Catalano v. Bujak, 642 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1994). · Go Syfert
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Catalano v. Bujak, 642 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“it would appear that the jury simply disbelieved evidence of damages in excess of what it awarded. it is not for any reviewing court to dictate what evidence a jury must believe.”
94 citation events (58 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ashley D. Gunno v. Kevin C. McNair (wva, 2016-11-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 28 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Ashley D. Gunno v. Kevin C. McNair
W. Va. · 2016 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
it would appear that the jury simply disbelieved evidence of damages in excess of what it awarded. it is not for any reviewing court to dictate what evidence a jury must believe.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Banasiak, D. v. Robinson, J.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2025 · confidence medium
In the second line of cases, however, the Supreme Court “focused on the power of the jury as the ultimate finder of fact” and, in turn, upheld a “jury award for medical expenses without a corresponding award for pain and suffering.” Davis, supra, at 767 , citing Boggavarapu, 542 A.2d at 518 (holding that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial because the jury was “not obliged to believe that every injury[, in this case, a dog bite,] causes pain or the pain alleged”), Catalano v. Bujak, 642 A.2d 448, 451 (Pa. 1994) (holding that the trial court er…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ellis, D. v. Liberty Mutual General
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2021 · confidence medium
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that when a trial court “determined that a new trial must be granted, then the law governing the scope of new trials, not the parties’ requests, [] govern[s].” Catalano v. Bujak, 642 A.2d 448, 450 (Pa. 1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McMichael, T. v. McMichael, M. & P&J Const, Aplts.
Pa. · 2020 · confidence medium
The court recognized a “jury is free to disbelieve that non-economic injury flows from an incident, which the jury obviously did here.” Id., citing Catalano v Bujak, 642 A.2d 448, 451 (Pa. 3 Appellee testified inconsistently about an alleged statement regarding her son David’s death as the loss of her “star witness,” see, e.g., N.T. 7/13/17 at 167-169, and she was also cross-examined about conflicts between her deposition and trial testimony.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Temple, J., Aplt. v. Providence Care Center
Pa. · 2020 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See Armbruster v. Horowitz, 813 A.2d 698 , 704 n.6 (Pa. 2002) (“[A] trial judge has the power to grant a new trial sua sponte if he determines that the interests of justice so require.”); cf. Catalano v. Bujak, 642 A.2d 448, 450 (Pa. 1994) (assuming that such a power exists by opining that “[t]he real question . . . is not whether the court had the power to award a new trial sua sponte, but whether the grant of a new trial on both liability and damages violated the law applicable to such requests”).16 Make no mistake, the “interest of justice” standard remains a very high threshold…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Smith, J. v. Kaplow, J.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2016 · confidence medium
Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155 , 642 A.2d 448, 450 (1994).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Kindermann, P. v. Cunningham, J. (4×) also: Cited "see"
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
“A compromise verdict is one where the jury, in doubt as to defendant’s negligence or plaintiffs freedom from contributory negligence, brings in a verdict for the plaintiff but in a smaller amount than it would have if these questions had been free from doubt.” Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155 , 642 A.2d 448, 450 (1994); see also Davis v. Steigerwalt, 822 A.2d 22, 31 (Pa.Super.2003).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. Mullen (6×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Pa. · 2001 · confidence medium
Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155 , 642 A.2d 448, 450 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hobbs v. Ryce
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2001 · confidence medium
Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155 , 642 A.2d 448, 451 (1994).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wainwright v. Fontenot
La. · 2000 · confidence medium
As the Supreme *77 Court of Pennsylvania observed in Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155, 161 , 642 A.2d 448, 451 (1994): In this case, the jury apparently did not believe that pain and suffering, for example, or missed work, resulted from the injury which [defendant] caused.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fischer v. Troiano (2×)
pactcompllackaw · 2000 · confidence medium
The medical evidence of Mrs. Fischer’s injury is markedly distinguishable from that which was introduced in those cases in which zero awards for noneconomic damages have been affirmed, See e.g., Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155, 157, 161 , 642 A.2d 448, 449, 451 (1994) (finding that jury could award damages for medical expenses only, without any provision for pain and suffering, since the defense had offered evidence that the injury had been caused at work rather than by defendant’s conduct); Labett v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 714 A.2d 522, 526 (Pa. Commw. 1998) (defense argued th…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carroll v. Kephart
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1998 · confidence medium
Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155, 161 , 642 A.2d 448, 451 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carroll v. Kephart
pactcompldelawa · 1997 · confidence medium
“It is not for any reviewing court to dictate what evidence a jury must believe.” Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155, 161 , 642 A.2d 448, 451 (1994).
