Hintson Richardson v. Richard E. Wiley, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n. Hintson Richardson v. Richard E. Wiley, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 569 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1977). · Go Syfert
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Hintson Richardson v. Richard E. Wiley, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n. Hintson Richardson v. Richard E. Wiley, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 569 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
55 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 12 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Dunbar v. Foxx (dcd, 2017-03-31)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dunbar v. Foxx
D.D.C. · 2017 · confidence medium
Thus, “covered federal employees may not sue alleging discrimination under other federal statutes, including § 1981.” Gong v. Napolitano, 612 F.Supp.2d 58 , 60 n.1 (D.D.C. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Richardson, 569 F.2d at 141).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McLaughlin v. Mukasey
D.D.C. · 2011 · confidence medium
See Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 835 , 96 S.Ct. 1961 , 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976); Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C.Cir.1977) (noting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 must be brought under Title VII). 4 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McAlister v. Potter
D.D.C. · 2010 · confidence medium
Brown, 425 U.S. at 835 , 96 S.Ct. 1961 (finding Title VII the *147 exclusive remedy for discrimination alleged by federal employees on account of race or sex); Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C.Cir.1977) (finding a federal employee’s claim under the Fifth Amendment precluded by Title VII); Ethnic Emps. of Library of Congress v. Boorstin, 751 F.2d 1405 , 1415 (D.C.Cir.1985) (“[F]ederal employees may not bring suit under the Constitution for employment discrimination that is actionable under Title VIL”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McAlister v. Potter
D.D.C. · 2010 · confidence medium
Brown, 425 U.S. at 835 (finding Title VII the exclusive remedy for discrimination alleged by federal employees on account of race or sex); Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Myvett v. Williams
D.D.C. · 2009 · confidence medium
Cir. 1978); Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Myvett v. Williams
D.D.C. · 2009 · confidence medium
This Circuit has “repeatedly held that federal employees may not bring suit under the Constitution for employment discrimination that is actionable under Title VII.” Ethnic Employees of Library of Cong. v. Boorstin, 751 F.2d 1405 , 1415 (D.C.Cir.1985) (citing Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 542 (D.C.Cir.1983); Lawrence v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1256, 1257, 1259 (D.C.Cir.1981); Torre v. Barry, 661 F.2d 1371, 1372, 1374 (D.C.Cir.1981); Hofer v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 975, 976, 978 (D.C.Cir.1978); Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C.Cir.1977); Morris v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Perry v. Snowbarger
D.D.C. · 2008 · confidence medium
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss appropriately seeks to dismiss any claims raised by Plaintiff under these statutes because Title VII “ ‘provides the exclusive remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment.’ ” Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C.Cir.1977) (per curiam) (quoting Brown v. Gen.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lutes v. Goldin
D.D.C. · 1999 · confidence medium
The Court of Appeals appended an extensive footnote citing similar holdings in this jurisdiction, including, among others, the holdings in Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 542 (D.C.Cir.1983); Lawrence v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1256, 1257 (D.C.Cir.1981); Torre v. Barry, 661 F.2d 1371, 1372 (D.C.Cir.1981); and Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C.Cir.1977). 20 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Margaret F. Johnson v. James Burnley, Secretary of the Department of Transportation (2×)
4th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
See King, 782 F.2d at 277 n. 3; Hofer v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 975, 977 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 , 99 S.Ct. 1218 , 59 L.Ed.2d 457 (1979); Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 142 (D.C.Cir.1977). .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States
Ct. Cl. · 1989 · confidence medium
Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 143 (D.C.Cir.1977), overturned an award of attorneys’ fees, not costs, because the court lacked jurisdiction and there was no prevailing party.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Oscar Lee, Jr. v. The U.S. Postal Service
11th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Id. (citing Hofer v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 975, 977 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 , 99 S.Ct. 1218 , 59 L.Ed.2d 457 ; Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 142 (D.C.Cir.1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ethnic Employees of the Library of Congress v. Daniel J. Boorstin Ethnic Employees of the Library of Congress v. Daniel J. Boorstin, Librarian of Congress
D.C. Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
We express no opinion on whether the EELC's filing of an administrative complaint, followed by its alleged failure to provide additional information, constituted adequate exhaustion of administrative remedies 12 See Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 542 (D.C.Cir.1983) (fifth amendment claim based on race and sex discrimination barred), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 709 , 79 L.Ed.2d 173 (1984); Lawrence v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1256, 1257, 1259 (D.C.Cir.1981) (fifth amendment claim based on race discrimination would be barred if Sec. 717 applied); Torre v. Barry, 661 F.2d 1371, 1372, 1374 (D.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ethnic Employees of the Library of Congress v. Boorstin
D.C. Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Cir.1983) (fifth amendment claim based on race and sex discrimination barred), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 709 , 79 L.Ed.2d 173 (1984); Lawrence v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1256, 1257, 1259 (D.C.Cir.1981) (fifth amendment claim based on race discrimination would be barred if § 717 applied); Torre v. Barry, 661 F.2d 1371, 1372, 1374 (D.C.Cir.1981) (fifth amendment claim based on race discrimination barred); Hofer v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 975, 976, 978 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (fifth amendment claim based on national origin discrimination barred), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 , 99 S.Ct. 1218 , 59 L.Ed.2d 457 …
cited Cited as authority (rule) King v. Dole
D.D.C. · 1984 · confidence medium
Hofer v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 975, 977 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 , 99 S.Ct. 1218 , 59 L.Ed.2d 457 (1979); Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 142 (D.C.Cir.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DiMaggio v. United States Postal Service
