In Re Gladys L., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). · Go Syfert
Search
In Re Gladys L., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
140 citation events (140 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In re Christopher L. (calctapp, 2020-11-24)
Treatment trajectory · 2006 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2006 2016 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Christopher L.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
(See In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 849 [waiver rule not enforced where it conflicts with due process]; see also In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“[T]he appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue. [Citations.] Although an appellate court’s discretion to consider forfeited claims extends to dependency cases [citations], the discretion must be exercised with special care in such matters.”].) 12 articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Christopher L.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
(See In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 849 [waiver rule not enforced where it conflicts with due process]; see also In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“[T]he appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue. [Citations.] Although an appellate court’s discretion to consider forfeited claims extends to dependency cases [citations], the discretion must be exercised with special care in such matters.”].) 12 articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Christopher L.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
(See In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 849 [waiver rule not enforced where it conflicts with due process]; see also In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“[T]he appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue. [Citations.] Although an appellate court’s discretion to consider forfeited claims extends to dependency cases [citations], the discretion must be exercised with special care in such matters.”].) 12 articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Riverside Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. D.H. (In re D.H.) (6×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Cal. Ct. App. 5th · 2017 · confidence medium
Due Process Requires a Detriment Finding Gladys L. , the foundational California case on presumed fathers' constitutional protections against termination of their parental rights, explains: "Parents have a fundamental interest in the care, companionship, and custody of their children. ( Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 , 758, 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 ( Santosky ).) Santosky establishes minimal due process requirements in the context of state dependency proceedings. 'Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requir…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re T.D. CA2/8
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(Gladys L., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 847 [“Before a juvenile court may terminate a presumed father’s parental rights over his child, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the presumed father is unfit.” (Italics added.)].) A court is not required to make a particularized finding of unfitness or detriment before terminating the parental rights of a biological father, as opposed to a presumed father.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) A.C. v. Superior Court CA4/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(See Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 747-748 [prior to 10 terminating parental rights, due process requires a finding of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence]; In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 848 [“California’s dependency system comports with Santosky’s requirements because, by the time parental rights are terminated at a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court must have made prior findings that the parent was unfit”]; In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1211 [“California’s dependency scheme no longer uses the term ‘parental unfitness,’…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alameda County Social Services Agency v. T.B. (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(Adoption of Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th atp. 849 ; In re G.S.R. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1205 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 398 ]; In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 847-848 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 ] (Gladys L.).) *6 At the dispositional hearing, a noncustodial presumed father is entitled to request custody, pursuant to section 361.2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re As
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Presumed fathers possess far greater rights than biological fathers. ( Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 596 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 679 ].) "[A] biological father's `desire to establish a personal relationship with [his] child, without more, is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the due process clause.' [Citation]." ( In re Christopher M. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 155, 160 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 197 ].) A The Parties' Contentions and Standard of Review Joseph contends principles of substantive due process prohibit termination of parental rights without a jurisdictional fi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Joseph S.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
(In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 848 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 ] (Gladys L.), citing Santosky, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 758 .) Joseph asserts his due process rights were violated when the court terminated his parental rights without an initial finding of parental unfitness and a subsequent, adequate finding of detriment. 6 The Agency asserts dependency jurisdiction may be established against one parent without regard to the fitness or unfitness of the other parent.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jorge C. v. Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services
Cal. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
(Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 758 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 599 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ]; In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 848 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 ].) Here, as in Kelsey S., we are faced with the prospect of the termination of a nonoffending biological father’s parental rights over his objection, notwithstanding that he would have been a statutory presumed father but for the unilateral actions of the child’s mother.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Scott F.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
(Cf. In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 848-849 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 ].) Here, although the court made findings of detriment under sections 361, subdivision (c) and 361.5, subdivision (b), it did not consider whether placement with Scott would be detrimental to the children under section 361.2, subdivision (a) and applicable case law.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Robert A.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
(In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 848 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 ].) A parent’s interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children is a fundamental civil right.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re PA (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
(Id. at p. 848, fn. 3, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 .) Gladys L. reversed the order terminating parental rights and remanded to permit the juvenile court to determine whether the presumed father could be the subject of a petition under section 300.
discussed Cited "see" In re: X.R., X.R., K.D.
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Gladys L., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434, 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining why California’s dependency system comports with due process because 21 by the time parent rights are terminated, “the juvenile court must have made prior findings that the parent was unfit” (emphasis in original)).
discussed Cited "see" In re: X.R., X.R., K.D.
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Gladys L., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434, 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining why California’s dependency system comports with due process because by the time parent rights are terminated, “the juvenile court must have made prior findings that the parent was unfit” (emphasis in original)).
discussed Cited "see" In re: X.R., X.R., K.D.
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Gladys L., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434, 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining why California’s dependency system comports with due process because by the time parent rights are terminated, “the juvenile court must have made prior findings that the parent was unfit” (emphasis in original)).
discussed Cited "see" In re D.L. CA2/6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
(Maj. opn. ante, at p. 6; see D.H., at pp. 732-733.) While I agree that prompt resolution of this case is in the best interest of all involved—especially D.L.—remanding for further proceedings “is the only way to safeguard [Father’s] rights as [D.L.’s] presumed father and ensure that he is afforded due process.” (In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 849 .) I would reach the same conclusion regarding Father’s challenge to the order setting the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 hearing.
discussed Cited "see" In re D.H. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: accord · confidence high
(Id. at pp. 13-14 [refusing to apply forfeiture doctrine to the father’s claim his due process rights were violated when the court terminated his parental rights without a finding of unfitness or detriment]; accord, Gladys L., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 849 , Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 (Frank R.).) We therefore decline DPSS’s invitation to dismiss the appeal on forfeiture grounds.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re N.R.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence medium
(See ibid.; see also In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 849 [declining to apply forfeiture where no findings made against presumed father before termination of parental rights]; In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [“we are reluctant to enforce the waiver rule when it conflicts with due process”].) We therefore decline to apply the forfeiture rule in this case. 2.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In re GLADYS L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Alex C., Defendant and Appellant.
B186442, B188355.
California Court of Appeal.
Jul 25, 2006.
46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434
Cooper.
Cited by 51 opinions  |  Published

