Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Blood Tests in Paternity Proceedings, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 395.

Recent Developments, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 257.

Recent Developments, Domestic Relations — Adoption, 57 Ark. L. Rev. 697.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Family Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 595.

Survey — Family Law, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 215.

Note, Evidence — Criminal Law — Evidence of DNAFingerprinting Admitted for Identification Purposes in Rape Trial, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 543.

Survey, Miscellaneous — Evidence, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 384.

Survey — Family Law, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 799.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Note: Family Law—Putative Fathers and the Presumption of Legitimacy—Adams and the Forbidden Fruit: Clashes Between the Presumption of Legitimacy and the Rights of Putative Fathers in Arkansas, 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 369.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Trial court ruling that utilizing this section to allow blood tests in evidence only to exclude paternity was not a denial of equal protection and that blood tests would not be admitted to establish paternity was evidentiary and thus not an appealable order. Story v. Hodges, 272 Ark. 365, 614 S.W.2d 506 (1981).

In General.

The claim of child support enforcement against putative father was an original action to establish paternity, as opposed to an action to modify a paternity order under § 9-10-115, and the judge correctly found paternity pursuant to subdivision (a)(6)(B) of this section. Bean v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 340 Ark. 286, 9 S.W.3d 520 (2000).

Statute granting trial courts authority to order a paternity test made an express distinction between the type of testimony required when the mother was alive and when the mother was deceased; subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section instructs that, upon motion of either party in a paternity action when the mother was deceased or unavailable, the trial court could order the putative father and child to submit to scientific testing for paternity. Watt v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 364 Ark. 236, 217 S.W.3d 785 (2005).

Where the putative father and the child's mother had a brief romantic relationship, he did not know the mother was pregnant and did not see or talk to her after the encounter, and at the time an adoption petition was filed he had not registered with the putative-father registry, the putative father was not statutorily entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding. Escobedo v. Nickita, 365 Ark. 548, 231 S.W.3d 601 (2006).

Additional Tests.

Though subdivision (a)(5) of this section does not explicitly provide procedures for requesting additional court-ordered tests, the statute also does not exclude such a possibility; in light of the legislative intent that paternity of the children be established in the most expedient manner for all children of Arkansas, the circuit courts have wide discretion to take actions to resolve the question of paternity and may require a party requesting an additional paternity test to prove that the first test was defective before the court can compel a second paternity test. State Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Morgan, 364 Ark. 358, 219 S.W.3d 175 (2005).

Section 9-10-103 applies to paternity tests ordered by the Office of Child Support Enforcement and not to tests ordered by the court; this section specifically deals with court-ordered paternity tests and, more importantly, while some language in § 9-10-103 incorporates the procedures of this section, there is no language in this section incorporating the protections of § 9-10-103. State Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Morgan, 364 Ark. 358, 219 S.W.3d 175 (2005).

Admissibility.

The trial court erred in allowing into evidence two blood tests which did not exclude defendant as being the father, for the purpose of showing that he was the father. Winston v. Robinson, 270 Ark. 996, 606 S.W.2d 757 (1980).

Fact of refusal to take blood test is admissible. Cox v. Farrell, 292 Ark. 177, 728 S.W.2d 954 (1987).

Blood tests inadmissible where person who verified test results did not perform them. This section requires that person performing blood test make verification thereon. Tolhurst v. Reynolds, 21 Ark. App. 94, 729 S.W.2d 25 (1987).

Where a paternity test was required to be notarized under subdivision (a)(5)(A) of this section, it was a self-authenticating document under Ark. R. Evid. Rule 902(8) and plaintiff was not required to produce any extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility. Barnes v. Barnes, 311 Ark. 287, 843 S.W.2d 835 (1992).

Appeals.

In a suit alleging paternity, an order for the defendant to report for paternity blood testing under this section is not final, and therefore not appealable under Ark. R. App. P. Civ. 2(a). Helton v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 309 Ark. 268, 828 S.W.2d 842 (1992).

Burden of Proof.

In a paternity proceeding brought against a living putative father, the mother's burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence, as the proceeding is civil in nature. Stewart v. Winfrey, 308 Ark. 277, 824 S.W.2d 373 (1992); Barnes v. Barnes, 311 Ark. 287, 843 S.W.2d 835 (1992); Erwin L.D. v. Myla Jean L., 41 Ark. App. 16, 847 S.W.2d 45 (1993).

