green
Positive treatment
18.6 score
Treatment trajectory · 2009 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2009
2017
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mills v. JPMorgan Chase Bank
See, e.g., James v. Weisheit, 367 A.2d 482, 485 (Md. 1977) (applying three-year statute of limitation to fraud claim); Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder, 972 A.2d 864, 872 (Md. 2009) (applying three-year statute of limitation to claim under MCPA); Story v. Columbia Home Loans, LLC, 11-3214, 2012 WL 1957978 , at *6 (D.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hooker v. Tunnell Government Services, Inc.
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Master Financial, 972 A.2d at 877.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Price v. Murdy
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Id. at 72 , 972 A.2d 864 n.4 ("other[ issues] may well be resolved based on the relevant documents").
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Boardley v. Household Finance Corp. III
Proc. § 5-101; Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51 , 972 A.2d 864, 872 (2009).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
NVR Mortgage Finance, Inc. v. Carlsen
(6×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
CJP § 5-102(a)(6) is a “ ‘relatively narrow catchall[.]’ ” AGV Sports Grp., Inc. v. Protus IP Solutions, Inc., 417 Md. 386, 399 , 10 A.3d 745, 753 (2010) (quoting Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51, 70 , 972 A.2d 864, 875 (2009)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Judge Gauvey, however, already addressed these arguments in this case: The Maryland Finder’s Fee Act meets [the Crowder ] requirements: application of this extended statute of limitations is not precluded by plaintiffs’ pursuit of additional claims, Crowder, 972 A.2d at 868, 872 , a statutory remedy that is heightened from that available at common law is sufficiently statutory to justify application of the specialty statute, id. ... at 876, and damages under the Finder’s Fee Act are certainly readily ascertainable, with the alternative liquidated, fixed remedy of $500 per transaction, id…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
AGV Sports Group, Inc. v. Protus IP Solutions, Inc.
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
"We made no such express ruling and, indeed, refrained from adopting any encompassing definition of a statutory specialty, being content merely to hold that an action for unliquidated damages under the CPA did not constitute a statutory specialty.” Id., 972 A.2d at 875 (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
The Maryland Finder’s Fee Act meets these requirements: application of this extended statute of limitations is not precluded by plaintiffs' pursuit of additional claims, Crowder, 972 A.2d at 868, 872 , a statutory remedy that is heightened from that available at common law is sufficiently statutory to justify application of the specialty statute, id., 409 Md. at 72 , 972 A.2d at 876 , and damages under the Finder’s Fee Act are certainly readily ascertainable, with the alternative liquidated, fixed remedy of $500 per transaction, Id. 5 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Spaw, LLC v. City of Annapolis
In Williams , the Court of Special Appeals traced the history of CJP § 5-107 from its inception on April 20, 1777, and concluded that “[the statute] has always been considered as applicable only to suits brought on behalf of the State to enforce the State’s penal laws for its financial benefit.” 76 Md.App. at 457-460 , 545 A.2d 708 ; see generally Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51, 72-73 , 972 A.2d 864 (2009) (acknowledging the thorough analysis of CJP § 5-107 in Williams).
examined
Cited "see"
McLeod v. PB Investment Corp.
(3×)
See Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51 , 972 A.2d 864 (2009).
examined
Cited "see"
Dennis McLeod v. PB Investment Corporation
(3×)
See Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder, 972 A.2d 864 (Md. 2009).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Patton v. Wells Fargo Financial Maryland, Inc.
See, e.g., Master Financial, Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51 , 972 A.2d 864 (2009) (determining statute of limitations for action brought under subtitle 4 of Title 12 without discussing CL § 12-707(g)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Mitchell v. Residential Funding Corp.
(2×)
See, e.g., Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51 , 972 A.2d 864, 881 (2009) (discussing cases addressing this issue); Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 434 Mass. 81 , 746 N.E.2d 522 , 529 *489 (2001) (finding that defendants might argue either that standing or typicality were lacking as such “related concepts” and opting as a state court to analyze the issue under typicality requirements); see also William D.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of the REINSTATEMENT to the Bar of Maryland OF Michael Vincent KUHN.
Misc. Docket AG No. 63, September Term, 2008.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Jun 9, 2009.
Published
ORDER
This matter came before this Court on the Verified Petition of Michael Vincent Kuhn for reinstatement to the Bar of Maryland.
The Court having considered the Petition and the Response of Bar Counsel, it is this 9th day of June, 2009
ORDERED that the Petition be, and the same is granted, a majority of the Court concurring, and the Petitioner's practice shall be monitored by Henry C. Clagett, III, Esquire for a period of two (2) years with regular reports to Bar Counsel as set forth in Bar Counsel's response to the Verified Petition.