cited Cited as authority (rule) DeVita v. Durst
Pa. Commw. Ct. · 1994 · confidence medium
It is not for any reviewing court to dictate what evidence a jury must believe.” Id. at 537 Pa. 162 , 642 A.2d at 451.
cited Cited "see" Shook, A. v. Lehigh Valley Restaurant Group
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2026 · signal: see · confidence high
See Catalano v. Bujak, 642 A.2d 448, 451 (Pa. 1994).
discussed Cited "see" Kindermann, P. v. Cunningham, J.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Catalano v. Bujak, 642 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1994) (jury award of medical and incidental expenses, but no damages for pain and suffering or missed work, did not warrant a new trial; plaintiff claimed his wrist was injured during his DUI arrest by defendant police officer, but officer’s evidence showed plaintiff never complained of injury on night of arrest and that injury was caused at work); Gagliano v. Ditzler, 263 A.2d 319, 320-321 (Pa. 1970) (jury award of $650 reflected compromise verdict when plaintiff’s car suffered $500 worth of damage and both sides presented “conflicting evidence w…
discussed Cited "see" McManamon v. Washko (2×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155 , 642 A.2d 448 (1994) (involving personal injury action where nine separate categories of damages were itemized on verdict slip and Supreme Court affirmed verdict for plaintiff); DeVita v. Durst, 167 Pa.Cmwlth. 105 , 647 A.2d 636 (1994) (involving person al injuries sustained in automobile accident where verdict slip itemized ten separate damage categories, and Commonwealth Court affirmed verdict for plaintiff).
examined Cited "see" Hutchison Ex Rel. Hutchison v. Luddy (4×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155 , 642 A.2d 448 (1994) (personal injury action where nine separate categories of damages were itemized on the verdict slip, and Supreme Court affirmed verdict for plaintiff); DeVita v. Durst, 167 Pa.Cmwlth. 105 , 647 A.2d 636 (1994) (personal injuries resulting from automobile accident where the verdict slip contained itemization for ten separate damage categories, and Commonwealth Court affirmed verdict for plaintiff).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Slover, D. v. Why, S. (2×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2020 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
Id. at 767; see e.g., Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 518 Pa. 162 , 542 A.2d 516 (1988), Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155 , 642 A.2d 448 (1994).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Avery, A. v. Cercone, B.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2019 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
Id. at 767 ; see e.g., Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 542 A.2d 516 (Pa. 1988), Catalano v. Bujak, 642 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1994).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Avery, A. v. Cercone, B.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2019 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
Id. at 767 ; see e.g., Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 542 A.2d 516 (Pa. 1988), Catalano v. Bujak, 642 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1994).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Singer, M. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2019 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., Catalano v. Bujak, 642 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1994), and Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 542 A.2d 516 (Pa. 1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Stemmerich, B. v. Massung, G. (2×)
Pa. Super. Ct. · 2018 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Boggavarapo v. Ponist, 518 Pa. 162 , 542 A.2d 516 (1988) and Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155 , 642 A.2d 448 (1994).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Rasieleski v. Connor (2×)
pactcompllackaw · 2002 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155, 161 , 642 A.2d 448, 451 (1994) (if the defense does not admit the existence of an injury, the jury is free to disbelieve the plaintiff’s evidence on damages and thereby refuse to award damages for pain and suffering).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Pisciuneri v. Esposito (2×)
pactcompllawren · 2001 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155 , 642 A.2d 448 (1994).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Snover v. McGraw (4×)
Ill. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155 , 642 A.2d 448 (1994); Hinson v. King, 603 So.2d 1104 (Ala.Civ.App.1992); Symon v. Burger, 528 N.E.2d 850 (Ind.App.1988); Wheeler v. Huston, 288 Or. 467 , 605 P.2d 1339 (1980); Hunter v. Sorensen, 201 Neb. 153 , 266 N.W.2d 529 (1978); Jahnke v. Smith, 56 Wis.2d 642 , 203 N.W.2d 67 (1973); Randles v. Lowry, 4 Cal.App.3d 68 , 84 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1970); see generally Annotation, Validity of Verdict Awarding Medical Expenses to Personal Injury Plaintiff, but Failing to Award Damages for Pain and Suffering, 55 A.L.R.4th 186 (1987).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Snover v. McGraw (2×)
Ill. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155 , 642 A.2d 448 (1994); Hinson v. King, 603 So. 2d 1104 (Ala. Civ.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lewis v. Letito (2×)
pactcomplphilad · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
DeVita v. Durst, 167 Pa. Commw. 105 , 647 A.2d 636 (1994); see also, Catalano v. Bujak, 537 Pa. 155 , 642 A.2d 448 (1994).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jeffrey A. CATALANO, Appellant at No. 23-93, Appellee at No. 24-93,
v.
David M. BUJAK, Appellee at No. 23-93, Appellant at No. 24-93
23, 24 W.D. Appeal Docket 1993.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
May 24, 1994.
642 A.2d 448
Paul J. Malizia, Malizia, Malizia & Geci, P.C., Emporium,' for appellant at No. 23 and appellee at No. 24., John C. Dennison, II, Dennison & Dennison, Brookville, for appellant at No. 24 and appellee at No. 23.
Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Zappala, Papadakos, Cappy, Montemuro.
Cited by 43 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

