In Re Sb, 90 P.3d 746 (Cal. 2004). · Go Syfert
Search
In Re Sb, 90 P.3d 746 (Cal. 2004). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
1,108 citation events (1,108 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Yang v. Zhu CA1/5 (calctapp, 2026-06-23)
Treatment trajectory · 2004 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2004 2015 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Yang v. Zhu CA1/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue”].) 3.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Kessee CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
(See Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580 , 591–592 [“arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited”]; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“The purpose of this [forfeiture] rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected”].) 9 Kessee contends that the trial court violated his “state and federal due process rights when it did not dismiss the case upon the prosecution’s refusal to turn over Brady information.” As discussed above, the Brady evidence at issue was exculpatory …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re G.M. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
(See S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1294 [Court of Appeal “did not abuse its discretion in entertaining the mother’s challenge to the visitation order notwithstanding her failure to object to it in the juvenile court” where determination of the validity of the juvenile court’s delegation of authority to the legal guardians to determine allowable visitation “would add certainty and stability to child’s visitation”]; In re Anthony Q., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 345 [Court of Appeal exercised discretion to address merits of the father’s appeal of removal order “notwithstanding th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re M.C. CA2/2 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
However, father never asserted the restraining order should contain an exception for court-ordered contact or visits, even though that was possible. “[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287 , 1293 (S.B.).) While we have discretion to excuse forfeiture in cases presenting important legal issues (S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293), the issue father raises here is factual rather than legal— whether it is in M.C.’s best interest that father have no cont…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re M.Z. CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court”]; In re T.G. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 ; American Indian Model Schools v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 258 , 275– 276.) 12
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Jones CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
(See Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887, fn. 7 ; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [the discretion to excuse a failure to object “should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue”]; accord People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 461, 471 [forfeited claims are heard only in cases where “enforcement of a penal statute is involved,” “the asserted error fundamentally affects the validity of the judgment[,]” or where “important issues of public policy are at issue”].) Jones next argues that 7(b), which requires her to participate in counseling…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re O.G. CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) As a general rule, we do so “rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.” (Ibid.) The issues father attempts to raise—his ability to “complete” individual counseling and pay for a professional monitor—are factual questions, not legal ones.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Victorian CA2/6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 [“ ‘Ordinarily, a criminal defendant who does not challenge an assertedly erroneous ruling of the trial court in that court has forfeited his or her right to raise the claim on appeal’ ”]; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [parties are encouraged to bring errors to the trial court’s attention “so that they may be corrected”].) We need not decide whether Victorian forfeited her contention.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re L.M. CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court” and “[d]ependency matters are not exempt from this rule”]); In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696 , 724–725 (S.F.).) Furthermore, absent evidence of any other explanation such as that the touch was inadvertent, it is reasonable to infer from L.M.’s assertion that Father touched her genital area that the touching was for sexual arousal.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reynolds v. Bacon CA2/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“The purpose of [the forfeiture] rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected”].) Even if we were to excuse this forfeiture, James’s claim would nevertheless fail because he has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion. “[V]erified time statements of . . . attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re S.J. CA2/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(Desiree M., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 333-334 [parent lacks standing to assert statutory notice right held by child].) Second, father forfeited that claim by failing to object at any point to the lack of notice to S.J.’s attorney in the probate proceeding.3 (E.g., People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 521, fn. 12 (Abilez) [denial of notice resulting in alleged due process violation is forfeited for failure to object]; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 (S.B.), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953 , 962.) Third, any error in fai…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re A.A. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [appellate courts may exercise discretion and excuse forfeiture], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated by In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953 , 962.) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), provides an exception to adoption where “the juvenile court determines that there is a ‘compelling reason’ for concluding that the termination of parental rights would be ‘detrimental’ to the child due to ‘substantial interference’ with a sibling relationship.” (In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 813 (Daniel H.).) The statu…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re C.R. CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court”]; American Indian Model Schools v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 258, 276 [“Fairness militates against allowing an appellant to raise an issue for the first time in a reply brief because consideration of the issue deprives the respondent of the opportunity to counter the appellant by raising opposing arguments about the new issue”].) Moreover, father himself reported that he con…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re R.B. CA3 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880-881 [“ ‘ “[n]o procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,” or a right of any sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it” ’ ”]; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court”].) Instead, 10 minor’s counsel requested that the juven…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re J.G. CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [a reviewing court generally will not consider a challenge to a ruling where an objection could have been made but was not].) As for Kevin, the court found he had not maintained regular and consistent visitation with the children to justify declining to apply the exception as to him.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re K.G. CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court”].) At the disposition hearing, father objected to K.G.’s placement with the maternal grandmother and requested that K.G. be released to his care.