Ark. Code Ann. § 5-11-102 (2026)

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 583.

Case Notes

In General.

This section, in defining kidnapping, speaks in terms of restraint rather than removal. Summerlin v. State, 296 Ark. 347, 756 S.W.2d 908 (1988).

Construction.

This section speaks in terms of restraint rather than removal; consequently, it reaches a greater variety of conduct, since restraint can be accomplished without any removal whatever. Wofford v. State, 44 Ark. App. 94, 867 S.W.2d 181 (1993).

It is the quality and nature of the restraint, rather than the duration, that determines whether a kidnapping charge can be sustained; where the action of the accused substantially confines his victim in such a way that escape is made difficult or impossible, the fact that the restraint is of relatively brief duration does not necessarily remove it from the scope of this section. Wofford v. State, 44 Ark. App. 94, 867 S.W.2d 181 (1993).

Accomplice.

There was sufficient proof defendant assisted in the commission of murder, kidnapping and attempted murder, where there was testimony he drove car in which victims were confined, assisted in confining them, and encouraged shootings of the victims. Williams v. State, 329 Ark. 8, 946 S.W.2d 678 (1997).

Evidence of kidnapping and rape held sufficient, even though a co-defendant actually committed the rape, where defendant entered victim's house first while brandishing a gun, tackled her, permitted her to be restrained with duct tape, and threatened to kill her if she looked at them. Harrell v. State, 331 Ark. 232, 962 S.W.2d 325 (1998).

Trial court properly found defendant guilty as an accomplice to the crime of kidnapping because defendant not only accompanied her son to the victim's apartment, she also assisted him in beating her, encouraged him to “get” her, he forcibly exposed the victim to defendant, choked her, and then forced her down the hallway into a bedroom where he raped her orally and vaginally. Singleton-Harris v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 436, 439 S.W.3d 720 (2014).

Attempt.

The crime of attempted kidnapping is encompassed in this section and § 5-3-201. Green v. State, 313 Ark. 87, 852 S.W.2d 110 (1993).

Although defendant had a knife, a pair of handcuffs, duct tape, a leatherman-type tool, and gloves when he was arrested, the circumstantial evidence of defendant's intent to restrain the victim's liberty for the purpose of terrorizing or harming the victim was not overwhelming and defendant's conviction for attempted kidnapping, pursuant to subsection (a) of this section and § 5-3-201(a)(2), was reversed. Proctor v. State, 349 Ark. 648, 79 S.W.3d 370 (2002).

Class of Felony.

Defendant committed a Class Y kidnapping, rather than a Class B kidnapping, where the defendant took a 5-year-old girl from the inside of a store to his house, sexually abused her, and then left her on the sidewalk outside, but around the corner from, the store. Jameson v. State, 333 Ark. 128, 970 S.W.2d 785 (1998).

Commission of Felony.

Where defendant was accused of kidnapping and another offense and was acquitted on the other charge did not make it impossible for him to be guilty of kidnapping, since to convict him of kidnapping it was only necessary to show that the victim was forceably taken for the purpose of committing a felony. Black v. State, 250 Ark. 604, 466 S.W.2d 463 (1971) (decision under prior law).

Where the state charged a kidnapping occurred either for the purpose of terrorizing the victim or for facilitating the commission of a felony, the jury did not have to find the kidnapping occurred in connection with a felony in order to convict the defendant for kidnapping. Walters v. State, 283 Ark. 243, 675 S.W.2d 364 (1984).

Conspiracy.

Defendant committed an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit kidnapping, aggravated robbery, theft of property, and aggravated residential burglary because he took another person to his residence and showed the person the inside of the premises, discussed how to break in the residence and how to subdue his wife, and identified the property to be taken from the residence. Winkler v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 704, 425 S.W.3d 808 (2012).

Double Jeopardy.

Being convicted of rape and kidnapping does not violate a defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy. White v. State, 301 Ark. 74, 781 S.W.2d 478 (1989).

Elements of Offense.

