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Quoted verbatim 3×
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G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2003–2015 · 2 courts ·
…it is the employer's participation in the discriminatory practice which serves as the predicate for the imposition of liability on others for aiding and abetting.
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Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
Hockeson v. New York State Office of General Services
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
But see Murphy v. ERA United Realty, 251 A.D.2d 469, 471-73 , 674 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417-18 (2d Dep’t 1998), Second Department case adopted the reasoning of Tomka .
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Harris Ex Rel. Demas's Bankruptcy Estate v. New York State Department of Correctional Services
it is the employer's participation in the discriminatory practice which serves as the predicate for the imposition of liability on others for aiding and abetting.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Mahmud v. Kaufmann
it has been established that executive law 296(l)(a) only governs discrimination in the traditional employer-employee relationship and not in the employment of independent contractors.
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Perks v. Town of Huntington
it is the employer's participation in the discriminatory practice which serves as the predicate for the imposition of liability on others for aiding and abetting.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Dorio v. Community Hous. Mgt. Corp.
(3×)
Further, "[i]t is the employer's participation in the discriminatory practice which serves as the predicate for the imposition of liability on others for aiding and abetting." Murphy v ERA United Realty , 251 AD2d 469, 472 (2d Dept 1998).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Suzan Russell v. New York University
(4×)
Indeed, in each of the cases cited by the dissent for the undisputed propositions that “state and federal courts have treated section 8-107 (1) (a) as creating individual liability for employees” and that “a person may sue an employee for allegedly creating or participating in a hostile work environment based on the complainant’s protected classification” (see dissenting op at 9-10, 14-15), with the exception of Murphy v ERA Realty ( 251 AD2d 469, 471 [2d Dept 1998]), plaintiff either did not bring a claim based on individual liability (see e.g.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jusino v. Federation of Catholic Teachers, Inc.
Dist ., 2023 NY Slip Op 23386 , quoting Murphy v ERA United Realty , 251 AD2d 469, 472 [2d Dept 1998]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jusino v. Federation of Catholic Teachers, Inc.
Dist ., 2023 NY Slip Op 23386 , quoting Murphy v ERA United Realty , 251 AD2d 469, 472 [2d Dept 1998]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Miller-Sethi v. City University of New York
Importantly, “it is the employer’s participation in the discriminatory practice which serves as the predicate for the imposition of liability on others for aiding and abetting.” Murphy v. ERA United Realty, 251 A.D.2d 469, 472 (1998) (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mykytyn v. Hannaford Bros.
Contrary to defendants’ contention, we conclude that plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to state a claim against Rosati individually for aiding and abetting the alleged discriminatory conduct (see Moskal v Utica Coll., 59 AD3d 956, 957 [2009]; Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 707 [2006]; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 472 [1998]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mykytyn v. Hannaford Bros.
Contrary to defendants’ contention, we conclude that plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to state a claim against Rosati individually for aiding and abetting the alleged discriminatory conduct (see Moskal v Utica Coll., 59 AD3d 956, 957 [2009]; Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 707 [2006]; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 472 [1998]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Matter of New York State Division of Human Rights v. Miranda
Inasmuch as the restaurant and Miranda are independently liable for violating Executive Law § 296 (1), their participation in the discriminatory conduct serves as a predicate for the imposition of personal liability against Paduano pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (6) for aiding and abetting his employer’s violations (see Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 471-473 [1998]; compare Matter of Medical Express Ambulance Corp. v Kirkland, 79 AD3d 886, 888 [2010], lv denied 17 NY3d 716 [2011]; Strauss v New York State Dept. of Educ., 26 AD3d 67, 73 [2005]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Croci v. Town of Haverstraw
Since the plaintiff failed to allege that LoBlanco aided, abetted, incited, compelled, or coerced the Town’s alleged discriminatory behavior, she has not sufficiently pleaded a cause of action pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (6) (see Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 707 [2006]; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 472 [1998]; cf. Matter of Medical Express Ambulance Corp. v Kirkland, 79 AD3d 886, 888 [2010]; Strauss v New York State Dept. of Educ., 26 AD3d 67, 72-73 [2005]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Croci v. Town of Haverstraw
Since the plaintiff failed to allege that LoBlanco aided, abetted, incited, compelled, or coerced the Town’s alleged discriminatory behavior, she has not sufficiently pleaded a cause of action pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (6) (see Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 707 [2006]; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 472 [1998]; cf. Matter of Medical Express Ambulance Corp. v Kirkland, 79 AD3d 886, 888 [2010]; Strauss v New York State Dept. of Educ., 26 AD3d 67, 72-73 [2005]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
D'Allaird v. Markline Sales, Inc.
