Coen v. Harrison Cnty. Sch. Bd., 638 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1981). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Coen v. Harrison Cnty. Sch. Bd., 638 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1981).
Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 79-3970Feb 23, 1981

Coen v. Harrison Cnty. Sch. Bd., 638 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1981)

Quick Summary

A civil rights plaintiff is not a prevailing party for attorney's fee purposes if they obtain only what a state official would have done without litigation.

Klan members sought permission from a county school board to hold a rally on school grounds. The board denied it, and they sued under section 1983. After suit was filed, they gave assurances about bonds, firearms, hoods, and crosses, and the board then granted permission, so the district court never reached the merits. Plaintiffs sought attorney's fees under section 1988. The court asks whether plaintiffs prevailed when they obtained the relief sought only because they accepted the defendant's conditions. The court holds they did not prevail, and it affirms a nominal fee award.

67 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 21 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Cited for
At page 26Determining prevailing plaintiff for attorney's fees22 citing cases“a civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorney's fees for demanding that a state officer do what he would have done in any case.”4 citing courts quote it · 20 listed here
  • Dunten v. Kibler, 518 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ga. 1981).published
    (In the context of § 1988 there is no such thing as a ‘technically prevailing plaintiff’; the issue of who has prevailed is a realistic judgment, not a technical one)
  • Mississippi State Chapter Operation Push v. Mabus, 788 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Miss. 1992).published
    At most, plaintiffs’ appeal only heightened the momentum “in a course of action already begun.” Posada, 716 F.2d at 1076. 10 Given the above, “a civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorneys’ fees for demanding that a state officer do w…
  • Knop v. Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 1457 (W.D. Mich. 1988).published 3 cites
    See also, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 688 , 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3279 , 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983) (“to be a ‘prevailing party,’ one must succeed on the ‘central issue,’ or ‘essentially succee[d] in obtaining the relief he seeks in his…
  • William Taylor v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 810 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987).published 4 cites
    Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of Hallandale, 742 F.2d 590 (11th Cir.1984); Coen v. Harrison City School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981); Iranian Students Assn. v. Sawyer, 639 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir.1981).
  • Harris ex rel. Harris v. Jones Cnty., 600 F. Supp. 1540 (S.D. Miss. 1985).published
    A civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorney’s fees for demanding that a state officer do what he would have done in any case.” Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981); Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 54…
  • Minnie Ann Hennigan v. Ouachita Par. Sch. Bd., 749 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1985).published 3 cites
    See Espino v. Besteiro, supra, 708 F.2d at 1007 ("we must ask whether, 'as a realistic matter, the plaintiff ... has gained anything from his suit that [he] could not have obtained without litigation.' ”), citing, Coen v. Harrison County S…
  • Teresa Diane P. v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 744 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1984).published 2 cites
    “[a] civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorney’s fees for demanding that a state officer do what he would have done in any case”
  • Hughes v. Livingston Par. Sch. Bd., 459 So. 2d 10 (La. Ct. App. 1984).published
    The standard for awarding attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 when a civil rights case has been mooted is stated in Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71…
  • Leroy v. City of Houston, 584 F. Supp. 653 (S.D. Tex. 1984).published
    Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982) (per curiam).
  • Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 720 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1983).published
    (identical language, citing Edwards and other cases)
Show 10 more citing cases
  • B & J Music, Inc. v. McAuliffe, 719 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1983).published 2 cites
    “A civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorney’s fees for demanding that a state officer do what he would have done in any case”
  • Victoria Posada v. Lamb Cnty., 716 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1983).published 2 cites
    Disagreement focuses solely on the requisite causal connection. 16 Causal connection is established by evidence that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was a "substantial factor or a significant catalyst in motivating the defendants to end their unco…
  • Raul Espino, Jr. v. Raul Besteiro, 708 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1983).published
    In determining whether a plaintiff has “prevailed,” we must ask whether, “as a realistic matter, the plaintiff ... has gained anything from this suit that [he] could not have obtained without litigation.” Coen v. Harrison County School Boa…
  • Jane Doe v. George D. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375 (11th Cir. 1982).published
    For example, a line of Fifth Circuit cases has enunciated a test that a party has prevailed when he “has succeeded on the central issue, as exhibited by the fact that he has obtained the primary relief sought.” Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F.2d…
  • Bert Williams v. John R. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1982).published
    A civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorney’s fees for demanding that a state officer do what he would have done in any case.” Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1981).
  • Davis v. City of Ennis, 520 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Tex. 1981).published
    See Ward v. Dearman, supra; Bly v. McLeod, 605 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 , 100 S.Ct. 1315 , 63 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980); cf., Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1981).
  • Benny B. Barrett v. Carl Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1981).published 2 cites
    Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
  • Devine v. Sutermeister, 733 F.2d 892 (Fed. Cir. 1984).published 2 cites
    See generally Citizens Coalition, 717 F.2d at 966 ; Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982) ("the issue of who has prevailed is a realistic j…
  • Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Colorado State Fair & Indus. Exposition Comm'n, 673 P.2d 368 (Colo. 1983).published
    See also Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982).
  • Strickland v. Lamar Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 807 F. Supp. 121 (M.D. Ga. 1992).published
Other citing cases2 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Douglas C. COEN and Robert Page, individually and as officers of the Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Mississippi Gulf Coast Chapter and the Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Mississippi Gulf Coast Chapter
v.
The HARRISON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD el al.
No. 79-3970.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Feb 23, 1981.
Published opinion
638 F.2d 24
1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 19936
Robert J. LaBine, Cooperating Att’y for the American Civil Liberties Union, Long Beach, N.Y., Joseph Edward Guarino, Brooklyn, N.Y., for plaintiffs-appellants., Boyce Holleman, Ben R. Galloway, Gulf-port, Miss., for defendants-appellees.
Johnson, Politz, Wisdom.
Cited by 29 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

The plaintiffs in this civil rights case appeal from a grant of one hundred dollars in attorney’s fees, contending that the amount is too low. We affirm.