Among the factors from an act of rape that may be considered in determining whether a separate kidnapping conviction is supportable include whether the movement or confinement: (1) prevented the victim from summoning assistance; (2) lessened the defendant's risk of detection; or (3) created a significant danger or increased the victim's risk of harm. Lee v. State, 326 Ark. 529, 932 S.W.2d 756 (1996).

Argument that there was insufficient evidence to support a kidnapping conviction based on a lack of evidence on the element of restraint without consent was not preserved for appellate review because a motion for the directed verdict before the trial court did not raise this issue. Davis v. State, 365 Ark. 634, 232 S.W.3d 476 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for kidnapping where the evidence showed that defendant picked the victim up by her waist and carried her away; defendant's purpose was clearly to cause physical injury or to terrorize. Davis v. State, 368 Ark. 351, 246 S.W.3d 433 (2007).

In the death-row inmate's capital murder trial, the pecuniary gain statutory aggravating factor did not unconstitutionally fail to narrow the class of death-eligible offenders on the ground that it merely duplicated an element of the underlying crime of felony murder during the course of a robbery, because the jury in the inmate's case was not instructed that the felony underlying the charge of capital murder was robbery; rather, the jury was instructed that the underlying felony was kidnapping, pursuant to § 5-10-101(a)(1)(iii), and that, consistent with the statutory definition of kidnapping under subdivisions (a)(3)-(5) of this section, it had to find that the inmate had restrained the victim with the purpose of inflicting physical injury upon her or engaging in sexual intercourse or sexual contact, or of committing aggravated robbery or any flight thereafter. After convicting the inmate of capital murder, the jury found in the penalty phase that he committed the murder for pecuniary gain, consistent with § 5-4-604(6); thus, there was no duplication of constitutional dimension or otherwise. Williams v. Norris, 576 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2009).

Evidence.

Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction. Black v. State, 250 Ark. 604, 466 S.W.2d 463 (1971); Guffey v. State, 253 Ark. 720, 488 S.W.2d 28 (1972); Martin v. State, 258 Ark. 529, 527 S.W.2d 903 (1975); McCraw v. State, 262 Ark. 707, 561 S.W.2d 71 (1978) (preceding decisions under prior law); Jackson v. State, 290 Ark. 160, 717 S.W.2d 801 (1986); Lewis v. State, 295 Ark. 499, 749 S.W.2d 672 (1988); Phills v. State, 301 Ark. 265, 783 S.W.2d 348 (1990); Vick v. State, 301 Ark. 296, 783 S.W.2d 365 (1990); Woods v. State, 302 Ark. 512, 790 S.W.2d 892 (1990); Fairchild v. State, 305 Ark. 406, 808 S.W.2d 743 (1991); Thomas v. State, 311 Ark. 609, 846 S.W.2d 168 (1993); McClure v. State, 314 Ark. 35, 858 S.W.2d 103 (1993); Chenowith v. State, 321 Ark. 522, 905 S.W.2d 838 (1995); Mills v. State, 322 Ark. 647, 910 S.W.2d 682 (1995); Britt v. State, 344 Ark. 13, 38 S.W.3d 363 (2001).

No corroborating testimony was necessary to prove crime of kidnapping. Black v. State, 250 Ark. 604, 466 S.W.2d 463 (1971) (decision under prior law).

To prove kidnapping, the state must only prove that the accused restrained the victim so as to interfere substantially with the victim's liberty, without the victim's consent, for a specific purpose outlined by this section. Jackson v. State, 290 Ark. 160, 717 S.W.2d 801 (1986).

Evidence held sufficient to support court's refusal to find defendant unfit for trial. Dyer v. State, 290 Ark. 405, 720 S.W.2d 297 (1986).

Evidence of marginal relevance admitted. Dumond v. State, 290 Ark. 595, 721 S.W.2d 663 (1986).

Proof of one's purpose or motive for an abduction is an essential element of the offense of kidnapping, and proof of the identity of the assailant is essential to conviction. Crutchfield v. State, 25 Ark. App. 227, 763 S.W.2d 94 (1988).

