In Re Misako R., 2 Cal. App. 4th 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). · Go Syfert
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In Re Misako R., 2 Cal. App. 4th 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
490 citation events (443 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In re M.P. CA5 (calctapp, 2026-05-20)
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discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re M.P. CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
(In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547 [“In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect” but the standard is “whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.”].) The services were reasonable under the circumstances of this case when no mental health professional recommended family therapy.
examined Cited as authority (rule) S.W. v. Superior Court CA1/2 (3×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
(See In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547 [“In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect”].) Most significantly, contrary to mother’s claim that she had made substantial progress in the areas where she was provided reasonable services and therefore should have been given more time, the record in fact shows that mother failed to make substantial progress in her case plan in the six- month period.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) B.D. v. Super. Ct.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
In such cases, the juvenile court may, at the six-month review hearing, schedule a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26. (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3).) “If, however, the court finds . . . that reasonable services have not been provided, . . . the court shall continue the case to the 12-month permanency hearing.” (Ibid.) “[T]he court shall determine by clear and convincing evidence whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent or legal guardian in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been provided or…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alexis L. v. Superior Court CA1/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
“The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 [observing that “[i]n almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect.”].) Under the circumstances in this case, the juvenile court did not err in concluding the services the Agency offered Mother were reasonable. 13 III.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) V.K. v. Superior Court CA1/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(See Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609 , 625–626; § 366.21, subd. (e)(8).) “[U]p until the time the section 366.26 hearing is set, the parent’s interest in reunification is given precedence over the child’s need for stability and permanency.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310 .) To support a reasonable services finding, the record must show that the child welfare agency “ ‘identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, 17 offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the…
cited Cited as authority (rule) C.N. v. Superior Court CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 (Misako R.).) B.
cited Cited as authority (rule) T.J. v. Superior Court CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 (Misako R.).) 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) L.T. v. Superior Court CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545-547 (Misako R.).) 15 Relying on Amanda H., supra, 166 Cal.App.4th 1340 , Mother blames CFS for not following up with her service providers or attempting to gather information about her compliance with her case plan.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) G.H. v. Superior Court CA4/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.).) “‘Reunification services are voluntary . . . and an unwilling or indifferent parent cannot be forced to comply with them. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Ronell A. (1995) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352 , 1365.) 22 A juvenile court must find SSA provided reasonable reunification services based on clear and convincing evidence.
cited Cited as authority (rule) M.C. v. Superior Court CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 (Misako R.).) 22 B.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) S.D. v. Superior Court CA1/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(See In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 546 [“the record here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent, indicates everyone was not aware [the mother] had mental limitations”].) Moreover, Mother does not explain what additional services the Department could have offered with regard to her mental health.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) S.S. v. Superior Court CA2/5 (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
(Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at 547 [“The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances”].) 17 DISPOSITION The petition for extraordinary writ is denied.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Edith D. v. Superior Court CA1/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
(See In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 [“The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances”].) 5Because the trial court’s finding was made under the clear and convincing evidence standard, “[w]e review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard.” (In re Isa…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re I.S. CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
If there is substantial 7 evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 (Misako R.); see also Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598 .) “The purpose of the California dependency system is to protect children from harm and to preserve families when safe for the child. (§ 300.2; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228 .) The focus during the reunification period is to preserve the family whenever possible. [Citation.] Until services are terminated, family reunification is th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Dominic L. CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Therefore, that some evidence may have supported a finding that Mother did not abuse methamphetamine is of no import when other evidence 24 substantially supported the finding the court made.8 (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 [when “‘“‘two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts,’ either deduction will be supported by substantial evidence, and a ‘reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court’”’”].) 3.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Ed. CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
DISCUSSION A. General Legal Principles The purpose of a reunification plan is “to overcome the problem that led to removal in the first place.” (Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1748 .) “Each reunification plan must be appropriate to the particular individual and based on the unique facts of that individual.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 (Misako).) It is the Agency’s responsibility “to provide reasonable reunification services in spite of difficulties in doing so or the prospects of success.” (In re Taylor J. (2014) 223 4 Cal.App.4th 1446,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re S.A. CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