Moreover, Markline was obliged to “keep Montalvo fully appraised” of any sales inquiries and “pertinent communications with prospective purchasers or customers.” While far from conclusive, Supreme Court properly found from this proof questions of fact as to Markline’s status that precluded an award of summary judgment to Montalvo with regard to plaintiffs’ common-law negligence claim (see Gitchell v Corby, 64 AD3d 1163, 1164 [2009]; Shah v Lokhandwala, 265 AD2d 396, 397 [1999]; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 470-471 [1998]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
D'Allaird v. Markline Sales, Inc.
Moreover, Markline was obliged to “keep Montalvo fully appraised” of any sales inquiries and “pertinent communications with prospective purchasers or customers.” While far from conclusive, Supreme Court properly found from this proof questions of fact as to Markline’s status that precluded an award of summary judgment to Montalvo with regard to plaintiffs’ common-law negligence claim (see Gitchell v Corby, 64 AD3d 1163, 1164 [2009]; Shah v Lokhandwala, 265 AD2d 396, 397 [1999]; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 470-471 [1998]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Medical Express Ambulance Corp. v. Kirkland
Moreover, Martinez cannot be held liable under Executive Law § 296 (6) for aiding and abetting his own violation of the Human Rights Law (see Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 707 [2006]; Strauss v New York State Dept. of Educ., 26 AD3d at 73 ; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 472 [1998]; Trovato v Air Express Intl., 238 AD2d 333, 334 [1997]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Carrea v. Imagimed, LLC
Co., 278 AD2d 353, 355 [2000]), or that Altieri, who was alleged to have participated in and incited the allegedly discriminatory conduct, would not be personally liable under an aiding and abetting theory (see Executive Law § 296 [6]; Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 707 [2006]; Nesathurai v University at Buffalo, State Univ. of N.Y., 23 AD3d 1070, 1072 [2005]; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 471 [1998]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Moskal v. Utica College
Contrary to defendants’ contention, plaintiff stated a cause of action against the individual defendants under Executive Law § 296 (6) for aiding and abetting the alleged discriminatory conduct (see Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 707 [2006]; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 472 [1998]; see also Nesathurai v University at Buffalo, State Univ. of N.Y., 23 AD3d 1070, 1072 [2005]; D’Amico v Commodities Exch., 235 AD 2d 313, 315 [1997]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mitchell v. TAM Equities, Inc.
Hence, although the plaintiff’s coworkers and immediate supervisors are not “employers” within the meaning of Executive Law § 292 (5), and thus cannot be held personally liable for a violation of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) (see Patrowich v Chemical Bank, 63 NY2d 541 [1984]), the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action against her coworkers and supervisors pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (6), which imposes liability upon individuals who aid and abet an employer that commits employment discrimination in violation of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a) (see Strauss v New …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Strauss v. New York State Department of Education
In other words, we hold that individuals cannot be held liable under Executive Law § 296 (6) for aiding and abetting their own violations of the Human Rights Law (see Trovato v Air Express Intl., supra at 334; DeWitt v Lieberman, 48 F Supp 2d 280, 294 [SD NY 1999]; cf. Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 472 [2d Dept 1998]; Bennett v Progressive Corp., 225 F Supp 2d 190, 213-214 [ND NY 2002]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Nesathurai v. University at Buffalo
Defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing as a matter of law that he did not aid or abet the other named defendants in the alleged discriminatory acts against plaintiff (see Executive Law § 296 [6]; Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 471-472 [1998]; D'Amico v Commodities Exch., 235 AD2d 313, 315 [1997]; see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Priore v. New York Yankees
(2×)
In Murphy v ERA United Realty ( 251 AD2d 469, 471 [1998]), the Second Department held as much with regard to the state statute, but went on to distinguish the City enactment (which is more important for our purposes, because it introduces the element of “sexual orientation” at issue here) by noting that the local ordinance further expands the area of liability for discriminatory practices to include an employer’s “employee or agent.” The Court there dismissed the cause of action against a fellow employee under the state law, but denied dismissal of a similar claim based on section 8-…
discussed
Cited "see"
Hart v. Rick's Cabaret International Inc.