D. Conn. · 1984 · confidence medium
In Richardson, the District of Columbia Circuit relied on Brown in holding that where a federal employee challenged an adverse personnel action under both the Fifth Amendment and Title VII, only Title VII was applicable. 569 F.2d at 141.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Smith
D.D.C. · 1984 · confidence medium
Brown v. GSA, supra, 425 U.S. at 833-34 , 96 S.Ct. at 1968-69 ; Hofer v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 975 (D.C.Cir.1978); and Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 142 (D.C.Cir.1977). 1.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adolph Kizas v. William H. Webster, Adolph Kizas v. William H. Webster
D.C. Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
See Lawrence v. Staats, 665 F.2d 1256, 1259 (D.C.Cir.1981); Torre v. Barry, 661 F.2d 1371, 1374 (D.C.Cir.1981); Hofer v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 975, 978 (D.C.Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 , 99 S.Ct. 1218 , 59 L.Ed.2d 457 (1979); Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C.Cir.1977) (per curiam) (federal employee covered by Title VII may not sue under any other federal statute, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), or under the fifth amendment).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cassidy v. Virginia Carolina Veneer Corp.
W.D. Va. · 1982 · confidence medium
See Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education, 585 F.2d 192, 197 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 , 99 S.Ct. 2053 , 60 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (“in order to be a prevailing party, a plaintiff must have been entitled to some form of relief at the time the suit was brought.”); Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 143 (D.C.Cir.1977) (“we express ho view of the scope of the term ‘prevailing party’ except to hold that it cannot include a plaintiff in a case where the District Court has no jurisdiction.”). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ruth Stewart v. Joseph Hannon
7th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
See Harrington v. Vandalia-Butier Board of Education, 585 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 , 99 S.Ct. 2053 , 60 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 143 (D.C.Cir.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dearsman v. Kurtz
D.D.C. · 1981 · confidence medium
Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C.Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Gissen v. Tackman, 537 F.2d 784, 786-87 (3rd Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per curiam); Founding Church of Scientology v. Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 459 F.Supp. 748, 759-60 (D.D.C.1978) ; Neely v. Blumenthal, 458 F.Supp. 945, 950-54 (D.D.C.1978); Carter v. Marshall, 457 F.Supp. 38, 42-43 (D.D.C.1978); Berio v. EEOC, 446 F.Supp. 171, 173-74 (D.D.C.1978); Mosley v. United States, 425 *1260 F.Supp. 50, 54-55 (N.D.Calif.1977); but see Krenzer v. Ford, 429 F.Supp. 499 , 501 n.l (D.D.C.1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) National Food Processors Ass'n v. Klutznick
D.D.C. · 1981 · confidence medium
Hofer v. Campbell, 581 F.2d at 977 ; Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 143 (D.C.Cir.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rossi v. Brown
D.D.C. · 1979 · confidence medium
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1976) (civil action may be filed after 180 days have expired without agency action on administrative complaint); Richardson v. Wiley, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 809 , 311, 569 F.2d 140, 142 (1977) (Title VII time limitations are jurisdictional).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carter v. Marshall
D.D.C. · 1978 · confidence medium
Title VII provides full and adequate relief for such conduct and that remedy is exclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 825 , 96 S.Ct. 1961 , 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976); Richardson v. Wiley, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 309, at 310-311 , 569 F.2d 140 at 141-142 (1977); Pace v. Mathews, 15 Fair Empl.Prac.Cases (BNA) 703, 704 (D.D.C.1976).
cited Cited "see" Gong v. Chertoff
D.D.C. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C.
cited Cited "see" Gong v. Napolitano
D.D.C. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140 , 141 (D.C.Cir.1977) (per curiam); see also StrongFischer v. LaHood, Civil Action No. 07-265(RWR), 611 F.Supp.2d 49, 52-54 , 2009 WL 1160114, at *3-4 (D.D.C.
discussed Cited "see" Haynes v. HHS
D.C. Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C.Cir.1977) (precluding § 1981 discrimination action by federal employee covered by Title VII); Great American Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378 , 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2352 , 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979), (same with regard to § 1985 claim); Thomas v. News World Communications, 681 F.Supp. 55, 73 (D.D.C.1988) (same with regard to § 1986 action).
cited Cited "see" Brooks v. Derwinski
D.D.C. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 142 (D.C.Cir.1977); Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 613 (D.C.Cir.1976).
cited Cited "see" Alfonso J. Torre v. Marion Barry, Jr., Individually and as Mayor of the District of Columbia
D.C. Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Richardson v. Wiley, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 309, 310 , 569 F.2d 140, 141 (1977).
discussed Cited "see" Torres v. Taylor
S.D.N.Y. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1024-25 (3d Cir. 1977); see Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140 (D.C.Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 1977); Del-linger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as Sword, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 1532, 1549 (1972) (courts should defer to congressional scheme of remedies where they are effective relief for constitutional infringements). 15 . 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b). 16 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Albritton v. Kantor
D.D.C. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence medium
The Court held that the plaintiff's retired status was not a bar to the district court fashioning some relief if it deemed that his claim was meritorious; see also Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C.Cir.1977) (holding that an employee's discrimination action was not rendered moot as a result of the employee's promotion subsequent to the filing of his complaint).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Frances E. King v. Elizabeth H. Dole, Secretary of Transportation
D.C. Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Id. at 977; see also Richardson v. Wiley, 569 F.2d 140, 142 (D.C.Cir.1977); Miller v. Smith, 584 F.Supp. 149, 153 (D.D.C.1984).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Hintson Richardson
v.
Richard E. Wiley, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission. Hintson Richardson v. Richard E. Wiley, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission
77-1080.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Dec 22, 1977.
569 F.2d 140
Published

