29 Fair empl.prac.cas. 890, 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,438 Ethel Ann Bricker Dean v. Benjamin R. Civiletti, in His Off. Capacity as Attorney Gen. of the United States of Am., 670 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1982). · Go Syfert
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29 Fair empl.prac.cas. 890, 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,438 Ethel Ann Bricker Dean v. Benjamin R. Civiletti, in His Off. Capacity as Attorney Gen. of the United States of Am., 670 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“having prevailed on the discrimination issue ... is entitled to recover nominal damages of at least 1 as well as reasonable attorney's fees”
47 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 16 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Brenda Parton v. Gte North, Incorporated, a Wisconsin Corporation, Brenda Parton v. Gte North, Incorporated, a Wisconsin Corporation (ca8, 1992-07-31)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Brenda Parton v. Gte North, Incorporated, a Wisconsin Corporation, Brenda Parton v. Gte North, Incorporated, a Wisconsin Corporation (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
8th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
having prevailed on the discrimination issue ... is entitled to recover nominal damages of at least 1 as well as reasonable attorney's fees
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tayler Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.
9th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
Waterworks & Sewer Dep’t, 802 F.2d 1073 , 1076 (8th Cir. 1986); Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 , 253 n.1 (4th Cir. 1983); Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); T & S Serv.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marilynn K. Hammond, M.D. v. Northland Counseling Center, Inc. Greg Walker
8th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266 , 98 S.Ct. 1042 (holding that denial of procedur *895 al due process is actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury) (“By making the deprivation of such [“absolute”] rights actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance of organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed .... ”); Welch v. Spangler, 939 F.2d 570, 573 (8th Cir.1991) (affirming award of nominal damages for violation of a consent decree, even though plaintiff had not proven actual injury or damages); Dean v. Civiletti…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marilyn K. Hammond v. Northland Counseling
8th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266 (holding that denial of procedural due process is actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury) ("By making the deprivation of such ["absolute"] rights actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance of organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed . . . ."); Welch v. Spangler, 939 F.2d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming award of nominal damages for violation of a consent decree, even though plaintiff had not proven actual injury or damages); Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tommy D. Hopkins v. John L. Saunders, Kyle Vickers, Charles Ausfahl, Roy Temple, Beth M. Wheeler, Tommy D. Hopkins v. John L. Saunders, Kyle Vickers, Charles Ausfahl, Roy Temple, Beth M. Wheeler
8th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
White involved a section 1983 claim and the assertion of qualified immunity as a defense to that claim, see White, 29 F.3d at 360-61, whereas Dean involved a claim under Title VII and its narrow pre-1991 remedial framework, see Dean, 670 F.2d at 100.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tommy Hopkins v. John Saunders
8th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
White involved a section 1983 claim and the assertion of qualified immunity as a defense to that claim, see White, 29 F.3d at 360-61, whereas Dean involved a claim under Title VII and its narrow pre-1991 remedial framework, see Dean, 670 F.2d at 100.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hatley v. Store Kraft Manufacturing Co.
D. Neb. · 1994 · confidence medium
However, Parton cited Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir.1982), Parton, 971 F.2d at 154 , in support of its holding that "nominal damages are appropriately awarded where a Title VII violation is proved even though no actual damages are shown." As Par-ton explicitly recognized, Civiletti was a sex-discrimination case. 4 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Griffith v. Colorado, Division of Youth Services
D. Colo. · 1992 · confidence medium
The Eighth Circuit has stated that “nominal damages are appropriately awarded where a Title VII violation is proved even though no actual damages are shown.” Parton v. GTE North, Inc., 971 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.1992); see also Maney v. Brinkley Municipal Waterworks and Sewer Dept., 802 F.2d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir.1986) (even if plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive relief, “the court should still award them nominal damages of at least one dollar”); Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (“We find that having prevailed on the discrimination issue involving …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McLaughlin v. New York, Governor's Office of Employee Relations
