Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-212 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Looney, Handling Administrative Proceedings Before the Arkansas Pollution Control and Ecology Department and Commission, 1988 Ark. L. Notes 23.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Derden, Survey of Arkansas Law: Administrative Law, 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 157.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Practice, Procedure, and Courts, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 905.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Acts 1989, No. 709, which amended subsection (a) of this section, unconstitutionally deprives inmates of review of constitutional questions, because judicial review of all other administrative questions may be granted, or withheld, according to the legislature's discretion. Clinton v. Bonds, 306 Ark. 554, 816 S.W.2d 169 (1991).

In General.

The procedure for judicial review under this subchapter is an exception to the rules of civil procedure. Whitlock v. G.P.W. Nursing Home, Inc., 283 Ark. 158, 672 S.W.2d 48 (1984).

This subchapter provides an alternate appellate procedure and jurisdiction for the judicial review of an adjudication by an agency subject to this subchapter. United States Rooter All Type Plumbing Co. v. Holliman, 50 Ark. App. 125, 900 S.W.2d 580 (1995).

Under this chapter, it is not the role of the circuit courts or the appellate courts to conduct a de novo review of the record, but to review the case to ascertain whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency decision or whether the agency decision runs afoul of one of the other criteria set out in subsection (h). Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Thompson, 331 Ark. 181, 959 S.W.2d 46 (1998).

Because there had been no adjudication before the administrative agency, there was no final agency action to be reviewed pursuant to this section and the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, § 25-15-201 et seq., did not apply. Ark. Dep't of Econ. Dev. v. William J. Clinton Presidential Found., 364 Ark. 40, 216 S.W.3d 119 (2005).

Under the flexible Mathews factors, the procedural avenues afforded by the Sex Offender Registration Act, § 12-12-901 et seq., were constitutionally adequate and provided notice to offenders of the risk assessment process and a meaningful opportunity to be heard; the Registration Act provides for an adversarial judicial review of the Committee's administrative review decision, with the full procedural guarantees set forth in the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, and it was unlikely that a right to counsel or to confront witnesses at the initial assessment stage would have appreciably reduced the risk of an erroneous determination. Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 917, 127 S. Ct. 2128, 167 L. Ed. 2d 862 (2007).

Applicability.

Judicial review of Arkansas Cemetery Board order was within the scope of a proceeding to review an action covered by this subchapter. Arkansas Cem. Bd. v. Memorial Properties, Inc., 272 Ark. 172, 616 S.W.2d 713 (1981).

It is only in the judicial functions that this subchapter purports to subject agency decisions to appellate review and then only as narrowly prescribed in the subchapter. Arkansas Livestock & Poultry Comm'n v. House, 276 Ark. 326, 634 S.W.2d 388 (1982).

Termination of an agency employee is not a judicial function, but an administrative act which is not subject to judicial review and agency did not subject itself to judicial review by giving employee the right to be heard and proceeding in a quasi-judicial fashion. Arkansas Livestock & Poultry Comm'n v. House, 276 Ark. 326, 634 S.W.2d 388 (1982).

The Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act is not closely analogous to the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and, therefore, the 30 day limitations period contained in subsection (b)(1) does not apply to the latter act. Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000).

In an action challenging a regulation issued by the Game and Fish Commission which prohibited commercial duck hunting guides from operating on three wildlife management areas on Saturdays and Sundays during the duck hunting season and also prohibited waterfowl hunters from hunting while being guided by a commercial duck guide on those same areas on weekends, the plaintiffs were not entitled to a stay as the commission had not sought to enforce the regulation against any of the plaintiffs and, therefore, there was no final agency action to be reviewed. Ark. State Game & Fish Comm'n v. Sledge, 344 Ark. 505, 42 S.W.3d 427 (2001).

Reading the Brine Production Act, § 15-76-301 et seq., with the Administrative Procedures Act, § 25-15-212(g), it appeared that the correct procedure for the circuit court to follow was to limit its review to the record and allow the parties to introduce evidence only for the purpose of showing the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission's order was invalid or unreasonable; the Brine Production Act does not allow a de novo review of orders issued by the Commission, but permits additional evidence relating to procedural irregularities before the Commission or where there was good reason for failure to present that evidence to the Commission. Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Bruner, 368 Ark. 74, 243 S.W.3d 285 (2006).

Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is an agency under § 25-15-202(2)(A); therefore, a decision from the DHHS to leave a person's name on the Arkansas Child Maltreatment Central Registry was reviewed under the standards in § 25-15-212(h)(1), (4). Vancleave v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 98 Ark. App. 299, 254 S.W.3d 770 (2007).

Although a local utility customer failed to file a notice of appeal to the circuit court as required under Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9, which applied to an appeal from the municipal utility's decision, but instead filed a complaint alleging that it was seeking judicial review of a final administrative order, the complaint properly described the final administrative decision and specified the date of that decision as required. Mt. Pure, LLC v. Little Rock Wastewater Util., 2011 Ark. 258, 383 S.W.3d 347 (2011).

Additional Evidence.

Where appellant failed to make the required statutory showing that additional evidence which he wanted to present was material and that there were good reasons for his failure to present it to the commission, the circuit court did not err in affirming commission's decision. Woolsey v. Ark. Real Estate Comm'n, 263 Ark. 348, 565 S.W.2d 22 (1978).

The trial court should first view the application for additional evidence to determine if the party was diligent and then determine if the application merely has general or conclusory statements as to the additional evidence. If the trial court finds that additional evidence should be taken, it must then remand the case to the board for it to hear the additional evidence. Marshall v. ABC Bd., 15 Ark. App. 255, 692 S.W.2d 258 (1985).

There was substantial evidence supporting the court's finding that there were good reasons for the failure of the applicant for retail liquor and off-premises beer permit to present evidence as to the public convenience and advantage before the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, where the director, in denying the application, indicated the deficiencies in the application were only the adequacy of the building and the adequacy of police protection; therefore, the court properly ordered additional evidence to be taken. ABC Bd. v. Hicks, 19 Ark. App. 212, 718 S.W.2d 488 (1986).

Third party contacts made to ABC Board members violated § 25-15-209(a) and, as procedural irregularities, were properly allowed by the trial court as additional testimony describing these contacts and were added to the record pursuant to this section. Arkansas Alcoholic Beverage Control Div. v. Cox, 306 Ark. 82, 811 S.W.2d 305, 1991 Ark. LEXIS 343 (1991).

The court erred in remanding to the Board for additional evidence to be taken concerning issues which had not been raised in the initial administrative hearing. Department of Fin. & Admin. v. Samuhel, 51 Ark. App. 76, 909 S.W.2d 656 (1995).

Where appellant never requested an evidentiary hearing nor made application to the circuit court for such pursuant to subsection (f) for leave to present additional evidence, this issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Mid-South Rd. Bldrs., Inc. v. Ark. Contractors Licensing Bd., 328 Ark. 630, 946 S.W.2d 649 (1997).

Adjudication.

Where board heard no testimony, made no findings of fact or conclusions of law, no copy of any decision was served on a party, and no record of proceedings was certified to a circuit court, there was no adjudication within the meaning of this section; rather an administrative decision was made, reviewable only by writ of certiorari in Pulaski County. Sikes v. General Publishing Co., 264 Ark. 1, 568 S.W.2d 33 (1978).