A Roche blood-test report finding a 99.98% probability that defendant was the father of plaintiff's child, along with the corroborating testimony of plaintiff, constituted a prima facie case of establishment of paternity; defendant had the burden of rebutting this proof. Bain v. State, 56 Ark. App. 7, 937 S.W.2d 670 (1997).

If the results of the paternity tests conducted pursuant to subdivision (a)(2) of this section establish a ninety-five percent (95%) or more probability of inclusion that the putative father is the biological father of the child, and there is corroborating testimony concerning the conception, birth, and history of the child, a prima facie case of establishment of paternity is created, and the burden of proof shall shift to the putative father to rebut such proof. Bean v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 340 Ark. 286, 9 S.W.3d 520 (2000).

Certification.

Although subsection (a) of this section was amended to allow for certification by an expert under whose supervision or direction the test has been performed, the statements by the signatory of the report, that she was a director of the laboratory and that she had read the report, also fell short of meeting the foundational prerequisites for admission under the amended version. Bain v. State, 56 Ark. App. 7, 937 S.W.2d 670 (1997).

Chain of Custody.

Like a challenge of the test procedures or results pursuant to subdivision (a)(5)(A) of this section, subdivision (a)(5)(B)(i) of this section requires a contest on chain-of-custody grounds within 30 days of trial. Parks v. Ewans, 316 Ark. 91, 871 S.W.2d 343 (1994).

Circuit court did not err when it admitted the seven appellees' reports of DNA test results into evidence, after finding substantial compliance with subdivision (a)(5)(B) of this section, and held that decedent was appellees' biological father, rejecting the contention of decedent's estate that strict compliance with the statutory requirements concerning chain-of-custody affidavits was required. All of the DNA test results contained supporting documentation of the collection and receipt of the samples at the testing facility, the packages containing the DNA specimens were examined for integrity upon receipt at the lab, and there was no sign of tampering during transit; and the case did not involve any challenge to the authenticity of the DNA test results or any allegation of tampering. Johnson v. Johnson, 2020 Ark. App. 9, 593 S.W.3d 33 (2020).

Corroboration.

Since subdivision (a)(6)(A) of this section requires corroborating testimony of access from the mother, where mother's affidavit providing corroboration was not proffered, the statutory presumption never arose. State v. Rogers, 50 Ark. App. 108, 902 S.W.2d 243 (1995).

Cross-Examination.

The trial court was correct in ruling that laboratory report was not admissible, since the persons who performed the blood tests at the laboratory were not available for cross-examination. Chandler v. Baker, 16 Ark. App. 253, 700 S.W.2d 378 (1985).

Evidence.

Although putative father attempted to rebut the evidence of paternity by offering the Affidavit of Birth Out of Wedlock and birth certificate as evidence that someone else was the father, his rebuttal failed, because under the law applicable when those documents were executed, they constituted presumptive evidence of paternity only, not conclusive evidence. Bean v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 340 Ark. 286, 9 S.W.3d 520 (2000).

Expert Witnesses.

In a paternity action, no prejudicial error found in plaintiff's examination of expert witness who administered blood test. Bradley v. Houston, 12 Ark. App. 351, 676 S.W.2d 746 (1984).

Ark. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(e), regarding supplementation of responses concerning expert witness, did not apply where court had ordered defendant and child to undergo blood tests. Bradley v. Houston, 12 Ark. App. 351, 676 S.W.2d 746 (1984).

Defendant failed to request expert witness's appearance within a reasonable time prior to trial where defendant made the request to cross-examine the expert who lived out-of-state only six business days before trial. Barnes v. Barnes, 311 Ark. 287, 843 S.W.2d 835 (1992).

Foreign Judgment.

As the North Carolina courts would give res judicata effect to its finding of paternity in a divorce judgment in its courts, the Arkansas court was required to do likewise under the constitutional command of full faith and credit in denying the defendant's motion for blood testing. Benac v. State, 34 Ark. App. 238, 808 S.W.2d 797 (1991).

