Coen v. Harrison Cnty. Sch. Bd., 638 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1981). · Go Syfert
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Coen v. Harrison Cnty. Sch. Bd., 638 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“in the context of 1988 there is no such thing as a 'technically prevailing plaintiff'; the issue of who has prevailed is a realistic judgment, not a technical one”
68 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 21 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Dunten v. Kibler (gand, 1981-07-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 23 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Dunten v. Kibler
N.D. Ga. · 1981 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in the context of 1988 there is no such thing as a 'technically prevailing plaintiff'; the issue of who has prevailed is a realistic judgment, not a technical one
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mississippi State Chapter Operation Push v. Mabus
N.D. Miss. · 1992 · confidence medium
At most, plaintiffs’ appeal only heightened the momentum “in a course of action already begun.” Posada, 716 F.2d at 1076. 10 Given the above, “a civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorneys’ fees for demanding that a state officer do what he would have done in any case.” Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir.1982), Posada v. lamb County, Texas, 716 F.2d 1066, 1072 (5th Cir.1983) quoting Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Knop v. Johnson (3×) also: Cited "see"
W.D. Mich. · 1988 · confidence medium
See also, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 688 , 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3279 , 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983) (“to be a ‘prevailing party,’ one must succeed on the ‘central issue,’ or ‘essentially succee[d] in obtaining the relief he seeks in his claims on the merits’ ”); Seaway Drive-In, Inc. v. Township of Clay, 791 F.2d 447 , 450 note 7 (6th Cir.1986); Kentucky Association for Retarded Citizens v. Conn, 718 F.2d 182, 186 (6th Cir.1983) (denying fees where plaintiffs prevailed on “some issues but not on the central issue”); Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (…
examined Cited as authority (rule) William Taylor v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Leo Callahan, Etc., Donald R. Hall, Etc., Defendants (4×)
11th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of Hallandale, 742 F.2d 590 (11th Cir.1984); Coen v. Harrison City School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1981); Iranian Students Assn. v. Sawyer, 639 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harris ex rel. Harris v. Jones County
S.D. Miss. · 1985 · confidence medium
A civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorney’s fees for demanding that a state officer do what he would have done in any case.” Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981); Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir.1982); Posada, supra, 716 F.2d at 1072 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Minnie Ann Hennigan v. Ouachita Parish School Board (2×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Garcia v. Guerra, 744 F.2d 1159 at 1162 ; Posada v. Lamb County, Texas, 716 F.2d 1066, 1072 (5th Cir.1983); Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir.1982); Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 620 F.2d 458, 476 (5th Cir.1981). 22 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Teresa Diane P., Through Her Parent and Next Friend, Marilyn J.P., and Marilyn J.P. v. Alief Independent School District (2×)
5th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
Defendants argue that they would have provided plaintiffs a residential placement and interim services even without the entry of a preliminary injunction. 21 Defendants correctly state the law when they assert that "[a] civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorney's fees for demanding that a state officer do what he would have done in any case." Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hughes v. Livingston Parish School Bd.
La. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
The standard for awarding attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 when a civil rights case has been mooted is stated in Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Devine v. Sutermeister
Fed. Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
See generally Citizens Coalition, 717 F.2d at 966 ; Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982) (“the issue of who has prevailed is a realistic judgment, not a technical one”); Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 , 101 S.Ct. 898 , 66 L.Ed.2d 828 (1981); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318 (4th Cir.1979); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978); Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer, 533 F.Supp. 348, 351 (D.D.C.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Devine v. Sutermeister
Fed. Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
See generally Citizens Coalition, 717 F.2d at 966 ; Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982) ("the issue of who has prevailed is a realistic judgment, not a technical one"); Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 , 101 S.Ct. 898 , 66 L.Ed.2d 828 (1981); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318 (4th Cir.1979); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978); Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer, 533 F.Supp. 348, 351 (D.D.C.1982). 26 NTEU's motion to dismiss was base…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Leroy v. City of Houston
S.D. Tex. · 1984 · confidence medium
Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) COMMONWEALTH OIL REFINING COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee
5th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
See also Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F.2d 663, 669 (5th Cir.1981) (identical language, citing Edwards ); Coen v. Harrison County School Bd., 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981) (identical language, citing Edwards and other cases). 2 We have applied this test of "prevailing party" status equally to both plaintiffs and defendants.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) B & J Music, Inc. v. McAuliffe
11th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
“A civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorney’s fees for demanding that a state officer do what he would have done in any case.” Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) B & J Music, Inc., and H. Dyke N. Spear, Jr., D/B/A Broadway Productions v. Hinson McAuliffe State of Georgia, Ex Rel., Lewis R. Slaton and Hinson McAuliffe v. H. Dyke N. Spear, Jr. And Broadway Productions
11th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
"A civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorney's fees for demanding that a state officer do what he would have done in any case." Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Victoria Posada v. Lamb County, Texas (2×)
5th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
Causal connection is established by evidence that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was a “substantial factor or a significant catalyst in motivating the defendants to end their unconstitutional behavior,” Williams, 672 F.2d at 551 ; Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 620 F.2d 468, 476 (5th Cir.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Raul Espino, Jr., Etc. v. Raul Besteiro
5th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
In determining whether a plaintiff has “prevailed,” we must ask whether, “as a realistic matter, the plaintiff ... has gained anything from this suit that [he] could not have obtained without litigation.” Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26-27 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jane Doe, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Jacob D. Adams, M.D. v. George D. Busbee, Etc.
11th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
For example, a line of Fifth Circuit cases has enunciated a test that a party has prevailed when he “has succeeded on the central issue, as exhibited by the fact that he has obtained the primary relief sought.” Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F.2d 663, 669 (5th Cir. 1981); Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982); Iranian Students Asso *1380 ciation v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353 (5th Cir. 1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bert Williams v. John R. Leatherbury
5th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
A civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorney’s fees for demanding that a state officer do what he would have done in any case.” Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. City of Ennis
N.D. Tex. · 1981 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See Ward v. Dearman, supra; Bly v. McLeod, 605 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 , 100 S.Ct. 1315 , 63 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980); cf., Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Benny B. Barrett, Cross-Appellant v. Carl Thomas, Sheriff, Cross-Appellee (2×)
5th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jackson Ex Rel. Jackson v. Philadelphia Housing Authority
E.D. Pa. · 1994 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., Coen v. Harrison County School Bd., 638 F.2d 24 , 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied. 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982) (holding plaintiff not “prevailing party” because lawsuit was not necessary to relief).
cited Cited "see, e.g." International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Colorado State Fair & Industrial Exposition Commission
Colo. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 , 102 S.Ct. 1427 , 71 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Iranian Students Association v. Dr. Granville M. Sawyer, President, Texas Southern University
5th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Coen v. Harrison County School Board, 638 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1981) (lawsuit must be a major factor in obtaining relief); Brown v. Culpepper, supra (lawsuit was necessary factor in obtaining relief).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Douglas C. Coen and Robert Page, Individually and as Officers of the Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Mississippi Gulf Coast Chapter and the Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Mississippi Gulf Coast Chapter
v.
The Harrison County School Board
79-3970.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Feb 23, 1981.
638 F.2d 24
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published

