Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982).
Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitPublished opinionNo. Nos. 81-3453, 81-3454, 81-3460 and 81-3461Aug 17, 1982

Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman

Quick Summary

A state statute prohibiting the transportation and storage of out-of-state radioactive waste violates the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause.

The district court granted summary judgment to the United States and commercial users of a low-level radioactive waste disposal site, striking down a Washington statute prohibiting the transportation and storage within the state of radioactive waste produced outside the state. The question presented is whether the statute violates the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause. The court applies the rule that a state may not erect barriers to the free flow of interstate commerce, even for health and safety reasons, if the law discriminates against out-of-state waste. The court holds that the statute violates both the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause because it discriminates against interstate commerce and is not a valid quarantine or market participant measure. The court affirms the summary judgment.

117 citation events (24 in the last 25 years) across 36 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Cited for
At page 630Interpreting rule 24 and federal preemption issues20 citing cases“as the public interest group that sponsored the initiative, was entitled to intervention as a matter of right under rule 24(a).”5 citing courts quote it · 17 listed here
  • Marx v. Gov't of Guam, 866 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1989).published 2 cites
    (Rule 24 traditionally has received a liberal construction in favor of applicants for intervention.)
  • Chandler v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehabilitiation, No. 1:21-cv-01657 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2023).
    (DWW, as the public interest group that sponsored the initiative, was entitled to intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24(a).)
  • Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries Comm'n v. Becerra, No. 2:19-cv-02488 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2020).
    (DWW, as the public interest group that 4 sponsored the initiative, was entitled to intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24(a).)
  • Coalition to Defend v. Granholm, No. 06-2656 (6th Cir. Sept. 6, 2007).published
    The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the appellant, “as the public interest group that sponsored the initiative, was entitled to intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24(a).” Id. at 630.
  • Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 2007).published 2 cites
    The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the appellant, “as the public interest group that sponsored the initiative, was entitled to intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24(a).” Id. at 630.
  • Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep't of the Interior, 100 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1996).published
    (holding that “the public interest group that sponsored the [statute as a ballot] initiative ... was entitled to intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)” in an action challenging the constitutionality of the s…)
  • Sierra Club v. Us Env't Prot. Agency, 995 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993).published
    Trades Council, 684 F.2d at 630, we held that an advocacy group opposed to radioactive waste in Washington could intervene as of right in litigation challenging a Washington statute which prohibited the transportation and storage of radioa…
  • Resort Timeshare Resales, Inc. v. Stuart, 764 F. Supp. 1495 (S.D. Fla. 1991).published
    The Spell-man court, noting only that Rule 24 “has received a liberal construction,” and failing to cite even Freeman , held that a public interest group that sponsored a statute was entitled to intervene in an action challenging its const…
  • United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988).published 2 cites
    United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir.1986), opinion vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1177 , 94 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987); Washington State…
  • United States v. 36.46 Acres of Upland, 113 F.R.D. 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).published
    Washington State Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir.1982), cert. den., Don’t Waste Washington Legal Defense Foundation v. Washington, 461 U.S. 913 , 103 S.Ct. 1891 , 77 L.Ed.2d 282 (1983).
Show 7 more citing cases
  • Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metro. Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127 (D. Or. 1986).published
    (Washington statute prohibiting transportation and storage within state of radioactive waste produced outside state violates dormant commerce clause)
  • United States v. J.B. Stringfellow, Jr., 783 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986).published 2 cites