(In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414 .) “The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.).) Reunification services “should be tailored to the particular needs of the family.” (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425 .) The adequacy of the plan and the Agency's efforts must be judged according to the circumstances of the particular case.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re R.K. CA2/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
(In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545 [“[i]n reviewing the reasonableness of the services provided, this court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent”].) Even if the social worker had failed to provide mother with a referral to a drug treatment program, this lone omission does not negate the other efforts made by the social worker to assist mother in complying with the drug services component of her case plan.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) B.People v. Superior Court CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
On appeal, our review is limited to whether the appellate record discloses substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification, recognizing that the standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances, since “[i]n almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re E.C. CA4/1 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.).) When a party challenges the finding that reasonable services were offered or provided, we determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the court’s finding by reviewing the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and indulging in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court’s ruling.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) E.M. v. Superior Court CA6 (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
(Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164 .) “The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.).) We consider the case plan offered to Mother under this standard.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) T. J. v. Superior Court of City & Cnty. of S.F. (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. 5th · 2018 · confidence medium
Both cases are distinguishable because Mother in our case was not "wholly uncooperative" with GGRC ( Misako R. , at p. 543, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 217 ); to the contrary, by her conduct in attempting to seek out her own therapist she demonstrated a willingness to receive required therapy and an understanding it was needed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) T.J. v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
(Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1166 .) The Agency insists “the standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.)), but that commonplace notion obscures the real issue here, which is whether the limited steps it took were adequate to meet this family’s particular needs.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Matthew C. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
(In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547, 545 (Misako R.) [“ ‘ “ ‘[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts,’ either deduction will be supported by substantial evidence, and ‘a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court’ ” ’ ”].) We conclude that is does. * Section B of this opinion is not certified for publication.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alameda County Social Services Agency v. T.G.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
(Mark N. v. Superior Court, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1010 .) “The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 217 ].) Here, the petition was sustained based on allegations that minor was contemplating suicide and engaging in behaviors that posed a substantial danger to herself.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) S.W. v. Superior Court CA1/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
“The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 [observing that in “almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect”].) Here, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding the Department provided reasonable services.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Patricia W. v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
(Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 603 ], superseded by statute as indicated in Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 368 ]; In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 217 ].) If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, the court’s order must be affirmed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re C.H. CA1/4 (2×) also: Cited "see"
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
These minors had already been moved once from a stable relative placement due to the erratic behavior of their mother. 37 frequently and that the services provided were imperfect.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.); see Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 .) Thus, when considering the adequacy of reunification services, “[t]he standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547 ; see…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Anthony B.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 217 ].) If the court’s ruling is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court must affirm the court’s rejection of the exceptions to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re N,R. CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
The purpose of a reunification plan is "to overcome the problem that led to removal in the first place." (Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1748 .) "Each reunification plan must be appropriate to the particular individual and based on the unique facts of that individual." (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 (Misako).) To support a finding of reasonable services, "the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the par…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) J.C. v. Super. Ct. CA1/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
The adequacy of the reunification plan and of the department’s efforts to provide suitable services is judged according to the circumstances of the particular case . . . . “[T]he record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult.” ’ ” (In re K.C. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 323 , 329–330.) “When reunificat…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Guardianship of Jordyn P. CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(In re Misako R., supra, at p. 545.) The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error on appeal.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re J.D. CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