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Huynh CA6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(See Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580 , 591–592 [“arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited”]; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“The purpose of this [forfeiture] rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected”].) Although we acknowledge that we retain discretion to consider even forfeited arguments in this appeal, we decline to do so because they rely on evidence that was not presented to the trial court and is not part of the record on appeal. 4 As defendant raises…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) S.V. v. Superior Court CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [a reviewing court generally will not consider a challenge to a ruling of an objection that could have been made but was not].) As such, we reject her contention she was 13. wrongly denied an opportunity to participate in the hearing on father’s section 388 petition. 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Estate of Cabrera CA6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580 , 591–592 [“arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited.”]; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“The purpose of this [forfeiture] rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected.”].) Even if objector had preserved the issue, the probate court implicitly found petitioner’s evidence credible.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Adrian M. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. 16 (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court”]; In re G.C. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1399 [“father forfeited the right to complain that his parental rights had been terminated without an adequate selection and implementation report” because he did not object in the juvenile court].) Adrian argues the Department’s reports contained “very little information” about the quality of his relationship with the children.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Barrios CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been 6 but was not made in the trial court”]; but see In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887, fn. 7 [appellate court may review forfeited claim “involv[ing] an important issue of constitutional law or a substantial right”].) Even addressing Barrios’s Sixth Amendment argument on its merits, the law does not support his argument.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re B.O. CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) As a general rule, we do so “rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.” (Ibid.) The issues Mother attempts to raise— parents’ ability to agree on a monitor and her ability to pay for a professional monitor—are factual questions, not legal ones.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. DeCutler CA3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
“Generally, issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” (Wisner v. Dignity Health (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 35 , 44.) “Although appellate courts have discretion to consider an issue in the first instance if it raises a question of law on undisputed facts, our Supreme Court has cautioned that such discretion should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.” (Id. at p. 44; see In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887, fn. 7 ; In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) “There is no rule . . . that an appellate cou…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Mehlenbacher CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 383 (Jennings); In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 [“the loss of a right based on failure to timely assert it is ‘forfeiture’ ”].) “Moreover, it is questionable ‘whether a defendant should be permitted to sit back, await a jury verdict, and then assert error based on the court’s improper communication with the jury’ [citation], at least when the improper communication was relatively minor.” (Jennings, at p. 384.) While Mehlenbacher is correct the court’s action denied him the opportunity to make a contemporaneous objecti…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re George C. CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(In re T.G. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 (T.G.) [“‘[a] party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court’”]; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 (S.B.) [“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court”].) With regard to the order for individual counseling, father’s only argument on appeal is that because the jurisdictional finding against him on count b-1 was erroneous, there was no basis to order …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Kahlil W. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(See, e.g., In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [a “reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court”]; In re P.L. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 406 , 409 [same].) Forfeiture, however, 5 does not apply here.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re R.F. CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Our discretion to excuse forfeiture “should be exercised rarely” and “with special care.” (S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) In the absence of a properly developed record, we decline to exercise that discretion here.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re M.C. CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.” “Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule.”], superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953 , 962.) Second, the court did not err in finding that substantial evidence supported its finding that the department provided reasonable reunification services and visitation to 13. mother.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re William R. CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(In re T.G. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 [“‘[a] party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial 14 court’”]; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court”].) However, we have elected instead to reach the merits of mother’s claim and find that the juvenile court’s removal order was supported by substantial evidence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Owen S. CA4/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
A court errs in failing to state facts supporting that conclusion.” However, county counsel argues, “Father did not object to any such deficiency below, and the issue could have easily been remedied by a timely objection and/or request for such findings; his complaints should be deemed forfeited before this Court.” County counsel is correct that an appellate court will ordinarily not consider a challenge to a dependency ruling if that challenge pertains to an objection that could have been raised in the juvenile court; however, “application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic.” (…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chomyk v. Christina Development Corp. CA2/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