    See, e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir.1983); Washington State Building & Construction Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629-30 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 , 103 S.Ct. 1891 , 77 L.Ed…
  • Reichert v. Keefe Commissary Network LLC, No. 3:17-cv-05848 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 2023).
    See Wash. State Building & Const. Trades Council, AFL- 20 CIO v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) 21 (Rule 24 traditionally has received a liberal construction in favor of applicants for 22 int…
  • Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metro. Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987).published 4 cites
    See Washington State Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d at 631 (holding that "uneven treatment of in-state and out-of-state parties fails the first part of the Pike test").
  • Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983).published
    See Washington State Building & Construction Trades v. Spellman, supra; Smith v. Pangilinan, supra; Idaho v. Freeman, supra. 14 There is no support for the dissent's novel proposition that the intervenor's interest and adequacy of represen…
  • Waller v. Fin. Corp. of Am., 828 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1987).published
  • Edwards v. City of Houston, 37 F.3d 1097 (5th Cir. 1994).published
At page 629Analyzing state action under the commerce clause8 citing casespublic interest group that sponsored statute as a ballot initiative had a right to intervene in an action challenging the constitutionality of the statute2 citing courts put it this way · 7 listed here
  • Equal Means Equal v. Ferriero, 3 F.4th 24 (1st Cir. 2021).published
    (not discussing standing)
  • Abraham v. Hodges, 255 F. Supp. 2d 539 (D.S.C. 2002).published
    (rejecting as violation of Commerce Clause state statute that purported to close the state’s borders to “the entry of low-level radioactive waste originating outside the state)
  • Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin, 170 F.R.D. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).published
    (public interest group that sponsored statute as a ballot initiative had a right to intervene in an action challenging the constitutionality of the statute)
  • Herdman v. Town of Angelica, 163 F.R.D. 180 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).published
    (public interest group that sponsored statute as a ballot initiative had a right to intervene in an action challenging the constitutionality of the statute)
  • United States v. J.B. Stringfellow, Jr., 783 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986).published 2 cites
    See, e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir.1983); Washington State Building & Construction Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629-30 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 , 103 S.Ct. 1891 , 77 L.Ed…
  • Benny v. England (In re Benny), 791 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1986).published 2 cites
    See Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527-29 (9th Cir.1983) (conducting de novo review of denial of intervention); Washington State Building and Construction Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629-30 (9th Cir.1982) (s…
  • Arkansas Elec. Energy Consumers & Reynolds Metals Co. v. Middle South Energy, Inc., 772 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1985).published
    See Washington State Building & Construction Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629-30 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 , 103 S.Ct. 1891 , 77 L.Ed.2d 282 (1983); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 612 F.2d at…
At page 631holding that "uneven treatment of in-state and out-of-state parties fails the first part of the Pike test3 citing cases2 citing courts put it this way · 2 listed here
Other citing cases3 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
WASHINGTON STATE BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO
v.
The Honorable John C. SPELLMAN, Governor of the State of Washington, Defendants-Appellants UNITED STATES of America v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, Defendants-Appellants WASHINGTON STATE BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO v. The Honorable John C. SPELLMAN, and Don't Waste Washington Legal Defense Foundation, Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant UNITED STATES of America v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, and Don't Waste Washington Legal Defense Foundation, Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant
Nos. 81-3453, 81-3454, 81-3460 and 81-3461.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Aug 17, 1982.
Published opinion
Michael B. Crutcher, Seattle, Wash., argued for Washington State Bldg, et al.; W. Russell Daggatt, Catherine B. Roach, Roberta R. Katz, Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellis & Holman, Seattle, Wash., on brief., Michael Hanbey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, Wash., argued for Spellman, et al.; Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Kenneth M. Macintosh, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, Wash., on brief., Michael W. Gendler, Seattle, Wash., for amicus curiae.
Goodwin.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
GOODWIN, Circuit Judge