P.C. timely appealed. 3 DISCUSSION I Reasonableness of Reunification Services A. General Legal Principles The purpose of a reunification plan is "to overcome the problem that led to removal in the first place." (Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1748 .) "Each reunification plan must be appropriate to the particular individual and based on the unique facts of that individual." (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 (Misako).) To support a finding of reasonable services, "the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) T.G. v. Superior Court CA1/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(See In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 [services adequate if “reasonable under the circumstances” and need not be perfect]; In re K.B., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288 [affirming conclusion of active efforts and holding active efforts does not require provision of services that would be futile]; see also In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41 , 47–48 [reasonable services provided when child opposed visits with mother and agency attempted to facilitate discussions between mother and child]; id. at p. 48 [“By her own volition, she avoided the services she was provided.”]…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stephanie M. v. Super. Ct. CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(Elijah R., supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 969 , citing In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.).) Substantial Evidence of Progress Both parents contend there was substantial evidence they each made substantial progress in their services and the juvenile court erred in finding they had not done so.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) A.B. v. Superior Court CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Our review is limited to whether the appellate record discloses substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the agency made reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification recognizing that the standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in 7 Section 388 allows the parent of a child adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court to petition the court to change, modify or set aside any order upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence. 13 an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances, since �…
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re J.S. CA3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 (Misako).) Here, there was credible expert evidence regarding the cause of S.S.’s injuries and his death.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stefanie K. v. Superior Court CA1/4 (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164 .) Further, “[i]n almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.); see also Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 .) Thus, when considering the adequacy of reunification services, “[t]he standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (M…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re D.T. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(In re Luke L, supra, citing In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 (Misako R.).) In other words, the juvenile dependency system is required to accommodate the special needs of 10 disabled and incarcerated parents.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David H. v. Superior Court CA1/4 (2×) also: Cited "see"
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed.” (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.) When considered in this context, we believe that the record contains substantial evidence that the services provided to both parents were reasonable.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) C.C. v. Superior Court CA6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
“The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.).) On appeal, the applicable standard of review is substantial evidence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) San Joaquin Human Services Agency v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972-973 [ 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 ].) The question is not whether more or better services could have been provided, but “whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 217 ].) A developmentally disabled parent is entitled to services responsive to the family’s special needs in light of the parent’s particular disabilities, such as utilizing regional centers that are specifically designed to provide services to such individuals.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re A.J. CA2/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 217 ].) ‘The failure of the parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental.’ (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) [¶] In reviewing whether the record contains substantial evidence that returning [a child] to [a parent’s] custody would have been detrimental to her, we must keep in mind that the purpose of the reunification plan is ‘to overcome the problem that led to removal in the first place.’ (Blanca P…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re J.C. CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.) If there is substantial evidence supporting the court's ruling, the reviewing court must affirm the court's rejection of the exceptions to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re L v. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308 .) “The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.).) A juvenile court’s finding that reasonable reunification services have been offered and provided to the parents is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re X.Z.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(See Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164 [“The adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of [DCFS’s] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case.”]; In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 [“The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.”].) At the dispositional hearing, the court ordered a straightforward plan for Mother, a parenting course and individual counseling to address case issues and drug a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) R.S. v. Super. Ct. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 (Misako).) Here, CFS sent four letters to father in four months informing him of the services required by his case plan and asking him to contact the social worker so she could help him obtain those services.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Robert W.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 217 ].) “The failure of the parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) In reviewing whether the record contains substantial evidence that returning Mary to Robert’s custody would have been detrimental to her, we must keep in mind that the purpose of the reunification plan is “to overcome the problem that led to removal in the first place.” (Blanca P. v. Superior …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re N.L. CA6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1362 (Ronell A.).) “The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 (Misako R.).) On appeal, we apply the substantial evidence test to the question of whether reunification services were reasonable.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Christi F. v. Super. Ct. CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 [appellate court reviews the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and indulges in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court's ruling].) The juvenile court reasonably determined that Christi withheld crucial evidence from the court and thwarted the purpose of the juvenile court proceedings, which is to protect the child from further harm. (§ 300.2.) On this record, we cannot conclude the juvenile court erred when it barred Christi from presenting a defense at the 12-month review hearing under the disentitlement doctri…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re Misako R., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. San Diego County Department of Social Services, and
v.
Chai R., And
D013604.
California Court of Appeal.
Dec 9, 1991.
2 Cal. App. 4th 538
COUNSEL Miriam R. Kennedy, under appointment by the Court of Appeals, for Defendant and Appellant. Lloyd M. Harmon, Jr., County Counsel, Susan Strom, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and John E. Philips, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. John Y. Tremblatt, under appointment by the Court of Appeals, for Minors. Page 541
Kremer.
Cited by 317 opinions  |  Published

