green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
36.3 score
“the trial court found that the state's proffered reasons for the strikes were race neutral, implicitly ruling that lynch did not carry his burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination.”
Treatment trajectory · 2015 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2015
2020
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
State v. Porter
the trial court found that the state's proffered reasons for the strikes were race neutral, implicitly ruling that lynch did not carry his burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Arizona v. Dimitri Polanco Romero
In State v. Robinson, 253 Ariz. 121 , ¶ 68 (2022) (quoting State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, ¶ 6 (2015), rev’d, 578 U.S. 613 , 616-17 (2016)), our supreme court indicated that “the legal impropriety of [a] prosecutor’s questions and actions” cannot “rise[] to the level of prosecutorial error” if performed without “the requisite ‘indifference, if not a specific intent, to prejudice’” the defendant.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Hon. Whitehead Gallegos
(2×)
A.R.S. § 13-752(N), (O). ¶16 Noting the ambiguity and apparent tension between these provisions, the Arizona Supreme Court clarified “when a defendant is entitled to an entirely new sentencing proceeding” or “only a new penalty- phase proceeding.” Lynch, 238 Ariz. at 102, ¶ 56.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ware 223315 v. Shinn
Because parole had been 7 abolished in 1994, the only “release” Ware could obtain after serving twenty-five years 8 would have been “executive clemency.” State v. Lynch, 357 P.3d 119, 139 (Ariz. 2015), 9 rev’d, 578 U.S. 613 (2016).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Olaoye
Second, by attempting a dramatic moment in which he pulled a baggie of unadmitted rosemary from his pocket to dispose of Olaoye’s defense, the prosecutor “intentionally engaged in improper conduct and did so with indifference, if not a specific intent, to prejudice [Olaoye].” See State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 92, ¶ 6 (2015), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2019).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Lewis
“When assessing cumulative error, this Court ‘consider[s] whether persistent and pervasive misconduct occurred . . . .’” Hulsey, 243 Ariz. at 394, ¶ 122 (quoting State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 100, ¶ 51 (2015)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Grier
This includes inviting jurors to place themselves in the victim’s position because doing so plays on the jurors’ fear of the defendant or sympathy for the victim.” State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 100, ¶ 48 (2015) (citation omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); see also Morris, 215 Ariz. at 337, ¶ 58 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Christopher Spreitz v. Charles Ryan
In doing so, [the court] review[s] the record de novo, considering the quality and the strength, not simply the number, of aggravating and mitigating factors.” State v. Lynch, 357 P.3d 119, 141 (Ariz. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Christopher Spreitz v. Charles Ryan
In doing so, [the court] review[s] the record de novo, considering the quality and the strength, not simply the number, of aggravating and mitigating factors.” State v. Lynch, 357 P.3d 119, 141 (Ariz. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Winiker
State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 97, ¶ 33 (2015), overturned on other grounds by Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016). ¶51 Viewed in the context of counsels’ full closing argument, the prosecutor’s challenged statements were not a misstatement of the law, but an attempt to address and refute defense counsel’s attacks on the adequacy of the police investigation.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Johnson
(7×)
also: Cited "see"
The defense objected on multiple occasions to what it perceived to be the impugning of defense counsel through the telling of the Copperfield story; we thus “consider alleged trial error under the harmless error standard when a defendant objects at trial and thereby preserves an issue for appeal.” State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 18 , 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). ¶9 Our case law has consistently held “[a] prosecutor[] ha[s] wide latitude in closing arguments and may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence.” State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 96, ¶ 28 , 357 P.3d 119, 131 (…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Quimayousie
(3×)
State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 104, ¶ 67 , 357 P.3d 119, 139 (2015).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Decker
State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 97, ¶ 33 , 357 P.3d 119 (2015).
discussed
Cited "see"
Bearup v. Shinn
See 11 Morris, 2024 WL 3091200. 12 In Morris, another division of this Court found that the pervasive confusion ended 13 either in September 2015, when the Arizona Supreme Court clarified that parole was 14 available only to certain juveniles and those who committed a felony pre-1994, State v. 15 Lynch (Lynch I), 357 P.3d 119, 138 (Ariz. 2015), or in May 2016, when the United States 16 Supreme Court held that the possibility of “release,” such as commutation or pardon, rather 17 than “parole,” did not justify the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury that the defendant 18 was in…
discussed
Cited "see"
State of Arizona v. Dwandarrius Jamar Robinson
(2×)
See State v. Lynch (Lynch I), 238 Ariz. 84 , 103 ¶ 65 (2015) (rejecting requirement to give parole ineligibility instruction where executive clemency made future release possible), rev’d, 578 U.S. 613 . ¶58 In Lynch II, the Supreme Court reversed our decision in Lynch I and held that neither the possibility of executive clemency nor the potential for future legislative reform could justify a trial court’s refusal to give a parole ineligibility instruction. 578 U.S. at 615–16; accord Simmons, 512 U.S. at 166 (plurality opinion) (“To the extent that the State opposes even a simple paro…
discussed
Cited "see"
State of Arizona v. Kenneth Wayne Thompson II
See State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84 , 100 ¶ 48 (2015), rev’d on other grounds, 578 U.S. 613 (2016) (“The proper response to an improper prosecutorial comment is an objection, motion to strike, and a jury instruction to disregard the stricken comment.”); State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389 , 403 ¶ 69 (2006) (finding an instruction that the jury must disregard statements after a sustained objection curative even where the jury was not told to disregard the statements at the time of the objection and noting that juries are 24 STATE V.