(See AAA Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, rule 36 <https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/EmploymentRules_ Web_2.pdf> [as of June 5, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/ 37ED-E4UC> (AAA Employment Rules) [“Any party who proceeds with the arbitration after knowledge that any provision or requirement of these rules has not been complied with, and who fails to state objections thereto in writing or in a transcribed record, shall be deemed to have waived the right to object.”]; cf. In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“a reviewing court ordinarily will not conside…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re L.U. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(Erik P., supra, at p. 403 ; In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293 [dependency matters are not exempt from forfeiture rule].) 20 Application of the beneficial parental relationship exception depends entirely on a detailed analysis of the relevant facts by the juvenile court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ACMC Finance and Trade v. Khachatryan CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 [“a person who fails to preserve a claim forfeits that claim”]; see also Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467 , 554-555 [review on appeal “‘“is limited to issues which have been adequately raised”’”].) 15 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) TMG Placerville v. City of Placerville CA3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 [“the correct legal term for the loss of a right based on failure to timely assert it is ‘forfeiture,’ because a person who fails to preserve a claim forfeits that claim”].) 8 subject the ensuing judgment to attack. [Citation.] Bait and switch on appeal not only subjects the parties to avoidable expense, but also wreaks havoc on a judicial system too burdened to retry cases on theories that could have been raised earlier.” (JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178 .) Having failed to…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Abel C. CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(In re T.G. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 [“‘[a] party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court’”]; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court”].) Therefore, we affirm the dispositional orders.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re I.M. CA2/8
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) I.M. is three years old, and apart 12 from a few weeks in Mother’s care, he has spent all of his life in the home of his prospective adoptive parents, Mr. and Mrs. V.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re E.M. CA3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(See In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221 [forfeiture doctrine applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion of the proceedings]; Fretland v. County of Humbold (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1489 [a 13 party may not assert theories on appeal that the party did not raise in the court below]; In re G.P. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1193 [recognizing that the doctrine of invited error can apply in the dependency context and that under the doctrine, when a party by its own conduct induces the commission of error,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Law Finance Group v. Key CA2/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 [“the correct legal term for the loss of a right based on failure to timely assert it is ‘forfeiture,’ because a person who fails to preserve a claim forfeits that claim”].) A defense based upon a statute that is not jurisdictional in nature may be waived or forfeited.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Estevez v. Adams CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [If an objection could have been made in the trial court, but was not, the reviewing court will not ordinarily consider a challenge to the trial court’s ruling]; People v. Davis (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 617, 627 [timely and specific objection generally required]; Evid.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clinicas del Camino Real v. Baass CA3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 [].)” (Lynch v. California Coastal Com., supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 475-476.) “Whether a waiver or forfeiture has occurred is often a factual question, typically reviewed for substantial evidence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Johnson CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(People v. Runyan (2012) 54 Cal.4th 849, 859, fn 3 [court “may consider new arguments that present pure questions of law on undisputed facts”]; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic”].) The People argue that had Johnson objected to consideration of the police reports in the superior court, the People could have identified which of the eight police reports supported their position.
cited Cited as authority (rule) M.W. v. A.W. CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re L.C. CA2/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) In dependency cases in particular, our “discretion must be exercised with special care . . . .” (Ibid.) Certainly, the right to care for one’s children is one of the most fundamental constitutional rights.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Victoria A. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Kimberly faults the social worker’s reports for failing “to substantially address [Victoria’s] attachment to [her].” By not making this argument at the hearing under section 366.26, however, Kimberly forfeited it.6 (See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court”]; In re G.C. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1399 [“father forfeited the right to complain that his parental rights had been terminated without an adequate selection and implementation re…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re M.V. CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider an issue not raised below], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953 , 961–962; see also In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 222 [forfeiture “applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion of the proceedings”].) Additionally, Mother does not challenge the merits of the exit order in her appeal, and 7 she does not cite any authority holding that a prior appeal from …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Kasey D. CA2/7
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have 22 been but was not made in the trial court”]; In re E.A. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 787, 791 [father forfeited his contention the juvenile court erred in denying visitation while he was incarcerated by failing to raise it in the juvenile court]; In re Anthony P. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 635, 641 [mother “waived her right to assert error as to sibling visitation on appeal by not properly raising the issue below”].) Even if Mother’s contention was n…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marriage of Bassi CA6 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 .) Moreover, Susan fails to articulate why any such improper rulings were material and prejudicial such that reversal of the judgment is required.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Jonathan N. CA2/4 (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider an issue not raised below]; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 222 [forfeiture “applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion of the proceedings”].) Even if we were to consider the merits of father’s contention on appeal, however, he has not demonstrated error.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re B.W. CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Our Supreme Court described the limited exception in dependency appeals to the forfeiture rule: “[T]he appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue. [Citations.] Although an appellate court’s discretion to consider forfeited claims extends to dependency cases [citations], the discretion must be exercised with special care in such matters.” (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) The visitation issue was not a complicated one.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re J.C. CA4/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Although we have discretion to excuse forfeiture, our Supreme Court has cautioned such discretion “should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.” (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) This is not one of those rare cases.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In re S.B. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S.M., Defendant and Appellant.
S112260.
California Supreme Court.
May 27, 2004.
90 P.3d 746
Kennard.
Published