FLAHERTY, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of Commonwealth Court granting Jeffrey Catalano a new trial as to liability and damages in his tort action against David Bujak, a police officer, for personal injuries.

[*157] On December 6, 1986, Bujak, a police officer for Beninger Township, Elk County, stopped the car which Catalano was driving for travelling 89 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. Bujak asked Catalano to step out of the car, and, because he suspected that Catalano might be intoxicated, administered a field sobriety test. Subsequently, he arrested Catalano for driving under the influence. Catalano pleaded guilty to the speeding charge and to disorderly conduct.

Thereafter, Catalano sued Bujak for alleged negligence, carelessness, recklessness or willfulness in using excessive force in arresting Catalano and causing injury to his wrists.

The circumstances of the arrest were disputed at trial. Catalano testified that Bujak forced him over the hood of his car in order to handcuff him and that he injured his wrists when he extended his arms to break the fall against the hood. Bujak testified that he did not use excessive force in arresting Catalano.

Catalano claimed that he sustained various injuries as a result of Bujak’s allegedly violent conduct: he underwent surgery on his wrist; he lost work following the surgery; he was no longer able to perform his job as assistant manager in a supermarket; he was humiliated by the injury; he experienced pain and suffering; and his future earnings were reduced.

Bujak’s evidence indicated that although Catalano was taken to a hospital for blood alcohol testing on the night of his arrest, he did not complain to Bujak or to hospital personnel that his wrists were injured; that Catalano could still do his job; and that the injury was caused at work, not by Bujak.

At the close of Catalano’s case, the trial court dismissed the allegations of negligence, carelessness and recklessness pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act, Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, No. 142, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8541. The remaining cause of action was for willful misconduct pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8550.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Catalano and against Bujak in the amount of $1,210.94 for medical expenses and[*158] $332.50 for incidental costs. Catalano filed post-trial motions requesting a new trial only on the issue of damages. The trial court denied the motion.

On appeal, Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court and ordered a' new trial on both the issues of liability and damages. 148 Pa.Cmwlth. 269, 611 A.2d 314. The court’s rationale was that the verdict was inadequate and inconsistent. The verdict, in pertinent part, was as follows:

VERDICT
CONTAINING SPECIFIC QUESTIONS QUESTION 1:
DO YOU FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT WAS WILLFUL?
YESX NO
If you answer Question 1 “No,” return to the Courtroom; your vérdict is for the Defendant.
QUESTION 2:
DO YOU FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT’S WILLFUL CONDUCT HARMED . THE PLAINTIFF?
YESX NO
If you answer Question 2 “No,” return to the Courtroom; your verdict is for the Defendant.
QUESTION 3:
STATE THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES, IF ANY, SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFF:
1. Medical Expenses........$1,210.94
2. Past Lost Earnings and Earning Capacity.......$ 0
3. Future Loss of Earnings and Earning Capacity .. $ 0
4. Past Pain and Suffering.. $ 0
5. Future Pain and Suffering....................$ 0
6. Embarrassment and Humiliation ...............$ 0
7. Disfigurement............$ 0
8. Enjoyment of Life.......$ 0
[*159] 9. Incidental Costs..........$ 332.50
TOTAL (Add Lines 1 through 9)..............$ 1,543.44

Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that the verdict was inadequate and inconsistent was based on the fact that although the jury found that Bujak had willfully caused Catalano’s injuries, and although it awarded Catalano all of the medical expenses which resulted from his surgery and medical care, it awarded no damages for lost wages or pain and suffering which he claimed were a direct result of the surgery. Because some injuries, such as surgery, are known to involve pain and suffering, and because as a general proposition, injury victims are entitled to compensation for all they lose and suffer as a result of a tortious injury, Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 518 Pa. 162, 542 A.2d 516 (1988), the lower court concluded that the verdict was inconsistent and inadequate.