569 F.2d 140

16 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 732, 15 Empl. Prac.
Dec. P 7997,
186 U.S.App.D.C. 309

Hintson RICHARDSON, Appellant,
v.
Richard E. WILEY, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission.
Hintson RICHARDSON, Appellee,
v.
Richard E. WILEY, Chairman, Federal Communications
Commission, Appellant.

Nos. 76-2085, 77-1080.

United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Nov. 23, 1977.
Decided Dec. 22, 1977.

Laura J. Rayburn, Washington, D. C., with whom Charles Stephen Ralston, Melvyn R. Leventhal and Bill Lann Lee, New York City, were on the brief for Hintson Richardson.

Steven D. Gordon, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and Ellen Lee Park, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief for Richard E. Wiley, Chairman, F. C. C.

Before TAMM and ROBB, Circuit Judges, and MARKEY,[*] Chief Judge, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.

Opinion PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM:

[*~140]1

This is an employment discrimination case. The parties cross appeal from a judgment of the District Court dismissing the action as moot and awarding attorneys' fees to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, Richardson, contends that his promotion subsequent to the filing of his complaint did not moot the controversy because he is entitled to back pay and the promotion's retroactive effect. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) contends that the District Court erred in awarding attorneys' fees because Richardson could not be a "prevailing party" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Because the District Court lacked jurisdiction in the case, we affirm the dismissal and reverse the award of attorneys' fees.

2

The FCC has employed Richardson since 1961. In February 1974 Richardson, then a GS-13 electronics engineer, filed a formal complaint with the FCC alleging that racial discrimination had blocked his promotion to GS-14. An FCC equal opportunity employment officer conducted an investigation and found "bias, racism, and discrimination." The EEO officer issued a proposed disposition of the complaint on November 13, 1974, concluding that Richardson should receive the next available GS-14 position. Richardson was informed that if this proposed disposition was unsatisfactory to him, he could request a hearing by the chairman of the FCC or his designee. Richardson made no objection to the proposed disposition. Nevertheless, five months later on April 25, 1975 Commissioner Washburn of the FCC issued the final decision of the Agency, finding that there had been no discrimination. Attached to this decision was a notice advising Richardson of his right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission within fifteen days or to file a civil action in District Court within thirty days. On June 17, 1975 Richardson requested review by the Appeals Review Board of the Civil Service Commission. On September 27, 1975 the Board declined to accept the appeal because it was untimely. Richardson filed this action in the District Court on October 22, 1975.

3

The complaint in the District Court alleged violations of section 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Fifth Amendment. Richardson sought to have the proposed disposition of November 13, 1975 implemented by promotion to GS-14 with retroactive effect, back pay, and attorneys' fees. Within a month of the filing in District Court Richardson received a promotion to GS-14.