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 540 OPINION

Chai R. appeals an order establishing long-term foster care for her children Misako and Ty1 and terminating reunification services for Misako, Ty, and Minna. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Chai R. was born and raised in Korea. She is illiterate in both English and Korean, although she can write her name in Korean. She completed only two or three years of schooling in Korea. Tests by a court-appointed psychologist indicated she is mildly retarded.

Chai's husband Michael R. is the father of children Misako and Ty. The four lived in Okinawa until Michael R. was discharged from the Air Force in 1986. Chai did not want to leave and was not caring for the children, so Michael R. returned to the United States with Misako and Ty. Military authorities sent Chai to join them in Texas 10 months later. Chai was pregnant with Minna when she arrived. Minna's father is Darryl M., a Marine. In October 1987, Chai and the three children left Michael R. in Texas to join Darryl M. in California. She did not contact Michael R. for six months.

On October 1, 1989, while in California, Chai directed Darryl M. to discipline her children. He did so by striking them with a wire hanger, electrical cord and belt. On October 4, 1989, the San Diego County Department of Social Services (Department) filed petitions on behalf of Misako R., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)2 and on behalf of Ty and Minna pursuant to section300(b) and (j). The petitions alleged Darryl M. exposed Misako to excessive discipline and damage including bruises and lacerations resulting from his striking him with a belt. On October 16, 1989, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that the allegations were true.

On October 31, 1989, following a dispositional hearing, the court declared Minna a dependent child of the court, under the care, custody and control of the Department pursuant to section300(b) and (j). The court ordered physical custody be removed from the parents, but ordered Minna be placed with the mother. The court also issued a reunification plan directing the mother to, *Page 542 inter alia, actively participate and cooperate with In-Home Services and Union of Pan Asian Communities Counseling and Treatment Center (UPAC) in learning new parenting skills. The reunification plan directed Chai to:

"Obtain and maintain the same residence for at least three months.

"Demonstrate an ability to meet the basic needs of the minor to include food, clothing, and shelter.

"Maintain your home in a safe and sanitary condition.

"Notify the Department of Social Services social worker of any person(s) sharing your residence.

"Keep the . . . social worker advised of your current home address and telephone number. . . . Immediate notification to the social worker is required whenever your address/telephone number changes.

"Provide the . . . social worker with proof of your financial ability to provide for your child(ren) from a legal source of income. . . ." It also directed Chai to enter into individual therapy if the Department could find a local Korean-speaking therapist.

On November 20, 1989, following another dispositional hearing, the court declared Misako a dependent child of the court pursuant to section 300(b). The court removed physical custody of Misako from the mother pursuant to section 361, subdivision (b). Misako was placed in a licensed foster home.

Also on November 20, 1989, Ty was declared a dependent child of the court pursuant to section 300(b) and (j). Ty was detained with the mother.

In December 1989 and February 1990, a Korean-speaking counselor carried out a psychosocial evaluation. The counselor's report recommended Chai volunteer in an educationally oriented day nursery to observe and learn parenting skills first hand. It also recommended Chai attend English as second language classes and learn how to use public transportation.

On May 22, 1990, a psychologist, with the help of an interpreter from UPAC, carried out a psychological evaluation. Although the language barrier created some difficulties for the psychologist, she was able to employ several nonverbal tests from which she was able to make her conclusions. The psychologist had extensive experience testing patients from a broad variety of Asian cultures, including Koreans. The psychologist concluded *Page 543 Chai is mildly retarded and would have great difficulty learning a second language. The psychologist also concluded Chai "is not able to function as a safe, single parent to her children without a live-in, competent adult." The report indicated a need for significant psychological intervention on behalf of the children as they are at high risk of:

"(1) fetal alcohol effects

"(2) chemical dependency

"(3) the cycle of abuse with their offspring

"(4) learning disability and school failure

"(5) antisocial behavior."

Subsequently, a social worker with the aid of the same UPAC interpreter/counselor3 visited with Chai once or twice each week, a total of three or four times. They attempted to teach her basic skills such as shopping, cooking, paying bills, using public transportation and proper methods of disciplining her children. A public health nurse also visited the home to check on the health and welfare of the children.

Chai frequently moved from motel to motel. She did not always inform the Department. When Chai moved from a motel in Escondido to a motel in Oceanside, the social worker continued to meet with her without the aid of the UPAC counselor/interpreter. Chai was unwilling or unable to learn. She did not complete a parenting class as directed by the social worker.

Much of Chai's food was prepared and delivered by volunteers from local churches who also helped her pay bills and read correspondence. Eventually the church was unable to continue providing for Chai's daily needs.

When Minna's father, Darryl M., gave Chai money, she would buy "trinkets" or junk food. Darryl M. testified he tried unsuccessfully to teach Chai how to shop. He said Chai seemed unable to learn. There was no food stored in the home. She provided no structure for mealtimes — when there was food they ate. The children's clothing was dirty and ill-fitting. Ty and Misako were absent from school for long periods.

