Ark. Code Ann. » Title 5 Chapter 14
Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-126 (2026)

Sexual assault in the third degree

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1. A person commits sexual assault in the third degree if the person:
    1. Engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another person who is not the actor's spouse, and the actor is:
      1. Employed with the Division of Correction, Division of Community Correction, Department of Human Services, or any city or county jail, the victim is in the custody of the Division of Correction, Division of Community Correction, Department of Human Services, or any city or county jail, and the actor is in a position of trust or authority over the victim and uses the position of trust or authority to engage in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity;
      2. Employed by or contracted with the Division of Community Correction, a local law enforcement agency, a court, or a local government and the actor is supervising the person while the person is on probation or parole or for any other court-ordered reason;
      3. Employed or contracted with or otherwise providing services, supplies, or supervision to an agency maintaining custody of inmates, detainees, or juveniles, the victim is in the custody of the Division of Correction, Division of Community Correction, Department of Human Services, or any city or county jail, and the actor is in a position of trust or authority over the victim and uses the position of trust or authority to engage in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity; or
      4. A mandated reporter under § 12-18-402(b) or a member of the clergy and is in a position of trust or authority over the victim and uses the position of trust or authority to engage in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity; or
      1. Being a minor, engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another person who is:
        1. Less than fourteen (14) years of age; and
        2. Not the person's spouse.
      2. It is an affirmative defense under this subdivision (a)(2) that the actor was not more than three (3) years older than the victim.
  2. It is no defense to a prosecution under this section that the victim consented to the conduct.
  3. Sexual assault in the third degree is a Class C felony.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1738, § 4; 2003, No. 1324, § 1; 2007, No. 363, § 1; 2009, No. 748, § 14; 2009, No. 758, § 4; 2017, No. 418, § 4; 2017, No. 660, § 1; 2019, No. 910, § 672.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2009, No. 758, § 29, provided: “Contingent Effectiveness. This act shall not become effective unless an act of the Eighty-Seventh General Assembly repealing the Arkansas Child Maltreatment Act, § 12-12-501 et seq., and enacting a new Child Maltreatment Act, § 12-18-101 et seq., becomes effective.” The contingency in Acts 2009, No. 758, § 29, was met by Acts 2009, No. 749.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment by No. 748 substituted “a minor” for “under eighteen (18) years of age” in the introductory language of (a)(2)(A).

The 2009 amendment by No. 758 substituted “mandated reporter under § 12-18-402(b)” for “professional under § 12-12-507(b)” in (a)(1)(C).

The 2017 amendment by No. 418 inserted present (a)(1)(B); redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; and made stylistic changes.

The 2017 amendment by No. 660, in (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) [now (a)(1)(C)], deleted “and” preceding the first occurrence of “victim” and added “and the actor is in a position of trust or authority over the victim and uses the position of trust or authority to engage in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity”.

The 2019 amendment substituted “Division of Correction” for “Department of Correction” and “Division of Community Correction” for “Department of Community Correction” in (a)(1)(A) through (a)(1)(C).

Research References

ALR.

Sufficiency of Allegations or Evidence of Serious Bodily Injury to Support Charge of Aggravated Degree of Rape, Sodomy, or Other Sexual Abuse. 103 A.L.R.6th 507 (2015).

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Defendant's due process and equal protection rights were not violated when he was convicted of violating subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section as he was not prosecuted for consensual sexual acts with the two victims, rather, he was prosecuted for using his position of trust and authority over the victims to engage in those acts; because the clergy was held in such a high regard, there was a legitimate reason for the state to criminalize a clergyman's abuse of his trust and authority to procure sex. Talbert v. State, 367 Ark. 262, 239 S.W.3d 504 (2006).

Subdivision (a)(1)(B) of this section is not unconstitutionally vague as, after reading the statute's language, a person of ordinary intelligence would not believe that it was a crime, per se, for a member of the clergy to have a consensual relationship with someone; the statute makes clear that a clergyman must have misused his position of trust and authority to engage in a sexual relationship for a violation to occur. Talbert v. State, 367 Ark. 262, 239 S.W.3d 504 (2006).

Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for sexual assault in the third degree where testimony of the victims did not indicate a consensual relationship: (1) both victims testified that they looked up to defendant as a minister and trusted him; (2) one victim testified that she was afraid of what might happen to her if she did not comply with his sexual requests; (3) that victim also testified that she was not attracted to defendant; (4) and the second victim testified that she told defendant that, because he was a minister, sex was not right. Talbert v. State, 367 Ark. 262, 239 S.W.3d 504 (2006).

Lesser included offenses.

Trial court was not required to instruct a jury on the offense of carnal abuse in the third degree (former § 5-14-106) because it was not a lesser-included offense of rape; carnal abuse in the third degree contained elements not found in § 5-14-103(a), and carnal abuse in the third degree differed from rape in more ways that just the seriousness of harm inflicted upon a victim. Gaines v. State, 354 Ark. 89, 118 S.W.3d 102 (2003).

Statute of Limitations.