4

If Richardson has a judicial remedy here, it is under Title VII because it is settled " § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment." Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 835, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1969, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976). The issue before us then is whether the District Court had jurisdiction under section 717.[1]

5

Section 717(c) provides that the complainant must file a civil action within thirty days of his receipt of notice of final action taken by the agency. This limitation is jurisdictional. See Brown v. GSA,supra, at 833-34, 96 S.Ct. 1961. On May 7, 1975 Richardson received the April 25, 1975 decision which was prominently titled "Notice of Final Decision of Agency." He did not appeal to the CSC until June 17, and did not file his civil action in the District Court until October 22, 1975. Thus the appeal to the Civil Service Commission and the civil action in the District Court were untimely filed. To overcome this difficulty Richardson argues that the April 25 decision was not a valid final decision because it failed to effectuate the earlier proposed disposition as required by Civil Service Commission regulations.[2] We think however that Richardson's argument on this point amounts to a contention that the April 25 decision was not final because it was wrong. The recourse from a wrong decision was an appeal, either to the Civil Service Commission or to the court. The question therefore is whether Richardson's appeal to the court was timely.

[*~141]6

Richardson relies on our decision in Coles v. Penny, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 277, 531 F.2d 609 (1976) and on the Third Circuit's decision in Allen v. United States, 542 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1976). In each of those cases the agency failed to advise the complainant of the time limitations governing his right to appeal the final decision of the agency to the Civil Service Commission or to file an action in district court. We held in the Coles case that section 717 required such a notice. 174 U.S.App.D.C. at 282, 531 F.2d at 614. In the Allen case the Third Circuit held that the failure to give this notice violated CSC regulations which deprived the agency's decision of its finality. 542 F.2d at 180. The critical point in each case was the concern that, absent notification by the agency, a complainant proceeding pro se before the agency would not be aware of the rigorous time limitations governing further review of the complaint. As we stated in the Coles decision: "we doubt that Congress intended to provide a judicial remedy . . . which is so easily forfeited by those whose rights it vindicates." 174 U.S.App.D.C. at 283, 531 F.2d at 615.

7

In the case before us Richardson was notified of his rights. The notice of the April 25, 1975 decision, received by Richardson May 7, and entitled "Notice of Final Decision of Agency" advised Richardson:

8

Attached to this notice is the final decision of the agency on your complaint of discrimination. If you are dissatisfied with this final decision, you have the following appeal rights.

9

You may appeal to the Civil Service Commission within 15 calendar days of receipt of the decision. Your appeal should be addressed to the Civil Service Commission, Board of Appeals and Review, 1900 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20415. The appeal and any representations in support thereof must be submitted in duplicate.

10

In lieu of an appeal to the Civil Service Commission, you may file a civil action in an appropriate U. S. District Court within 30 days of receipt of the decision.

11

(Emphasis in original)

12

Richardson is an educated man who holds a responsible position in the FCC. That the April 25 "final decision" failed to carry out the proposed disposition was obvious and the alternative courses of action were stated plainly. There is no basis here to invoke the rationale of the Coles and Allen cases. The 30-day limitation is jurisdictional and cannot be circumvented by artful pleading.

13

Counsel suggested at oral argument that Richardson had difficulty in obtaining an attorney to represent him in District Court. This argument should be addressed to the Congress, not the courts. See Kavanagh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 539, 68 S.Ct. 235, 92 L.Ed. 150 (1947). We conclude that the action was filed too late and the District Court had no jurisdiction to hear it.

14

The District Court awarded Richardson $1500 attorneys' fees because " the gravamen of the action was the implementation of the proposed disposition." The court ruled that Richardson was a "prevailing party" within the meaning of the statute because relief did not come for a year following the proposed disposition and not until the filing of the lawsuit. Id. We express no view of the scope of the term "prevailing party" except to hold that it cannot include a plaintiff in a case in which the district court had no jurisdiction. The award of attorneys' fees must be reversed.

15

The judgment below is affirmed in part, reversed in part.

[*~142]16

So ordered.

*

Sitting by designation pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 293(a)

1

If there is jurisdiction the case is not moot because issues of back pay and retroactive effect were not affected by Richardson's promotion to GS-14. Day v. Mathews, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 232-33, 530 F.2d 1083, 1084-85 (1976)

2

Civil Service Commission regulations require that an agency not propose a disposition of a complaint unless it is prepared to carry out that disposition if the complainant agrees to it. Federal Personnel Manual Letter No. 713-21, at 4. Richardson was informed at the time he filed his initial complaint with the FCC that the proposed disposition would become final if he agreed to it. Richardson argues therefore that his suit in the District Court was timely because it was filed more than 180 days after the date of the complaint with the FCC and before a final decision by the FCC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). The argument overlooks the April 25, 1975 decision which, although substantively inadequate, was the final decision of the agency for appeal purposes