Whether a decision of the Statewide Health Coordinating Council was the result of rule making or adjudication was a question of fact to be determined by the circuit court. Statewide Health Coordinating Council v. Circuit Court, 287 Ark. 84, 696 S.W.2d 729 (1985).

After an appeal of a sex offender adjudication was dismissed on the ground that it could not be concluded that appellant had received notice of the Arkansas Department of Corrections Sex Offender Screening and Risk Assessment Committee's (SOSRA's) final decision, the court denied SOSRA's petition for rehearing because § 12-12-922(b)(6)(A) and (7)(A) required SOSRA to send “findings” to appellant, which proscription was consistent with the requirements of the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act under subsection (a) of this section. Munson v. Ark. Dep't of Corr. Sex Offender Screening, 369 Ark. 290, 253 S.W.3d 901 (2007).

State employee's appeal from her termination by a state school for the deaf could not be heard due to lack of jurisdiction because there was no judicial review of such termination decisions absent a public policy exception; such decisions were legislative rather than adjudicatory. The school's alleged violation of its non-mandatory reduction policy did not rise to the level of a public policy violation. Tripcony v. Ark. Sch. for the Deaf, 2012 Ark. 188, 403 S.W.3d 559 (2012).

Amended Petition.

There is no prohibition in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), §§ 25-15-201 to 25-15-217, against the filing of an amended petition; plaintiffs' filing of an amended petition to support its showing of standing to challenge an agency decision, which amended petition was not objected to by the defendants, did not make the petition a nullity under the APA. Ark. Bev. Retailers Ass'n v. Moore, 369 Ark. 498, 256 S.W.3d 488 (2007).

Appeal from Circuit Court.

The rules governing judicial review of administrative decisions are identical for both the circuit and appellate courts, and it is the decision of the agency, rather than that of the circuit court, which the appellate court reviews. City of Hector v. Arkansas Soil & Water Conservation Comm'n, 47 Ark. App. 177, 888 S.W.2d 312 (1994).

In cases arising under this subchapter, the appellate court reverses only if substantial evidence is lacking, an abuse of discretion has occurred, or if the agency has acted in an arbitrary of capacious manner. City of Hector v. Arkansas Soil & Water Conservation Comm'n, 47 Ark. App. 177, 888 S.W.2d 312 (1994).

Because an appraiser's argument that the circuit court erred in determining that she was not permitted to present additional evidence before the agency pursuant to the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, subsection (f) of this section was not ruled on by the Arkansas Appraiser Licensing and Certification Board; the supreme court was precluded from considering the argument on appeal; at the circuit court's hearing, the appraiser requested the circuit court to remand the case to present additional evidence pursuant to subsection (f), but she failed to obtain a ruling on the issue. Chandler v. Ark. Appraiser Licensing & Certification Bd., 2011 Ark. 519 (2011).

Attorney's Fees.

An award of attorney's fees is not provided for by this section; only the cost of the preparation of the record may be borne by the agency. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Kistler, 320 Ark. 501, 898 S.W.2d 32 (1995).

Costs.

Where state agency, as appellee, paid for a transcript of the record and was the prevailing party, the circuit court did not err in ordering appellant to reimburse the agency. Hankins v. Department of Fin. & Admin., 330 Ark. 492, 954 S.W.2d 259 (1997).

Election of Remedies.

This section did not preclude review of insurance commissioner's order under review provision of insurance code. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Monroe, 257 Ark. 1029, 522 S.W.2d 431 (1975).

Where appellant asserted that the appeal should be tried de novo pursuant to alcoholic beverage control law and made no request in the circuit court that the appeal be treated as taken under this subchapter, he was bound by his decision to follow one procedure for appeal rather than the other. Byrd v. Jones, 263 Ark. 406, 565 S.W.2d 131 (1978). See also Green v. Carder, 276 Ark. 591, 637 S.W.2d 594 (1982).

Where plaintiffs were forced to choose whether to proceed under this section or de novo review provision of alcoholic beverage control laws and the de novo review statute they elected to pursue their remedy under was subsequently declared unconstitutional, the plaintiffs would be treated as if they had only made a mistake and not an irrevocable election of remedies and would be allowed to proceed under this section. Green v. Carder, 276 Ark. 591, 637 S.W.2d 594 (1982).

Illustrative Cases.

State racing commission's order that greyhound racing purse be redistributed to owner of second place finisher after the winning greyhound's urine tested positive for an anti-inflammatory drug in violation of state racing rules was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion as the state racing commission merely applied the undisputed fact that the drug was administered to the to the dog to the state's racing rules prohibiting such conduct. Arkansas State Racing Comm'n v. Wayne Ward, Inc., 346 Ark. 371, 57 S.W.3d 198 (2001).

Circuit court was without jurisdiction to enjoin a licensing board from having a hearing, where the bail bond company did not receive notice until day before the hearing and sought a continuance, because the bail bond company failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Ark. Prof'l Bail Bondsman Licensing Bd. v. Frawley, 350 Ark. 444, 350 Ark. 444, 88 S.W.3d 418 (2002).

Because the Arkansas Soil and Water Conservation Commission acted within its statutory authority under § 15-22-503(e) in approving a water project submitted by a municipality that included a portion of a neighboring city's five-mile extraterritorial planning area, which was not preempted under § 14-56-413 by the neighboring municipality's planning authority in the five-mile area surrounding its city limits, and because the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court affirmed the Commission's order approving the municipality's water development project, as amended, for water plan compliance certification. Ark. Soil & Water Conservation Comm'n v. City of Bentonville, 351 Ark. 289, 92 S.W.3d 47 (2002).

Evidence supported the Arkansas State Board of Chiropractic Examiners' finding that physical therapist's treatments, which caused his patients' spines to “pop,” were “spinal manipulations” as defined in § 17-81-102(7) and could only be performed by licensed chiropractors. Teston v. Ark. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 361 Ark. 300, 206 S.W.3d 796, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 960, 126 S. Ct. 480, 163 L. Ed. 2d 363 (2005).

Reduction of sex offender's risk assessment was appropriate as his Level 3 classification was not supported by substantial evidence; the Arkansas Department of Correction Sex Offender Screening and Risk Assessment failed to cite any incident where defendant's answers differed from documents assembled for the interview. Ark. Dep't of Corr. Sex Offender Screening & Risk Assessment v. Claybaugh, 93 Ark. App. 11, 216 S.W.3d 134 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence in the record to show that funeral director failed to make reasonable attempts to fulfill the needs and desires of decedent's survivors and that the funeral director entered decedent's house without permission and removed her property; thus, the decision by the Arkansas Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors to suspend funeral director's license for two years was affirmed. Ark. Bd. of Embalmers Funeral Dirs. v. Reddick, 366 Ark. 89, 233 S.W.3d 639 (2006).

Where evidence showed that a physician treated patients for low back pain and he advertised his operation as a pain management clinic, the Arkansas State Medical Board's decision that Ark. State Medical Board Regulation 19 applied to the physician was upheld. Kale v. Ark. State Med. Bd., 367 Ark. 151, 238 S.W.3d 89 (2006).