Voice identification was sufficient. White v. State, 303 Ark. 30, 792 S.W.2d 867 (1990).

There was substantial evidence to support the defendant's conviction of a Class Y kidnapping offense inasmuch as he did not voluntarily release his victim. Wells v. State, 303 Ark. 471, 798 S.W.2d 61 (1990).

Evidence held insufficient to sustain conviction. Shaw v. State, 304 Ark. 381, 802 S.W.2d 468 (1991).

The instrumentality used to inflict fear is patently relevant to crimes of rape, kidnapping and aggravated robbery, all of which include an element of force for perpetration. Brooks v. State, 308 Ark. 660, 827 S.W.2d 119 (1992).

Knife found at crime site was relevant to corroborate the testimony of the victim concerning stabbings and no prejudice resulted to the defendant from its admission into evidence. Brooks v. State, 308 Ark. 660, 827 S.W.2d 119 (1992).

Evidence held sufficient where defendant's use of physical force against the victim led to an inference that he intended to cause her physical harm and the questions defendant asked the victim regarding her marital status and her state of loneliness led to the inference that he was considering sexual contact with the victim. Green v. State, 313 Ark. 87, 852 S.W.2d 110 (1993).

It was sufficient to support the charge that the victim was kidnapped when she was forced to the rear of the store and bound to a chair. Neely v. State, 317 Ark. 312, 877 S.W.2d 589 (1994).

Although defendant was obliged to abort his robbery of a small store, the evidence of kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and attempted murder held sufficient. Durham v. State, 320 Ark. 689, 899 S.W.2d 470 (1995).

Where defendant dragged the victim for approximately one city block from a lighted city street to a dark and secluded area, defendant allowed the rape to be carried out more easily and decreased his risk of being caught, and where defendant strangled the victim to keep her from summoning assistance, the restraint employed exceeded that which was necessary to effectuate the crime of rape, and thus supported a separate conviction for kidnapping. Lee v. State, 326 Ark. 529, 932 S.W.2d 756 (1996).

Defendant's kidnapping conviction was proper pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) of this section where defendant duct-taped the victim's hands behind her back while he was robbing and fleeing from the liquor store. Lowe v. State, 357 Ark. 501, 182 S.W.3d 132 (2004).

Evidence showing that appellant formed a plan to lure the victim into his vehicle with the purpose of injuring or killing him, and that the victim died under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, was sufficient to support appellant's conviction of capital felony murder, with the underlying charge of kidnapping. Ridling v. State, 360 Ark. 424, 203 S.W.3d 63 (2005).

In a capital murder and kidnapping case, evidence was sufficient to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony, such as testimony of other witnesses that one of the victims had stolen marijuana plants from defendant, that defendant instructed others to say he was at home at the time of the murders, and that defendant approached his nephew and told him that if he ever said anything about the victims he would get hurt; however, the case was reversed because the trial court improperly allowed evidence concerning other bad acts and reputation. Green v. State, 365 Ark. 478, 231 S.W.3d 638 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's kidnapping conviction as the 13 year old victim's mother relied upon the representation that defendant was taking the victim to the movies with his daughter when she gave permission for the victim to leave her home with defendant; the victim's mother did not consent to defendant escorting her daughter to a motel room under the guise of meeting someone briefly before meeting her daughter at the movies. Mitchem v. State, 96 Ark. App. 78, 238 S.W.3d 623 (2006).

Trial court did not err in sustaining state's objection that the terms of the civil dispute regarding a loan and the collateral for the loan were irrelevant and in refusing to permit defendant to question the victim concerning the property that had been collateral for the loan because, even if the victim had lied regarding the terms of the loan, that would be no defense to the crimes for which he was convicted, which included kidnapping, terroristic threatening, and aggravated assault. Tarpley v. State, 97 Ark. App. 122, 245 S.W.3d 192 (2006).