The plaintiffs are a unit of the Ku Klux Klan and two of its officers. In 1977 and 1978 they requested permission from the School Board of Harrison County, Mississippi, to hold an “Americanism Rally” at the ballpark facilities of Saucier Elementary School in Saucier, Mississippi. The School Board denied their requests.

[*26] The plaintiffs filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), alleging deprivations of their first and fourteenth amendment rights and demanding declaratory and injunctive relief. After trial but before judgment, the trial judge suggested that the plaintiffs should make a new application including assurances that they would post a bond for costs and property damage and would not burn crosses, carry firearms, or wear hooded robes. The plaintiffs did so, and the School Board granted permission for the rally. The rally was held on September 16, 1978 without violence or disturbance. Accordingly, the district court never issued a judgment on the merits.

The plaintiffs moved for allowance of attorney’s fees of $8,192.36 under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). Under that statute, a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. E.g., Iranian Students Ass’n v. Edwards, 5 Cir. 1979, 604 F.2d 352; Criterion Club v. Board of Commissioners, 5 Cir. 1979, 594 F.2d 118 (per curiam); Morrow v. Dillard, 5 Cir. 1978, 580 F.2d 1284; Brown v. Culpepper, 5 Cir. 1977, 559 F.2d 274. The district court found that the plaintiffs were “technically” prevailing parties, but it nevertheless granted only a nominal fee. The court noted that it had issued no order granting relief to the plaintiffs. Further, the Board had objected to the rally on precisely those points on which the plaintiffs gave adequate assurances before they were permitted to hold the rally: firearms, hoods, burning crosses, and security for damage. This, the court reasoned, amounted to “special circumstances” warranting denial of any higher amount.

It is undisputed that a plaintiff need not obtain formal relief in adversary proceedings to be a prevailing party for purposes of § 1988; it is enough that his suit has served to vindicate his rights, whether by court decision, consent judgment, or voluntary compliance by the defendant after the filing of the suit. The proper focus is on whether the plaintiff has succeeded on the central issue, as exhibited by the fact that he has obtained the primary relief sought. Iranian Students Ass’n, 604 F.2d at 353; Criterion Club, 594 F.2d at 120; Brown, 559 F.2d at 277; Hanrahan v. Hampton, 1980, 446 U.S. 754, 757, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 1989, 64 L.Ed.2d 670, 674; Robinson v. Kimbrough, 5 Cir. 1980, 620 F.2d 468, 475-76; S.Rep.No.1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 5908, 5912. To recover an attorney’s fee, however, it is not sufficient the plaintiff has obtained what he asked for; it is also necessary that his suit be, if not the sole reason for his success, at least a major factor in bringing it about. A civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorney’s fees for demanding that a state officer do what he would have done in any case. See also Criterion Club, 594 F.2d at 120; Ward v. Deerman, 5 Cir. 1980, 626 F.2d 489, 492 (per curiam).

In this light, it appears that the district court erred, if at all, only in its terminology. The court found that the School Board rejected the plaintiffs’ initial requests because of its concern that Klan members would carry guns, wear hoods, and burn crosses at the planned rally (as they had done at previous rallies). This finding is not clearly erroneous, and we accept it. When the Klan assured the Board that there would be no guns, hoods, or crosses, the Board gave permission for the rally. Thus, although the district court stated in its judgment that the plaintiffs had “technically” prevailed, it ultimately rested its decision on the “special circumstance” that it was the plaintiffs, not the defendants, who acceded to the other parties’ terms. “The use of the school ground premises was actually obtained ... on a proper application which assured protection of the school ground properties and a minimum interference with the educational processes being conducted in said facilities.” In the context of § 1988 there is no such thing as a “technically prevailing plaintiff”; the issue of who has prevailed is a realistic judgment, not a technical one. As a realistic matter, the plaintiffs have not gained[*27] anything from this suit that they could not have obtained without litigation.[1] Therefore, they did not prevail within the meaning of § 1988.[2]

The district court could justifiably have denied the plaintiffs any attorney’s fees at all. It follows a fortiori that it did not abuse its discretion, as far as the plaintiffs are concerned, in granting only a nominal sum. The defendants have not appealed from the grant of one hundred dollars, so we decline to disturb it.

AFFIRMED.

1

This is a statement about the actual result of the dispute, not about the relevant law. We express no opinion as to whether the plaintiffs would have been entitled to hold their rally without giving assurances, nor as to whether the Board could rightfully have withheld permission even after receiving assurances.

2

Whether the plaintiffs have prevailed is a matter of so-called ultimate fact — “simply the result reached by processes of legal reasoning from, or the interpretation of the legal significance of, the evidentiary facts” or the subsidiary facts as found by the district court. Hence, we are not bound by the “clearly erroneous” standard of review on that point. Eg., Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 5 Cir. 1954, 218 F.2d 217, 219; Skou v. United States, 5 Cir. 1976, 526 F.2d 293, 295; Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Fedders Financial Corp. (In re Hammons), 5 Cir. 1980, 614 F.2d 399, 403.