discussed
Cited "see"
State of Arizona v. James Clayton Johnson
(2×)
See Lynch I , 238 Ariz. at 105 ¶ 71, 357 P.3d at 140 . ¶123 During the trial, Johnson moved to disqualify juror 6 because the juror's daughter had been the victim in an unrelated case arising in February 2016, and Johnson argued this would bias juror 6 in favor of the prosecution.
discussed
Cited "see"
State of Arizona v. James Clayton Johnson
See Lynch I, 238 Ariz. at 105 ¶ 71. ¶123 During the trial, Johnson moved to disqualify juror 6 because the juror’s daughter had been the victim in an unrelated case arising in February 2016, and Johnson argued this would bias juror 6 in favor of the prosecution.
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Paskins
See State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 93, ¶ 12 (2015) (citing State v. Manuel, 229 Ariz. 1, 6, ¶ 25 (2011)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State of Arizona v. Christopher John Spreitz
Independent Review ¶9 In reviewing Spreitz’s death sentence, we “independently review the trial court’s findings of aggravation and mitigation and the propriety of the death sentence.” § 13-755(A); see also State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84 , 106 ¶ 79 (2015) (noting that this Court “independently review[s] the trial court’s findings of aggravation and mitigation and the propriety of the death sentence . . . de novo” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. 613 (2016). 2 1.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Ellison v. Shinn
See, e.g., State v. 25 Lynch, 357 P.3d 119 , 138–39 (Ariz. 2015). 26 One year after the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch—and 12 years after 27 Ellison’s sentencing—the United States Supreme Court overruled the Arizona Supreme 28 Court’s precedent, holding that Arizona courts had incorrectly interpreted Simmons. - 185 - Case 3:16-cv-08303-DWL Document 71 Filed 03/05/24 Page 186 of 208 1 Lynch, 578 U.S. at 614-16.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Andriano v. Shinn
(2×)
See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 27 238 Ariz. 84 , 103–04, 357 P.3d 119 , 138–39 (2015), reversed by Lynch, 136 S. Ct. at 1818– 28 20. - 77 - Case 2:16-cv-01159-SRB Document 70 Filed 01/19/21 Page 78 of 143 1 Twelve years after Andriano’s trial, the United States Supreme Court overruled the 2 Arizona Supreme Court’s precedent, holding that the court had incorrectly interpreted 3 Simmons.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State of Arizona v. John Michael Allen
See id. (“Mental anguish includes the victim’s uncertainty as to her ultimate fate . . . .” (quoting State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 392 (1991)); see also State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84 , 106 ¶ 83 (2015) (concluding cruelty aggravator shown by evidence that victim was conscious and secured to chair, indicating he had “ample time to contemplate his fate”), rev’d on other grounds by Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016). ¶28 Allen also argues the State failed to prove he intended that A.D. suffer or knew she would do so.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State of Arizona v. Bryan Wayne Hulsey
He stated that the defense wanted the jury to “[go] to Neverland” and enter the “Land of Oz.” Hulsey unsuccessfully moved for mistrial based on the “unethical behavior.” ¶99 While commentary about the defense’s theory is common, “[a]n argument that impugns the integrity or honesty of opposing counsel is . . . improper.” Id. at 86 ¶ 59; see also State v. Lynch (Lynch II), 238 Ariz. 84 , 96–97 ¶¶ 28–29 (2015) (illustrating improper commentary towards counsel as suggesting defense counsel fabricated evidence), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch III, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); …
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
State of Arizona v. Jasper Phillip Rushing
See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84 , 103 ¶ 65 (2015) (“Lynch I”), rev’d by Lynch II, 136 S. Ct. 1818 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Brown
See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84, 96, ¶ 29 (2015) (citations omitted) (finding prosecutor’s repeated suggestions that defense theories were not credible was not misconduct), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 171 (1990) (finding the characterization of defense as “outrageous” and a “smoke screen” permissible); Ramos, 235 Ariz. at 237 - 38, ¶¶ 24-25 (holding there was no misconduct where prosecutor suggested defense counsel was attempting to divert jurors by raising distractions or “red herrings”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State of Arizona v. Joel Randu Escalante-Orozco
(2×)
See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz. 84 , 103 ¶ 65, 357 P.3d 119, 138 (2015), rev.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
ANGEL S.
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY/A.S
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY/A.S
No. CV-15-0133-PR.
Arizona Supreme Court.
Sep 1, 2015.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
¶ 1 ORDERED: Appellant’s Petition for Review = DENIED.
¶ 2 FURTHER ORDERED: The Court of Appeals’ Opinion shall not be published, pursuant to Rule 111(g), Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court.