638 F.2d 24

Douglas C. COEN and Robert Page, individually and as
officers of the Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan, Mississippi Gulf Coast Chapter; and the Invisible
Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Mississippi Gulf Coast
Chapter, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
The HARRISON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 79-3970.

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.

Unit A

Feb. 23, 1981.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 7, 1981.

Robert J. LaBine, Cooperating Att'y. for the American Liberties Union, Long Beach, N.Y., Joseph Edward Guarino, Brooklyn, N.Y., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Boyce Holleman, Ben R. Galloway, Gulfport, Miss., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before WISDOM, POLITZ and SAM D. JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

[*~24]1

The plaintiffs in this civil rights case appeal from a grant of one hundred dollars in attorney's fees, contending that the amount is too low. We affirm.

2

The plaintiffs are a unit of the Ku Klux Klan and two of its officers. In 1977 and 1978 they requested permission from the School Board of Harrison County, Mississippi, to hold an "Americanism Rally" at the ballpark facilities of Saucier Elementary School in Saucier, Mississippi. The School Board denied their requests.

3

The plaintiffs filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), alleging deprivations of their first and fourteenth amendment rights and demanding declaratory and injunctive relief. After trial but before judgment, the trial judge suggested that the plaintiffs should make a new application including assurances that they would post a bond for costs and property damage and would not burn crosses, carry firearms, or wear hooded robes. The plaintiffs did so, and the School Board granted permission for the rally. The rally was held on September 16, 1978 without violence or disturbance. Accordingly, the district court never issued a judgment on the merits.

