Ark. Code Ann. » Title 4 Chapter 09
Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-108 (2026)

Sufficiency of description

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section JustiaArk. Code CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c), (d), and (e), a description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a description of collateral reasonably identifies the collateral if it identifies the collateral by:
    1. specific listing;
    2. category;
    3. except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code;
    4. quantity;
    5. computational or allocational formula or procedure; or
    6. except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), any other method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable.
  3. A description of collateral as “all the debtor's assets” or “all the debtor's personal property” or using words of similar import does not reasonably identify the collateral.
  4. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a description of a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity account is sufficient if it describes:
    1. the collateral by those terms or as investment property; or
    2. the underlying financial asset or commodity contract.
  5. A description only by type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code is an insufficient description of:
    1. a commercial tort claim; or
    2. in a consumer transaction, consumer goods, a security entitlement, a securities account, or a commodity account.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1439, § 1.

Case Notes

Insufficient Descriptions.

Descriptions in security agreements and financing statements establishing liens on growing crops were insufficient to identify the subject of the security agreement. Piggott State Bank v. Pollard Gin Co., 243 Ark. 159, 419 S.W.2d 120 (1967) (decision under prior law).

Description of crops was insufficient as to the real estate not described under this section, § 4-9-402, and § 4-9-203. People's Bank v. Pioneer Food Indus., Inc., 253 Ark. 277, 486 S.W.2d 24 (1972) (decision under prior law).

Where the only land description was the statement that the property would be located at the Greenway Elevator Company at Greenway, Arkansas, which was identified only by a post office box number, this was insufficient to meet Uniform Commercial Code requirements. Corning Bank v. Bank of Rector, 265 Ark. 68, 576 S.W.2d 949 (1979) (decision under prior law).

Financing statement which neither indicated where equipment could be located nor disclosed the name of the business where the equipment was to be used fell short of the minimum requirement for collateral description. Womack v. Newman Fixture Co., 27 Ark. App. 117, 766 S.W.2d 949 (1989) (decision under prior law).

A description that only describes the debtor's name and the county and state where the real estate is located is not a sufficient description. Schieffler v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Peeler), 145 B.R. 973 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992) (decision under prior law).

Sufficient Descriptions.

A trial court erred in ruling that a description of the subject of a security agreement as “company owned inventory of” and giving the name and address of the company was insufficient as a matter of law. Security Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hlass, 246 Ark. 1113, 441 S.W.2d 91 (1969) (decision under prior law).

Description of crops and other plant products as collateral in security agreement and financial statement held sufficient. United States v. Oakley, 483 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (decision under prior law).

Where financing statement contains a collateral description stating that “crops covered hereby are growing or are to be grown on” certain described real property, the use of the term “crops” is a sufficient description under this section to put third parties on notice that soybean crops are covered by the financing statement since third parties finding this term in a financing statement should reasonably construe it to include all crops on the subject property. United States v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (decision under prior law).

Description of crops was sufficient to notify third parties that crops grown after the 1974 crop year are covered, and it should reasonably notify third parties that after-acquired property is part of the subject matter of the financing statement. United States v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (decision under prior law).

Trial court did not err in concluding that the bank's financing statement was sufficiently specific to identify the covered goods, or in concluding that the lender failed to avail itself of the information on file to protect its interests; the bank's statement was short, simple, and concise, which was all that was needed to perfect its lien. First Nat'l Bank of Lewisville v. Bank of Bradley, 80 Ark. App. 368, 96 S.W.3d 773 (2003).

Lender's lien on Arkansas crops was properly perfected by a financing statement because it reasonably identified the Arkansas crops as collateral under this section where it indicated that the collateral consisted of crops produced by two entities, and it suggested that the crops were located in Arkansas; this, along with the name of the secured lender, would have provided a third party with sufficient inquiry notice to locate the Arkansas crops. There was no evidence that an unsuccessful inquiry was made by a farmer prior to providing funding, and there was no unjust enrichment that allowed the farmer's equitable lien to prime the lender's lien because the lender did not participate or encourage the farmer's efforts in providing his own resources in planting and growing the crops. Newsom v. Rabo Agrifinance, Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 259, 427 S.W.3d 688 (2013).

Test of Sufficiency.

The test is whether the description made possible the identification of the real estate. Corning Bank v. Bank of Rector, 265 Ark. 68, 576 S.W.2d 949 (1979) (decision under prior law).

Nothing in the Arkansas statutes or case law indicates that a full legal description of real estate is required in a financing statement covering crops. United States v. Oakley, 483 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (decision under prior law).

Where the information in the financing statement, together with inquiry suggested therein, would enable a stranger to the transaction to identify crops, the filing of the financing statement perfected the government's security interest in the crops. United States v. Oakley, 483 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (decision under prior law).

Cited: United States v. Baptist Golden Age Home, 226 F. Supp. 892 (W.D. Ark. 1964); Commercial Credit Corp. v. National Credit Corp., 251 Ark. 702, 473 S.W.2d 881 (1971) (decisions under prior law); Richardson v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Lawhon Farm Supply, Inc. v. Hayes, 316 Ark. 69, 870 S.W.2d 729 (1994).

Subpart 2 Applicability of Chapter

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 5 cases, 1989–2013 · leading case: Newsom v. Rabo Agrifinance, Inc., 427 S.W.3d 688 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Newsom v. Rabo Agrifinance, Inc., 427 S.W.3d 688 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 6× “Collateral is sufficiently indicated if it is described pursuant to |7Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-9-108 (Repl. 2001), or if the financing statement provides an indication that it “covers all assets or all personal property.”
Tradax Am., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank in Stuttgart (In Re Howell Enter., Inc.), 105 B.R. 494 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1989). · cites it 2× “Although the value (loan proceeds) given by FNB was extended at the time of the execution of the security agreement, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-108 provides that a secur *499 ity interest in after-acquired property is deemed to be taken for new value, and not as security for an…”
Beebe v. MacMillan Petroleum (Arkansas), Inc. (In Re MacMillan Petroleum (Arkansas), Inc.), 115 B.R. 175 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990). · cites it 2× “” Moreover, at the time the security documents were executed and the debtor conveyed the security interest in its inventory, the inventory was not subject to the claims of these reclaiming sellers. Therefore, MCorp’s security agreement encompassed the crude oil in question.”
Niedermeier v. Cent. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 777 S.W.2d 210 (Ark. 1989). · cites it 3× “” Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-108 (1987) gives examples of what is meant by “new value;” new value arises where a secured party (1) makes an advance, (2) incurs an obligation, or (3) releases a perfected security interest.”
First Nat'l Bank of Lewisville v. Bank of Bradley, 96 S.W.3d 773 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 3× “Appellant asserted that appellee’s description was no more than a description of collateral as “all the debtor’s assets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” or words of similar import, which does not reasonably identify the collateral according to Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-108…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 4-9-108(b)(2) — 1 case
Newsom v. Rabo Agrifinance, Inc., 427 S.W.3d 688 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013). “Collateral is sufficiently indicated if it is described pursuant to |7Arkansas Code Annotated section 4-9-108 (Repl. 2001), or if the financing statement provides an indication that it “covers all assets or all personal property.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.