Kathleen Murphy Mallinger, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Lloyd W. Pellman, County Counsel, Sterling Honea, Principal Deputy County Counsel, and Gary P. Gross, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Ann Miller Ravel, County Counsel (Santa Clara) and Charles W. Nickell, Deputy County Counsel, for Santa Clara County[*788] Department of Family and Children's Services as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

William Wesley Patton for Whittier Law School Legal Policy Clinic as Amicus Curiae.

[*787] KENNARD, J.

At a permanent plan hearing in a juvenile dependency matter (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 366.26),[1] the court appointed legal guardians for the minor, S.B. and, without objection from the mother, ordered that visitation between the two be determined by the legal guardians. We address two issues: (1) whether, by not objecting to the visitation order, the mother forfeited her right to challenge that order on appeal; and (2) whether the court erred in having the legal guardians determine the question of visitation.

We hold that the mother's failure to challenge the visitation order in juvenile court did not preclude the Court of Appeal from considering the issue on appeal, and that the juvenile court can under current law delegate to a legal guardian the decision whether to allow parental visitation.

I

In November 1999, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) took custody of S.B., then 11 years old, and her half brother, J.M., then 7 years old. The Department filed a dependency petition under section 300 alleging that the children came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The petition alleged, among other things, that the children's mother failed to ensure that the children attended school, that because of her emotional problems she did not provide the children with the basic necessities of life, and that she was unable to care regularly for the children. The petition further alleged that the identity and whereabouts of the children's fathers were unknown. This appeal concerns only the minor S.B.

At the initial detention hearing (§ 319), the juvenile court ordered the Department to detain the two children and to monitor visits with the mother. The court appointed separate counsel for the children and the mother. At the jurisdictional hearing (§ 345 et seq.), the court sustained the petition; it appointed psychologist Steve Ambrose to evaluate the children and their mother.