There was substantial evidence supporting the administrative law judge's finding that the foster mother caused a nonaccidental physical injury to the child, and therefore the circuit court erred by removing the mother's name from the child maltreatment registry because: (1) the child had bruising on the back of her thighs from the back of her knees to the bottom of her buttocks; (2) there were at least eight to ten bruises, which were evidence by several straight lines, some of which were near the child's vaginal area; (3) there was testimony that the bruises were at least 24 hours old; (4) two of the other children being fostered by the mother told an investigator that she used a switch when administering punishment; and (5) the mother herself stated during the investigation that she had used a switch to swat the child. None of the exceptions to a finding of abuse under § 12-12-503(2)(C) were present. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. R.C, 368 Ark. 660, 249 S.W.3d 797 (2007), cert. denied, R. C. v. Ark. HHS, 128 S. Ct. 359, 169 L. Ed. 2d 58 (2007).

Arkansas State Board of Collection Agencies' decision that it was unable to pursue money from a surety bond was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion because a consent judgment entered in favor of a customer determined that a corporation licensed under § 23-52-107 had charged usurious rates of interest with regards to a deferred presentment agreement, in violation of Arkansas State Board of Collection Agencies Regulation XXI and Ark. Const., Art. 19, § 13(a). Staton v. Ark. State Bd. of Collection Agencies, 372 Ark. 387, 277 S.W.3d 190 (2008).

Approval of a private-club permit was proper because a club established that it had a nonprofit purpose other than the consumption of alcohol under § 3-9-202(12)(A)(i) where it operated in conjunction with a restaurant and was designed to enhance the dining experience. Moreover, the Arkansas Alcoholic Beverage Control Division Board's interpretation of § 3-9-202(12)(A)(i) was entitled to deference, and arguments relating to nonprofit status that were not fully developed before the Board were not preserved for appellate review. Barnes v. Ark. Dep't of Fin. & Admin., 2012 Ark. App. 237, 419 S.W.3d 20 (2012).

When the Arkansas State Medical Board received verification that the Alaska proceedings resulted in a finding that the doctor had violated Alaska law, the Arkansas board then revoked his medical license under § 17-95-409, and the appellate court could not say that the Arkansas board's decision was arbitrary or capricious under subsection (h) of this section. Ahmad v. Ark. State Med. Bd., 2018 Ark. App. 111, 542 S.W.3d 224 (2018).

As Alaska pharmacists had reported high volumes of the doctor's patients with prescriptions for high-dosage opioids and controlled substances without visible symptoms and the doctor's exam findings did not support the specific diagnoses listed in patient records, the Arkansas Board's decision to revoke the doctor's Arkansas license under § 17-95-409 was not unduly harsh for purposes of subsection (h) of this section. Ahmad v. Ark. State Med. Bd., 2018 Ark. App. 111, 542 S.W.3d 224 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported the Department of Human Services' decision to place appellant on the Child Maltreatment Central Registry where the testimony and other evidence showed that he was the minor victim's sexual partner, and appellant was essentially asking the appellate court to reweigh the evidence and give one witness's testimony more weight and credibility. Shaw v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 322, 550 S.W.3d 925 (2018).

Injured Persons.

This section affords to “any person who considers himself injured in his person, business or property, by final agency action” judicial review of such action whether such person was a party to the administrative proceeding or not. Estes v. Walters, 269 Ark. 891, 601 S.W.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1980).

Appeal from agency decision dismissed where appellant failed to allege that he had sustained or was immediately in danger of sustaining injury either in his “person, business or property” as a consequence of the decision since only a claimant who has a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy has standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court in order to seek remedial relief; his injury must be concrete, specific, real and immediate rather than conjectural or hypothetical. Estes v. Walters, 269 Ark. 891, 601 S.W.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1980).

Inmates.

Inmate's petition failed to sustain a claim under this section to support a judicial review of the Arkansas Department of Corrections' decision because it did not set forth facts to show deprivation of a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause; the inmate alleged only a breach of contractual terms and that the DOC rules interfered with his right to correspond or otherwise communicate with persons not in prison. Renfro v. Smith, 2013 Ark. 40 (2013).

Because the circuit court summarily denied an inmate's petition to proceed in forma pauperis, a record of the entire proceedings was not lodged in the circuit court pursuant to subsection (d) of this section; the inmate stated a colorable claim that had to be evaluated in light of the entire record, and he was, therefore, entitled to proceed in forma pauperis. Ruiz v. Felts, 2017 Ark. 85, 512 S.W.3d 626 (2017).

Judicial review of administrative complaints is generally unavailable to inmates unless a constitutional violation is sufficiently alleged. When an inmate challenges a disciplinary proceeding and prison officials' implementation of Department of Correction policy, the petition must allege a constitutional question sufficient to raise a liberty interest. Muntaqim v. Kelley, 2019 Ark. 240, 581 S.W.3d 496 (2019).

Circuit court did not err in denying an inmate's petition to proceed in forma pauperis on his claims that prison officials initiated and conducted a disciplinary proceeding against him in violation of his constitutional rights because the Department of Correction officials did not violate his right to due process as there was no liberty interest protecting against a 20-day assignment to punitive isolation; and the inmate's claim that disciplinary charges were brought against him in retaliation for his exercising his right to seek redress of grievances failed to support his petition because the disciplinary charges were supported by “some evidence” that the inmate had threatened and acted insolently toward prison officials. Muntaqim v. Kelley, 2019 Ark. 240, 581 S.W.3d 496 (2019).

Judicial-Discipline Matters.

The Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act (§ 25-15-201 et seq.) is inapplicable to judicial-discipline matters under subdivision (h)(4) of this section. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n v. Proctor, 2010 Ark. 38, 360 S.W.3d 61, cert. denied, isability Comm'n, 561 U.S. 1027, 130 S. Ct. 3516, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1093 (2010)(mem.).

Jurisdiction.

There was no final agency action necessary for purposes of judicial review under this section because a doctor voluntarily surrendered the doctor's medical license before the board could render a decision on the doctor's requests for a closed hearing and voluntary restriction of the doctor's license; the circuit court correctly found that it lacked jurisdiction. Baber v. Ark. State Med. Bd., 2010 Ark. 243, 368 S.W.3d 897 (2010).

“Court of competent jurisdiction” is circuit court; chancery court did not have jurisdiction to entertain suit. Arkansas State Bd. of Educ. v. Purifoy, 292 Ark. 526, 731 S.W.2d 209, 1987 Ark. LEXIS 2179 (1987), superseded by statute as stated in, Walker v. Ark. State Bd. of Educ., 2010 Ark. 277, 365 S.W.3d 899 (2010).

The judicial review provisions of this subchapter are not applicable to the discharge of an employee; the discharge of an employee is not an adjudication but administrative decision and the circuit court is without jurisdiction to review such actions. Viswanathan v. Mississippi County Cmty Coll. Bd. of Trs., 318 Ark. 810, 887 S.W.2d 531 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 815 (1995).

A court retains jurisdiction over a proceeding after it remands the proceeding to an agency pursuant to subsection (f) of this section and, therefore, can issue subpoenas after such a remand. Oliver v. Pulaski County Court, 340 Ark. 681, 13 S.W.3d 156 (2000).

The administrative remedy available to the State Medical Board before the State Board of Dental Examiners on its claim that a dentist, with the aid of the State Board of Dental Examiners, engaged in the unlawful practice of medicine was inadequate and, therefore, the chancery court had jurisdiction over the matter. Ark. State Med. Bd. v. Schoen, 338 Ark. 762, 1 S.W.3d 430 (1999).

There can be no judicial review pursuant to subdivision (h)(3) of this section when the circuit court enjoins an agency from conducting a hearing, thereby preventing the agency from making a decision regarding a person's request for a continuance. Ark. Prof'l Bail Bondsman Licensing Bd. v. Frawley, 350 Ark. 444, 350 Ark. 444, 88 S.W.3d 418 (2002).