Offense of terroristic threatening required no more than the communication of a threat, by word or deed, with the purpose of terrorizing the victim, and the offense of aggravated assault was accomplished when defendant displayed the gun and pointed it at the victim; given the testimony that defendant kept the doorway blocked for several minutes after performing those acts and that the victim was prevented from summoning assistance during that time, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the kidnapping conviction. Tarpley v. State, 97 Ark. App. 122, 245 S.W.3d 192 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's kidnapping conviction where defendant's accomplice testified that defendant killed the victim, and an officer testified that defendant stated that the accomplice attacked the victim, knocked him down, taped him in a chair, and that the victim was “moaning” and “in a bad way” before he died; although there was a discrepancy as to which individual attacked the victim, both statements pointed to defendant's involvement in the victim's murder. Holsombach v. State, 368 Ark. 415, 246 S.W.3d 871 (2007).

Circuit court did not err by admitting into evidence a recording of the kidnapping victim's 911 call as the evidence contained in the recording was relevant to prove the restraint element of the kidnapping offense and to counter defendant's argument that he released the victim; in the call, the victim told the operator the circumstances of the crimes and that she was bound and could not escape, and defendant did not produce any authority to support his position that the 911 recording was unduly prejudicial because the victim's voice was hysterical. Davis v. State, 368 Ark. 401, 246 S.W.3d 862 (2007).

Defendant's convictions for two counts of capital murder in violation of § 5-10-101(a)(4) and two counts of kidnapping in violation of subsection (a) of this section were appropriate, in part because evidence that defendant possessed a gun similar to that used in the murder was independently relevant proof on the issue of defendant's identity. Moreover, its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Gilcrease v. State, 2009 Ark. 298, 318 S.W.3d 70 (2009), appeal dismissed, 2011 Ark. 108 (2011).

Record disclosed that defendant disabled the rape victim's vehicle, hoisted her out of the vehicle, dragged her into the house, forcibly pulled her back inside the house when the victim attempted to escape, dragged to into the bedroom while the victim tried to hang onto the door frames and forced her to have sexual relations with him; the victim escaped on her own, and defendant did not release her. The Court of Appeals of Arkansas held that substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for kidnapping under subdivision (a)(5) of this section. Henson v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 464, 320 S.W.3d 19 (2009).

There was sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction for kidnapping; appellant substantially interfered with the victim's liberty interest by physically threatening her and impeding her egress from the home. The victim voiced her decision that she was leaving, thus expressing her intention and revoking her consent to remain at appellant's home; appellant then stood up, slammed the door telling the victim that she was not going anywhere and told her to go to his bedroom and when the victim refused, appellant slapped her and told her that he had a .380 pistol and would kill her if she said anything. Hickey v. State, 2010 Ark. 109 (2010).

As defendant hit the victim (his ex-wife's mother) in the head with the baseball bat and cut the victim's throat, threatened his ex-wife, and forced her to go with him from the scene of the crime, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and terroristic threatening under subsection (a) of this section and §§ 5-10-102(a)(2) and 5-13-301(a)(1)(A). Alvard v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 160 (2011).

Court did not err in denying defendant's motions for a directed verdict on kidnapping charges, in violation of subdivision (a)(4) of this section, because evidence was offered to establish his relationship with the victims, evidence was offered that he always carried a knife and pistol, and evidence was offered of his attempt to conceal the crimes and to manufacture an alibi. Green v. State, 2013 Ark. 497, 430 S.W.3d 729 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for kidnapping because the purpose of the restraint could have been inferred from circumstantial evidence where defendant had previously coerced the victim into having sex with him. Moreover, defendant was armed with a pistol and a screwdriver, and he threatened the victim that she would never see her son again. Van Winkle v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 591, 445 S.W.3d 542 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's kidnapping conviction; there was evidence that he restrained his mother, given defendant's concession that the charge of false imprisonment was proven, plus there was substantial testimony from his mother regarding his threats to kill her and his physical harm to her, and although defendant claimed that he did not threaten his mother, two witnesses testified otherwise, and witness credibility was for the jury to determine. Ronk v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 126 (2016).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for kidnapping because the victim identified defendant as the person who grabbed her as she ran along a paved trail at a lake, dragged her into the woods, threatened her, straddled her body, and beat and choked her. Furthermore, defendant's DNA was found on sunglasses located near the victim's headband and earbuds, defendant had a ring described by the victim, and eyewitnesses testified as to seeing defendant at the lake on the same day and the day before. Turner v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 5, 538 S.W.3d 227 (2018).