See Murphy v. ERA United Realty, 251 A.D.2d 469, 470-71 , 674 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2d Dep’t 1998) (considering factors including requirement that worker wear the company uniform, follow company procedures, attend mandatory meetings, sign in and out of the office, and coordinate vacation time with supervisor); E.
cited
Cited "see"
Patane v. Clark
Patane, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 317-18 ; see DeWitt v. Lieberman, 48 F. Supp. 2d 280, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Murphy v. ERA United Reality, 251 A.D.2d 469, 471 (N.Y. 2d Dep’t 1998)).
cited
Cited "see"
Patane v. Clark
Patane, 435 F.Supp.2d at 317-18 ; see DeWitt v. Lieberman, 48 F.Supp.2d 280, 293 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (citing Murphy v. ERA United Realty, 251 A.D.2d 469, 471 , 674 N.Y.S.2d 415 (N.Y.A.D.2d Dep't 1998)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Heinemann v. Howe & Rusling
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Murphy, 251 A.D.2d at 472 , 674 N.Y.S.2d 415 (“By alleging that the owner-employer engaged in acts of unlawful discrimination, the plaintiff unquestionably stated a cause of action against the owner-employer.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Gorman v. Covidien, LLC
Compare Trovato v. Air Express Int'l, 238 A.D.2d 333 , 655 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (1997) ("Wo find a coemployee liable as an aider and abettor would ignore the statutory and legal authority limiting the parties who may be sued for employment discrimination”), with Murphy v. ERA United Realty, 251 A.D.2d 469 , 674 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1998) ("Moreover, the broad language in [Trovato] should not be read to rule out a cause of action pursuant to Executive Law § 296(6) against a coemployee who is alleged to have actively aided and abetted the employer in acts prohibited under Executive Law article 15.…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
M.O.C.H.A. Society, Inc. v. City of Buffalo
See, e.g., DeWitt v. Lieberman, 48 F.Supp.2d 280, 293 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (citing Murphy v. ERA United Realty, 251 A.D.2d 469 , 674 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (2d Dep’t 1998)); see also Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa per Azioni, 585 F.Supp.2d 520, 526 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (“Before accessorial liability can be found as to an alleged aider and abettor, the plaintiff must first establish liability as to the employer/principal.”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Mascola v. City University of New York
As the claims against the university were properly dismissed, the court also properly dismissed the claims against the individual defendants for aiding and abetting (see Trovato v Air Express Intl., 238 AD2d 333 [1997]; compare Murphy v ERA United Realty, 251 AD2d 469, 472 [1998]).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Lewis v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority
Compare Murphy v. ERA United Realty, 251 A.D.2d 469, 472-73 , 674 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417-18 (2d Dep't 1998) (affirming denial of summary judgment on claims that co-employees aided and abetted discrimination by their employer); Steadman v. Sinclair, 223 A.D.2d 392, 393 , 636 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326 (1st Dep't 1996) (permitting defendant to amend answer to assert aiding and abetting counterclaims); and Peck v. Sony Music Corporation, 221 A.D.2d 157, 158 , 632 N.Y.S.2d 963, 963 (1st Dep’t 1995) (holding that § 296(6) "provides that an individual may be held liable for aiding and abetting discriminatory c…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Valentino Morales
v.
City of New York, and L.C. Driggs, Corp., and Third-Party Brooklyn Union Gas, Third-Party (And Another Title.)
v.
City of New York, and L.C. Driggs, Corp., and Third-Party Brooklyn Union Gas, Third-Party (And Another Title.)
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jun 15, 1998.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the third-party defendant Brooklyn Union Gas appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.), dated April 18, 1997, which, inter alia, granted the plaintiffs’ motion to restore the action to the trial calendar.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable by the appellant to the respondents.
A motion to vacate the dismissal of an action pursuant to CPLR 3404 and to restore the matter to the calendar is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court (see, Carter v City of New York, 231 AD2d 485; Smith v City of New York, 203 AD2d 553). Under the circumstances of this case, where it is not clear that the case was marked off the calendar because of any fault of the plaintiffs, it cannot be said that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion (see, e.g., Holbrook v United Hosp. Med. Ctr., 239 AD2d 317). Bracken, J. P., Copertino, Santucci and Mc-Ginity, JJ., concur.