Defendant failed to request expert witness's appearance within a reasonable time prior to trial where defendant made the request to cross-examine the expert who lived out-of-state only six business days before trial. Barnes v. Barnes, 311 Ark. 287, 843 S.W.2d 835 (1992).

Genetic Testing.

In light of the fact that recently developed genetic testing can, with a high degree of certainty, identify the father of a child, and be viewed as conclusive by the fact-finder in paternity suits, strict adherence to the statutory foundational prerequisites is not unreasonable. Ross v. Moore, 30 Ark. App. 207, 785 S.W.2d 243 (1990).

Circuit court did not err in denying the request for an additional paternity test because the Office of Child Support Enforcement presented no evidence that the first paternity test was untrustworthy or defective; however, the circuit court did not expressly determine that a dismissal with prejudice was in the best interests of the child as, at the time of the trial, paternity had not been established for the child and the only effect of a dismissal with prejudice was to permanently exclude appellee from further paternity testing. State Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Morgan, 364 Ark. 358, 219 S.W.3d 175 (2005).

Identity of Test-Giver.

Although the chancery court has broad discretion in determining whether blood test reports should be admitted into evidence, chancellor abused his discretion by admitting report that contained nothing to indicate the identity of the person who performed the test or whether the person who performed the test was a duly qualified expert, and was signed by the laboratory director and scientific director respectively, but did not indicate that these two men performed the test or that they were qualified experts. Boyles v. Clements, 302 Ark. 575, 792 S.W.2d 311 (1990).

Blood test inadmissible where there was nothing in the report to indicate the identity of the person who performed the test or whether the person who performed the test was a duly qualified expert. Ross v. Moore, 30 Ark. App. 207, 785 S.W.2d 243 (1990).

Notice of Objection.

Putative father was not required to give 30 days' notice in order to object to admission of a blood test report; such notice is required only where the chain of custody, test procedures, or results are contested. Bain v. State, 56 Ark. App. 7, 937 S.W.2d 670 (1997).

Paternity of Deceased Child.

Father's petition to establish paternity to a deceased child through DNA testing pursuant to this section was properly dismissed under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6) as there was no provision in the statute for establishing paternity when it was the child who was deceased. Scoggins v. Medlock, 2011 Ark. 194, 381 S.W.3d 781 (2011).

Right to Counsel.

Putative father's physical liberty was not in jeopardy at the initial hearing when he was ordered to submit to a paternity test; thus, he was not guaranteed the right to counsel in the paternity proceeding. Burrell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 41 Ark. App. 140, 850 S.W.2d 8 (1993).

Sufficiency.

Evidence of blood tests was sufficient to establish that husband was not father of wife's child. Richardson v. Richardson, 252 Ark. 244, 478 S.W.2d 423 (1972).

Where the blood tests showed a 99.27% probability that the putative father was the father, he was living with the mother during the probable period of conception, and the mother stated she was not involved with anyone else at that time, this evidence gave her a statutory presumption of paternity. Stewart v. Winfrey, 308 Ark. 277, 824 S.W.2d 373 (1992).

Blood test showing a 99.59% probability that defendant was the natural father, coupled with the mother's testimony regarding access during the probable period of conception, gave rise to a statutory presumption of paternity which was not rebutted by the father. Barnes v. Barnes, 311 Ark. 287, 843 S.W.2d 835 (1992).

Where written blood test report did not comply with the foundational prerequisites set forth in subdivision (a)(5)(A), it could not be admitted into evidence. Bain v. State, 56 Ark. App. 7, 937 S.W.2d 670 (1997).

Cited: George v. George, 247 Ark. 17, 444 S.W.2d 62 (1969); Dunn v. Davis, 291 Ark. 492, 725 S.W.2d 853 (1987); Laden v. Morgan, 303 Ark. 585, 798 S.W.2d 678 (1990); Roe v. State, 304 Ark. 673, 804 S.W.2d 708 (1991); Green v. Bell, 308 Ark. 473, 826 S.W.2d 226 (1992); Davis v. Child Support Enforcement Unit, 326 Ark. 677, 933 S.W.2d 798 (1996); Blankenship v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 58 Ark. App. 260, 952 S.W.2d 173 (1997); In re SCD, 358 Ark. 51, 186 S.W.3d 225 (2004).