amount paid by a joint tortfeasor, but if evidence as to the amount paid by one of the tortfeasors is introduced into evidence in trial against the other tortfeasor, the defendant cannot, after verdict, have the court reduce the amount of the verdict by the amount paid by the other defendant, as he has had the benefit of the amount paid by the other tortfeasor, when he introduced the amount of the settlement before the jury reached its verdict. Giem v. Williams, 215 Ark. 705, 222 S.W.2d 800 (1949).

Trial court properly refused to permit tortfeasor to introduce settlement agreement between second tortfeasor and injured party, even though it might have had some bearing on the plaintiff's credibility, as the evidence would have informed the jury that one of the defendants had admitted liability and would have been used for arguing that plaintiff had accepted the amount of settlement as fair compensation for his injuries. Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962).

In this case the trial court refused the defendant permission to introduce evidence of one tortfeasor's settlement payment to plaintiff, but after verdict the trial court, under the theory that the law of joint tortfeasors applied, correctly credited the judgment with the payment, since the jury had no knowledge of the settlement, and therefore assessed the total damages of plaintiff. Woodard v. Holliday, 235 Ark. 744, 361 S.W.2d 744 (1962).

Where settlement was made during the course of trial by one or more joint tortfeasors, the trial court committed no error in advising the jury of the fact, but not the amount, of the settlement. Arhart v. Micro Switch Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1986).

Retroactivity.

It was held that enactment of this section would not be given a retroactive effect. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. McDaniel, 131 F.2d 89 (1942).

Section 16-61-201 et seq., as amended by Acts 2013, No. 1116, did not apply retroactively to a medical malpractice action because this section provided rights for joint tortfeasors against released tortfeasors and provided that when an injured person released a joint tortfeasor, the remaining defendants were entitled to a determination by the finder of fact of the released joint tortfeasor's pro rata share of responsibility for the injured person's damages, creating substantive rights that were absent from the previous version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 16-61-201 et seq.English v. Robbins, 2014 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.3d 566 (2014).

Section 16-61-201 et seq., as amended by Acts 2013, No. 1116, did not apply retroactively to a medical malpractice action because Act 1116 added a new provision in § 16-61-202 providing that the right to contribution is not limited to money damages but also includes the right to allocation of fault as among all joint tortfeasors and the rights provided for in § 16-61-204. English v. Robbins, 2014 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.3d 566 (2014).

Time for Determining Liability.

The question of the joint or common liability of joint tortfeasors is determined as of the time the cause of action accrues and not at the time when the right to recover contribution is asserted; but where the jury, by its verdict, obviously found that defendant was neither jointly nor severally liable for the injury to the plaintiff, there simply was no way under the statutory definition that the defendant could be considered as a joint tortfeasor. Scalf v. Payne, 266 Ark. 231, 583 S.W.2d 51 (1979).

Cited: Hill v. Southside Pub. Sch., 688 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Garver & Garver v. Little Rock San. Sewer Comm., 300 Ark. 620, 781 S.W.2d 24 (1989); Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991).