At the dispositional hearing (§ 358), the court found that removal of the children from the mother's custody was necessary to protect them from substantial danger to their physical health, and that they were suffering severe emotional damage. It declared the children dependents of the court, placed them in the care of the Department for suitable placement, and ordered the Department to provide family reunification services. The Department placed the two children in separate foster homes.

Reunification services were not successful. The mother canceled some of the Department-supervised visits with the children, and she was late for many others. When she did visit, she verbally abused S.B. The court-appointed psychologist concluded that the mother suffered from a "debilitating mental illness that significantly impaired her ability to cooperate with a reunification case plan and to provide a stable home life for her children."

On July 27, 2001, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and scheduled a permanent plan hearing. (§ 366.26.)[*789] At that hearing, the mother was represented by counsel. Although the mother was in the courthouse, she did not appear at the hearing. The court did not terminate the mother's parental rights, but it did appoint S.B.'s foster parents as her legal guardians. Without objection from the mother's attorney, the court ordered the legal guardians to make all decisions concerning parental visits between S.B. and her mother. On appeal, the mother challenged that order, contending that the issue of visitation could be determined only by the juvenile court, not the legal guardians.

A divided Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case to the juvenile court, directing it to comply with the statutory language of either ordering visitation with guidance as to the time, place, and manner of visits; or denying visitation because of the detrimental effect on the child's physical or emotional well-being.

We granted the Department's petition for review challenging the Court of Appeal's holding that the juvenile court erred in leaving it to the minor's legal guardians to determine visitation, if any, between S.B. and her mother. Our order granting review directed the parties to brief the additional issue whether the mother could challenge on appeal the juvenile court's order notwithstanding her failure to object in the juvenile court. While this case was pending before this court, the Legislature amended the controlling statute, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4), effective January 1, 2004. At this court's request, the parties filed supplemental briefs addressing the effect, if any, of the amendment.

II

The Department contends that the failure of S.B.'s mother to object to the juvenile court's order granting the legal guardians the authority to determine visitation precluded the Court of Appeal from considering that issue. We disagree.

It is true that, as the Department contends, a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093.)[2] The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. (Saunders, at p. 590, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093.)

Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule. (See, e.g., In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 196 [failure to obtain supervising agency's assessment of prospective guardian under § 366.22, subd. (b)]; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 562 [failure to request court to order bonding study]; In re Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885-886, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 763 [failure to challenge setting of § 366.26 permanency planning hearing when court determined that no reasonable reunification efforts were made].)

But application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic. (Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394, 149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512; see People v. Williams[*790] (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 948 P.2d 429 [party's failure to object in trial court does not deprive appellate court of authority].) But the appellate court's discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue. (See Canaan v. Abdelnour (1985) 40 Cal.3d 703, 722, fn. 17, 221 Cal.Rptr. 468, 710 P.2d 268; Hale v. Morgan, supra, at p. 394, 149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512.) Although an appellate court's discretion to consider forfeited claims extends to dependency cases (Rosa S. v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1188, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 866; Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1459, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 118), the discretion must be exercised with special care in such matters. "Dependency proceedings in the juvenile court are special proceedings with their own set of rules, governed, in general, by the Welfare and Institutions Code." (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 200, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 866, 913 P.2d 1075.) Because these proceedings involve the well-being of children, considerations such as permanency and stability are of paramount importance. (§ 366.26.)

The Court of Appeal majority here did not abuse its discretion in entertaining the mother's challenge to the visitation order notwithstanding her failure to object to it in the juvenile court. The appeal presented an important issue of law: whether a juvenile court in a dependency case may delegate to the child's legal guardian the authority to decide whether a parent may visit the child, a question that has divided the Courts of Appeal. Moreover, because the juvenile court here had neither allowed nor prohibited visitation, but instead had delegated to the legal guardians the authority to either allow or prohibit visitation, an appellate determination on the validity of that delegation would add certainty and stability to the child's visitation.