Reviewing court lacked jurisdiction to consider the supplier's appeal, because the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter, when the decision of the Office of State Procurement did not emanate from a hearing and the Office did not issue an order containing any findings of fact; administratively, the Office merely determined that the supplier's protest could not be heard, therefore, the decision did not come within the purview of the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, and thus the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review it. Fatpipe, Inc. v. State, 2012 Ark. 248, 410 S.W.3d 574 (2012).

Circuit court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to review the licensing decision of the Medical Marijuana Commission (MMC) concerning cultivation facilities because (1) under this section, no “adjudication” as defined by statute occurred at the agency level and the MMC's decision was not quasi-judicial, and (2) under § 25-15-207, the court only had jurisdiction to resolve a rule's validity or applicability, but the invalidity of a MMC rule was not pled, the “applicability” of a rule was not contested, and no declaration of whether a rule should have been applied was sought; instead, the complaints sought a declaration that the “application” of the MMC rules was improper, unfair, and arbitrary. Ark. Dep't of Fin. & Admin. v. Naturalis Health, LLC, 2018 Ark. 224, 549 S.W.3d 901 (2018).

Supreme Court of Akansas did not address whether Rule 19 of the Medical Marijuana Commission conveyed subject-matter jurisdiction to the circuit court; although that rule provided that a denial of a cultivation license may be appealed to the circuit court, the issue was not ripe because the appellees had not been issued denial letters subsequent to an adjudication. Ark. Dep't of Fin. & Admin. v. Naturalis Health, LLC, 2018 Ark. 224, 549 S.W.3d 901 (2018).

Modification.

Revocation of license held to be unduly harsh and penalty modified to suspension for one year. Ark. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Patrick, 243 Ark. 967, 423 S.W.2d 265 (1968).

The trial court has the authority to modify a penalty assessed under this subchapter if it is found that such penalty is unduly harsh and unreasonable under all the facts. Arkansas State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Isely, 13 Ark. App. 111, 680 S.W.2d 718 (1984).

Under subsection (h), the trial court has the discretion to decide whether or not to modify an agency decision. Brown v. Department of Human Servs., 330 Ark. 764, 956 S.W.2d 866 (1997).

Procedural Irregularities.

Alleged procedural irregularities in administration of market conduct examination, results of which formed basis of State Insurance Commissioner's finding, were not matters of record before the commissioner; therefore, the court could take evidence about these matters as they went towards alleged irregularities in procedure not in the record and could support a showing of discriminatory treatment of insurer. Garner v. Foundation Life Ins. Co., 17 Ark. App. 13, 702 S.W.2d 417 (1986).

State Police Commission's failure to adhere to its own requirements that the results of police officer's drug test results be confirmed by a medical review officer deprived police officer of the fundamental rights the commission's procedures were designed to protect, and commission's decision to terminate officer was reversed. Stueart v. Arkansas State Police Comm'n, 329 Ark. 46, 945 S.W.2d 377 (1997).

Trial court erred in dismissing as untimely appellant's petition for judicial review of an assessment declaring appellant to be a sex offender where the record did not contain any evidence that letters from the Arkansas Department of Correction Sex Offender Screening and Risk Assessment Committee were sent to appellant by certified mail, as required by § 12-12-922(b)(7)(A)(i). Without proof that the letters were properly sent, it could not be said that either letter constituted a final decision under § 25-15-212(b). Munson v. Arkansas Dep't of Corr. Sex Offender Screening & Risk Assess., — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Ark. LEXIS 226 (Mar. 22, 2007).

Issuance of a commercial disposal well permit was made upon unlawful procedure and was thus subject to reversal under subdivision (h)(3) of this section because the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission failed to comply with its own rules pursuant to § 15-71-111(a)(3) when it did not require timely proof of financial assurance under Ark. Oil & Gas Comm'n Rule H-1. Capstone Oilfield Disposal of Ark., Inc. v. Pope County, 2012 Ark. App. 231, 408 S.W.3d 65 (2012).

Record.

The results of a polygraph examination would not be the type of evidence commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs, thus there was no error in excluding the results from the record of a hearing. Baxter v. Ark. State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 269 Ark. 67, 598 S.W.2d 412 (1980).

An administrative agency was not required to file an answer to a complaint which was in the nature of a petition for review of a final decision of the agency; the agency met the requirement of subsection (d) by filing the original or a certified copy of the record of the proceeding under review. Whitlock v. G.P.W. Nursing Home, Inc., 283 Ark. 158, 672 S.W.2d 48 (1984).

Where the parties agreed not to submit medical records as part of the administrative record in a case involving the operation of a pain management program by a physician, it was improper to charge the physician for copying costs. Kale v. Ark. State Med. Bd., 367 Ark. 151, 238 S.W.3d 89 (2006).

Declining to award a former certified nursing assistant a default judgment against the Department of Human Services (DHS) based on its failure to timely file the record on appeal was not error as default judgment was not an appropriate remedy for an appeal from an administrative proceeding. Additionally, DHS had received an extension of time to file the record, and the record was filed within 90 days as required by subdivision (d)(1) of this section. Snyder v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 473, 559 S.W.3d 771 (2018).

Where the administrative record was not filed in the circuit court due to an “inadvertent oversight”, the administrative record could not be filed directly with the appellate court, bypassing the circuit court, because the “reviewing court” in subdivision (d)(1) of this section was the lower court and not the appellate court. Furthermore, it had been more than 90 days from the service of the petition. Webb v. Sex Offender Assessment Comm., 2020 Ark. App. 30 (2020) (per curiam).

Remand.

Although the Arkansas Transportation Commission is excluded from the provisions of this subchapter, where a judge relied on this subchapter in issuing remand order, his action would not be reversed where the order could be supported on other grounds. Bridges v. Arkansas Motor Coaches, Ltd., 256 Ark. 1054, 511 S.W.2d 651 (1974).

Where record of proceeding was totally inadequate for review, the case was remanded to commission for adjudication in accordance with this subchapter. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n v. National Adv. Co., 273 Ark. 433, 619 S.W.2d 678 (1981).

Case was sent back to the Arkansas State Board of Chiropractic Examiners because the Board's final order imposing a fine on the chiropractors and placing them on probation for committing eight “unprofessional conduct” violations was not specific enough given the many issues in play and the voluminous agency record. Ark. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Currie, 2013 Ark. App. 612 (2013).

Case had to be remanded for the State Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers and Professional Surveyors to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law because the findings and conclusions were insufficient to allow a reviewing court to determine whether several issues were resolved in conformity with the law; the Board made no comment regarding the truth or falsity of a landowner's assertions against a surveyor. Ark. State Bd. of Licensure for Prof'l Eng'rs & Prof'l Surveyors v. Callicott, 2016 Ark. App. 476, 503 S.W.3d 860 (2016).

Request for Argument or Briefs.

Circuit court did not err in not inviting oral argument or written briefs, where no request for oral argument or for submission of briefs was made and where no objection was made after entry of circuit court order affirming board's action. Bank of Glenwood v. Arkansas State Banking Bd., 260 Ark. 677, 543 S.W.2d 761 (1976).

Scope of Review.

Under this section, the courts are given the same type of review that is applied by the federal courts to the federal Administrative Procedure Act. Arkansas Sav. & Loan Ass'n Bd. v. Central Ark. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 260 Ark. 58, 538 S.W.2d 505 (1976).