[*435] Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel and Pamela S. Landeros, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

COOPER, P.J.

We reverse the juvenile court's order terminating Alex C.'s parental rights over his daughter Gladys. Before a juvenile court may terminate a presumed father's parental rights over his child, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the presumed father is unfit. Here, it was neither alleged nor proven that Alex was an unfit parent.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Gladys and her two siblings became dependants of the juvenile court while they were in the custody of their mother, who is not a party to this appeal. Gladys's father, Alex C., appeared at the detention hearing in August 2002 and submitted to the court's jurisdiction. He was represented by counsel. The juvenile court found him to be Gladys's presumed father. Alex was a nonoffending parent, but at the detention hearing the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) warned that it might amend the Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300 petition to name him. The court refused to make "anticipatory orders," without any petition alleging that Alex either abused or neglected Gladys.

Alex then disappeared. In his three year absence, Alex did not request custody and did not visit Gladys. Alex reappeared in August 2005 at the section 366.26 hearing. At that time, he requested visits with Gladys. The court denied the request.[2] The court found that it was not in Gladys's best interest to have any contact with Alex. In December 2005, at the continuation of the section 366.26 hearing, the court terminated Alex's parental rights. The court denied Alex's renewed request to reestablish his relationship with Gladys. Alex appeals from the termination of his parental rights.

DCFS never filed a petition alleging that Alex violated any provision of the Welfare and Institutions Code, and he was[*436] never adjudicated to be an unfit parent.[3]

DISCUSSION

Parents have a fundamental interest in the care, companionship, and custody of their children. (Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 758, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (Santosky).) Santosky establishes minimal due process requirements in the context of state dependency proceedings. "Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence." (Id. at pp. 747-748.) "After the State has established parental unfitness at that initial proceeding, the court may assume at the dispositional stage that the interests of the child and the natural parents do diverge." (Id. at p. 760, 102 S.Ct. 1388.) "But until the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship." (Ibid.)

California's dependency system comports with Santosky's requirements because, by the time parental rights are terminated at a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court must have made prior findings that the parent was unfit. (Cynthia D. v. Superior (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 254, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 851 P.2d 1307.) "The number and quality of the judicial findings that are necessary preconditions to termination convey very powerfully to the fact finder the subjective certainty about parental unfitness and detriment required before the court may even consider ending the relationship between natural parent and child." (Id. at p. 256, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 851 P.2d 1307.) The linchpin to the constitutionality of the section 366.26 hearing is that prior determinations ensure "the evidence of detriment is already so clear and convincing that more cannot be required without prejudice to the interests of the adoptable child, with which the state must align itself." (Ibid.)

Here, the requirements of Santosky and the safeguards embedded in the California dependency scheme were ignored. DCFS never alleged that Alex was unfit and the trial court never made that finding. Due process therefore prohibits the termination of Alex's parental rights. Implying a finding of detriment, as requested by DCFS, asks this court to act as petitioner and fact finder, thereby denying Alex an opportunity for notice of specific charges and an opportunity to respond to the charges against him. (Cf. In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1824, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 198 [refusing to make an implied finding of detriment under section 361.2].) Notably, DCFS's request for implicit findings is devoid of specific charges.

Contrary to DCFS's argument, Alex did not forfeit his right to contest the termination of his parental rights by failing to act sooner. (In re Gerardo A. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 988, 993, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 798 [waiver rule not enforced where it conflicts with due process].) Although the reversal of the juvenile court's order undermines the important goal of rapidly concluding dependency proceedings, it is the only way to safeguard Alex's rights as Gladys's presumed father and ensure that he is afforded due process.

DISPOSITION

The order terminating Alex C.'s parental rights is reversed. The case is remanded to the juvenile court to determine[*437] whether, based upon the facts as they currently exist, a petition under section 300 can be properly pleaded and proven.

We concur: BOLAND and FLIER, JJ.

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to this code.
2 Alex appeals from this order, which we consolidated with his appeal from the termination of parental rights. However, he makes no argument with respect to the court's denial of visitation rights.
3 DCFS states that the court found the return of Gladys to Alex's custody would cause her detriment but the record does not support that statement.