Barnum v. Srogi, 96 A.D.2d 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). · Go Syfert
Barnum v. Srogi, 96 A.D.2d 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
15 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Case v. Case (nyappdiv, 2013-07-19)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Case v. Case
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Dibble & Miller was not then the attorney of record for plaintiff in this action, and it is well settled that “[o]nly the attorney of record ... is entitled to an attorney’s . . . charging lien” (Matter of Barnum v Srogi, 96 AD2d 723, 724 [1983]; see Rodriguez v City of New York, 66 NY2d 825, 827-828 [1985]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Case v. Case
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Dibble & Miller was not then the attorney of record for plaintiff in this action, and it is well settled that “[o]nly the attorney of record ... is entitled to an attorney’s . . . charging lien” (Matter of Barnum v Srogi, 96 AD2d 723, 724 [1983]; see Rodriguez v City of New York, 66 NY2d 825, 827-828 [1985]).
discussed Cited "see" Greenberg v. State
N.Y. App. Div. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
It is only the attorney of record in an action or special proceeding who has a statutory lien under Judiciary Law § 475 (Johnson v Jahr, 1 AD2d 579, 580 ; see, Matter of Barnum v Srogi, 96 AD2d 723 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of T. Crouse Barnum
v.
Robert Z. Srogi, as Commissioner of Assessment of the City of Syracuse, and Hancock, Estabrook, Ryan, Shove & Hust
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Jul 11, 1983.
96 A.D.2d 723
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published

— Order unanimously affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: This appeal is from an order which vacated an attorney’s charging lien filed, pursuant to section 475 of the Judiciary Law, against a portion of the proceeds due under a judgment rendered in this tax certiorari proceeding. Appellant contends that there was a fee-splitting agreement between its firm and T. Crouse Barnum, the attorney of record, which permitted them to share in any contingent fee received as a result of the tax assessment litigation. In its petition, appellant alleges claims which may form the basis for a contractual claim (see People v Keeffe, 50 NY2d 149, 155), but we find no allegations sufficient to support a lien against the moneys available for satisfaction of the judgment (cf. Matter of Gutchess, 90[*724] AD2d 663, 664). Only the attorney of record herein is entitled to an attorney’s statutory or charging lien (Melzer v 195 Broadway Corp., 18 AD2d 1108; Friedland v 601 West 149th St., 15 AD2d 742; Matter of Sebring, 238 App Div 281; 7 NY Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law, § 176, pp 98-99). Appellant acknowledges that T. Crouse Barnum was the attorney of record, and that the firm of Smith, Sovik, Kendrick, McAuliffe & Schwarzer, P. C., was retained as trial and appellate counsel. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Tenney, J. — attorney’s lien.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Doerr, Boomer, Green and Schnepp, JJ.