In view of the fact that administrative decisions are not reviewed de novo, the agency, and not the reviewing court, is in a position to observe witnesses and consider their demeanor and conduct so that the credibility of witnesses and the proper weight to be accorded evidence adduced is a prerogative of the agency, not the reviewing court. White County Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. F & M Bank, 262 Ark. 893, 562 S.W.2d 582 (1978).

Upon review of the actions of an administrative board or agency, the circuit court's review of the evidence is limited to a determination of whether there was substantial evidence to support the action taken, and upon appeal, the Supreme Court's review of the evidence is similarly limited. Ark. Real Estate Comm'n v. Harrison, 266 Ark. 339, 585 S.W.2d 34 (1979); Arkansas Real Estate Comm'n v. Hale, 12 Ark. App. 229, 674 S.W.2d 507 (1984).

Supreme Court must affirm the decision of an administrative agency if there is substantial evidence of record to support it. Partlow v. Arkansas State Police Comm'n, 271 Ark. 351, 609 S.W.2d 23 (1980).

When reviewing administrative decisions, the Supreme Court reviews the entire record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence to support the administrative agency's decision, or whether there was arbitrary and capricious action, or whether it was characterized by abuse of discretion. Ark. ABC Bd. v. King, 275 Ark. 308, 629 S.W.2d 288 (1982).

Review of agency action under the arbitrary and capricious standard is a narrow scope of review. Ark. State Bd. of Nursing v. Long, 8 Ark. App. 288, 651 S.W.2d 109 (1983).

Upon judicial review of administrative decisions, the court must review the entire record and determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the administrative findings. Ark. State Bd. of Nursing v. Long, 8 Ark. App. 288, 651 S.W.2d 109 (1983); Wright v. Ark. State Plant Bd., 311 Ark. 125, 842 S.W.2d 42 (1992).

The rules governing judicial review of administrative decisions are the same for both the circuit and appellate courts and this review is limited in scope; administrative decisions will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion. Fouch v. State, Alcoholic Beverage Control Div., 10 Ark. App. 139, 662 S.W.2d 181, 1983 Ark. App. LEXIS 935 (1983).

The reviewing court may not displace the board's choice between two fairly conflicting views even though the court might have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo; the reviewing court may not set aside a board's decision unless it cannot conscientiously find from a review of the entire record that the evidence supporting the decision is substantial. Fouch v. State, Alcoholic Beverage Control Div., 10 Ark. App. 139, 662 S.W.2d 181, 1983 Ark. App. LEXIS 935 (1983).

When reviewing administrative decisions, the court reviews the entire record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence to support the agency's decision, or whether there was arbitrary and capricious action, or action characterized by abuse of discretion. Green v. Carder, 282 Ark. 239, 667 S.W.2d 660 (1984).

The court will not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency, absent an abuse of discretion by that agency. Green v. Carder, 282 Ark. 239, 667 S.W.2d 660 (1984).

The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board had the statutory authority to make findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the evidence presented, and the circuit court acted without authority in making its own findings of fact and conclusions of law in the absence of a decision by the board. ABC Bd. v. Hicks, 19 Ark. App. 212, 718 S.W.2d 488 (1986).

The trial court may reverse or modify a board's decision if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion, and the Supreme Court's review is similarly limited. Ark. ABC Bd. v. Muncrief, 308 Ark. 373, 825 S.W.2d 816 (1992).

Administrative agencies are better equipped than courts, by specialization, insight through experience, and more flexible procedures, to determine and analyze underlying legal issues affecting their agencies, and this recognition accounts for the limited scope of judicial review of administrative action, and the refusal of a trial court to substitute its judgment and discretion for that of an administrative agency. Wright v. Ark. State Plant Bd., 311 Ark. 125, 842 S.W.2d 42 (1992).

Where the trial court took three of the factors under subsection (h) into consideration: whether supported by substantial evidence, whether made upon unlawful procedure, and whether there existed arbitrary and capricious procedure, this was more than sufficient to satisfy this subchapter. Wright v. Ark. State Plant Bd., 311 Ark. 125, 842 S.W.2d 42 (1992).

Appellate court review is not directed toward the circuit court but toward the decision of the agency; the administrative agency's decision will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. Arkansas State Hwy. & Transp. Dep't v. Kidder, 326 Ark. 595, 933 S.W.2d 794 (1996).

An appellate court may reverse or modify an agency decision if the substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are, inter alia, not supported by substantial evidence of record or are arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion. Olsten Health Servs., Inc. v. Arkansas Health Servs. Comm'n, 69 Ark. App. 313, 12 S.W.3d 656 (2000).

Substantial evidence supported the decision rendered by The Arkansas Department of Human Services which gradually cut the assigned number of hours of private-duty nursing care which was medically necessary for a patient's care, based on the last documented prescription the Department received. In re Brandenburg, 83 Ark. App. 298, 126 S.W.3d 732 (2003).

Decision by the Department of Human Services are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act; thus, the appellate court reviewed the decision of an agency who held that a school principal had abused a child when paddling him for discipline, rather than the trial court decision, to see if it was supported by substantial evidence. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Holman, 96 Ark. App. 243, 240 S.W.3d 618 (2006).

In conducting review, pursuant to this section, of a decision of the Arkansas State Medical Board, which revoked a physician's license based on a finding that he violated Regulation 2.7 by becoming sexually involved with a patient, the court found substantial evidence to uphold the decision because the evidence showed that the physician became romantically involved with a patient and subsequently ordered prescription medication for her; however, revocation of the physician's license to practice under § 17-95-409 was arbitrary and capricious based on the physician's unblemished professional record and based on the fact that he did not try to willfully violate the Regulations. Thus, the revocation was modified to a one-year suspension. Collie v. Ark. State Med. Bd., 370 Ark. 180, 258 S.W.3d 367 (2007).

Section 23-48-603 did not allow the Arkansas Bank Commissioner to award interest to dissenting shareholders for the period between the date the surviving bank tendered an offer of the fair value of the shares, until the final determination of the value of the shares after the appraisal process, because the Arkansas General Assembly did not grant the Commissioner the authority to award either prejudgment or postjudgment interest under § 23-48-603. Brookshire v. Adcock, 2009 Ark. 207, 307 S.W.3d 22 (2009).

Appellate court could not reverse a decision of the Arkansas Department of Human Services interpreting its Medicaid reimbursement rules because the agency's interpretation was neither too narrow nor clearly wrong and its denial of a health services company's request for reimbursement was supported by substantial evidence. Northport Health Servs. of Ark. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. 619, 363 S.W.3d 308 (2009).

There was no error in suspending the licensee's funeral director license for one year and imposing a $1,500 fine, because the evidence was sufficient to support the determination by the Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors that the licensee violated § 20-18-303, when the Division of Vital Records repeatedly and fruitlessly contacted the licensee to obtain the demanded information and death certificate, and despite an offer by the Division to help facilitate the filing, the Division was required to take the extraordinary step of issuing the death certificate under its own authority. Collins v. Ark. Bd. of Embalmers & Funeral Dirs., 2009 Ark. App. 498, 324 S.W.3d 716 (2009).