III

At the time of the juvenile court proceedings in this case, former section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4) (hereafter former section 366.26(c)(4)) provided in relevant part: "If the court finds that adoption of the child or termination of parental rights is not in the best interest of the child ... the court shall either order that the present caretakers or other appropriate persons shall become legal guardians of the child or order that the child remain in long-term foster care.... The court shall also make an order for visitation with the parents or guardians unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the visitation would be detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the child." (Italics added.)

The italicized sentence had been construed by the Courts of Appeal in In re Jasmine P. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 617, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 562 (Jasmine P.) and in In re Randalynne G. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1156, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 880 (Randalynne G.), with conflicting interpretations. Jasmine P. held that the juvenile court could delegate to a legal guardian the issue of visitation between parent and child. In the court's words: "[W]here the child is left in long-term foster care and not in a legal guardianship, then the juvenile court shall order visitation with the parents or guardians unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the visitation would be detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the child." (91 Cal.App.4th at p. 621, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 562, original italics.) The section 366.26 hearing in this case occurred on November 27, 2001; the Court of Appeal's decision in Jasmine P. was filed on July 12, 2001. Here, in leaving to the minor's appointed guardians the determination of visitation between the minor and her mother, the juvenile court's[*791] ruling was in accord with the Jasmine P. decision.

After the permanent plan hearing in this case, the Court of Appeal in Randalynne G., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 1156, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 880, disagreed with the holding of Jasmine P., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 617, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 562. It held that the juvenile court in a dependency proceeding may not delegate to a minor's legal guardian the issue of visitation between child and parent. The Court of Appeal here followed Randalynne G.

The statutory language directing the juvenile court to determine visitation between parent and child, which was construed by the Courts of Appeal in Jasmine P., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 617, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 562, in Randalynne G., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 1156, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 880, and on appeal in this case, came at the end of a long paragraph concerning both legal guardianships and long-term foster care placements. This created uncertainty as to whether the statutory mandate that only the juvenile court, not the legal guardian, determine the issue of visitation applied solely to foster care or to both foster care and legal guardianships. Not surprisingly, this ambiguity has led to different interpretations of the statutory language in the Courts of Appeal.

The ambiguity has now been eliminated by a statutory amendment that took effect on January 1, 2004, while this case was pending before us. (Stats.2003, ch. 813, § 7.) Whereas former section 366.26(c)(4) comprised a long paragraph lumping together legal guardianships and foster care placements, the amended version deals with these two subjects in two separate paragraphs, designated section 366.26(c)(4)(A) and (B).

Section 366.26 (c)(4)(A), which pertains to legal guardianships, provides: "If the court finds that adoption of the child or termination of parental rights is not in the best interest of the child, because one of the conditions in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E) of paragraph (1) or in paragraph (2) applies, the court shall either order that the present caretakers or other appropriate persons shall become legal guardians of the child or order that the child remain in long-term foster care. Legal guardianship shall be considered before long-term foster care, if it is in the best interests of the child and if a suitable guardian can be found. A child who is 10 years of age or older who is placed in a group home shall be asked to identify any individuals who are important to the child to identify potential guardians. The agency may ask any child who is younger than 10 years of age to provide that information, as appropriate."

Section 366.26 (c)(4)(B), which concerns foster care placements, says: "If the child is living with a relative or foster parent who is willing and capable of providing a stable and permanent environment, but not willing to become a legal guardian, the child shall not be removed from the home if the court finds the removal would be seriously detrimental to the emotional well-being of the child because the child has substantial psychological ties to the relative caretaker or foster parents. The court shall also make an order for visitation with the parents or guardians unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the visitation would be detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the child." (Italics added.)

