green
Positive treatment
7.5 score
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988
2007
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Smith
This court, in State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416 , 443–44, 546 A.2d 292 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988), explained that ‘‘[a]n ‘illegal sentence’ is essentially one which either exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant’s right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory.’’ By contrast, the court explained, ‘‘[s]en- tences imposed in an illegal manner have been defined as being within the relevant statutory limits but . . . imposed in a way which violates defendant’s right . . . to be addressed per…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. CHARLES F.
Sentences imposed in an illegal manner have been defined as being within the relevant statutory limits but . . . imposed in a way which violates [a] defendant’s right ... to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment ... or his right to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the record, or his right that the government keep its plea agreement promises . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 443-44.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Osuch
Rather, the defendant argues that his sentence was imposed in an “illegal manner.” “Sentences imposed in an illegal manner have been defined as being within the relevant statutory limits but . . . imposed in a way which violates defendant’s right ... to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment ... or his right to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the record, or his right that the government keep its plea agreement promises . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 444.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Dickman
Such practice facilitates the penal philosophy that sentences ought to be individualized to fit not only the crime but also the criminal. . . . [BJefore making a [sentencing] determination, a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 445.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Olson
“Sentences imposed in an illegal manner have been defined as being within the relevant statutory limits but . . . imposed in a way which violates the defendant’s right ... to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment ... or his right to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the record, or his right that the government keep its plea agreement promises . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 444; see also Borrelli v. Commissioner of Correction, 113 Conn. App. 805, 814 , 968 A.2d 439 (2009).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Lawrence
In State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 443-44 , 546 A.2d 292 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988), this court defined an illegal sentence as “essentially one which either exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant’s right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory.” A sentence imposed in an illegal manner is one “within the relevant statutory limits but . . . imposed in a way which violates [the] defendant’s right ... to be addressed personally at sentencing and to speak in mitigation of punishment ... or his right …
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Barretta
See State v. Ortiz, 14 Conn. App. 493, 494-97 , 542 A.2d 734 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 804 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Elsey
See State v. Smith, 15 Conn. App. 122, 126 , 543 A.2d 301 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 805 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988); see also State v. Fuller, 58 Conn. App. 567, 575 , 754 A.2d 207 (jury may infer intent from failure to summon assistance), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 918 , 759 A.2d 1026 (2000).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Casey
See State v. Bowden, 15 Conn. App. 539, 543-44 , 545 A.2d 591 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 810 , 548 A. 2d 438 (1988).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Demers, No. Cr95-227725 (Jan. 10, 1997)
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 ; see State v. Bowden, 15 Conn. App. 539 , 544-46 (25 minute detention, during part of which defendant was separated from another suspect and placed in a police cruiser, deemed, under the circumstances of an ongoing investigation of a bank robber by three individuals, to be constitutionally reasonable), cert. denied, 209 Conn. 810 (1988).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Clinkscales
See State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416 , 420 n.2, 546 A.2d 292 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988).
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Holloman
(2×)
See State v. Bowden, 15 Conn. App. 539, 542-46 , 545 A.2d 591 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 810 , 548 A.2d 438 (1988).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Reyes
See State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 433 , 546 A.2d 292 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Daniels
See State v. Bowden, 15 Conn. App. 539, 543 , 545 A.2d 591 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 810 , 548 A.2d 438 (1988).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Rosado
See, e.g., State v. Smith, 15 Conn. App. 122, 126 , 543 A.2d 301 (defendant’s conduct before, during and after commission of crime providing sufficient evidence of participation in conspiracy to commit crime), cert. denied, 209 Conn. 805 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Zapata
Thus, a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kentucky v. Stincer, supra, 745 ; see also State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 432 , 546 A.2d 292 (voir dire of jurors concerning possible jury tampering was critical stage of criminal proceeding), cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809 , 548 A.2d 441 (1988).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Leggett
While the state must prove an agreement, the existence of a formal agreement between the conspirators need not be proved because [i]t is only in rare instances that conspiracy may be established by proof of an express agreement to unite to accomplish an unlawful purpose. . . . [T]he requisite agreement or confederation may be inferred from proof of the separate acts of the individuals accused as coconspirators and from the circumstances surrounding the commission of these acts.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 68 Conn. App. 794, 798-99 , 793 A.2d 1151 ,…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
State of Connecticut
v.
Charles Mendez
v.
Charles Mendez
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Sep 20, 1988.
Donald D. Dakers, public defender, in support of the petition., Susan C. Marks, assistant state’s attorney, in opposition.
Published
The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 15 Conn. App. 531, is denied.