Delaware Watch Co., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 332 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1964). · Go Syfert
Search
Delaware Watch Co., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 332 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1964). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
27 citation events (16 in the last 25 years) across 14 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Federal Trade Commission v. Tax Club, Inc. (nysd, 2014-01-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1964 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1964 1995 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Federal Trade Commission v. Tax Club, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 2014 · confidence medium
Co., 332 F.2d at 746 (holding that where “the same individuals were transacting an integrated business through a maze of interrelated companies ... the pattern and frame-work of the whole enterprise must be taken into consideration” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Consumer Health Benefits II, 2012 WL 1890242 , at *5 (noting that where the “structure, organization, and operation of a business venture among separate corporate entities reveals] a common enterprise ... the FTC Act” will “disregard! ] the corporate form”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Federal Trade Commission v. National Urological Group, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.D. Ga. · 2008 · confidence medium
When determining whether a common enterprise exists, “the pattern and frame-work of the whole enterprise must be taken into consideration.” Delaware Watch Co., 332 F.2d at 746 (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Federal Trade Commission v. Think Achievement Corp.
N.D. Ind. · 2000 · confidence medium
Factors in determining common enterprise include: (1) common control, Sunshine Art, 481 F.2d at 1175 ; Waltham Precision Instrument Co. v. FTC, 327 F.2d 427, 431 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 377 U.S. 992 , 84 S.Ct. 1918 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1964); (2) sharing office space and offices, Zale Corp. & Corrigan-Republic, Inc. v. FTC, 473 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5th Cir.1973); Delaware Watch, 332 F.2d at 746; (3) whether business is transacted through a “maze of interrelated companies,” id.; and (4) commingling of funds, SEC v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560 ,1565 n. 1 (11th Cir.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) W. M. R. Watch Case Corporation, a Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission
D.C. Cir. · 1965 · confidence medium
So ordered. 1 . 332 F.2d at 746. 2 .
cited Cited "see" Mao v. Global Trust Management, LLC
E.D. Va. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. (quoting Delaware Watch Co. v. FTC, 332 F.2d 745 , 746 (2d Cir. 1964)).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Federal Trade Commission v. Grant Connect, LLC
D. Nev. · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence low
Nat’l Urological Group, Inc., 645 F.Supp.2d at 1182 ; see also Delaware Watch Co. v. F.T.C., 332 F.2d 745 , 746 (2d Cir.1964) (finding common enterprise where “the same individuals were transacting an integrated business through a maze of interrelated companies”).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Sunshine Art Studios, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission
1st Cir. · 1973 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Delaware Watch Co. v. FTC, 332 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1964).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Delaware Watch Company, Inc., a Corporation, and A. Schwarcz & Sons, Inc., a Corporation, and Steven Vogel and Leslie Shaw, Individually and as Officers of Said Corporations
v.
Federal Trade Commission
28513_1.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
May 13, 1964.
332 F.2d 745
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published

332 F.2d 745

DELAWARE WATCH COMPANY, Inc., a corporation, and A. Schwarcz & Sons, Inc., a corporation, and Steven Vogel and Leslie Shaw, individually and as officers of said corporations, Petitioners,
v.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Respondent.

No. 398.

Docket 28513.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued May 11, 1964.

Decided May 13, 1964.

Harvey M. Lewin, New York City, for petitioners.

Lester A. Klaus, Atty., F. T. C., Washington, D. C. (James McI. Henderson, Gen. Counsel, J. B. Truly, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Miles J. Brown, Atty., F. T. C., Washington, D. C., on the brief), for respondent.

Before KAUFMAN, HAYS and MARSHALL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

[*~745]1

After a hearing, the Federal Trade Commission found the various petitioners guilty of unfair and deceptive practices in that they failed to disclose the true metallic content of certain watchcase parts made of base metal which had been treated to simulate precious metals or stainless steel; failed to disclose the foreign origin of the watchcase parts; and misrepresented that their watches were "water-resistant." The petitioners here seek to set aside the Commission's resulting order, directing them to cease and desist from such practices.

2

We find it clear that the Commission's findings were supported by substantial evidence, and we hold that the petitioners' exceptions thereto are without merit. In most instances, the practices cited were virtually conceded by the petitioners, and the Commission's conclusion that such conduct was, in fact, misleading, was well within the scope of its discretion. The choice of a remedy is also a matter for the discretion of the Commission, and may not be disturbed on review unless that discretion is abused. See Federal Trade Commission v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 79 S.Ct. 818, 3 L.Ed.2d 893 (1959). Such is plainly not the case here.

3

Only one of petitioners' arguments warrants discussion. Thus, petitioner Delaware Watch Company, Inc., contends that it merely acted to clear the watch movements in question through customs, and that it was consequently innocent of the deceptive practices charged. Accordingly, Delaware insists that the complaint must be dismissed against it, and the order modified to exempt Delaware from the prohibitions imposed.

4

We find no error in the Commission's rejection of Delaware's arguments in this regard. As revealed before the Commission, petitioners Delaware and Schwarcz are New York corporations with their offices and principal places of business located at the same Manhattan address. Vogel and Shaw, the individual petitioners, are officers of both corporations, and Shaw is the president and majority stockholder of Schwarcz; Schwarcz, in turn, owns all of the stock of Delaware.

5

Under these circumstances, the Commission properly concluded that the functions of Delaware and Schwarcz were not sufficiently isolated as to warrant an exemption for Delaware. Rather, this seems a case in which the same individuals were transacting an integrated business through a maze of interrelated companies; in such a case, "the pattern and frame-work of the whole enterprise must be taken into consideration." Art National Mfrs. Dist. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 298 F.2d 476, 477 (2d Cir. 1962). Indeed, the Commission may well have believed that Vogel and Shaw would have been provided with a clear mechanism for avoiding the terms of the order if only Schwarcz — and not Delaware — were enjoined from the deceptive trade practices involved.

[*~746]6

Petitioners' other contentions are without merit. The order is affirmed, and its enforcement is decreed.