In an appeal by parents under this section of the Arkansas State Board of Education's decision to close a K-12 school campus under § 6-20-602(a), the state's duty to provide an adequate education, its obligation to render a definition of excessive transportation time, and its obligation to adequately fund the transportation needs of school districts were not issues before the court where the state was not a party to the action. Walker v. Ark. State Bd. of Educ., 2010 Ark. 277, 365 S.W.3d 899 (2010).

Arkansas Veterinary Medical Examining Board's findings that a veterinarian violated § 17-101-305(a)(5) and Board Regulations 19F, 19L, and 19O, were not supported by substantial evidence because these provisions required expert evidence of the standard of care, and no such evidence was presented. Zepecki v. Ark. Veterinary Med. Examining Bd., 2010 Ark. App. 187, 375 S.W.3d 41 (2010).

Decision by the Appraiser Licensing and Certification Board that a real estate appraiser had violated several standards of appraisal practice was properly overturned because the Board's findings of fact did not correlate with its conclusions of law relating to the professional standards that it found that the appraiser had violated. Since the Board's conclusions of law were without adequate corresponding factual support, they lacked substantial evidence and were arbitrary and capricious. Ark. Appraiser Licensing v. Quast, 2010 Ark. App. 511 (2010).

Because the Capitol Zoning District Commission's decision denying a property owner's application to install a 48-inch-high fence was supported by substantial evidence, it was not arbitrary and capricious. Capitol Zoning Dist. Comm'n v. Cowan, 2012 Ark. App. 619, 429 S.W.3d 267 (2012).

There was substantial evidence to support the Capitol Zoning District Commission's decision denying a property owner's application to install a 48-inch-high fence. The owner's property was one of the most historic residences in all of Arkansas, and surrounding properties traditionally had fences at or under 40 inches in height. Capitol Zoning Dist. Comm'n v. Cowan, 2012 Ark. App. 619, 429 S.W.3d 267 (2012).

There was substantial evidence to support the finding that the prior felony conviction should not be waived to allow the applicant to offer counseling, because the Arkansas Board of Examiners in Counseling found that the applicant's testimony that there would be no future aberrations in his behavior was not credible. Beavers v. Ark. Bd. of Examiners in Counseling, 2013 Ark. App. 222, 427 S.W.3d 130 (2013).

Administrative law judge (ALJ) said the mother was carelessly swinging a belt at the child and knowingly struck him, but the two adverbs of “carelessly” and “knowingly” were diametrically opposed and invalidated the reasoning behind her conclusion that the mother abused her child, and the facts did not rise to the level of substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision; the mother accidentally hit the child in the face as he was moving, which did not rise to the level of knowingly or intentionally as required by statute. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Children & Family Servs. v. Nelson, 2015 Ark. App. 98, 455 S.W.3d 859 (2015).

There was substantial evidence to support the revocation of the license of a title insurance company owner because there was a longtime pattern of poor record-keeping, poor management, and questionable business practices that enabled the owner's employee to commit fraud; and the owner disregarded the sanctity of escrow accounts and failed to place correct information on title policies regarding his license, business name, and the required statutory notices. Moreover, the sanction was not too harsh because revocation was an available sanction for the violations that occurred. Dyer v. Ark. Ins. Dep't, 2015 Ark. App. 446, 468 S.W.3d 303 (2015).

Substantial evidence supported the decision of the Department of Human Services that a teacher had committed sexual abuse of a minor student and ordering that the teacher's name be placed in the Child Maltreatment Central Registry, even though the criminal charges had been dropped; the ALJ had clearly considered the teacher's defenses and rejected them, the appellate court does not act as a super factfinder, and the teacher could not complain that he was denied an opportunity to cross-examine the student when he failed to subpoena her. J.C. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 131, 572 S.W.3d 878 (2019).

—Arbitrary, Capricious, Etc.

Administrative action may be regarded as arbitrary and capricious only where it is not supportable on any rational basis. Partlow v. Arkansas State Police Comm'n, 271 Ark. 351, 609 S.W.2d 23 (1980).

To set aside administrative action as arbitrary and capricious, it must be proven that it was willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and with a disregard of the facts or circumstances of the case. Partlow v. Arkansas State Police Comm'n, 271 Ark. 351, 609 S.W.2d 23 (1980); Ark. State Bd. of Nursing v. Long, 8 Ark. App. 288, 651 S.W.2d 109 (1983); Garner v. Foundation Life Ins. Co., 17 Ark. App. 13, 702 S.W.2d 417 (1986).

The requirement that administrative action not be arbitrary or capricious is less demanding than the requirement that it be supported by substantial evidence; in order for the action to be invalid as arbitrary, the action must lack rational basis or hinge on a finding of fact based on an erroneous view of the law, and the action is not arbitrary simply because the reviewing court would act differently. Woodyard v. Arkansas Diversified Ins. Co., 268 Ark. 94, 594 S.W.2d 13 (1980); In re Sugarloaf Mining Co., 310 Ark. 772, 840 S.W.2d 172 (1992).

Agency action held not arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion. Partlow v. Arkansas State Police Comm'n, 271 Ark. 351, 609 S.W.2d 23 (1980); Huth v. Division of Social Servs. of Dep't of Human Servs., 287 Ark. 294, 698 S.W.2d 789 (1985); Garner v. Foundation Life Ins. Co., 17 Ark. App. 13, 702 S.W.2d 417 (1986).

Agency action held to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Division of Social Servs. v. Oak Hills Corp., 287 Ark. 32, 695 S.W.2d 836 (1985); Wright v. Ark. State Plant Bd., 311 Ark. 125, 842 S.W.2d 42 (1992).

Even though the director for the Arkansas Tobacco Control Board sent the tobacco company an offer of settlement “recommending” a $500 fine for the tobacco company which gave unlawful rebates to retailers, and the company accepted the offer, the defense of agency estoppel was not preserved, and because the evidence established that the company had paid rebates to at least 28 Arkansas retail establishments, it was not arbitrary or capricious for the Board to reject the “recommendation” and impose a $28,000 fine and suspension of the company's permit for six months. H.T. Hackney Co. v. Davis, 353 Ark. 797, 120 S.W.3d 79 (2003).

Trial court determined that the administrative law judge acted arbitrarily in determining that the husband's annuity was purchased to assist the institutionalized spouse in qualifying for Medicaid benefits; however, the appellate court reversed and remanded for further findings as the Arkansas Department of Human Services did not properly complete the eligibility worksheet to determine eligibility. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Schroder, 353 Ark. 885, 122 S.W.3d 10 (2003).

Administrative law judge's finding that a stepfather, who acted at the direction of and in concert with the natural mother in disciplining their children with respect to a specific incident, was not entitled to the protection of the reasonable and moderate discipline exception under § 12-12-503(2)(C)(i), was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Parker, 88 Ark. App. 222, 197 S.W.3d 33, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 769 (2004).

Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors' denial of the request for licensure reinstatement of appellants, a funeral director and her funeral establishment was not arbitrary and capricious because the record demonstrated that appellants engaged in a systematic course of committing violations, resulting in suspensions, probation, and ultimately revocation of their funeral-director and funeral-establishment licenses and that even after their licenses were revoked, appellants continued to conduct funerals in violation of the statutes. Collins v. Ark. Bd. of Embalmers & Funeral Dirs., 2013 Ark. App. 678, 430 S.W.3d 213 (2013).

If an agency's action is supported by substantial evidence, then it follows automatically that the decision cannot be characterized as arbitrary and capricious. Reynolds v. Ark. Appraiser Licensing & Certification Bd., 2019 Ark. App. 587, 591 S.W.3d 837 (2019).