The italicized sentence in section 366.26(c)(4)(B) makes it clear that the juvenile court's obligation to "make an order for visitation" is triggered only when the court decides to leave the child with a caretaker who is not willing to become the child's legal guardian, and not when, as here, the court appoints the child's caretaker as the child's legal guardian.[*792] Thus, under the Legislature's amendment to section 366.26(c)(4), a juvenile court is not precluded from delegating to the appointed guardian the determination whether visitation is to occur between the parent and the child. Here, the mother has not argued that this construction of the amendment is in error.[3]

Rather, the mother argues that applying the amended provision to this case would constitute an improper retrospective application. She correctly points out the general rule that statutes do not operate retrospectively unless the Legislature plainly indicates otherwise. (Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40, 50 P.3d 751.) "A statute has retrospective effect when it substantially changes the legal consequences of past events." (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507.) Application of a statute that clarifies existing law is not retrospective, because the true meaning of the statute has not changed. (Ibid.)

Here, we need not decide whether the Legislature's recent amendment to section 366.26(c)(4) changed the statute or merely clarified its meaning. If the amendment simply clarified the meaning of the existing statutory provision, the juvenile court acted properly in leaving it to the court-appointed legal guardian to determine the issue of visitation. If, on the other hand, the recent amendment did change existing law, then the juvenile court erred in delegating the visitation issue to the guardian. But because on remand the amended statutory provision would control, the juvenile court at that time, in compliance with the amended provision, could again delegate control of visitation to the legal guardians. (See Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434 [laws addressing future acts are prospective in nature].) We therefore reject the mother's contention that we should remand the matter to the juvenile court directing that the court itself, rather than the court-appointed legal guardians, determine the issue of visitation.[4] This conclusion does[*793] not mean, however, that the mother has no legal recourse. Section 388 allows any parent to petition the juvenile court and section 385 allows the court on its own motion to change, modify, or set aside any order previously made by the court.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.

WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C.J., BAXTER, WERDEGAR, CHIN, BROWN and MORENO, JJ.

1 Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 Although the loss of the right to challenge a ruling on appeal because of the failure to object in the trial court is often referred to as a "waiver," the correct legal term for the loss of a right based on failure to timely assert it is "forfeiture," because a person who fails to preserve a claim forfeits that claim. In contrast, a waiver is the "`intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'" (People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1097, fn. 9, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 25 P.3d 598; People v. Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 590, fn. 6, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093.)
3 After the parties submitted supplemental briefs on the effect of the enactment of the January 1, 2004 amendment to section 366.26(c)(4), and after oral argument, the mother requested that we judicially notice Assembly Bill No. 2807 and the analysis of that bill by the Assembly Committee on Judiciary. That legislation, introduced in the Assembly on February 4, 2004, would again amend section 366.26(c)(4) by moving the sentence concerning visitation when the child is placed with a relative or foster parent, and not a legal guardian, into a separate and new subdivision that would then apply to "parents or guardians." The committee's analysis contains a brief discussion under the heading "Author's amendment," stating that this change is "to correct a drafting error" in Assembly Bill No. 408, the legislation that amended the statute effective January 1, 2004.

The request for judicial notice of Assembly Bill No. 2807 and the analysis of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary is granted. (Evid.Code, § 452, subd. (c).) The existence of the legislation and the committee analysis does not, however, affect our decision here. The bill has not been enacted into law, and we generally "do not rely on evidence of the individual views of proponents of legislation." (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 780, fn. 9, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 117, 919 P.2d 731; see also Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062 & fn. 5, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 906 P.2d 1057.)

4 Contrary to the mother's assertion, our conclusion will not disrupt existing guardianships in cases in which the juvenile court, rather than the legal guardian, determined the issue of visitation. Section 366.26(c)(4) as amended does not prohibit a juvenile court from deciding the issue of visitation when it appoints a legal guardian. Our holding that the juvenile court is not required to issue a visitation order when a guardian is appointed does not mean that such orders are statutorily prohibited. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1465(d)(2) [court may issue visitation orders when appointing legal guardian].) Thus, our holding has no effect on existing visitation orders in other cases where the juvenile court appointed legal guardians for the minor.