Semel v. Dill, 731 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1984). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Semel v. Dill, 731 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1984).
Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 83-2165Apr 19, 1984

Semel v. Dill

Quick Summary

A bona fide dispute over liability does not render a claim contingent for involuntary bankruptcy purposes.

Creditors file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against a debtor, alleging unpaid subscription fees for a limited partnership. The bankruptcy court dismisses the petition, finding the claims contingent and that creditors failed to show the debtor was generally not paying debts. The Ninth Circuit holds that the claims are non-contingent contract claims, as bona fide disputes over liability do not render a claim contingent. The court further holds that determining whether disputed debts count toward the general failure to pay requires balancing creditor and debtor interests, rather than applying a rigid rule. The court affirms the reversal of the dismissal and remands for a hearing to determine the inclusion of the disputed claims in the calculation and to allow creditors to present evidence of the debtor's general financial condition.

108 citation events (29 in the last 25 years) across 37 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Cited for
At page 632Determining general not paying debts under bankruptcy statute15 citing cases“requires a more general showing of the debtor's financial condition and debt structure than merely establishing the existence of a few unpaid debts.”8 citing courts quote it · 14 listed here
  • In re Monica Hujazi, No. NC-16-1018-FBJu (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 14, 2017).unpublished 2 cites
    “A finding that a debtor is 14 generally not paying its debts ‘requires a more general showing 15 of the debtor’s financial condition and debt structure than 16 merely establishing the existence of a few unpaid debts.’” Id. 17 (quoting Sem…
  • In re Marciano, 446 B.R. 407 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010).published
    Semel v. Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629, 632 (9th Cir.1984).
  • Nahman v. Jacks (In re Jacks), 266 B.R. 728 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001).published
    (dealing with insolvency determination for purpose of an involuntary petition in bankruptcy)
  • In re Valdez, 250 B.R. 386 (D. Or. 1999).published 2 cites
    (ability to execute on a judgment despite pending appeal favored a finding, on the balance of equities, that the debt should be included in the totality test for determining whether the debtor is paying debts generally a…)
  • Rothery v. Rothery (In re Rothery), 211 B.R. 929 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997).published
    In re Dill, supra, 731 F.2d at 632.
  • Boston Beverage Corp. v. Turner, 81 B.R. 738 (D. Mass. 1987).published 3 cites
    This interpretation was anomalous: a number of courts had explicitly rejected it, see, e.g., In re Dill, 731 F.2d at 632; In re B.D.
  • In re Johnston Hawks, Ltd., 49 B.R. 823 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985).published
    Id. at 632.
  • In re Cent. Hobron Assocs., 41 B.R. 444 (D. Haw. 1984).published 2 cites
    The Covey rule appears to lean too heavily toward favoring creditors’, as opposed to debtors’, interests.” 731 F.2d at 632 (citation omitted).
  • In re Focus Media, Inc., Debtor, Focus Media, Inc. v. Nat'l Broad. Co. Inc. Abc Inc. Paxson Commc'ns Inc., 378 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2004).published
    (An award of attorney’s fees under 11 U.S.C. § 303 (i) depends upon dismissal of the petition.)
  • In re Caucus Distributors, Inc., 83 B.R. 921 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).published
    See In re Dill, 731 F.2d 629 , 631 (9th Cir.1984); In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1980); Matter of Cinnamon Lake Corp., 48 B.R. 70, 72 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1985).
Show 4 more citing cases
At page 631Review standards and non-contingency of bankruptcy claims12 citing cases“Because we find that appellees’ claims are non-contingent contract claims, it is unnecessary for us to resolve the question of whether tort claims may be non-contingent as to liability within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1).”the opinion's own words at *631 · 11 listed here
  • Butler v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 550 B.R. 860 (W.D. Wash. 2015).published
    Semel v. Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629, 631 (9th Cir.1984).
  • Reyes v. Stand. Parking Corp., 461 B.R. 153 (D.R.I. 2011).published
    As the First Circuit has not addressed this situation head-on, this Court finds it useful to rely on the frequently invoked analytical framework set forth in In re All Media Props., Inc., to assess when a contingent claim for breach of con…
  • In re Horne, 277 B.R. 320 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2002).published
    Moreover, "just be cause a claim is unliquidated, disputed or unmatured apparently does not mean it is contingent.” In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Tex.1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.1981); Semel v. Dill…
  • In re Horne, 277 B.R. 712 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2002).published
    In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Tex.1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.1981); Semel v. Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629, 631 (9th Cir.1984). 3 .
  • Yadidi v. Herzlich (In re Yadidi), 274 B.R. 843 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002).published
    Dominguez, 51 F.3d at 1508 ; Semel v. Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629, 631 (9th Cir. 1984). 2 We construe our decisions regarding pleadings as consistent with general federal civil practice.
  • All Blacks B v. v. Gruntruck, 199 B.R. 970 (W.D. Wash. 1996).published
    Gruntruck’s Alleged Bad Faith Whether reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, In re Dill, 731 F.2d at 631, or abuse of discretion standard, In re Leach, 130 B.R. 855, 856 (9th Cir.BAP 1991), this court affirms the Bankruptcy Court d…
  • In re Pulliam, 90 B.R. 241 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).published
    In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1980), aff'd, 696 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.1981); Semel v. Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629, 631 (9th Cir.1984).
  • Boston Beverage Corp. v. Turner, 81 B.R. 738 (D. Mass. 1987).published 3 cites
    This interpretation was anomalous: a number of courts had explicitly rejected it, see, e.g., In re Dill, 731 F.2d at 632; In re B.D.
  • In re Taylor & Assocs., L.P., 193 B.R. 465 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996).published 2 cites
    See Semel v. Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629, 631 (9th Cir.1984).
  • Bear v. Coben, 829 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986).published 2 cites
    See Semel v. Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629, 631 (9th Cir.1984).
Show 1 more citing case
Other citing cases17 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Show 7 more citing cases
In re Wallace DILL, Debtor. George SEMEL, Robert Sullivan, and Gene A. Trini
v.
Wallace DILL, Debtor/Appellant
No. 83-2165.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Apr 19, 1984.
Published opinion
731 F.2d 629
1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 23374
R. Paul Sorenson, Las Vegas, Nev., for petitioners/appellees., James H. Walton, Nitz, Schofield & Walton, Las Vegas, Nev., for debtor/appellant.
Schwartz.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
EDWARD J. SCHWARTZ, Senior District Judge:

This is an appeal from a decision of a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, 30 B.R. 546, reversing the decision of the Bankruptcy Court which had dismissed a bankruptcy petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1293(a). Although our reasoning differs from that of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, we affirm that panel’s reversal and remand to the Bankruptcy Court.

FACTS

Appellees filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against appellant under Chapter 7, Title 11, United States Code on May 5, 1980. Each of the three appellees alleged he was induced by appellant to subscribe and pay into a limited partnership in return for an agreement by appellant to place a ranch and certain personal assets into the partnership and that appellant “fraudulently” did not so place the assets. Appellees’ combined payments to the partnership allegedly exceeded $200,000.00.

The Bankruptcy Court treated appellees’ claims only as unadjudicated tort claims and held a hearing on March 24, 1981, to decide the “very narrow question” of whether appellant had admitted liability on the tort claims, so as to render them non-contingent. The bankruptcy judge stated that only if the claims were so shown to be non-contingent would he hear evidence on the issue of whether appellant was generally not paying his debts as they became due. The bankruptcy judge expressed the view that, based on the record then available, if appellees’ claims were non-contingent, the possibility would be raised that appellant was generally not paying his debts as they came due.

Later in the March 24 hearing, the bankruptcy judge explicitly recognized that ap-pellees were raising contract as well as tort claims. The record on appeal does not disclose whether the bankruptcy judge ever ruled on the objection by appellant that raising contract claims went beyond the scope of the pleadings.

The Bankruptcy Court concluded that ap-pellees were not holders of non-contingent claims as required by 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1), and dismissed appellees’ petition on April 29, 1981. The Bankruptcy Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law also included a finding that appellees had not shown that appellant was generally not paying his debts as they became due.

On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) reversed, holding that appel-lees’ claims, treated again exclusively as tort claims, were non-contingent. The BAP approved the analysis in Matter of Covey, 650 F.2d 877 (7th Cir.1981), regarding inclusion of disputed debts in the “generally not paying” calculation, and remanded with the instruction that appellees’ claims should be included in the calculation of whether appellant was paying his debts as they became due unless the Bankruptcy Court[*631] were to try the tort claims and find no liability.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As stated in In re Comer, 723 F.2d 737, 739 (9th Cir.1984), this court is in as good a position as the BAP to review the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact, so the facts will be reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” standard. The Bankruptcy Court’s conclusions of law are subject to de novo review by this court. Id.

NON-CONTINGENCY OF CLAIMS

Unless there are fewer than twelve creditors, an involuntary bankruptcy petition must be filed by at least three creditors holding claims which are not contingent as to liability, and such claims must aggregate at least $5,000 more than any liens which secure the claims. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1). Appellant’s only challenge to the validity of the petition centers on the question of whether appellees’ claims are contingent as to liability.