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States and certain commercial users of a low-level radioactive waste disposal site in the State of Washington. The decision, reported at 518 F.Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1981), struck down as unconstitutional a Washington statute closing the borders of Washington to the entry of low-level radioactive waste originating outside the state. Don’t Waste Washington (DWW), a public interest group which had sponsored the challenged initiative legislation, appeals the denial of leave to intervene as a party. The State appeals the summary judgment.

For more than fifteen years, the State of Washington has leased from the United States 1,000 acres in an area known as the Hanford Reservation. During this time, the State has sub-leased part of the land for use as a commercial low-level radioactive waste dump. By arrangement with the United States under § 274 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. § 2021), Washington monitors the dumping site (Richland) and inspects shipments of waste to determine their compliance with state and federal regulations concerning radioactive material. The State also licenses users and collects a fee from them.

Richland is one of three low-level radioactive dump sites in operation nationwide and receives about 40 percent of the country’s low-level radioactive waste. It is also the only currently operating site accepting absorbed-liquid low-level radioactive waste. Approximately 95 percent of the waste received by Richland originates outside the State of Washington.

In November 1980, the voters of the State of Washington enacted Initiative Measure No. 383 (“383”) prohibiting the transportation and storage within Washington of radioactive waste produced outside the state. The initiative also gave permission for the state to enter into an interstate compact to solve the problem of radioactive waste on a regional basis. Federal legislation had already provided for military and high level radioactive wastes.

After the Washington initiative was approved by the voters, Congress passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1981 (Pub.L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347, hereinafter referred to as the “Low-Level Waste Act”) encouraging the use of compacts between and among states to accomplish regional storage of low-level radioactive waste. At the time the Low-Level Waste Act was passed, Congress was aware of the enactment of 383 in Washington.

The operator of the site, together with seven other plaintiffs, filed an action in district court seeking a declaration that 383 was unconstitutional and requesting injunc-tive relief. Shortly afterward, the United States of America filed a similar action.

The parties concede that regulation of the disposal of high-level radioactive waste has been preempted by the federal government and that this area is therefore not susceptible to regulation by the states. The dispute concerns the power of a state to regulate within its borders the importation and disposal of low-level radioactive waste such as filter sludges, resins, filter bottoms, used gloves and protective clothing, rags, tools, papers, plastic and material used in the manufacture of smoke detectors, luminous dials and emergency exit signs.

The government and the users of the Richland site attack the state statute on two grounds: (1) the Atomic Energy Act and the Low-Level Waste Act preempt state action; and (2) Measure 383 violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The State of Washington contends that § 274 of the Atomic Energy Act and the interstate compact provision of the Low-Level Waste Act cede control to the state over low-level waste disposal in general. The State also argues that 383 does not violate the Commerce Clause.

DWW appeals the district court’s denial of its motion to intervene either as a matter of right under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a), or under Rule 24(b)’s provision for permissive intervention.

Denial of DWW’s motion to intervene was error and accordingly we reverse as to[*630] that holding. Rule 24 traditionally has received a liberal construction in favor of applicants for intervention. 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1904 (1972). DWW, as the public interest group that sponsored the initiative, was entitled to intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24(a). However, while we sustain DWW’s appeal, this reversal does not require a new trial because the holding of the case would not be changed. DWW was permitted to participate in the argument on the appeal from the order granting summary judgment, and its contentions were duly considered. We conclude that the district court was correct in granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs. No genuine issue of fact exists. Initiative 383 violates the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

I. Supremacy Clause

The initiative violates the Supremacy Clause because it seeks to regulate legitimate federal activity and to avoid the preemption of the Atomic Energy Act. Neither § 274 of the Act nor the Low-Level Waste Act is a grant of total authority to the states over the disposal of low-level wastes within their own borders.

The regulation of the disposal of low-level radioactive waste is a legitimate federal activity, and Congress has not waived or delegated its authority over the subject. The United States’ § 274 agreement with the State of Washington gives the State authority over such matters as licensing, inspection, and levying of lease and maintenance fees. However, as the district court correctly points out, complete control of the Richland site did not pass with the assignment of regulatory responsibilities.

The Low-Level Waste Act comes closer to yielding control of disposal sites to the states in which the sites are located. The Act permits the establishment and operation of regional disposal facilities through interstate compacts. Because Congress specifically gives permission for regional disposal in this Act, states signatory to a compact could exclude waste from nonsignatory states without violating the Supremacy or Commerce Clauses. Permission to exclude such wastes, however, is conditioned on participation in a compact.

The State of Washington has signed the proposed Northwest Interstate Compact on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management (Northwest Compact) with Oregon, Idaho, Montana and Utah. As of this date, the proposed compact has not received Congressional approval. Until the state participates in a compact which has become law, the Low-Level Waste Act does not grant power to any state to close its borders to interstate traffic in low-level waste.

In any case, Initiative 383 was not framed in terms of the Northwest Compact. It was an unqualified closing of the Rich-land facility to all out-of-state users. As such, it violates the Supremacy Clause.