Federal Law.

Defendant had to be resentenced for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because his 2006 Arkansas conviction for kidnapping did not qualify as a predicate offense for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) as it was not a violent felony; this section was overbroad, and it was not divisible as the nefarious purposes listed in this section were means, not elements. United States v. Coleman, 918 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2019).

Indictment or Information.

Where the information originally charged that the defendant unlawfully restrained the victim so as to interfere substantially with her liberty for the purpose of engaging in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity, and the trial court allowed the state at the close of its case to amend the information to include the allegation that the defendant proposed to engage in sexual contact with the victim, the amendment was proper. Jones v. State, 275 Ark. 12, 627 S.W.2d 6 (1982).

State was not erroneously allowed to amend the information charging appellant with three counts of kidnapping based on subdivision (a)(4) of this section after his trial was underway because the additional allegations under subdivisions (a)(3) and (6) of this section in the amended information did not change the nature of the original kidnapping charge, but amended the manner in which the kidnapping took place. Furthermore, appellant was not unfairly surprised by the amendment since a review of the testimony made it clear that he inquired into whether his victims felt terrorized by his actions. Hill v. State, 370 Ark. 102, 257 S.W.3d 534 (2007), appeal dismissed, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. LEXIS 54 (Jan. 24, 2008).

Instructions.

Instruction that kidnapping included the taking of a person into another state or territory and transporting a person for the purpose of thwarting arrest or detention held not inherently erroneous. Hale v. State, 246 Ark. 989, 440 S.W.2d 550 (1969) (decision under prior law).

Jurisdiction.

State court held to have jurisdiction to hear evidence relating to the defendant's activity in another state where the evidence of such activity was necessary to prove a requisite element of the kidnapping charge which had been filed against him in Arkansas. Smith v. Housewright, 667 F.2d 689 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 978, 102 S. Ct. 2245 (1982).

Defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the murder took place in Arkansas was rejected as, although evidence showed that the victim's body was found in Oklahoma, and there was no positive evidence presented that the crime actually occurred outside of Arkansas; the record provided ample substantial evidence that, at the very least, the premeditation and deliberation element of capital murder and kidnapping by deception occurred in Arkansas. Smith v. State, 367 Ark. 274, 239 S.W.3d 494 (2006).

Lesser Included Offenses.

None of the crimes of rape, burglary or kidnapping is necessarily a lesser included offense of the other, since all involve separate elements, and it is not necessary to prove one offense in order to prove another. Hickerson v. State, 282 Ark. 217, 667 S.W.2d 654 (1984); Handy v. State, 24 Ark. App. 122, 749 S.W.2d 683 (1988).

Refusal to instruct the jury on lesser included offense held proper. Walters v. State, 283 Ark. 243, 675 S.W.2d 364 (1984).

Kidnapping and rape are not lesser included offenses of one another because each crime requires a different element of proof. While kidnapping does require the restraint to be substantial for one of several purposes, one of which is the purpose of engaging in sexual intercourse, kindapping does not require the act of sexual intercourse itself. Rape requires a sexual act by forcible compulsion; that force is not necessarily the same as that required to sustain a conviction for kidnapping. Cozzaglio v. State, 289 Ark. 33, 709 S.W.2d 70 (1986).

Where the victim was forced to drive to the county where she was repeatedly raped, her life was threatened several times although she was not seriously injured physically, and after the rape the victim was tied to a tree, the crime of rape and kidnapping were separate. Jones v. State, 290 Ark. 113, 717 S.W.2d 200 (1986).

