green
Positive treatment
25.4 score
Treatment trajectory · 2004 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2004
2015
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Serini v. City of New York
Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 2000)). “[A] civilian complainant can be held liable for malicious prosecution if she ‘intentionally provided false evidence to the police resulting in the plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution.’” Weiner, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 46 (quoting Brown v. Nassau County, 306 A.D.2d 303, 303 (2d Dep’t 2003)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Merrill v. Copeland
On the other hand, “a complainant can be held liable for false arrest if the complainant ‘intentionally provided false information’ to instigate an arrest by law-enforcement officials, or had no reasonable basis for the report.” Biswas v. City of New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 504, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Nassau Cty., 306 A.D.2d 303, 303 (2d Dep’t 2003)); see also Grant v. City of New York, No. 15-cv-3635, 2019 WL 1099945 , at *7, 2019 U.S. Dist.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Merrill v. Copeland
On the other hand, “a complainant can be held liable for false arrest if the complainant ‘intentionally provided false information’ to instigate an arrest by law-enforcement officials, or had no reasonable basis for the report.” Biswas v. City of New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 504, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Nassau Cty., 306 A.D.2d 303, 303 (2d Dep’t 2003)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Levitz v. Bree
See, e.g., Weiner v. McKeefery, 90 F. Supp. 3d 17, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Brown v. Nassau Cty., 306 A.D.2d 303, 303 (N.Y.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Higgins v. Goyer
Accepting plaintiff's allegations as true, as we must, the complaint adequately alleges that Goyer "knowingly provided false information to the police" and such allegations are "sufficient to state that the complainant initiated the proceeding by playing an active role in the other party's arrest and prosecution" ( Place v Ciccotelli , 121 AD3d at 1379-1380 ; see Coscia v Jamal , 156 AD3d 861, 863-864 [2017]; Kirchner v County of Niagara , 107 AD3d 1620, 1622 [2013]; Brown v Nassau County , 306 AD2d 303, 303 [2003]; Ramos v City of New York , 285 AD2d 284, 299-300 [2001]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Coscia v. El Jamal
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there was a rational process by which the jury could find that the defendants affirmatively induced law enforcement officials to act by providing them with false information, which the defendants knew to be false and which resulted in the plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution (see DeMarzo v DeMarzo, 150 AD3d 1202, 1203 [2017]; Maskantz v Hayes, 39 AD3d 211, 213-214 [2007]; Mesiti v Wegman, 307 AD2d 339, 341 [2003]; Brown v Nassau County, 306 AD2d 303, 303 [2003]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Place v. Ciccotelli
Similar allegations that a complainant has knowingly provided false information to the police or withheld information from police have been found to be sufficient to state that the complainant initiated the proceeding by playing an active role in the other party’s arrest and prosecution (see Kirchner v County of Niagara, 107 AD3d 1620, 1622 [2013]; Lupski v County of Nassau, 32 AD3d 997, 998 [2006]; Brown v Nassau County, 306 AD2d 303, 303 [2003]; Ramos v City of New York, 285 AD2d 284, 299-300 [2001]; see also Grucci v Grucci, 20 NY3d at 901-902 [Pigott, J., dissenting]; PJI 3:50.2).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Place v. Ciccotelli
Similar allegations that a complainant has knowingly provided false information to the police or withheld information from police have been found to be sufficient to state that the complainant initiated the proceeding by playing an active role in the other party’s arrest and prosecution (see Kirchner v County of Niagara, 107 AD3d 1620, 1622 [2013]; Lupski v County of Nassau, 32 AD3d 997, 998 [2006]; Brown v Nassau County, 306 AD2d 303, 303 [2003]; Ramos v City of New York, 285 AD2d 284, 299-300 [2001]; see also Grucci v Grucci, 20 NY3d at 901-902 [Pigott, J., dissenting]; PJI 3:50.2).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
PlacevCiccotelli
Similar allegations that a complainant has knowingly provided false information to the police or withheld information from police have been found to be sufficient to state that the complainant initiated the proceeding by playing an active role in the other party's arrest and prosecution (see Kirchner v County of Niagara, 107 AD3d 1620, 1622 [2013]; Lupski v County of Nassau, 32 AD3d 997, 998 [2006]; Brown v Nassau County, 306 AD2d 303, 303 [2003]; Ramos v City of New York, 285 AD2d 284, 299-300 [2001]; see also Grucci v Grucci, 20 NY3d at 901-902 [Pigott, J., dissenting]; PJI 3:50.2).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robles v. City of New York