N.D.N.Y. · 1992 · confidence medium
See Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 905 (11th Cir.1988); Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir.1986); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 , 253 n. 1 (4th Cir.1983); Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir.1982); Joshi v. Florida State Univ., 646 F.2d 981 , 991 n. 33 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 , 102 S.Ct. 2233 , 72 L.Ed.2d 845 . 9 Unfortunately, each of these courts merely assumed in passing, without explanation, that nominal damages are an available remedy under Title VII.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Afanador v. United States Postal Service
D.P.R. · 1991 · confidence medium
Id. at 101 (footnote omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Maney v. Brinkley Municipal Waterworks & Sewer Department
8th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir.1982) (per curiam); see Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d at 1323-24 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) 50 Fair empl.prac.cas. 145, 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,661 Benjamin F. Maney Robert Butler Robert L. Tucker v. Brinkley Municipal Waterworks and Sewer Department (Arkansas), a Municipal Corporation Mr. Lambert D. Dial Jubal Etheridge Pete Medford Gus Rusher Robert L. Travis, President, Individually and in Their Official Capacities as Members of the Board of Commissioners of the Brinkley, Arkansas Water and Sewer Commissioners John Holliday, Individually and in His Official Capacity as City Manager of Brinkley
8th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir.1982) (per curiam); see Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d at 1323-24 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gail Derr v. Gulf Oil Corporation
10th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 175 (10th Cir.1982); Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir.1982) (per curiam); Fancher v. Nimmo, 549 F.Supp. 1324, 1333 (E.D.Ark.1982).
discussed Cited "see" Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert
Conn. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99 , 101 and n.2 (8th Cir. 1982) (victim of discrimination would be entitled to assignment to geographic station from which she had been wrongly excluded but not to station of her choosing). 42 For example, § 46a-60 (8) provides in relevant part: ‘‘If an employer takes immediate corrective action in response to an employee’s claim of sexual harassment, such corrective action shall not modify the conditions of employment of the employee making the claim of sexual harassment unless such employee agrees, in writing, to any modification in the conditions of e…
cited Cited "see" Rogers v. Kelly
E.D. Ark. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99 (8th Cir.1982) (per curiam).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." George E. Bailey v. Marvin T. Runyon, Jr., Postmaster General
8th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Bailey also argues that the jury’s finding of no damages and the court’s *882 award of nominal damages are inconsistent with a finding of harassment, asserting emotional harm is inherent in such a finding. 1 Not only has this court affirmed nominal damage awards in harassment cases, see, e.g., Dhyne, 184 F.3d at 986 ; Kline, 175 F.3d at 668 , we have held that “nominal damages are appropriately awarded where a Title VII [harassment] violation is proved even though no actual damages are shown.” Parton v. GTE North, Inc., 971 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.1992); see also Dean v. Civiletti, 670 …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." George E. Bailey v. Marvin T. Runyon
8th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Bailey also argues that the jury's finding of no damages and the court's award of nominal damages are inconsistent with a finding of harassment, asserting emotional harm is inherent in such a finding.1 Not only has this court affirmed nominal damage awards in harassment cases, see, e.g., Dhyne, 184 F.3d at 986 ; Kline, 175 F.3d at 668 , we have held that "nominal damages are appropriately awarded where a Title VII [harassment] violation is proved even though no actual damages are shown." Parton v. GTE North, Inc., 971 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99, 101 …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Marten Transport, Ltd. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations (2×)
Wis. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99 (1982) (holding that a plaintiff who proved discrimination in violation of Title VII was denied reinstatement because she did not prove a constructive discharge).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
29 Fair empl.prac.cas. 890, 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,438 Ethel Ann Bricker Dean
v.
Benjamin R. Civiletti, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of the United States of America
81-1542.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Feb 9, 1982.
670 F.2d 99
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published