A kidnapping which qualifies as a Class B felony is not a lesser included offense of a kidnapping which constitutes a Class Y felony. Rather, the offense is still kidnapping, even when there is a voluntary, safe release of the victim. Woods v. State, 302 Ark. 512, 790 S.W.2d 892 (1990).

Second-degree false imprisonment is not a lesser included offense of kidnapping; thus, instruction on second-degree or first-degree false imprisonment was not required in a kidnapping case. Davis v. State, 365 Ark. 634, 232 S.W.3d 476 (2006).

In a kidnapping case, there was no error in the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on false imprisonment because it was not considered a lesser-included offense to kidnapping. Sweet v. State, 2011 Ark. 20, 370 S.W.3d 510 (2011).

Restraint.

When the restraint exceeds that normally incident to the crime of rape or robbery, the perpetrator should also be subject to prosecution for kidnapping. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980); Frensley v. State, 291 Ark. 268, 724 S.W.2d 165 (1987); Smith v. State, 318 Ark. 142, 883 S.W.2d 837 (1994).

There was held to be clearly evidence of more than the minimal restraint which necessarily accompanies the crime of rape, and the evidence clearly formed the basis for the two separate crimes of rape and kidnapping. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980).

It is not necessary that a victim be captured or held at gunpoint for the offense of kidnapping to be established under this section; to prove kidnapping the state must only prove that the accused restrained the victim so as to interfere substantially with the victim's liberty, without the victim's consent, for a specific purpose outlined by the statute. Ellis v. State, 279 Ark. 430, 652 S.W.2d 35 (1983).

It is the quality and nature of the restraint, rather than the duration, that determines whether a kidnapping charge can be sustained. Cook v. State, 284 Ark. 333, 681 S.W.2d 378 (1984).

Whether or not the actor was able to complete the objective of the kidnapping is immaterial; once the kidnapper has undertaken the activity and the victim has been exposed to the attendant dangers, the act of kidnapping is complete. Cook v. State, 284 Ark. 333, 681 S.W.2d 378 (1984).

Evidence held sufficient so that a finding of substantial interference with the victim's liberty could be supported despite its relatively brief duration. Cook v. State, 284 Ark. 333, 681 S.W.2d 378 (1984).

Evidence of the use of a gun was relevant, although not essential, to a charge of kidnapping, which contains the element of restraint without consent. Hickerson v. State, 286 Ark. 450, 693 S.W.2d 58 (1985).

Evidence held sufficient to sustain a jury's finding that defendant substantially interfered with victim's liberty. Hickey v. State, 14 Ark. App. 50, 684 S.W.2d 830 (1985).

Substantial interference with the liberty of another person does not necessarily require that the interference be for a substantial period of time. Jackson v. State, 290 Ark. 160, 717 S.W.2d 801 (1986); Green v. State, 313 Ark. 87, 852 S.W.2d 110 (1993).

Where the defendant restrained the prosecutrix for the purpose of committing rape, and her children were restrained of their liberty by being kept in the car throughout the episode and the restraint was for the purpose of facilitating the commission of the principal offense, the proof was sufficient to support the three convictions of kidnapping. Dyer v. State, 290 Ark. 405, 720 S.W.2d 297 (1986).

The exclusion of de minimis restraints from the definition of kidnapping is desirable since offenses such as rape or robbery necessarily contemplate restrictions on the victim's liberty while the crime is actually committed. Thus, it is only when the restraint exceeds that normally incidental to the crime that the rapist (or robber) should also be subject to prosecution for kidnapping. Summerlin v. State, 296 Ark. 347, 756 S.W.2d 908 (1988).

Chasing and dragging the victim from room to room or building to building and forcefully engaging in acts of rape between victim's attempts at freedom involved restraint more than that normally incidental to the crime of rape, and warranted the finding that the defendant kidnapped his victim before and between the acts of rape. Harris v. State, 299 Ark. 433, 774 S.W.2d 121 (1989).

