green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 10×
61.2 score
G Cite
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984
2005
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
B&B Manufacturing, Inc. v. United States Virgin Islands
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
this court has emphasized in the past that 'time already invested in litigating the state cause of action is an insufficient reason to sustain the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United Corporation v. USVI
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
this court has emphasized in the past that 'time already invested in litigating the state cause of action is an insufficient reason to sustain the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Apex Construction Company, Inc v. USVI
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
this court has emphasized in the past that 'time already invested in litigating the state cause of action is an insufficient reason to sustain the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Bluewater Construction, Inc. v. The United States Virgin Islands
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
this court has emphasized in the past that 'time already invested in litigating the state cause of action is an insufficient reason to sustain the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Impex Trading International, Inc. v. USVI
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
this court has emphasized in the past that 'time already invested in litigating the state cause of action is an insufficient reason to sustain the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
MSI Building Supplies, Inc. v. The United States Virgin Islands
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
this court has emphasized in the past that 'time already invested in litigating the state cause of action is an insufficient reason to sustain the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
MODERN PORTABLE REFRIGERATION, LLC v. TEMPERATSURE LLC d/b/a NORDIC COLD CHAIN SOLUTIONS
we have held that pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable absent 'extraordinary circumstances.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
La-Qun Williams v. Louis Folino
pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Blue Line Coal Co., Inc. v. Equibank
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
here the underlying issue of state law is a question of first impression ... factors weighing in favor of state court adjudication certainly predominate
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Executive Software North America, Inc. v. United States District Court for the Central District of California
emphasized the reluctance of federal courts to decide important and unclear issues of state law under principles of pendent jurisdiction.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lindell Moore v. Cody Gonzales, et al.
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining we should refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where no viable federal claims remain absent “extraordinary circumstances” to exercise such jurisdiction) (citation omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pedro Luis Gavilan-Cruz v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al.
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining that, absent “extraordinary circumstances,” supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims should be declined “where the federal claims are no longer viable” (citation omitted)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
John Doe, Jane Doe, in their individual capacities, and as parents and natural guardians of James Doe, a minor v. The Haverford School
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
KANAPESKY v. TOWNSHIP OF EAST BRANDYWINE
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
APPELGREN v. ISLAND HOSPITALITY MANAGEMENT VII, LLC
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984)) (“[T]he district court ‘may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ over state law claims if the court ‘has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,’ and absent extraordinary circumstances, ‘jurisdiction [over claims based on state law] should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable.’”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Noel v. Shaw
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining that, absent “extraordinary circumstances,” supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims should be declined “where the federal claims are no longer viable” (citation omitted)). 76 Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Hector v. Jackson
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Weaver v. Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 744, 746 (3d Cir. 1982)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
BRUMFIELD v. ATLANTIC CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984)); see also Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortg.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
KIM v. MOBILIA
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir.1984) (stating that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the district court should ordinarily refrain from exercising supplemental jurisdiction where the federal causes of action are dismissed).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
LAVELL v. CAMDEN COUNTY COLLEGE
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Weaver v. Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 744, 746 (3d Cir. 1982)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
SPATAFORE v. SUGARHOUSE HSP GAMING, L.P.
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brown v. Glover
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining that, absent “extraordinary circumstances,” supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims should be declined “where the federal claims are no longer viable” (citation omitted)). 59 See Doc. 11 at 6-7. 60 See id.; see also Doc. 16 at 5-6. 61 Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 2010)). (3) the plaintiff’s protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the prison officials’ decision to take the adverse action.62 Brown cannot state a claim for…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Betts v. Varner
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining that, absent “extraordinary circumstances,” supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims should be declined “where the federal claims are no longer viable” (citation omitted)). 87 See Doc. 22 at 14-15; 42 PA.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
LOPEZ v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that “pendent [i.e., supplemental] jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable, absent ‘extraordinary circumstances’”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gautier-James, Ivy v. Hovensa LLC
(2×)
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 1976)). “[W]here the claim over which the district court has jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendant state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.” Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
BRATHWAITE v. CITY OF LONG BRANCH
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
MARTIN v. WETZEL
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
ROBINSON v. WETZEL
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
LANKO v. WETZEL
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
SPEEDWELL, LLC v. TOWN OF MORRISTOWN
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that “pendent jurisdiction [over state law claims] should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable, absent ‘extraordinary circumstances.’”) (citation omitted); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that “where the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Wilson v. Wings Over Happy Valley MDF
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
GUAMAN v. WETZEL
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
ACRISON, INC. v. RAINONE
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that “pendent [i.e., 8 Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a) requires that “every plaintiff must be of diverse state citizenship from every defendant.” In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 215 (3d Cir. 2006).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
BUNDY v. CUMBERLAND COUNTY
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that “pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable, absent extraordinary circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
PATTERSON v. CUMBERLAND COUNTY
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that “pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable, absent extraordinary circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
PAGAN v. PEREZ
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that “pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable, absent extraordinary circumstances”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
CHEY v. LaBRUNO
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that “pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable, absent extraordinary circumstances”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR ITALIAN AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS, INC. v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, 540 F.2d 187 , 196 (3d Cir.1976)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
HAILEY v. WETZEL
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
GREGOR v. TD BANK, N.A.
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that “pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable, 8 I will not construct an argument on Plaintiffs’ behalf that written notice is or should be excused, but will await clarification in any amended pleading that may be filed as to whether written notice was given.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
TAYLOR v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that “pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable, absent extraordinary circumstances”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
FEUSS v. ENICA ENGINEERING, PLLC
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that “pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable, absent extraordinary circumstances”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
GAVIN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, SOUTH ORANGE-MAPLEWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that “pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable, absent extraordinary circumstances”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
CRUZ v. ASPEN LANDSCAPING CONTRACTING, INC.
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that “pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable, absent extraordinary circumstances”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
TAYLOR v. CHESMER
Albert Gallatin Area Sch, Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
WESTERFIELD v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Albert Gallatin Area Sch, Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
BURGA v. CITY OF PLAINFIELD
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that “pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable, absent extraordinary circumstances”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
BURGA v. CITY OF PLAINFIELD
Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that “pendent jurisdiction should be declined where the federal claims are no longer viable, absent extraordinary circumstances”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 91,408 Phyllis Sanders
v.
Thrall Car Manufacturing Company
v.
Thrall Car Manufacturing Company
920.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Mar 28, 1984.
730 F.2d 910
Published
Citer courts: Ninth Circuit (1)
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 91,408
Phyllis SANDERS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THRALL CAR MANUFACTURING COMPANY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 920, Docket 83-7888.
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Argued March 19, 1984.
Decided March 28, 1984.
Avrom S. Fisher, Brooklyn, N.Y., for plaintiff-appellant.
Lewis A. Kaplan, New York City (Harriet L. Goldberg, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, Jack C. Auspitz, Charles S. Barquist, Parker Auspitz Neeseman & Delehanty P.C., New York City, on brief), for defendants-appellees.
Before MANSFIELD, NEWMAN and PRATT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
1
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed on the well-reasoned opinion of District Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr., Sanders v. Thrall Car Manufacturing Co., 582 F.Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y.1983).