—Substantial Evidence.

Circuit court properly reversed an administrative decision that parents neglected their children as there was no substantial evidence to support a finding that the children were placed in danger by the parents by allowing them to spend the night with their step-grandfather, a convicted sex offender, following their grandmother's death, especially where those visits went without any suggestion of abuse. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Bixler, 91 Ark. App. 277, 210 S.W.3d 135 (2005), rev'd, 364 Ark. 292, 219 S.W.3d 125 (2005).

The requirement that the action of the board be supported by sufficient evidence does not place upon the board the burden of presenting evidence that a petition should be denied nor relieve the petitioner of the burden of presenting evidence sufficient to justify the granting of the petition. Gray's Butane Whsle., Inc. v. Arkansas Liquefied Petro. Gas Bd., 250 Ark. 69, 463 S.W.2d 639 (1971).

Substantial evidence supported agency decision. White County Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. F & M Bank, 262 Ark. 893, 562 S.W.2d 582 (1978); Woodyard v. Arkansas Diversified Ins. Co., 268 Ark. 94, 594 S.W.2d 13 (1980); Garner v. Foundation Life Ins. Co., 17 Ark. App. 13, 702 S.W.2d 417 (1986).

Substantial evidence is valid, legal, and persuasive evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Partlow v. Arkansas State Police Comm'n, 271 Ark. 351, 609 S.W.2d 23 (1980); Ark. State Bd. of Nursing v. Long, 8 Ark. App. 288, 651 S.W.2d 109 (1983); Arkansas Real Estate Comm'n v. Hale, 12 Ark. App. 229, 674 S.W.2d 507 (1984).

On appeal, the court gives the evidence its strongest probative force in favor of the administrative agency. Williams v. Scott, 278 Ark. 453, 647 S.W.2d 115 (1983); Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Simes, 281 Ark. 81, 661 S.W.2d 378 (1983).

In order to establish an absence of substantial evidence to support the decision, the appellant must demonstrate that the proof before the administrative tribunal was so nearly undisputed that fair-minded men could not reach its conclusion. The question is not whether the testimony would have supported a contrary finding but whether it supports the finding that was made. Williams v. Scott, 278 Ark. 453, 647 S.W.2d 115 (1983); Wright v. Ark. State Plant Bd., 311 Ark. 125, 842 S.W.2d 42 (1992).

Evidence insufficient to support agency decision. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Simes, 281 Ark. 81, 661 S.W.2d 378 (1983); Fouch v. State, Alcoholic Beverage Control Div., 10 Ark. App. 139, 662 S.W.2d 181, 1983 Ark. App. LEXIS 935 (1983).

Substantial evidence means relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion based on a review of the entire record. Woodyard v. Arkansas Diversified Ins. Co., 268 Ark. 94, 594 S.W.2d 13 (1980); Fouch v. State, Alcoholic Beverage Control Div., 10 Ark. App. 139, 662 S.W.2d 181, 1983 Ark. App. LEXIS 935 (1983).

In applying subsection (h) to child abuse reporting cases, an administrative decision is reviewed under the same credible evidence standard, rather than the substantial evidence standard, however the remaining portions of that subsection remain in effect. DeWeese v. Polk County Children & Family Servs., 40 Ark. App. 139, 842 S.W.2d 466 (1992).

Substantial evidence did not support the decision placing the employee on the certified nursing abuse registry because the administrative law judge did not make the requisite findings to support the violation she found; the administrative law judge concluded that the employee's conduct was abusive under § 5-28-101(1), without specifying which of the two definitions of abuse in the provision she was applying. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Haen, 81 Ark. App. 171, 100 S.W.3d 740, 2003 Ark. App. LEXIS 206 (2003).

There was substantial evidence to support the Arkansas State Board of Physical Therapy's decision to suspend physical therapist, with probation thereafter, where during the hearing, there was evidence produced that the physical therapist and the patient engaged in kissing, hugging, and heavy petting during the course of her treatment, and there was also testimony that the physical therapist made very intimate and personal comments to the patient during treatment, and the two had intercourse within at least two weeks of the patient's final therapy session. Williams v. Ark. State Bd. of Physical Therapy, 353 Ark. 778, 120 S.W.3d 581 (2003).

Circuit court properly affirmed the decision of the Board of Trustees of the Arkansas Teacher Retirement System (ATRS) because substantial evidence supported its finding that a school district was responsible for paying the employer contribution to ATRS on settlement proceeds a teacher received and that it failed to follow the calculation of damages designated in the settlement as back pay. Palestine-Wheatley Sch. Dist. v. Hopkins, 2016 Ark. App. 112, 484 S.W.3d 682 (2016).

Circuit court did not fail to consider whether substantial evidence supported the decision of the Board of Trustees of the Arkansas Teacher Retirement System because it recited the standard of review applicable, specifically noting the standard of whether there was substantial evidence to support the agency's findings; the circuit court found that the decision of the administrative hearing officer from which the appeal arose was supported by substantial evidence. Palestine-Wheatley Sch. Dist. v. Hopkins, 2016 Ark. App. 112, 484 S.W.3d 682 (2016).

Where an appraiser was sanctioned by the appraiser board for a deficient appraisal, the fact that the board's chief investigator did not review certain documents until the hearing did not, by itself, render the board's decision without substantial evidence to support it. Reynolds v. Ark. Appraiser Licensing & Certification Bd., 2019 Ark. App. 587, 591 S.W.3d 837 (2019).

Sovereign Immunity.

Circuit court erred in dismissing with prejudice, based on sovereign immunity, an administrative appeal from final orders of the Oil and Gas Commission because sovereign immunity was not implicated where the commission was not “made a defendant” as contemplated by the state constitution; the commission's role in the proceeding was that of a tribunal or a quasi-judicial decision-maker rather than a real party in interest. It followed that the circuit court's rulings declaring the adjudicatory provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act unconstitutional and invalidating the commission's orders as void ab initio also were reversed. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm'n v. Hurd, 2018 Ark. 397, 564 S.W.3d 248 (2018).

Standing.

Since the Arkansas Department of Labor is covered under the Administrative Procedure Act both, employer and employee have the right to institute an original action in a court of law. United States Rooter All Type Plumbing Co. v. Holliman, 50 Ark. App. 125, 900 S.W.2d 580 (1995).

The court rejected the contention that when an individual does not appear in the proceedings below, but seeks to appeal a final action under the Administrative Procedures Act, he must set out in his petition how the issuance of the permit will harm him; instead, in order to have standing, a petitioner must assert in his pleadings how he has already sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining injury either in his person, business, or property as a consequence of the final action. Ark. Alcoholic Bev. Control v. Muncrief, 74 Ark. App. 221, 45 S.W.3d 438 (2001).

There is no need for Arkansas courts to resort to the requirements for standing under the federal Administrative Procedure Act when determining standing under § 25-15-212(a); a petitioner under the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act (APA), §§ 25-15-201 to 25-15-217, did not have to show an “injury in fact” and that such injury was within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected, as those terms were used under the federal Administrative Procedure Act, because the Arkansas APA did not have the same requirements as the federal Administrative Procedure Act. Ark. Bev. Retailers Ass'n v. Moore, 369 Ark. 498, 256 S.W.3d 488 (2007).