Where evidence showed the restraint on rape victim's liberty to have exceeded that which was incidental to the rape, conviction of kidnapping was also proper. Thomas v. State, 311 Ark. 609, 846 S.W.2d 168 (1993).

Evidence of restraint shown exceeded the restraint necessary to prove the crime of rape; thus, the defendant was also subject to prosecution for kidnapping. Aaron v. State, 312 Ark. 19, 846 S.W.2d 655 (1993).

Where there was no evidence that defendant interfered with the victim's liberty to an extent beyond that which was incidental to the underlying crimes of battery and theft, there was insufficient evidence to support a judgment of conviction for kidnapping. Chism v. State, 312 Ark. 559, 853 S.W.2d 255 (1993).

An offense such as rape necessarily contemplates restrictions on the victim's liberty while the crime is being committed; therefore, only when the restraint imposed exceeds that normally incidental to the underlying crime should the rapist also be subject to prosecution for kidnapping. Wofford v. State, 44 Ark. App. 94, 867 S.W.2d 181 (1993).

This section speaks in terms of restraint rather than removal; consequently, it reaches a greater variety of conduct, since restraint can be accomplished without any removal whatsoever. Smith v. State, 318 Ark. 142, 883 S.W.2d 837 (1994).

Evidence was sufficient to show restraint where the victim was forced to stay in a house during a beating, was removed to another location with his hands tied, and was prevented from leaving a house in the new location. McFarland v. State, 337 Ark. 386, 989 S.W.2d 899 (1999), cert. denied, McFarland v. Arkansas, 528 U.S. 933, 120 S. Ct. 334 (1999).

Defendant's restraint of the victim was not incident to the rape and was sufficient to satisfy the restraint without consent element of the offense of kidnapping; although the victim willingly entered defendant's car, defendant restrained her liberty without her consent prior to the rape by forcing her at gunpoint to go with him to his home rather than letting her get out of his car at her friend's house. Marbley v. State, 81 Ark. App. 165, 100 S.W.3d 48 (2003).

Pursuant to § 5-11-101(2) and subdivisions (a)(1) and (4) of this section, the restraint employed by defendant exceeded that which was necessary to effectuate the rapes of the two victims and, thus, supported defendant's separate convictions for kidnapping because (1) defendant continued to hold his victims hostage after the rapes were completed; (2) during the ordeal, defendant threatened, poked, slapped, and hit the victims both with his fist and with a vase; and (3) defendant not only raped the victims, but he demanded money from them as well. Moore v. State, 355 Ark. 657, 144 S.W.3d 260 (2004).

In a case alleging rape, kidnapping, and third-degree domestic battery, a sufficiency of the evidence argument was not preserved for review because defendant argued on the first time on appeal that the amount of restraint or force used did not warrant a kidnapping conviction and a third-degree battery conviction in addition to the rape. This was not the same argument raised during a directed verdict motion. Rounsaville v. State, 372 Ark. 252, 273 S.W.3d 486 (2008).

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict on the issue of the amount of restraint used to commit a kidnapping, in violation of subdivision (a)(5) of this section, because the state presented substantial evidence that defendant used deception to restrain the victim; defendant told the victim he was a police officer and showed her a badge, which constituted deception. Prater v. State, 2012 Ark. 164, 402 S.W.3d 68 (2012).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's kidnapping conviction as there was overwhelming evidence that defendant restrained the victim, and he threatened to kill her and her son; the victim testified how defendant restrained her with cables and locks for hours while he severely beat her, and defendant repeatedly told her that he was going to kill her and behead her son. The fact that the victim did not attempt to escape immediately after the restraints had been removed did not negate defendant's criminal conduct, nor did the fact that he later helped her bathe. Reynolds v. State, 2016 Ark. 214, 492 S.W.3d 491 (2016).

Sentencing.

Where appellant entered negotiated pleas of guilty to kidnapping under this section and additional charges, he was sentenced to 120 months' in prison with an additional 120-month suspended sentence; appellant was not entitled to postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, because he could not prove that counsel failed to advise him of a possible life sentence under § 5-4-401. On the record, counsel indicated that he had advised appellant that he could be subject to a life sentence if he violated the terms of the suspended sentence. French v. State, 2009 Ark. 443 (2009).

