Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-108 (2026)
Concealment, suppression, or omission of material facts
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When utilized in connection with the sale or advertisement of any goods, services, or charitable solicitation, the following is unlawful:
- The act, use, or employment by a person of any deception, fraud, or false pretense;
- The concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression, or omission;
- Displaying or causing to be displayed a fictitious or misleading name or telephone number on an Arkansas resident's caller identification service; or
- Using a third party to display or cause to be displayed a fictitious or misleading name or telephone number on an Arkansas resident's caller identification service.
- Subdivision (a)(3) of this section does not apply to the transmission of a caller identification service by a telecommunications provider that complies with § 23-17-122.
History. Acts 1971, No. 92, § 4; A.S.A. 1947, § 70-904; Acts 1991, No. 1177, § 3; 1995, No. 836, § 2; 2019, No. 677, § 3.
A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 4-88-107. Former § 4-88-108 has been renumbered as § 4-88-109.
Acts 2019, No. 677, § 1, provided: “Legislative findings and intent.
“(a) The General Assembly finds that:
“(1) The citizens of this state are being negatively affected by illegal robocalls from telemarketers and from others seeking to perpetrate scams on them;
“(2) While these illegal robocalls are frustrating for most, the robocalls are costly and dangerous for far too many Arkansans;
“(3) An alarming number of illegal robocalls originate from scammers using automatic telephone dialing systems to send out thousands of phone calls per minute with fictitious or misleading names or telephone numbers displaying on unsuspecting consumers' telephone caller identification service;
“(4) These scammers are engaging in insidious schemes and targeting seniors and other vulnerable groups by soliciting personal information such as credit or debit card information and Social security numbers;
“(5) Displaying fictitious or misleading names or telephone numbers, or ‘spoofing’, is the predominant means by which a robocaller protects their identities and entices consumers to answer the telephone; and
“(6) Spoofing is the gateway for illegal robocalls and scams.
“(b) It is the intent of the General Assembly:
“(1) To protect the citizens of this state from being spoofed by receiving illegal robocalls from telemarketers and from others seeking to perpetrate scams on unsuspecting or vulnerable citizens;
“(2) To provide the citizens of this state who use a caller identification service with accurate information about the identities and locations of callers;
“(3) To encourage telecommunications providers to swiftly implement technologies that will allow telecommunications providers to identify and stop illegal calling practices; and
“(4) That this act be construed as broadly as possible to ensure that the citizens of this state are protected from the negative impact of illegal robocalls and to ensure that scammers and complicit telecommunications providers are held criminally accountable”.
Amendments. The 2019 amendment added designation (a); added (a)(3), (a)(4), and (b); and made stylistic changes.
Research References
ALR.
World wide web domain as violating state trademark protection statute or state unfair trade practices act. 96 A.L.R.5th 1.
Case Notes
Purpose.
This section is not designed to regulate the lawyer-client or accountant-client relationship. Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Ark. 1986). But see Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 110 S. Ct. 945, 108 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1990), rehearing denied, 494 U.S. 1092, 110 S. Ct. 1840, 108 L. Ed. 2d 968 (1990).
Negligence.
A violation of this section, prohibiting the employment of any deception or the intentional concealment of a material fact in the sale or advertisement of goods, can be considered as evidence of negligence. Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983).
Odometer.
There were no genuine issues of material fact remaining where there was a violation of the Arkansas Odometer Fraud Act by failing to have the odometer read the correct mileage or by adjusting it to zero to put buyers on notice; a violation of the Odometer Fraud Act constituted an unfair or deceptive trade practice. The damages for economic loss, treble damages, and attorney’s fees were upheld under the Odometer Fraud Act and the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Ukegbu v. Daniels, 2014 Ark. App. 422, 438 S.W.3d 284 (2014).
Omission.
Ordinarily, absent affirmative fraud, a party, in order to hold another liable in fraud (as opposed to breach of implied warranty), must seek out the information he desired and may not omit inquiry and examination and then complain that the other did not volunteer information. Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983).
Consumers sufficiently alleged specific deceptive statements or omissions made by a refrigerator manufacturer, which was necessary to assert actionable claims under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, § 4-88-107(a)(10) and subdivision (2) of this section. The consumers alleged: (1) that the manufacturer knew of defects in its refrigerators, which defects were a material fact; (2) the manufacturer failed to disclose that material fact to the public, knowing that its failure to do so would tend to deceive the public and cause them to purchase its refrigerators; (3) the manufacturer failed to disclose the defects with the intent of having the public rely on its omission to purchase its refrigerators; and (4) the consumers suffered an injury because they relied on the manufacturer's omission and would not have purchased its refrigerators if the defects had been disclosed. Rush v. Whirlpool Corp., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17210 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 22, 2008).
Scienter.
Section 4-88-107(a)(10) and subdivision (2) of this section did not require knowing or intentional deception, and § 4-88-107(a)(10) listed deception as unlawful, and since omitting an installation requirement from defendant supplier's rebate documents could be a deceptive trade practice, plaintiff retailer's claims under those sections, alleging the retailer lost profits and was forced to issue its own rebates to customers due to the supplier's refusal to honor its rebate program for the retailer's customers, should have survived summary judgment; subdivision (1) of this section listed both fraud and deception as unlawful acts, and those terms could not be coterminous, as that result would violate the basic principle that a statute had to be construed so that every word was given meaning and effect, if possible, so that no word was left void, superfluous, or insignificant. Curtis Lumber Co. v. La. Pac. Corp., 618 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2010).
Cited: Arkansas Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rogers, 279 Ark. 433, 652 S.W.2d 15 (1983); New Equity Sec. Holders Comm. ex rel. Golden Gulf, Ltd. v. Phillips, 97 B.R. 492 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Stein v. Lukas, 308 Ark. 74, 823 S.W.2d 832 (1992).