670 F.2d 99

29 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 890,
28 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,438
Ethel Ann Bricker DEAN, Appellant,
v.
Benjamin R. CIVILETTI, in his official capacity as Attorney
General of the United States of America, Appellee.

No. 81-1542.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 13, 1982.
Decided Feb. 9, 1982.

Stuart E. Schiffer, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., James R. Britton, U. S. Atty., Fargo, N. D., Robert S. Greenspan, Frederick Geilfuss, argued, Attys., Civil Division, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Michael Ward, Minot, N. D., for appellant.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, and ROSS and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

[*~99]1

Ethel Bricker Dean brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging that the United States Marshal Service discriminated against her on the basis of sex in not accepting her application for transfer to the position of deputy marshal assigned to Bismarck, North Dakota. She also alleges that after the filing of her discrimination complaint the United States Marshal engaged in retaliatory behavior against her, forcing her to resign from her position. She appeals from the decision of the district court denying her back pay and reinstatement in the Marshal Service.

2

We modify and affirm the decision of the district court.

3

In 1977 Ethel Bricker was a United States Deputy Marshal stationed in the District of Colorado. While on special assignment she met and later decided to marry Robert Dean, a Missile Escort United States Deputy stationed in Minot, North Dakota.

4

In the summer of 1977 both Bricker and Dean were seeking to transfer to jobs within the same geographic area. At the same time, the United States Marshal for the District of North Dakota, Alvin Bumann, and his Chief Deputy, Harold Warren,[1] were attempting to obtain authorization from the Marshal Service to hire two additional deputies. One of the vacancies was intended for Bismarck, North Dakota.

5

On July 1, 1977, the position of deputy marshal assigned to Bismarck, North Dakota, was advertised. Because of the great difficulty in finding applicants willing to accept assignment in North Dakota, Warren, having heard of Bricker and Dean's marriage plans, had been in touch with them prior to the announcement of the position. He indicated that if one of them was interested in the position, the other could probably later be transferred to Bismarck to replace a deputy who was scheduled to retire in January 1978. Bricker contends that she applied for the vacancy with this understanding.

6

Bricker and Dean both applied for the job but Dean later withdrew his application, leaving Bricker as the sole applicant. Bricker was, according to all witnesses, highly qualified for the job.

7

The United States District Judge at Bismarck, upon learning of the intended arrangement which would result in a husband and wife team being the only deputy marshals stationed in Bismarck, made his objections to the transfer known to Warren and his superiors. Shortly thereafter the vacancy was withdrawn. Bricker initiated a formal complaint with the Marshal Service August 26, 1977. In September 1977 a vacancy in the Fargo office was advertised. Bricker applied for and was hired for the position. The Bismarck vacancy was again opened after Bricker accepted the Fargo position. She testified that she accepted the Fargo position with the understanding that Dean would be transferred to Fargo upon the promotion of another Fargo deputy to chief deputy. That promotion never occurred and Dean remained stationed at Minot, North Dakota. Bricker and Dean were married in December 1977. Bricker's complaint also alleges that after their marriage the Marshal Service initiated a program of harassment against them intended to preclude them from transferring to another district.

8

It is evident from the record that considerable discord developed between the Deans and Warren as a result of the thwarted transfers.

9

On April 7, 1978, Bricker Dean resigned from the Marshal Service following a dispute with Warren over her allegedly late return from a trip for which she had used annual leave. Bricker Dean contends that she was constructively discharged as a result of the retaliatory actions of her supervisors.

10

At the close of a nonjury trial the district court determined that the Marshal Service did discriminate against Bricker Dean in withdrawing the Bismarck vacancy for which she was qualified and was the sole applicant. It found no discrimination against Bricker Dean on the basis of her other discrimination complaint relating to her resignation and consequently no constructive discharge. Despite the finding of discrimination, however, the district court concluded that special circumstances prevented Bricker Dean from obtaining the requested relief. It found no evidence that the failure to transfer her to Bismarck caused any loss of income or benefits. The district court noted that denial of the transfer did not in any way force Bricker Dean to leave her job in Colorado or resign from her Fargo position.

11

Bricker Dean urges on appeal simply that she is entitled to back pay and reinstatement in the Marshal Service at a location where she and her husband would be able to live and work in the same area.

[*~100]12

A thorough review of the record convinces us that the district court was correct in finding that the Marshal Service discriminated against Bricker Dean in withdrawing the Bismarck vacancy but that there had been no subsequent discrimination on the basis of her complaint and therefore no constructive discharge. However, we disagree with the district court's conclusion that Bricker Dean is entitled to no relief. We find that having prevailed on the discrimination issue involving the Bismarck vacancy she is entitled to recover nominal damages of at least $1 as well as reasonable attorney's fees for proceedings in the district court.[2] Moreover appellants' attorney is hereby directed to make application for attorney's fees incurred in conjunction with this appeal. That portion of the district court order denying relief is hereby vacated and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.

1

Warren replaced Bumann as United States Marshal for the District of North Dakota on July 1, 1977

2

Bricker Dean requested that she be reinstated as a Deputy United States Marshal and that she and her husband, now stationed in Las Vegas, be assigned to the same city. This type of relief is not justified under these facts and the district court was correct in denying it. The only injunctive relief to which she would be entitled is reinstatement in Bismarck, which she no longer wants unless her husband is transferred there with her