Further, Commonwealth Court determined that a new trial as to liability and damages was required because liability was contested and because liability was inextricably related to the issue of damages. Implicit in this rationale is that the verdict was what is sometimes called a compromise verdict. That is, although the jury believed that the defendant caused the injury, perhaps it was not fully convinced that the defendant was responsible for the totality of the injury, and reduced the damages accordingly.

Commonwealth Court was careful to point out that it did not reach the issue of whether a compromise verdict is permissible on the facts of this case 1 , but determined only that the refusal to award any damages, as opposed to a portion of damages for lost earnings or pain and suffering, compelled its conclusion that a new trial must be awarded.

[*160] The majority below also held that “the issue of liability is hotly contested and intertwined with the extent of the damages below.” Based on this holding, the majority remanded for a new trial on both liability and damages, reasoning that it is not clear from the verdict the extent to which Bujak caused Catalano’s injuries.

Catalano argues that Commonwealth Court exceeded its authority in reversing the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial “limited to damages alone,” and sua sponte ordering a new trial on liability and damages; and secondly, that a so-called compromise verdict is not applicable to cases involving intentional torts.

As to Catalano’s first point, on post-trial motions, Catalano requested a new trial on the issue of damages only. He made no request for a new trial on the issue of liability. Once Catalano demanded a new trial, the court was required first to address the question of whether a new trial must be granted. Only if that question is answered in the affirmative, need the court address the scope of the new trial.

If the court determined that a new trial must be granted, then the law governing the scope of new trials, not the parties’ requests, would govern. The real question, then, is not whether the court had the power to award a new trial sua sponte, but whether the grant of a new trial on both liability and damages violated the law applicable to such requests.

In Tulewicz v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 529 Pa. 584, 606 A.2d 425 (1991), we stated:

In passing upon the sufficiency of a verdict, we have necessarily relied heavily upon the findings of the trial court:
“It is the duty of the lower Court to control the amount of the verdict; it is in possession of all the facts as well as the atmosphere of the case, which will enable it to do more evenhanded justice between the parties than can an appellate court.”
Bochar v. J.B. Martin Motors, Inc., 374 Pa. 240, 241, 97 A.2d 813, 814 (1953).
[*161] We have given guidance and absent abuse of discretion trust to the appraisal of the trial court.
The Court is not warranted in setting aside, reducing, or modifying verdicts for personal injuries unless unfairness, mistake, partiality, prejudice, or corruption is shown, or the damages appear to be grossly exorbitant. The verdict must be clearly and immoderately excessive to justify the granting of a new trial. The amount must not only be greater than that which the Court would have awarded, but so excessive as to offend the conscience and judgment of the Court.
Stark v. Lehigh Foundries, 388 Pa. 1, 23, 130 A.2d 123, 135 (1957).

Id., 529 Pa. at 586, 606 A.2d at 426.

As to whether Commonwealth Court was within these guidelines, we must first consider the court’s rationale for remanding. The rationale was that the verdict was inconsistent and inadequate. We disagree. It would appear that the jury simply disbelieved evidence of damages in excess of what it awarded. It is not for any reviewing court to dictate what evidence a jury must believe. [2]

In this case, the jury apparently did not believe that pain and suffering, for example, or missed work, resulted from the injury which Bujak caused. It did believe that medical and incidental expenses were incurred as a result of the injury, and it awarded damages for those claims. The jury made its determinations, and it is not for this court, absent evidence of unfairness, mistake, partiality, prejudice, corruption, exorbitance, excessiveness, or a result that is offensive to the conscience and judgment of the court, to disturb them.

Order of Commonwealth Court is vacated. The verdict in[*162] favor of Catalano in the amount of $1,548.44 is reinstated. [3]

LARSEN, J., did not participate in the decision of this case. MONTEMURO, J., was an appointed Justice of the Court at the time of argument. *
1

. This court has defined "compromise verdict” as follows:

"A compromise verdict is one where the jury, in doubt as to defendant’s negligence or plaintiff s freedom from contributory negligence, brings in a verdict for the plaintiff but in a smaller amount than it would have if these questions had been free from doubt.”

Stokan v. Turnbull, 480 Pa. 71, 78, 389 A.2d 90, 93 (1978) (emphasis in original), (citations omitted).

2

. We need not reach the question of whether the case should be remanded for a new trial on damages only or on damages and liability together, for the initial inquiry, whether the case should be remanded at all, has been answered in the negative. See Gagliano v. Ditzler, 437 Pa. 230, 263 A.2d 319 (1970).

3

. Because of the disposition of this case, we do not address Catalano’s claim that a so-called compromise verdict is inapplicable to cases involving intentional torts.