Liquor store retailers' association had standing under § 25-15-212(a) to challenge a decision of the Arkansas Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, which granted permits to a department store, based on the association's claims of disparate treatment under § 3-4-218 and its members' inability to compete on an equal basis with the store. Ark. Bev. Retailers Ass'n v. Moore, 369 Ark. 498, 256 S.W.3d 488 (2007).

In an appeal by parents of the Arkansas State Board of Education's decision to close a K-12 school campus under § 6-20-602(a), the parents' allegation that their children would suffer a negative impact on their academic achievement due to the Board's approval of the school district's petition for closure was sufficient injury to confer standing under this section. Walker v. Ark. State Bd. of Educ., 2010 Ark. 277, 365 S.W.3d 899 (2010).

Competitor challenging the transfer of a retail liquor permit sufficiently alleged standing pursuant to subsection (a) of this section and standing was not challenged by the permit holder or the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. The circuit court erred by raising the standing issue sua sponte and finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition, as the issue of standing is not akin to subject-matter jurisdiction; instead, it is a defense that may be waived by the parties. Gildehaus v. Ark. ABC Bd., 2016 Ark. 414, 503 S.W.3d 789 (2016).

Retail liquor permittee had standing to petition for review of the decision granting a competitor's liquor-permit application where he held a permit for a nearby location that would have been in direct competition with the competitor's store. Moore v. Ark. ABC Bd., 2016 Ark. 422, 503 S.W.3d 796 (2016).

Cited: Norton v. Blaylock, 409 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. Ark. 1969); Floyd v. Ark. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 248 Ark. 459, 451 S.W.2d 874 (1970); Ark. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Whayne, 248 Ark. 934, 454 S.W.2d 667 (1970); Arkansas State Racing Comm'n v. Sayler, 249 Ark. 913, 462 S.W.2d 472 (1971); Ark. Sav. & Loan Ass'n Bd. v. Corning Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 264, 478 S.W.2d 431 (1972); Norton v. Blaylock, 285 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Ark. 1973); Hickman v. Arkansas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 361 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Jarvis v. ABC Bd., 253 Ark. 728, 488 S.W.2d 712 (1973); Arkansas Racing Comm'n v. Emprise Corp., 254 Ark. 975, 497 S.W.2d 34 (1973); Thomas v. Committee “A” Thomas, 255 Ark. 517, 255 Ark. 517, 501 S.W.2d 248, 1973 Ark. LEXIS 1398 (1973); Selig v. Novak, 256 Ark. 278, 506 S.W.2d 825 (1974); Hewitt v. Gage, 257 Ark. 579, 519 S.W.2d 749 (1975); Jones v. Reed, 267 Ark. 237, 590 S.W.2d 6 (1979); Citizens Bank v. Arkansas State Banking Bd., 271 Ark. 703, 610 S.W.2d 257 (1981); Snyder v. ABC Bd., 1 Ark. App. 92, 613 S.W.2d 126 (1981); Copeland v. ABC Bd., 4 Ark. App. 143, 628 S.W.2d 588 (1982); Rowell v. Austin, 276 Ark. 445, 637 S.W.2d 531 (1982); Johnson v. Ark. ABC Bd., 6 Ark. App. 366, 642 S.W.2d 335 (1982); Fayetteville School Dist. No. 1 v. ABC Bd., 279 Ark. 89, 648 S.W.2d 804 (1983); Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Donis, 280 Ark. 169, 655 S.W.2d 452 (1983); ABC Div. v. Barnett, 285 Ark. 189, 685 S.W.2d 511 (1985); Livingston v. Ark. State Medical Bd., 288 Ark. 1, 701 S.W.2d 361 (1986); Patterson v. Hillcrest Home, 299 Ark. 27, 770 S.W.2d 654 (1989); Arkansas State Bd. of Cosmetology v. Roberts, 28 Ark. App. 249, 772 S.W.2d 624 (1989); Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Heath, 307 Ark. 147, 817 S.W.2d 885 (1991); Edwards v. ABC Div. Bd., 307 Ark. 245, 819 S.W.2d 271 (1991); Hollabaugh v. Ark. State Medical Bd., 43 Ark. App. 83, 861 S.W.2d 317 (1993); Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Walters, 315 Ark. 204, 866 S.W.2d 823 (1993); Volunteer Council v. Governmental Bonding Bd., 319 Ark. 716, 894 S.W.2d 580 (1995); Thomas v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 319 Ark. 782, 894 S.W.2d 584 (1995); Bohannon v. Ark. State Bd. of Nursing, 320 Ark. 169, 895 S.W.2d 923 (1995); Regional Care Facilities, Inc. v. Rose Care, Inc., 322 Ark. 767, 912 S.W.2d 409 (1995); Douglass v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 323 Ark. 105, 913 S.W.2d 277 (1996); Ark. Appraiser Licensing & Certification Bd. v. Fletcher, 326 Ark. 628, 933 S.W.2d 789 (1996); Mid-South Rd. Bldrs., Inc. v. Ark. Contractors Licensing Bd., 328 Ark. 630, 946 S.W.2d 649 (1997); Social Work Licensing Bd. v. Moncebaiz, 332 Ark. 67, 962 S.W.2d 797 (1998); Ark. Bd. of Exm'rs. v. Carlson, 334 Ark. 614, 976 S.W.2d 934 (1998); Ark. Bd. of Registration for Professional Geologists v. Ackley, 64 Ark. App. 325, 984 S.W.2d 67 (1998); Brown v. Ark. State Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Licensing Bd., 336 Ark. 34, 984 S.W.2d 402 (1999); McQuay v. Arkansas State Bd. of Architects, 337 Ark. 339, 989 S.W.2d 499 (1999); Ford v. Keith, 338 Ark. 487, 996 S.W.2d 20 (1999); Ark. Contractors Licensing Bd. v. Pegasus Renovation Co., 347 Ark. 320, 64 S.W.3d 241 (2001); Ark. Prof'l Bail Bondsman Licensing Bd. v. Oudin, 348 Ark. 48, 69 S.W.3d 855 (2002); Van Curen v. Ark. Prof'l Bail Bondsman Licensing Bd., 79 Ark. App. 43, 84 S.W.3d 47 (2002); Holloway v. State Bd. of Architects, 79 Ark. App. 200, 86 S.W.3d 391 (2002); Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Campbell, 87 Ark. App. 206, 189 S.W.3d 495 (2004); Mann v. Ark. Prof'l Bail Bondsman Licensing Bd., 88 Ark. App. 393, 199 S.W.3d 84 (2004); Batiste v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 361 Ark. 46, 204 S.W.3d 521 (2005); Hanks v. Sneed, 366 Ark. 371, 235 S.W.3d 883 (2006); Linell v. Norris, 320 S.W.3d 642 (2009); Gilmore v. Ark. Bd. of Registration for Prof'l Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, 2011 Ark. App. 139, 381 S.W.3d 860 (2011); Hester v. Ark. Prof'l Bail Bondsman Licensing Bd., 2011 Ark. App. 389, 383 S.W.3d 925 (2011); Marrufo v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. 323, 429 S.W.3d 210 (2013); Halstead v. Sex Offender Assessment Comm., 2013 Ark. App. 445 (2013); Brown v. Sex Offender Assessment Comm., 2014 Ark. App. 236 (2014); Odyssey Healthcare Operating A. LP v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 459, 469 S.W.3d 381 (2015); McCormick v. Ark. State Med. Bd., 2017 Ark. App. 697, 545 S.W.3d 776 (2017).