There was sufficient evidence that the sexual assault against one victim occurred in 2002 and, therefore, was within the three-year statute of limitations of § 5-1-109(b)(2) where the victim testified that defendant, a minister, assaulted her while she was working for the church during the summer of 2002. Talbert v. State, 367 Ark. 262, 239 S.W.3d 504 (2006).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 2006–2025 · leading case: Talbert v. State, 239 S.W.3d 504 (Ark. 2006).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Talbert v. State, 239 S.W.3d 504 (Ark. 2006). · cites it 10× “While Lawrence, supra, does stand for this proposition, the acts criminalized by the Texas statute in Lawrence are distinguishable from the acts criminalized by § 5-14-126. In Lawrence, supra, the Texas statute had criminalized consensual sexual acts.”
State of Iowa v. Patrick Edouard, 854 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 2014). · cites it 4× “, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-126 (a)(1)(C) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Fiscal Sess.”
Paschal v. State, 388 S.W.3d 429 (Ark. 2012). · cites it 6× “We also rejected Tal-bert’s challenge under the Arkansas Constitution and held that section 5-14-126(a)(1)(B) did “not infringe upon Tal-bert’s fundamental right to have private, consensual sex” because “[t]he conduct criminalized by the statute is the use of trust and authority…”
Rees v. Smith, 301 S.W.3d 467 (Ark. 2009). · cites it 2× “See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-14-126(a)(l)(C) (Supp.2007); Ark.”
Arkansas Dep't of Corr. Sex Offender Assessment Comm. v. Terry W. Hastings, 2024 Ark. App. 407 (Ark. Ct. App. 2024). · cites it 4× “]” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-126 (a)(1)(B) (Repl.”
State v. Edwards, 288 P.3d 494 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012). “See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-126 (a)(1)(B) (Repl.”
David Walton v. Ashley Nehls, 135 F.4th 1070 (7th Cir. 2025). “23-1207 17 Appendix In 26 states plus the District of Columbia, statutes make it a criminal offense for prison officials to engage in sexual ac- tivity with prisoners and explicitly state that consent is not an affirmative defense: State Relevant Statute Alabama Ala.”
Fountain v. State, 285 S.W.3d 706 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008). “§ 12-12-903 , the Definitions chapter of our Sex Offender Registration statute: (12)(A) “Sex offense” includes, but is not limited to: (i) The following offenses: (a) Rape, § 5-14-103; (b) Sexual indecency with a child, § 5-14-110; (c) Sexual assault in the first degree, §…”
Ames v. Ennis (W.D. Ark. 2024). · cites it 5× “Ames refers to Court to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-126 which sets forth the crime of sexual assault in the third degree.”
Amended December 3, 2014 State of Iowa v. Patrick Edouard (Iowa 2014). · cites it 2× “, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-126 (a)(1)(C) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Fiscal Sess.”
David Walton v. Ashley Nehls (7th Cir. 2025). “23-1207 17 Appendix In 26 states plus the District of Columbia, statutes make it a criminal offense for prison officials to engage in sexual ac- tivity with prisoners and explicitly state that consent is not an affirmative defense: State Relevant Statute Alabama Ala.”
David Walton v. Ashley Nehls (7th Cir. 2025). “23-1207 17 Appendix In 26 states plus the District of Columbia, statutes make it a criminal offense for prison officials to engage in sexual ac- tivity with prisoners and explicitly state that consent is not an affirmative defense: State Relevant Statute Alabama Ala.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-126(a)(1)(B) — 2 cases
Paschal v. State, 388 S.W.3d 429 (Ark. 2012). “We also rejected Tal-bert’s challenge under the Arkansas Constitution and held that section 5-14-126(a)(1)(B) did “not infringe upon Tal-bert’s fundamental right to have private, consensual sex” because “[t]he conduct criminalized by the statute is the use of trust and authority…”
Ames v. Ennis (W.D. Ark. 2024). “Ames refers to Court to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-126 which sets forth the crime of sexual assault in the third degree.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-126(a)(1)(C) — 2 cases
Paschal v. State, 388 S.W.3d 429 (Ark. 2012). “We also rejected Tal-bert’s challenge under the Arkansas Constitution and held that section 5-14-126(a)(1)(B) did “not infringe upon Tal-bert’s fundamental right to have private, consensual sex” because “[t]he conduct criminalized by the statute is the use of trust and authority…”
State of Iowa v. Patrick Edouard, 854 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 2014). “, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-126 (a)(1)(C) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Fiscal Sess.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-126(a)(l)(B) — 2 cases
Talbert v. State, 239 S.W.3d 504 (Ark. 2006). “While Lawrence, supra, does stand for this proposition, the acts criminalized by the Texas statute in Lawrence are distinguishable from the acts criminalized by § 5-14-126. In Lawrence, supra, the Texas statute had criminalized consensual sexual acts.”
Paschal v. State, 388 S.W.3d 429 (Ark. 2012). “We also rejected Tal-bert’s challenge under the Arkansas Constitution and held that section 5-14-126(a)(1)(B) did “not infringe upon Tal-bert’s fundamental right to have private, consensual sex” because “[t]he conduct criminalized by the statute is the use of trust and authority…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-126(a)(l)(C) — 2 cases
Rees v. Smith, 301 S.W.3d 467 (Ark. 2009). “See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-14-126(a)(l)(C) (Supp.2007); Ark.”
State of Iowa v. Patrick Edouard, 854 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 2014). “, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-126 (a)(1)(C) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Fiscal Sess.”
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