4

The plaintiffs moved for allowance of attorney's fees of $8,192.36 under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). Under that statute, a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. E.g., Iranian Students Ass'n v. Edwards, 5 Cir. 1979, 604 F.2d 352; Criterion Club v. Board of Commissioners, 5 Cir. 1979, 594 F.2d 118 (per curiam); Morrow v. Dillard, 5 Cir. 1978, 580 F.2d 1284; Brown v. Culpepper, 5 Cir. 1977, 559 F.2d 274. The district court found that the plaintiffs were "technically" prevailing parties, but it nevertheless granted only a nominal fee. The court noted that it had issued no order granting relief to the plaintiffs. Further, the Board had objected to the rally on precisely those points on which the plaintiffs gave adequate assurances before they were permitted to hold the rally: firearms, hoods, burning crosses, and security for damage. This, the court reasoned, amounted to "special circumstances" warranting denial of any higher amount.

[*~25]5

It is undisputed that a plaintiff need not obtain formal relief in adversary proceedings to be a prevailing party for purposes of § 1988; it is enough that his suit has served to vindicate his rights, whether by court decision, consent judgment, or voluntary compliance by the defendant after the filing of the suit. The proper focus is on whether the plaintiff has succeeded on the central issue, as exhibited by the fact that he has obtained the primary relief sought. Iranian Students Ass'n, 604 F.2d at 353; Criterion Club, 594 F.2d at 120; Brown, 559 F.2d at 277; Hanrahan v. Hampton, 1980, 446 U.S. 754, 757, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 1989, 64 L.Ed.2d 670, 674; Robinson v. Kimbrough, 5 Cir. 1980, 620 F.2d 468, 475-76; S.Rep.No.1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in (1976) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5908, 5912. To recover an attorney's fee, however, it is not sufficient the plaintiff has obtained what he asked for; it is also necessary that his suit be, if not the sole reason for his success, at least a major factor in bringing it about. A civil rights plaintiff may not collect attorney's fees for demanding that a state officer do what he would have done in any case. See also Criterion Club, 594 F.2d at 120; Ward v. Deerman, 5 Cir. 1980, 626 F.2d 489, 492 (per curiam).

[*~26]6

In this light, it appears that the district court erred, if at all, only in its terminology. The court found that the School Board rejected the plaintiffs' initial requests because of its concern that Klan members would carry guns, wear hoods, and burn crosses at the planned rally (as they had done at previous rallies). This finding is not clearly erroneous, and we accept it. When the Klan assured the Board that there would be no guns, hoods, or crosses, the Board gave permission for the rally. Thus, although the district court stated in its judgment that the plaintiffs had "technically" prevailed, it ultimately rested its decision on the "special circumstance" that it was the plaintiffs, not the defendants, who acceded to the other parties' terms. "The use of the school ground premises was actually obtained ... on a proper application which assured protection of the school ground properties and a minimum interference with the educational processes being conducted in said facilities." In the context of § 1988 there is no such thing as a "technically prevailing plaintiff"; the issue of who has prevailed is a realistic judgment, not a technical one. As a realistic matter, the plaintiffs have not gained anything from this suit that they could not have obtained without litigation.[1] Therefore, they did not prevail within the meaning of § 1988.[2]

7

The district court could justifiably have denied the plaintiffs any attorney's fees at all. It follows a fortiori that it did not abuse its discretion, as far as the plaintiffs are concerned, in granting only a nominal sum. The defendants have not appealed from the grant of one hundred dollars, so we decline to disturb it.

8

AFFIRMED.

1

This is a statement about the actual result of the dispute, not about the relevant law. We express no opinion as to whether the plaintiffs would have been entitled to hold their rally without giving assurances, nor as to whether the Board could rightfully have withheld permission even after receiving assurances

2

Whether the plaintiffs have prevailed is a matter of so-called ultimate fact "simply the result reached by processes of legal reasoning from, or the interpretation of the legal significance of, the evidentiary facts" or the subsidiary facts as found by the district court. Hence, we are not bound by the "clearly erroneous" standard of review on that point. E.g., Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 5 Cir. 1954, 218 F.2d 217, 219; Skou v. United States, 5 Cir. 1976, 526 F.2d 293, 295; Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Fedders Financial Corp. (In re Hammons), 5 Cir. 1980, 614 F.2d 399, 403