green
Positive treatment
16.4 score
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
United States v. Mullins
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
But cf. Roylance, 690 F.2d at 167 ("One causes mailings and triggers operation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 when it is reasonably foreseeable his ... activities will result in the use of interstate mails.”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Weiss
(2×)
Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9 , 74 S.Ct. 358 ; United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164, 166 (10th Cir.1982) (holding the causation element is met when the defendant "set forces in motion which foreseeably would involve mail uses."). [5] Weiss's wire fraud convictions rest upon five wire transmissions between *1272 mortgage brokers and the FHA requesting access to the Computerized Home Underwriting Management System ("CHUMS") to generate an FHA case number for properties involved in Weiss's scheme.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Weiss
Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9 , 74 S.Ct. 358 ; United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164, 166 (10th Cir.1982) (holding the causation element is met when the defendant “set forces in motion which foreseeably would involve mail uses.”). 5 Weiss’s wire fraud convictions rest upon five wire transmissions between *1272 mortgage brokers and the FHA requesting access to the Computerized Home Underwriting Management System (“CHUMS”) to generate an FHA case number for properties involved in Weiss’s scheme.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Brenda Lu Smith
Hopkini, 744 F.2d at 718 ; United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir.1982); Steiger v. United States, 373 F.2d 133, 135 (10th Cir.1967).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. James Darriel Orr
See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514, 1521 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 952 , 106 S.Ct. 320 , 88 L.Ed.2d 303 (1985); United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir.1982).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. William Esch, United States of America v. Linda Esch
United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164, 167 (10th Cir.1982).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. James William Bolt
We find that all of this evidence was admissible as probative of the questions of the identity *1471 of James William Bolt/Russell Woolf, the existence of the schemes to defraud, the question of intent, and the absence of mistake, inadvertence, etc. Such evidence “(d)id not constitute excludable ‘other crimes’ evidence but proof highly probative of the existence of the very scheme(s) generating the government’s case.” United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir.1982).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
The exemption for short-term notes is limited to " 'prime quality negotiable [commercial] paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public, that is, paper [issued] to facilitate well recognized types of current operational business requirements and of a type eligible for discounting by Federal Reserve banks.' " Id. (quoting Securities Act Release No. 4412, 26 Fed.Reg. 9158, 9159 (1961)); see also United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164, 168-69 (10th Cir.1982). 28 The maturity of a note is therefore not dispositive.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Reg. 9158 , 9159 (1961)); see also United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164, 168-69 (10th Cir.1982).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. David W. Warren
The Supreme Court has held that one causes the use of the mails when he “does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended.” Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9 , 74 S.Ct. at 362-363 (quoted in United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399 , 94 S.Ct. 645, 647 , 38 L.Ed.2d 603 (1974)); see also United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164 , *1345 167 (10th Cir.1982); United States v. Curtis, 537 F.2d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir.1976); Marvin v. United States, 279 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir.19…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Amos A. Hopkins, United States of America v. Larry Peterman
(2×)
See also United States v. Roylance, 690 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), United States v. Westbo, 576 F.2d 285 (10th Cir.), and Sparrow v. United States, 402 F.2d 826 (10th Cir.).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
ESTATE of Mattias Arnold MADSEN, Norma
v.
Madsen, Executrix, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee
v.
Madsen, Executrix, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee
79-7607.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Oct 13, 1982.
Steven Soha, Aiken, St. Louis & Siljeg, Seattle, Wash., for petitioner-appellant., Robert T. Duffy, Dept, of Justice, Tax Div., Washington, D.C., argued, for respondent-appellee; Gilbert E. Andrews, Dept, of Justice, Tax Div., Washington, D.C., on brief.
Wright, Ferguson, Norris.
Published
PER CURIAM.
This court’s opinion of October 2, 1981, 659 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1981) certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Washington:
In Washington, is a life insurance policy naming the deceased spouse as the insured and the surviving spouse as the beneficiary and owner, though the premiums were paid out of community funds, the separate property of the surviving spouse?
The Washington court’s opinion, reported in 97 Wash.2d 792, 650 P.2d 196 (1982), concludes:
We hold that RCW 48.18.440(1) does not convert community property life insurance policies into the separate property of the beneficiary spouse.
The judgment of the Tax Court herein is affirmed.