Chai visited the San Diego Regional Center for the Developmentally Disabled (Regional Center) twice but was wholly uncooperative as she believed it was a place for treating "crazy person[s]." *Page 544

At one point Chai disappeared for three days. Chai expressed an intent to take the children to Texas to rejoin Michael R. However, Michael R. was in a new relationship with a woman who had seven children. The social worker concluded Chai's expectation to rejoin Michael R. was unrealistic as Michael R. was not interested in taking Ty and Misako back. Several attempts by the Texas Department of Human Services to contact Michael R. were unsuccessful as he never responded to any correspondence.

During the meetings with the social worker, Chai had difficulty understanding what she was being told. However, the social worker would check with her to see what she did understand and get help from the UPAC counselor/interpreter on the problem areas. The social worker concluded Chai was incapable of learning basic parenting skills despite being given in-home services.

A contested six-month review hearing commenced on June 5, 1990. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that return of the children to the mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to their emotional and physical well-being. The court further found reasonable services had been provided or offered to the parents which were designed to assist them in overcoming the problems which led to the initial removal of the minors. The court ordered continuation of the services pursuant to the plan which it found to be reasonably fashioned. Ty and Misako were placed together in a licensed foster home. Minna was placed with her paternal grandmother in Ohio.

Chai did not appear at the 12-month review hearing on November 27, 1990, although her attorney was present. The court found there was not a substantial probability Misako or Ty would be returned to either parent. The court also found clear and convincing evidence Misako and Ty were not adoptable and ordered long-term foster care for them. The court found a substantial probability Minna would be returned to her father's custody and continued placement with the paternal grandmother in Ohio.

Chai appeals these orders.

DISCUSSION
I
REASONABLE SERVICES WERE PROVIDED
The mother, Chai, contends there is insufficient evidence to support a finding reasonable services were provided. *Page 545 (1) "[W]henever a minor is removed from a parent's . . . custody, the juvenile court shall order the probation officer to provide child welfare services . . . to the . . . parents . . . for the purpose of facilitating reunification of the family. . . ." (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) Each reunification plan must be appropriate to the particular individual and based on the unique facts of that individual. (In re Michael S. (1987)188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1458 [234 Cal.Rptr. 84]; In re Edward C. (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 193, 205 [178 Cal.Rptr. 694].)

(2) In reviewing the reasonableness of the services provided, this court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent. We must indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the verdict. If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed. (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [45 P.2d 183]; People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425 [90 Cal.Rptr. 417, 475 P.2d 649]; In reLuwanna S. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 112, 114 [107 Cal.Rptr. 62];People v. Belcher (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 404, 407 [11 Cal.Rptr. 175].) (3) "`"[W]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts," either deduction will be supported by substantial evidence, and "a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (In re Eric J. (1979)25 Cal.3d 522, 527 [159 Cal.Rptr. 317 [601 P.2d 549].)

(4) Chai contends the services offered were not reasonable given her intellectual deficiencies and language difficulties. In particular, she complains of the Department's failure to obtain an earlier psychological evaluation, an evaluation which revealed her intellectual limitations, and to make an earlier referral to the Regional Center. To support her argument the reunification services were inadequate here, Chai relies on the decision in Inre Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1317 [255 Cal.Rptr. 498].

In the Victoria M. decision, a case involving the termination of parental rights under Civil Code section 232, the court reversed the termination because there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that reasonable reunification services had been offered. The mother in Victoria M. had limited mental capabilities. The appellate court found the record was "clear that no accommodation was made for [the mother's] special needs in providing reunification services" although "[e]veryone was aware that [the mother] had mental limitations" from the outset. (In re Victoria M., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1329.) InVictoria M., the Department had not referred the mother to the Regional Center. The court concluded "the rights of a developmentally disabled parent may not be terminated without first assessing whether the services offered by the state through regional centers may *Page 546 enable the family of a disabled person to remain intact. [¶] . . . Once it has considered [possible alternatives], it is within the court's discretion to order further services, if appropriate, or to conclude that further services would not be fruitful. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1331, fn. omitted.)