II. Commerce Clause

Initiative 383 also violates the Commerce Clause. The initiative is based upon an impermissible exercise of the State of Washington’s police powers. Congress has established in the Atomic Energy Act a pervasive statutory scheme to regulate nuclear activity. As discussed above, through § 274 of the Act and through the Low-Level Waste Act, Congress has also ceded some regulatory authority to the states. But Congress stopped short of granting the states power to ban wastes transported from outside their borders.

Even in the absence of pervasive federal legislation, “the Commerce Clause prevents the States from erecting barriers to the free flow of interstate commerce.” Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440, 98 S.Ct. 787, 793, 54 L.Ed.2d 664 (1978). A state statute may affect commerce without violating the Commerce Clause, however, if the statute serves a legitimate state interest and if it is applied in a nondiscriminatory manner. Id.

The criteria for determining whether the Commerce Clause has been violated are articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847, 25[*631] L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). The Pike test asks whether the state law (1) regulates evenhandedly; (2) accomplishes a legitimate local public purpose; and (3) has only an incidental effect on interstate commerce.

Low-level waste from within Washington and that traveling through the state are exempted from the initiative. Only out-of-state waste bound for disposal within Washington is banned. Such uneven treatment of in-state and out-of-state parties fails the first part of the Pike test.

This facial discrimination, in turn, “invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1737, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979). The initiative cannot withstand this level of scrutiny.

A challenge to bona fide safety regulations must overcome a strong presumption of validity. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524, 79 S.Ct. 962, 964, 3 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1959). However, the Supreme Court has recently held that “the incantation of a purpose to promote the public health or safety does not insulate a state law from Commerce Clause attack.” Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670, 101 S.Ct. 1309, 1316, 67 L.Ed.2d 580 (1981).

The state relies upon the proposition that “releases of radioactive materials and emissions to the environment are inimical to the health and welfare of the people of Washington ....” Initiative 383, § 1. Undoubtedly, the release of radioactive materials and emissions is inimical to the safety of the people of any state. The State of Washington neglects to address, however, the manner in which local waste, transported and stored within Washington has superior safety and environmental virtues over waste produced elsewhere and similarly controlled by state regulatory measures. Initiative 383, therefore, also fails the second part of the Pike test.

Finally, Initiative 383 has more than an incidental effect on interstate commerce. Washington receives two-fifths of the country’s low-level radioactive waste and has the only site currently available to receive absorbed-liquid low-level waste. Closing Washington’s borders would significantly aggravate the national problem of low-level waste disposal. Thus, 383 fails to meet the last part of the Pike test and violates the Commerce Clause.

Further, 383 fails to qualify under either the market participant or quarantine theory exceptions to the Commerce Clause. The State’s contention that it is a “market participant,” thereby placing the initiative beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause, is unconvincing. The State argues that 383 is a proprietary measure enacted to limit the state’s participation in the waste disposal market. Whether or not the State is a proprietor of the Richland site, the initiative is cast in state regulatory rather than in proprietary terms. The measure is based on public safety rather than on economic considerations. The measure denies entry of waste at the state’s borders rather than at the site the State is operating as a market participant. The measure establishes civil and criminal penalties which only a state and not a mere proprietor can enforce.

The State’s quarantine theory is equally unconvincing. Under the quarantine theory, a state may close its borders to protect citizens against health hazards such as epidemics.

In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978), however, the Supreme Court held that one state may not “isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade.” Id. at 628, 98 S.Ct. at 2538. In that case, the out-of-state user of a New Jersey disposal site challenged a New Jersey statute prohibiting the importation of out-of-state waste. The New Jersey statute, like the Washington initiative, protected the health of the individual state’s citizens while ignoring the nationwide problem of waste disposal. The Supreme Court found the measure “blocks the importation of waste in an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State with the entire burden of slowing the flow[*632] of refuse into New Jersey’s remaining landfill sites. That legislative effort is clearly impermissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.” Id. at 629, 98 S.Ct. at 2538. Thus, Initiative 383 fails to come within either the market participant or the quarantine theory exceptions to the Commerce Clause.

Affirmed.