The plaintiffs submissions were also sufficient to raise triable issues of fact as to whether the Allstate defendants intentionally provided false information to law enforcement officials or withheld material information (see Brown v Nassau County, 306 AD2d 303, 303 [2003]; cf. Brown v Sears Roebuck & Co., 297 AD2d 205, 210 [2002]; DeFilippo v County of Nassau, 183 AD2d at 696 ), thereby permitting an inference of actual malice (see Mesiti v Wegman, 307 AD2d at 340 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robles v. City of New York
The plaintiffs submissions were also sufficient to raise triable issues of fact as to whether the Allstate defendants intentionally provided false information to law enforcement officials or withheld material information (see Brown v Nassau County, 306 AD2d 303, 303 [2003]; cf. Brown v Sears Roebuck & Co., 297 AD2d 205, 210 [2002]; DeFilippo v County of Nassau, 183 AD2d at 696 ), thereby permitting an inference of actual malice (see Mesiti v Wegman, 307 AD2d at 340 ).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Vasquez v. State
Props., 306 AD2d 303, 304 [2003]; Stuckey v Westchester County Dept. of Transp., 298 AD2d 577 , 578 [2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 502 [2003]).
discussed
Cited "see"
Calicchio v. Sachem Central School District
See Brown v. Nassau County, 306 A.D.2d 303 , 760 N.Y.S.2d 655, 655-56 (2d Dept.2003) (rejecting claim that defendant was a mere civilian as there were issues of fact as to whether she intentionally provided false evidence to the police); see also Stampf v. Long Island R.R.
discussed
Cited "see"
Rivera v. County of Nassau
Amend established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing cause of action alleging the false arrest by submitting evidence that he did not actively importune the police to arrest the defendant without “reasonable cause” to believe that the plaintiff had made the threatening telephone calls (DeFilippo v County of Nassau, 183 AD2d at 696-697 ; see Brown v Nassau County, 306 AD2d 303 [2003]; Du Chateau v Metro-North Commuter R.R.
discussed
Cited "see"
Weiss v. Hotung
Upon our review of the record, we conclude that there is an issue of fact whether an employee of Violet Realty intentionally gave false information to the police, resulting in the commencement of the criminal proceeding against plaintiff (cf. id. at 210-212 ; see generally Brown v Nassau County, 306 AD2d 303 [2003]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Elisa Brown
v.
World Financial Properties, Inc., Formerly Known as Olympia and York, Inc.
v.
World Financial Properties, Inc., Formerly Known as Olympia and York, Inc.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jun 9, 2003.
Cited by 3 opinions | Published
—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant World Financial Properties, Inc., formerly known as Olympia and York, Inc., appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Milano, J.), dated May 10,[*304] 2002, as only conditionally granted its motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3216 for failure to prosecute.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted unconditionally, and the complaint is dismissed.
Having been served with a 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216, the plaintiff should have complied with the notice by filing a note of issue or should have moved, before the default date, either to vacate the notice or extend the 90-day period (see Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 499, 503 [1997]; Stuckey v Westchester County Dept. of Transp., 298 AD2d 577 [2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 502 [2003]; Raffa v Cook, 289 AD2d 385 [2001]; Wechsler v First Unum Life Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 340 [2002]). The plaintiff failed to do so. Accordingly, to avoid dismissal, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate both a justifiable excuse for the delay in properly responding to the 90-day notice and the existence of a meritorious cause of action (see Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., supra at 503; Stuckey v Westchester County Dept. of Transp., supra). The plaintiff did not demonstrate a justifiable excuse, nor did she demonstrate a meritorious cause of action (see Rubin v Baglio, 234 AD2d 534 [1996]; Longacre Corp. v Better Hosp. Equip. Corp., 228 AD2d 653 [1996]; Aalbue v Flaherty, 202 AD2d 381 [1994]). Therefore, the Supreme Court improperly relieved the plaintiff of her default. Ritter, J.P., Feuerstein, McGinity, Townes and Cozier, JJ., concur.