Appellees’ petition asserts contract claims at least as clearly as it alleges tort. Each appellee was allegedly induced by appellant to pay money as a subscription to the limited partnership “and in return for same [appellant] agreed to place into said partnership real estate and other property ... and that said debtor fraudulently did not place any assets into said partnership and has converted same fully to his own use.” The allegation that appellant failed to transfer the assets to the partnership would support either a tort or a breach of contract action.

If the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion of law that appellees are not holders of non-contingent claims is viewed as tacitly sustaining appellant’s objection that assertion of contract claims would exceed the scope of the pleadings, the conclusion is incorrect. Liberality of construction and “notice pleading” apply to actions brought under the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Dahlberg, 681 F.2d 546, 549 (8th Cir.1982). The petition adequately pled breach of contract claims.

Appellant does not appear to contend that these contract claims are contingent, and we note that under the rule of In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Tex.1980), affirmed, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.1981) (adopting the opinion of the bankruptcy judge), these are not contingent claims. The well-reasoned holding of All Media Properties was that a bona fide dispute over liability does not render a claim contingent. That court provided a definition of contingency:

claims are contingent as to liability if the debt is one which the debtor will be called upon to pay only upon the occurrence or happening of an extrinsic event which will trigger the liability of the debtor to the alleged creditor and if such triggering event or occurrence was one reasonably contemplated by the debtor and creditor at the time the event giving rise to the claim occurred.

In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133.

Because we find that appellees’ claims are non-contingent contract claims, it is unnecessary for us to resolve the question of whether tort claims may be non-contingent as to liability within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1). Therefore, we express no opinion on the analysis of the BAP regarding this issue.

“GENERALLY NOT PAYING DEBTS” CALCULATION

Under 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1), a Bankruptcy Court can grant relief on an involuntary petition only if the creditors show that the debtor was generally not paying his debts as they became due. The Bankruptcy Court entered a finding of fact that appel-lees did not show appellant’s general failure to pay his debts as they came due, a finding reversible only for clear error.

Appellees’ claims were not included in the calculation determining whether appellant was generally not paying his debts as they became due because the Bankruptcy[*632] Court found these claims to be contingent. As noted earlier, appellees are asserting non-contingent contract claims as well as the tort claims considered by the Bankruptcy Court.

Appellant correctly argues that a finding that a debtor is generally not paying his debts requires a more general showing of the debtor’s financial condition and debt structure than merely establishing the existence of a few unpaid debts. In re All Media Properties, Inc., supra, 5 B.R. 126, 142, 143, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy U 303.-12[1] at 303-47 to 303-48 (15th ed. 1983). Appellees offer the persuasive response that, once it became clear that the Bankruptcy Court would not consider their claims in the generally not paying calculation, it was fruitless to proceed with an attempt to show appellant’s general debt structure.

We agree with the BAP that this case must be remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for a determination of whether to include appellees’ claims in the generally not paying debts calculation. Unlike the BAP, we do not adopt Matter of Covey, 650 F.2d 877 (7th Cir.1981) as the rule for making that determination where the claim is disputed as to liability. The Covey rule appears to lean too heavily toward favoring creditors’, as opposed to debtors’, interests. Also, we share Judge Friendly’s reservations that, whether “the treacherously simple statutory language will-support [Covey’s] so elaborate a gloss, we think it a bit early in the day to essay a ‘guideline’ opinion on this subject.” In re B.D. Intern. Discount Corp., 701 F.2d 1071, 1077 (2d Cir.1983).

Inclusion of disputed debts in the § 303(h)(1) generally not paying debts calculation involves difficult policy evaluations with little legislative guidance. In the absence of a preferable formulation, the rule to be applied by the Bankruptcy Court on remand is to balance the interests of the creditors against those of the debtor. Case law is developing along this line. See, e.g., In re R.N. Salem Corp., 29 B.R. 424, 429 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio, W.D.1983).

In balancing the interests herein, the Bankruptcy Court should consider any underlying policies of bankruptcy law which may be implicated in these facts. We note that the property which is the subject of these disputed claims was used in what may be a preferential transfer. If such an improper transfer is found by the Bankruptcy Court, that would argue strongly in favor of inclusion of the disputed claims in the generally not paying debts calculation.

ATTORNEY’S FEES

An award of attorney’s fees under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) depends upon dismissal of the petition. Because the dismissal is reversed, the Bankruptcy Court’s award of attorney’s fees is vacated.

CONCLUSIONS

Although, as indicated, our reasoning differs from the BAP, we agree that the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of this petition must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

On remand, the Bankruptcy Court should conduct a hearing to determine whether appellees’ disputed claims should be included in the generally not paying debts calculation. Then, irrespective of whether the disputed claims are so included, appellees should be afforded the opportunity to show that appellant was generally not paying his debts as they became due.

Affirmed.