Jones v. Garner, 164 F.3d 589 (11th Cir. 1999). · Go Syfert
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Jones v. Garner, 164 F.3d 589 (11th Cir. 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
44 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Rios v. Quiros (ctd, 2025-08-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rios v. Quiros
D. Conn. · 2025 · confidence medium
The Court stated, with respect to the decision of the Court of Appeals: The Court of Appeals recognized that the Parole Board would set a new parole review date three years or more into the future (up to eight years) only where it concludes that “‘it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted’” sooner. [Jones v. Garner, 164 F.3d 589, 594 (11th Cir. 1999).] The court thought this policy insufficient, however, because, unlike the statute in [California Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 , (1995)], it does not require the Board “to make any particularized findings�…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pa Prison Society v. Cortes
3rd Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
“After Jones was incarcerated but before he was initially considered for parole, the Board [of Pardons] amended its rules to require that parole reconsideration take place only once every eight years.” Jones v. Garner, 164 F.3d 589, 590 (11th Cir.1999) (citing Ga. Comp.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Crump v. Kansas
D. Kan. · 2001 · confidence medium
The appellate court distinguished Morales in that (1) the Georgia regulation applies to a much broader class of inmates, (2) the deferral time of up to eight years is much longer than the three years allowed by the California statute in Morales, and (3) although the regulation allows the board discretion to establish individual times, it does not require the board “to make particularized findings” *1265 and is not “carefully tailored.” Id. at 248-49 , 120 S.Ct. 1362 (quoting Jones v. Garner, 164 F.3d 589, 594-95 (11th Cir.1999)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Garner v. Jones (6×)
SCOTUS · 2000 · confidence medium
Id., at 594.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Tuff v. State (5×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Based on the differences cited above, the Jones Court struck down the Georgia rule as unconstitutional, stating: Given the length of time that the Georgia provision requires inmates to wait between parole consideration hearings and the absence of safeguards such as a "full hearing and review of all the relevant facts" and an obligation on the part of the Board to state particularized facts relating to the inmate's likely future parole eligibility, we cannot conclude-as we must, to find no ex post facto violation-that the amended regulation "ha[s] neither the purpose nor the effect of increasin…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jones
v.
Garner
97-9009.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jan 6, 1999.
164 F.3d 589
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
Robert L. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

J. Wayne GARNER, Chairman, State Board of Pardons and Paroles, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-9009.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

May 10, 2000.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (No. 1:95-cv-3012-CAM); Charles A. Moye, Jr., Judge.

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Before BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and HANCOCK*, Senior District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Garner v. Jones, --- U.S. ----, 120 S.Ct. 1362, --- L.Ed.2d

---- (March 28, 2000), we remand the case for further proceedings. In its decision the Supreme Court noted that:

The Court of Appeals' analysis failed to reveal whether the amendment to Rule 475-3-.05(2), in its operation, created a significant risk of increased punishment for respondent. Respondent claims he has not been permitted sufficient discovery to make this showing. The matter of adequate discovery is one for the Court of Appeals or, as need be, for the District Court in the first instance. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Id. at 1371. We thus remand the case to the district court to determine, after permitting sufficient discovery, whether the amendment to Ga. Rules & Regs., Rule 475-3-.05(2) (1985) in its operation created a significant risk of increased punishment for Robert L. Jones.

SO ORDERED.

* Honorable James H. Hancock, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.