In contrast to the Victoria M. case, the record here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent, indicates everyone was not aware Chai had mental limitations. The psychosocial evaluation performed by a Korean-speaking counselor in February 1990 did not identify Chai as mentally retarded although it did suggest a "thorough evaluation of her physical and mental impairment from a prolonged alcohol abuse should be made." Such an evaluation was conducted in late May 1990 and revealed Chai was mildly retarded. The Department then referred Chai to the Regional Center in June 1990. A social worker for the Regional Center attempted to do a social assessment of Chai on June 26, 1990, but Chai was "unyielding in her insistence that she did not need Regional Center services and did not have time to answer questions or participate in evaluations." Ultimately, the interview on June 26 was terminated. The Regional Center gave her a booklet explaining Regional Center services and encouraged her to call in the future if she felt she needed additional services. Chai began utilizing the Regional Center's services in August 1990.

Chai, who did not keep an appointment at the Regional Center, complains she was misinformed that the Regional Center served mentally infirm patients. The record is clear this information came from a Korean friend of Chai's and not from the Department. There is no indication in the record that the Department misled Chai as to the nature of the services provided by the Regional Center. Indeed, the record indicates that when Chai went to the Regional Center, the personnel there attempted to correctly inform her of their services and encouraged her to utilize them.

As to Chai's language difficulties, the record shows the Department utilized interpreters some of the time to communicate with her. At other times the social worker talked to Chai without an interpreter. Chai spoke some English. The social worker testified Chai spoke enough English so that she could be understood. The counselor who interviewed Chai at the Regional Center stated she "seems to know quite a bit of the English language and was able to make her point in English as well." This record indicates the Department was aware of Chai's language difficulties and used interpreters when necessary.

Chai also complains about the Department's reliance on church members to help her without investigating the capabilities of the church members to *Page 547 do social work. She contends "[s]pecial expertise was necessary to help [her] learn to function on her own." The church members were but one resource provided to the mother. In addition, the mother was aided by the social worker, a public health nurse, the Regional Center, In-Home Services, UPAC and a psychologist. The Department through these agencies provided Chai with professional help to learn skills necessary to effectively care for her children. Far from evidencing inadequacy, the record shows the Department commendably utilized a wide range of services including those of church members in the community.

Finally, Chai complains the Department did not provide enough services, e.g., that the visits of the social worker and the UPAC counselor should have been more frequent. In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances. We conclude here the mother was provided with the assistance of numerous people and agencies and the services provided were reasonable under the circumstances.

II
STANDARD OF PROOF
(5) Chai urges this court to remand for the court to clarify the standard of proof it applied. She argues the statute requires a finding of reasonable services must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. We do not agree.

Section 366.21, subdivision (f) provides:

"At the review hearing held 12 months after the initial dispositional hearing, the court shall order the return of the minor to the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian unless, by a preponderance of the evidence, it finds that return of the child would create a substantial risk or detriment to the physical or emotional well-being of the minor. The probation department shall have the burden of establishing that detriment. The court shall also determine whether reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parent or parents which were designed to aid the parent or parents to overcome the problems which led to the initial removal and continued custody of the minor. . . ."

Thus, in the context of the 12-month review hearing, the statute does not specify the standard of proof the court must apply when determining whether *Page 548 reasonable services were provided. "Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence." (Evid. Code, § 115.)

When a hearing is to be held pursuant to section 366.26 to terminate parental rights, section 366.21, subdivision (g)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parents. In the instant case, parental rights were not terminated. The permanent plan ordered by the court for Misako and Ty was long-term foster care. For Minna, the court ordered continued placement with the paternal grandmother and continued reunification services provided to the father. There is no legal reason preventing Chai from petitioning the court pursuant to section 388 for additional services or return of the children.

Chai's reliance on In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540 [247 Cal.Rptr. 784] is misplaced. Katrina C. involved a dispositional order transferring custody from one parent to the other, which order issued shortly after the effective date of revision to section 361 making clear that the higher standard of proof applied. As the record was silent and case law had been in flux, the appellate court remanded to allow the trial court to articulate the standard applied. Here not only is the standard preponderance of the evidence but there is no indication the court might have applied an incorrect standard. No reversal is required on this ground.

DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

Wiener, J., and Todd, J., concurred.

1 Ty was also called "Peter" at various points in the hearings.
2 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. When referring to statutory subparts of section 300, we omit repetition of the word "subdivision."
3 Chai later complained that the interpreter "didn't do it right" and a different interpreter was used at the subsequent hearings.
*Page 549