Defendant never argued to the trial court that the state's evidence proved a Class B felony kidnapping pursuant to this section, but not Class Y. Accordingly, defendant failed to comply with the requirements of Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(a), (c), and the issue was not preserved for appellate review. Sweet v. State, 2011 Ark. 20, 370 S.W.3d 510 (2011).

In a case where probation was revoked, a 20-year sentence for Class B felony kidnapping was not improper since it was authorized under § 5-4-401(a)(3); the appellate court was unable to reduce a sentence within the range of punishment contemplated by the Arkansas Legislature. Moreover, since appellant failed to object to the sentence imposed, he was unable to argue on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to consider alternatives to the 20-year sentence. Pfeifer v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 556 (2012).

Voluntary Release of Victim.

Defendant held not entitled to have the penalty ranges of the kidnapping offense reduced from a Class Y felony to a Class B felony under subsection (b), where the defendant did not voluntarily release the victim, nor was the victim left in what could reasonably be characterized as a safe place. Whitt v. State, 281 Ark. 466, 664 S.W.2d 876 (1984).

Victims who were left handcuffed to immovable structures, and thus dependent on being discovered and freed before their release was complete, were not released, and sentencing as a Class Y rather than a Class B felony was proper. Clark v. State, 292 Ark. 69, 727 S.W.2d 853 (1987).

Victim was not released in a safe place given the physical condition in which she was left; the only safe place that the victim could have been released was the hospital. Black v. State, 50 Ark. App. 42, 901 S.W.2d 849 (1995).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for kidnapping, and whether defendant released the victim at a place of safety was a fact question properly submitted to the jury; however, defendant failed to prove that he released the victim in a safe place where he took the victim to the hospital after he ran over her leg and remained with her constantly. Morgan v. State, 359 Ark. 168, 195 S.W.3d 889 (2004).

Where defendant car jacked a mother and her children, substantial evidence supported the Class Y kidnapping convictions where the victims were not released into safety the of a home but on an unfamiliar dark country road, the mother had been beaten, raped, and threatened with death, and she feared defendant might try to run over her when she was left alone on the road and, clearly, defendant had not known that a house was nearby. Ratliff v. State, 359 Ark. 479, 199 S.W.3d 79 (2004).

Circuit court did not err by refusing to lower the kidnapping charge from a Class Y to a Class B felony as defendant did not release his stepdaughter where the stepdaughter was left with a mask over her face, a gag in her mouth, her feet bound together, her hands bound behind her back, and was left in a house that was in a rural area with no one expected to be home for several hours; although the stepdaughter found a cellular phone and scissors defendant left for her, she was unable to physically release herself from her restraints. Davis v. State, 368 Ark. 401, 246 S.W.3d 862 (2007).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict to reduce the kidnapping charge from a Class Y felony to a Class B felony under subdivisions (b)(1) and (2) of this section because defendant released the victim based on her resistance, and because he did not leave her in a safe place when he left her in the path of his vehicle. Huff v. State, 2012 Ark. 388, 423 S.W.3d 608 (2012).

Cited: Griffin v. State, 276 Ark. 266, 633 S.W.2d 708 (1982); Harmon v. State, 277 Ark. 265, 641 S.W.2d 21 (1982); Wallace v. Lockhart, 701 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1983); Glick v. State, 286 Ark. 133, 689 S.W.2d 559 (1985); Garmon v. State, 290 Ark. 371, 719 S.W.2d 699 (1986); Mask v. State, 314 Ark. 25, 869 S.W.2d 1 (1993); Hardaway v. State, 321 Ark. 576, 906 S.W.2d 288 (1995); Morris v. State, 53 Ark. App. 183, 920 S.W.2d 508 (1996); Avery v. State, 93 Ark. App. 112, 217 S.W.3d 162 (2005).